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Since India’s independence in 1947, economists, scholars, and practitioners coming from 
various development paradigms have implemented numerous programs to mitigate female 
poverty and gender inequality in India.  However, gender disparities in education, health care, 
and the overall female/male sex ratio persist.  Whether these development programs designed for 
women truly promote large-scale gender equality is still open to debate.  In my research, I use 
longitudinal quantitative methods to analyze district-level data from six Indian states for the 
period 1961-2001 that I have gathered from various sources, such as the Census of India, 
directories of women’s organizations and NGOs, and women’s development web sites.  I 
examine whether economic growth and urbanization (associated with modernization theory), 
women’s rights programs, women’s market-based programs, and women’s microfinance 
programs lead to increases in female/male literacy ratios and female/male child sex ratios.  I also 
analyze how region and various women’s programs interact to affect gender equality over time.  
I find that economic growth is associated with a decrease in female/male child sex ratios and 
female/male literacy ratios.  Urbanization leads to a small increase in female/male literacy ratios, 
but has no impact on female/male child sex ratios. I also find that there is no relationship 
between the presence of women’s rights programs, market programs, or microfinance programs 
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with variation in either female/male child sex ratios or female/male literacy ratios over time.  The 
passage of time accounts for most of the variation in both female/male child sex ratios and 
female/male literacy ratios.  This suggests that there are other factors that lead to changes in 
female/male child sex ratios and female/male literacy ratios that I do not account for in this 
study. 
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1 
1.0 CHAPTER ONE:  INTRODUCTION  
Since the 1950s, policy-makers, scholars, and practitioners have developed numerous programs 
and policies to alleviate poverty in developing nations, yet today extreme poverty persists in 
many countries.  In 2010, 1.44 billion people had to sustain themselves on $1.25 or less a day 
(UN Human Development Report 2010).  If one considers not only income/economic measures 
but also deprivation in other measures of well-being such as health and nutrition, children’s 
school enrollment, and the availability of potable water, cooking fuel, and toilets, then this 
number increases to 1.75 billion people who experienced deprivation in two to six of these 
categories (UN Human Development Report 2010).  This is roughly one-third of the population 
across 104 nations worldwide.  Roughly 23% of the world’s population lives in South Asia, 
which is also home to the largest percentage (51%) of the world’s population who are 
multidimensionally poor (World Bank 2009, UN Human Development Report 2010). About 
12% of the world’s population lives in Sub-Saharan Africa, which is home to 28% of the world’s 
multidimensionally poor. 
In many developing nations (and more affluent nations as well), poverty goes hand-in-
hand with gender inequality.  Despite the efforts of development practitioners to address the 
needs of women, severe gender inequalities persist in the developing world.  Women around the 
world are more likely than men to suffer deprivation in terms of access to health care, nutritional 
resources, employment, education, and property ownership (UNDR 2010).  Moreover, 
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worldwide the female/male sex ratio, defined as the number of females per 1,000 males, is 
unnaturally low.  Based on Sen’s definition of “missing women” (Sen 2005), in 2010 there were 
over 134 million women that were missing worldwide (UNDR 2010:76).  In South Asia the 
average number of years of schooling that girls complete is under 60% of the average number of 
years of schooling that boys complete (Barro and Lee 2010, cited in UN HDR 2010).   
India is one country where widespread poverty and gender inequality persist.  Even 
though India has been industrializing and becoming more economically developed since winning 
its independence in 1947, the overall poverty rate is still high.  From 1950-51 to 2009-2010, 
India’s GDP per capita increased from about Rs. 6,200 to about Rs. 37,100 a year (Census of 
India 2011).  However, during the period of 2000-2008, almost 42% of India’s population of 
over 1 billion lived on $1.25 or less a day.  About 55% of the population suffered from multiple 
forms of deprivation in 2010, such as lack of nutrition, education, or potable water, or from poor 
sanitation conditions (UN HDR 2010).  In eight states of India alone, 421 million people suffer 
deprivation in multiple dimensions of human well-being, making South Asia the region of the 
world where multidimensional poverty is most intense. 
There are still great gender disparities in education, health care, and the overall 
female/male sex ratio in India.  Throughout the 20th century and even into the 21st century, 
gender inequality has worsened on some measures.  The female/male sex ratio in India, defined 
as the number of females per 1,000 males, has dropped from 972 in 1901 to 933 in 2001 (Bhan 
2001) and has increased to 940 by 2011 (Census of India website 2011).  This means that from 
2001 to 2010  there were 60 “missing” females per every 1,000 males, due to factors such as 
unequal nutritional and health care compared to men and boys, outright neglect, and female 
infanticide (Dreze and Sen 2004).  Moreover, the female/male sex ratio at birth has declined 
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from 929 females per 1,000 males in 1990 to 922 females per 1,000 males in 2010 (UN HDR 
2010).  This implies that a number of Indian couples practice sex-selective abortion to ensure 
that they get the desired number of sons.  Researchers for the International Center for Research 
on Women (ICRW) analyzed data from the National Family Health Survey on over 50,000 ever-
married rural Indian women and their children under five years old (Pande and Malhotra 2006).  
They found that almost 60% of the women considered the ideal number of boys to be two or 
more, whereas only about 23% of the women thought that two or more girls was the ideal 
number (Pande and Malhotra 2006).  They also found that by the time children are five years of 
age, 13% more boys than girls have received vaccinations, and that 6% fewer boys than girls are 
notably stunted due to lack of nutrition (Pande and Malhotra 2006).  Although overall female 
literacy in India has increased almost 12 percentage points from 2001 to 2011, the current female 
literacy rate of about 65% is still lower than that of males, which is about 82% (Census of India 
2011, Bhan 2001).  In 2010, about 50% of men at least 25 years of age had completed at least 
secondary education, whereas only about 27% of women aged 25 years or older had completed 
secondary education (UN HDR 2010).  Moreover, while 85% of Indian men participate in the 
labor force, only about 36% of women do so.   
Since the end of World War II until the present, policy-makers, scholars, and 
practitioners have developed numerous programs and policies that were intended to alleviate 
poverty in developing nations.  During the 1950s-1960s, modernization theory was the 
predominant paradigm of development.  In this period, the U.S. and other wealthy member 
nations of the UN started focusing on giving technical aid and money to less-developed, 
formerly colonized countries to improve their economies (Tinker 1990).  The goal of policy-
makers and practitioners who took the modernization approach was to instill modern, Western, 
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and rationalistic values within the cultures of less-developed nations, with the belief that this 
would bring about economic growth and increased industrialization.  These modernization 
policy-makers and practitioners targeted men with their development projects in order to bring 
about economic growth, and especially to promote capital-intensive agricultural methods that 
required the use of high-yielding varieties of seeds, heavy use of pesticides and fertilizers – all 
goods produced in the global North (McMichael 2000). Modernization policy-makers and 
practitioners assumed that the benefits of the projects would trickle down to all members of 
society, including women. As societies modernized, their developmental trajectories would 
converge, coming to resemble the U.S. and other Western nations.   
The women-in-development (WID) approach to development had its beginnings among 
feminist scholars in the early 1970s.  Since the U.N. World Conference for the International 
Women’s Year in 1975, scholars and practitioners have recognized that they must take women’s 
needs into account when developing programs to alleviate poverty (Tinker 1990).  The focus of 
WID theory was economic development (Tinker 1997).  WID theorists, like modernization 
theorists, assumed that industrialization and the rise of capitalism are both inevitable and 
beneficial to all societies (Jaquette and Staudt 2006).  Unlike modernization theorists, WID 
theorists argued that industrialization and development programs will benefit women only if 
women are included in this process (Boserup 1970, Tinker 1997).  Women-in-Development 
advocates argued that development programs that allocated resources to women’s concerns 
would help increase food production, enhance the well-being of families, and increase women’s 
equality. However, they did not challenge cultural norms such as female seclusion and son 
preference that oppress women and girls (Jaquette and Staudt 2006).   
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Many feminists critiqued the WID theoretical framework, and argued that it had not gone 
far enough in addressing the needs of women in the global South, particularly the unequal power 
relations between women and men (Jaquette and Staudt 2006).  These feminists formulated the 
gender-and-development (GAD) theoretical framework during the 1980s to address these issues.  
The development of the GAD framework was influenced by socioeconomic and political factors, 
and is a more holistic approach than the WID framework. GAD theorists argued that the 
development process includes more than economic development, such as an improvement in 
individuals’ lives in the political, economic, social, and cultural arenas.  This contrasts with the 
WID framework, which focuses on gender relations in the economic and legal/political spheres 
only.  Caroline Moser, one of the founders of GAD theory, emphasized the importance of 
establishing women’s property rights, training women to do traditionally “male” occupations, 
and providing needed services to women workers, such as child care and transportation (Moser 
1989, cited in Jaquette and Staudt 2006). GAD policymakers critique the women’s programs 
started under the auspices of the WID paradigm because they focused exclusively upon women 
rather than bringing women’s issues into other development programs.  Therefore, GAD 
policymakers sought to “mainstream” women’s interests into development projects that included 
both women and men. GAD scholars and practitioners placed importance on activism, such as 
awareness-raising about institutions that oppress women, organizing the community, and 
coalition building (Visvanathan 1997).  Whereas WID theorists and practitioners emphasized 
women’s need for greater access to credit or waged labor, GAD theorists and practitioners 
argued that women need to organize to gain political power in the economic system.   
The neoliberal theory of development came to dominate the world stage starting in the 
1980s, and is still the prevailing development paradigm today.  Neoliberal policy-makers and 
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practitioners assume that rational and informed individuals are able to calculate, predict, and then 
practice the most efficient way of gaining wealth (Nelson 2006).  The goal of the neoliberal 
approach is to strengthen poor people’s ability to participate in the market, such as by loaning 
them a small amount of capital to start or expand small businesses, or by giving squatters the title 
to private property.  Although the goal of practitioners and policy-makers that take the neoliberal 
approach is macro-level economic development, their focus is on the individual—giving 
individuals the power to ‘lift themselves out of poverty’.  Neoliberal practitioners and policy 
makers view financial assets as the most important resource for women.  Although some 
neoliberal practitioners do recognize the need for educational and informational resources, they 
focus only on education and training related to finance and entrepreneurship.   
Researchers have conducted a myriad of studies related to theories of development, yet 
which development approach is best in raising women’s status and remedying the problem of 
gender inequality is still open for debate.  Researchers have conducted numerous studies on how 
microlending impacts women in Bangladesh, whether related to their emotional well-being, 
decision-making power, or to other issues (see, e.g., Todd 1996, Rahman 1999, Hashemi et. al. 
1996, Goetz and Sen Gupta 1996, Ahmed et. al. 2001, Kabeer 2001).  Researchers have carried 
out impact evaluations or case studies on the effectiveness of women’s rights programs or 
microlending programs in India, such as SEWA and the Federation of Thrift and Credit 
Associations (Carr et. al. 1996).  These micro-level case studies are appropriate for evaluating 
the impact that a particular program has in a localized region, such as in a few towns or villages.   
Some researchers highlight the positive effects of women’s involvement in micro-credit 
programs, such as increased control over economic resources and greater participation in family 
decision-making (Todd 1996, Hashemi et al. 1996).  Other researchers draw a more negative 
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conclusion about the effects of microcredit on women’s status, arguing that many women do not 
retain control over the loans that they have taken out, and must turn the loans over to their 
husbands or other male household members (Goetz and Sen Gupta 1994, Rahman 1999).  
However, none of these studies have compared the effects of women’s development programs 
that come from very different development paradigms on women’s lives, such as a women’s 
development program that actively challenges patriarchal cultural norms and a women’s 
development program that provides micro-loans.   
Other researchers have conducted cross-national, longitudinal studies on how nations’ 
economic development is related to overall women’s status and gender inequality (see Forsythe 
et al. 2000, Young et. al. 1994, and Dijkstra and Hanmer 2000).  Several of them use databases 
of international development organizations, such as the WISTAT database, the Gender-related 
Development Indicators, or the Gender Empowerment Measure, and some  also cluster nations 
by region or cultural values. While some cross-national studies assess the impacts of several 
development paradigms on gender equality, none seem to do this for a single nation.  However, it 
could very well be true that development programs of the same paradigm (say, economic 
growth) will not have the same effect on increasing gender equality in all nations.  However, 
little if any research has been done comparing how the presence of various types of development 
programs coming from different development paradigms affect changes in gender inequality and 
economic development more generally in a single nation such as India.   
Strategies for increasing gender equality in developing countries that are grounded in 
modernization, WID, GAD, or neoliberal theory operate with different sets of logics.  Is there a 
way of assessing the impact that women’s programs coming from different development 
paradigms have on changes in gender inequality and economic development more generally?  If 
8 
so, which development approach is most effective in raising gender equality in India? Are the 
WID analysts right about the hypothesized importance of incorporating women into economic 
development programs and processes?  These are some of the central questions that I address in 
this dissertation.  My study addresses these issues by analyzing the effects that economic growth, 
urbanization, and women’s development programs associated with different development 
paradigms have on district-level changes on gender inequality in India from 1961-2001.  In 
carrying out this research, I hope to add to the knowledge about how the presence of women’s 
rights programs, microfinance programs, and other market programs impact overall patterns of 
gender inequality in particular regions of a country.  My research has wider policy implications 
because it accounts for changing development strategies of different time periods, thus allowing 
development practitioners to assess which strategy has had the most impact on raising gender 
equality in a single developing nation.  
The research design of this study has several advantages over both micro-level studies of 
one or two women’s development programs at the individual or village level and macro-level 
studies on changes in gender inequality that take the nation as the unit of analysis.   First, I use a 
longitudinal research design that includes data across five decades.  A longitudinal design allows 
me to examine how the proliferation of women’s development programs under modernization, 
WID, GAD, and neoliberal frameworks affects changes in gender inequality over time.  This is 
because I can test whether economic growth or the presence of women’s programs at earlier 
time-points are correlated with changes in gender inequality at later time-points. This allows me 
to make stronger causal inferences than if I measured the presence of women’s programs and 
gender inequality at only one time-point.  Also, by analyzing data across several decades, I am 
able to examine the long-range effects of economic growth, urbanization, and the presence of 
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women’s programs better than prior studies on women’s development programs, such as the 
studies of women’s microcredit programs mentioned earlier. 
Second, by taking the district rather than the individual as the unit of analysis I can more 
easily compare the effects of several types of women’s programs on gender inequality. A 
district-level study can control for the particularities of each individual development program to 
assess the overall effect of that type of program on raising women’s status on a larger scale than 
the village or census block.  I include districts from six different states, three of which are in 
southern India and three of which are in northern India.  This is a benefit over micro-level studies 
since it allows one to examine how regional variations affect the impact that economic growth 
and different development programs have on changes in women’s status.  This is important for a 
vast country like India, since patriarchal norms tend to be stronger in northern states than in 
southern states (Dreze and Sen 2004).   
Third, my meso-level research design has certain advantages over cross-national studies.   
There are some cross-national studies that assess the relative merits of different development 
paradigms by analyzing the effects of economic growth or trade openness on measures of gender 
inequality.  However, it could very well be true that development policies of the same paradigm 
(say, policies promoting economic growth or trade openness) will not have the same effect on 
increasing gender equality in all nations.  By studying one nation such as India, I am able to take 
into account India’s particular national and regional characteristics, such as certain patriarchal 
institutions, forms of governance, and development policies that the government has 
implemented.   
In chapter two of this dissertation, I introduce the debates among modernization, WID, 
GAD, and neoliberal theorists as they pertain to the impact of economic development strategies 
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on women’s status and changes in gender inequality.  I discuss how modernization, women-in-
development, gender-and-development, and neoliberal theorists have made competing claims 
about the best ways of promoting economic growth, how the process of development impacts 
women, and the best ways of raising gender equality in developing nations. 
In chapter 3, I discuss how many development organizations stress the importance of 
women’s “empowerment,” yet how this word has taken on different meanings for organizations 
that come from different development paradigms.  I highlight women’s microlending 
organizations and women’s rights organizations in India and Bangladesh as examples of how 
some organizations equate “empowerment” with economic power, whereas others equate it with 
challenging social structures that reinforce gender inequalities.  I also review various 
conceptualizations of power, and explain how conceptualizations of power and empowerment 
can help us classify development programs as modernization, WID, GAD, or neoliberal-type 
programs.  Finally, I provide examples of Indian development programs of each type.   
In chapter four, I discuss the cultural context of gender inequality in India, including how 
variation in regional patriarchal norms affects the status of women and girls.  I next provide a 
detailed discussion of the three measures of gender inequality that I use in this study: the 
female/male sex ratio, female/male child sex ratio, and female/male literacy ratio.  I discuss how 
cultural norms such as marriage patterns, son preference, and female seclusion have negatively 
impacted female/male sex ratios, child sex ratios, and literacy ratios in India.  I then develop my 
hypotheses to test the competing claims of modernization, WID, GAD, and neoliberal theorists 
regarding these three measures of gender inequality.  
In chapter five, I discuss my data collection processes, including the states I chose for the 
study, the unit of analysis, and sources of data.  I discuss how I collected the data on women’s 
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programs, on the measures of gender inequality, and on measures of urbanization and economic 
growth.  Next, I talk about how I deal with time using longitudinal data and issues of causality.  
After this, I discuss the analytic methods I employ, including descriptive statistics and the 
statistical models I use to test the hypotheses.   
In chapter six, I lay the groundwork for the statistical models that I present in chapters 
seven and eight by carrying out descriptive analyses on all of my variables.  I find that the 
presence of women’s rights programs, market programs, and microfinance programs all vary 
significantly over time.  This variation in presence of women’s programs over time is statistically 
significant in both regions and in all six states.  Change-score analyses and OLS regressions 
reveal that changes over time in SDP per capita, urbanization, female/male child sex ratio, and 
female/male literacy ratio are all statistically significant.  However, change in the female/male 
sex ratio over time is not statistically significant, which is why I do not use it as a dependent 
variable.  In chapter seven, I present results for the statistical models related to changes in the 
female/male child sex ratio, while in chapter eight I discuss the results of the statistical models 
related to changes in the female/male literacy ratio over time.  Finally, in chapter nine I conclude 
the dissertation by discussing the findings of my study, the policy implications of my research, 
and areas for exploration in future studies. 
 
. 
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2.0 CHAPTER TWO: GENDERED THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 BRIEF HISTORY OF GENDERED DEVELOPMENT THEORIES 
2.1.1 Modernization theory 
 
Modernization theory has its beginnings in the post-World War II era of the U.S. (So 1990). 
Unlike most countries that were involved in World War II, the U.S. was strengthened by 
involvement in the war and in the re-construction of Western Europe during the 1950s. The 
colonial empires of European nations began to crumble, and as they did, new nation-states in 
Latin America, Africa, and Asia emerged.   During this same period, the Soviet Union 
successfully spread communism to Eastern Europe, Korea, and China.  American policy-makers 
were concerned that these newly post-colonial states in the “Third World” would turn to 
communism as their new form of political economy if the U.S. did not promote political stability 
and capitalist routes to economic growth in these newly-liberated countries (Chirot 1981:261-
262, cited in So 1990:17).  The U.S. government as well as private foundations provided support 
for economists, sociologists, political scientists, and other social scientists to carry out studies of 
these new, less-developed nations to attempt to explain why some nations are industrialized, 
while others are not (So 1990, Webster 1990).  During the 1960s, other wealthy member nations 
of the UN also started focusing on giving technical aid and money to less-developed, formerly 
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colonized countries to improve their economies (Tinker 1990).  These UN members and other 
development planners used a modernization theoretical framework as they carried out their 
development projects (Tinker 1997, Visvanathan 1997).    
Modernization theorists drew their inspiration from evolutionary theory to explain how 
societies modernize.  They argued that as societies modernize, they start out in a simple, 
undifferentiated phase and move through the different phases until they become complex, 
differentiated societies (So 1990). Modernization theorists also viewed progress and change in 
societies as an irreversible yet gradual process, taking generations to occur.  They argued that 
industrialization was a linear, inevitable process, and that less-developed nations would follow 
the same path as Western industrialized nations as they became more modern.  As societies 
modernized, their developmental trajectories would converge, coming to resemble the U.S. and 
other Western nations.  They also argued that modernization is a systematic process, and that all 
institutions and aspects of a society will undergo change; that democracy and capitalism develop 
hand-in-hand, with political freedoms following and reinforcing market forces. Moreover, 
changes in one social institution will cause changes in other institutions (So 1990). 
Modernization theorists also drew from the functionalist theories of Emile Durkheim, 
Max Weber, and especially Talcott Parsons (So 1990).  The greatest influence of Parsons on the 
modernization school was Parsons’ “pattern variables” of traditional versus modern societies.  
According to Parsons, there are four pattern variables that characterize either traditional or 
modern societies (Parsons 1951, cited in So 1990).  First, societies may be characterized with 
either “affective” or “affective-neutral” relationships among individuals.  People in traditional 
societies tend to have emotional, personal relationships with others, whereas people in modern 
societies tend to have more impersonal, detached relationships with others.  Second, traditional 
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societies are particularistic, while modern societies are universalistic.  That is, in traditional 
societies social obligations and trust bind people together, and individuals know personally all 
the people with whom they come in contact.  In modern societies, one interacts with many 
people, including many strangers, in one’s day-to-day life, and therefore there must be universal 
norms that guide people’s interactions.  Third, traditional societies have a collectivist orientation, 
whereas modern societies have an individualist orientation.  In traditional societies, one must 
sacrifice for the sake of loyalty to one’s family and community, and innovation and creativity are 
discouraged in order to maintain stability in the society.  In modern societies, however, 
individuals are encouraged to develop their talents and skills and advance in their careers; 
individual risk-taking and acting on material interest, in this theory, leads to aggregate and 
socially beneficial technological innovation and economic growth.  Fourth, the status of 
individuals in traditional societies is ascribed to them depending on factors such as gender, 
family, caste, etc, whereas the status of individuals in modern societies is achieved—that is, it’s 
based on one’s talents, skills, and achievements (Parsons 1951, cited in So 1990).  
The modernization school of theorists borrowed from Parsons’ conception of “pattern 
variables” to argue that cultural aspects of a society greatly affect whether that society will 
develop into a modern, industrialized society with a capitalist economy, or remain what they saw 
as a “backward,” undeveloped society.  These “modern” expectations and values include the 
values of achieved rather than ascribed status, greater autonomy from authorities and parents, 
greater social and geographic mobility, and the values of a scientific and entrepreneurial 
orientation rather than an orientation to tradition and the past (Webster 1990, Inkeles and Smith 
1974).  Moreover, as societies modernize – specifically, as they conform to capitalist market 
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discipline and competition and adopt democratic political institutions and practices - they will 
become more individualistic and less collectivist (Friedman 1962).  
According to modernization scholars, the modernization process affects women in 
positive ways (Jaquette 1982).  They argued that as people in a society adopt “modern” 
expectations and values, women’s mobility increases and they gain more freedom to act on their 
own (Jaquette 1982).  Some modernization theorists argued that as societies become more 
industrialized and forms of birth control become more readily available, women would gain 
greater control over their own fertility.  Women would be stimulated intellectually by being able 
to take advantage of the employment opportunities in the cities (Rosen and LaRaia 1972, in 
Jaquette 1982).  The day-to-day experiences would expose them to the values of achievement 
and competency, which they would internalize (Rosen and LaRaia 1972, in Jaquette 1982).  
Moreover, as traditional societies become more modern and adopt modern values, they become 
less authoritarian and male-dominated, and more egalitarian and democratic (Jaquette 1982).  
Modernization theorists viewed the modernization process, as well as development programs, as 
either gender-neutral or as more beneficial to women than to men.  This is because women living 
in traditional societies face more restrictions than men, and therefore benefit more when their 
societies become more modern.   
Although modernization theory was the main development paradigm in the 1950s for 
social scientists conducting research on how nations become more economically developed, 
there were scholars who criticized the theory for several reasons.  Some critics have charged 
modernization theorists with being ethnocentric, as modernization theorists from the U.S. and 
Western Europe assumed that the values of their own countries were modern values, and that the 
values of non-Western nations that differed from Western values were “primitive” (So 1990).  
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These critics also argued that modernization theorists assumed that modernization is a 
unidirectional process, and that there are no alternative paths to development other than the path 
that Western nations took to become economically developed (that is, capitalist industrialization 
powered by ecologically and economically unsustainable fossil fuel consumption and capital-
intensive, export-oriented agriculture).  Other critics questioned modernization theorists’ 
assumption that traditional and modern values are mutually exclusive in a society.  They argued 
that even in Western “modern” societies, traditional values like strong family ties often exist 
alongside modern values such as high achievement motivation.  Moreover, these critics argued 
that it is not really possible to completely replace the values of non-Western societies with 
Western values because a society’s values change extremely slowly over time.  Still other critics 
faulted modernization researchers for being very abstract and generalizing to all developing 
nations without grounding their analyses in any particular time period or providing an in-depth 
analysis of any one particular country.   
Neo-Marxists criticized modernization theorists and researchers for not taking into 
consideration the history of colonialism, and the negative impact decades of resource extraction, 
exploitation, colonial rule, and “dependent development” had on the newly-freed, less developed 
nations.  They pointed out that the nations that modernization theorists considered economically 
advanced are the very nations that had dominated the nations that are considered “backward” (So 
1990). Others have criticized modernization practitioners and policy-makers for promoting 
capital-intensive agricultural methods that required the use of high-yielding varieties of seeds, 
heavy use of pesticides and fertilizers, and intensive use of irrigation systems (Webster 1990, 
McMichael 2000).  They argued that these intensive farming methods depleted the soil of 
nutrients, requiring farmers to increase the amount of fertilizers that they used in order to 
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maintain the same level of produce from the land (Webster 1990).  Moreover, wealthy farmers’ 
use of these modern agricultural methods resulted in declining working conditions for 
agricultural laborers who had to work with the pesticides and fertilizers (McMichael 2000).  Still 
others have argued that farmers’ use of these modern agricultural methods in developing nations 
has led to economic inequality in rural areas, especially in India and some Latin American 
countries (McMichael 2000).  They argued that rich farmers could afford to buy the expensive 
inputs required by modern farming methods, which resulted in larger crops and greater 
prosperity.  Poorer farmers could not afford to use these “modern,” capital-intensive methods, 
however, and had difficulty competing with the wealthier farmers’ higher crop yields.  The result 
was that poorer farmers became more vulnerable to market forces, and sometimes were forced to 
lease their land to wealthier farmers, thus losing their access to even subsistence farming for their 
own needs. 
Although classic modernization theory of the 1950s-1960s has come under attack from 
many quarters, there are some social theorists who have refined the theory to take the critics’ 
complaints into account. Inglehart and Welzel (2005) have developed a new version of 
modernization theory that differs from the earlier modernization school in important ways.  
Whereas earlier modernization theorists believed that changes in societies’ cultural values lead to 
socioeconomic modernization, Inglehart and Welzel argued that the reverse is true.  They argued 
that economic development in societies leads to changes in cultural values, not the other way 
around.  More specifically, as societies shift from an agricultural economy to an industrial 
economy and become more economically developed, people have greater economic security, 
levels of poverty decrease, and people’s life expectancy increases, thus leading to less reliance 
on supernatural powers for their survival.  Socioeconomic development also leads to increases in 
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social complexity and the specialization of occupations.  There is an increased diversity in social 
interactions, which frees people from tight communal ties they experienced in more traditional 
societies.  As societies move from having primarily agricultural economies to industrial 
economies, the cultural values and beliefs of those societies shift from traditional values to 
secular-rational values (Inglehart and Welzel 2005).   
Unlike earlier modernization theorists, who saw the socioeconomic modernization 
process as inevitable and irreversible, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) argued that socioeconomic 
modernization is probabilistic rather than deterministic.  They state that “…other things being 
equal, socioeconomic development tends to make people more secular, tolerant, and trusting and 
to place more emphasis on self-expression, participation, and quality of life” (Inglehart and 
Welzel 2005:46).  Aspects of cultural and historical heritage, such as religion, continue to 
influence societal values and people’s behavior, and mediate the effects of modernization on 
changes in cultural values.  Historical value systems such as those of Islam, Protestantism, and 
Confucianism impact the rate that values change in modernizing societies.  Inglehart and Welzel 
do seem to equate modernization with industrialization.  They observed that even though 
industrialization began in the West, East Asia has been leading the way in the modernization 
process in recent decades.  Moreover, cultural modernization is reversible.  For example, if there 
is an economic collapse such as that which the post-Soviet states experienced in the 1990s, 
people in that society may shift from holding self-expressive values to survival values as 
economic security becomes more tenuous (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). 
Inglehart and Welzel (2005) have presented compelling evidence in support of their 
modified modernization theory.  They have carefully tested the causal relationships between 
changes in nations’ levels of economic development and the values that their citizens hold.  They 
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have taken other development theorists’ critiques of “classical” modernization theory into 
account and have built a more nuanced model than earlier modernization theorists, recognizing 
that the values that a nation’s people hold are dependent not only on economic factors such as 
GDP/per capita, but also on historical and cultural factors unique to each nation.i 
 
2.1.2 Women-In-Development (WID) Theory 
 
Women members of the United Nations conceived of the women-in-development (WID) 
framework that evolved during the early 1970s as a response to the United Nations’ and donors’ 
realization that development programs based on modernization theory did not benefit women as 
much as expected (Tinker 1997, Jaquette and Staudt 2006).  UN members and development 
planners had focused on helping men, and if they thought about it at all, apparently believed that 
this aid would “trickle down” and eventually benefit everyone in the societies, including women 
(Tinker 1997, Visvanathan 1997). However, in response to pressure from feminist activists and 
academics, Canadian and European donors, as well as UN agencies, started viewing women’s 
status and poverty as development issues (Jaquette and Staudt 2006).  In 1973, USAID created 
the Office of Women in Development to address this problem.  The UN General Assembly 
pronounced the year of 1975 as “International Women’s Year”, and held an International 
Conference on Women that year in Mexico City (Jaquette and Staudt 2006).  The Plan of Action 
that was drafted at this Conference highlighted the economic disparities between women and 
men and emphasized the importance of women’s legal rights, but did not address women’s 
political representation.  The General Assembly created the International Development Strategy 
for the Second Development Decade, and in it they stated the necessity of fostering the “full 
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integration of women in the total development effort” (Tinker 1997:34).  Women-in-
Development advocates argued that development programs that allocated resources to women’s 
concerns would help increase food production, enhance the well-being of families, and increase 
women’s equality, all within cultural norms (Jaquette and Staudt 2006).  Such programs included 
agricultural inputs and training for women, as well as income-generating projects.  In some 
cases, these income-generating projects were successful in decreasing poverty and assisting 
women to become more economically independent.  WID proponents also pressed for 
evaluations of development projects to determine how they affected women and men.  The WID 
office within USAID sponsored country studies that utilized anthropological methods and “time 
budgets” to understand the quality of women’s lives.  When the results of these studies showed 
that women worked more hours per day than men, USAID initiated projects that brought new 
time-saving technologies to women, such as water pumps and better stoves.  By 1987, the World 
Bank had created a special emphasis on WID, and in 1988 the World Bank stipulated that every 
project proposal needed to be analyzed to determine if it addressed women’s issues and needs 
before the project was approved (Prugl and Lustgarten 2006).  WID theorists and practitioners 
have been successful in bringing women to the attention of development planners, and have 
legitimized the creation and implementation of development programs with women in mind.  
Moreover, WID advocates have been successful in pressuring governments to start 
disaggregating official statistical information by sex to determine how women and men may be 
benefiting from economic development and industrialization differently (Tinker 1997). 
The focus of WID theory was economic development (Tinker 1997).  WID theorists, like 
modernization theorists, assumed that industrialization and the rise of capitalism are both 
inevitable and beneficial to all societies, even though many women from developing countries 
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viewed socialism as a potentially effective development strategy (Jaquette and Staudt 2006).  
Unlike modernization theorists, WID theorists argued that industrialization and development 
programs will benefit women only if women are included in this process (Boserup 1970, Tinker 
1997).  WID theorists argued that there has been a gender bias in modernization-grounded 
programming for economic development and that these putatively gender-blind but in fact 
androcentric programs have ignored the economic activities carried out by women (Tinker 
1997).  They also argued that not integrating women into development programs is irrational and 
inefficient, and that programs that do not include women are less productive than they would be 
if women were included (Jaquette 1982). WID theorists stated that development programs 
grounded on gender-blind and androcentric modernization theory assume that male household 
heads would provide for the needs of women, and that women’s subsequent marginalization 
from the economic sphere is both inevitable and unproblematic.  WID theorists further argued 
that urbanization and the shift from subsistence to market-oriented production forced women into 
the modern economic system.  These women were paid less than what they needed to survive, 
and thus their dependence on men was intensified.  Women’s exploitation in the modern 
economic system had even more deleterious effects for the large percentage of women who were 
the heads of households and did not receive support from men (Jaquette 1982). 
  Women-in-development theorists not only criticized development programs coming 
from a modernization perspective; they also critiqued the modernization process itself.  Some 
feminists viewed urbanization and the rise of capitalism as processes that separate women from 
their traditional social and economic roles and force them into the manufacturing sector where 
they are exploited and paid less than what they need to survive (Jaquette 1982).  In Women’s 
Role in Economic Development, a classic work in the WID literature, Ester Boserup (1970) 
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analyzed data on women’s changing economic roles in the Caribbean, Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America.  She argued that colonialism and capitalism, two specific forms of modernization, have 
negatively affected women in less-developed, former colonized countries.  For instance, 
European colonial governments established Western farming techniques in the African colonies 
they ruled over.  Because of their Eurocentric view that men were “naturally” superior to women 
in farming, they introduced these more efficient farming methods to African men, but not to 
women.  Women continued to use hand tools to cultivate crops.  Even in regions where 
traditionally women were agricultural workers and men were not, European colonialists refused 
to teach new agricultural techniques to women.  In addition to this, colonizers made their 
colonized societies shift from subsistence agriculture to the cultivation of cash crops, which they 
relegated to men.  Women’s status in African societies decreased on two counts: They continued 
to use less efficient methods of farming, and therefore were less productive.  They also continued 
to produce crops for their families’ immediate needs, while men gained extra money from 
growing cash crops (Boserup 1970).  In a market society, subsistence farming is undervalued.  If 
women are engaged in subsistence farming in a market society, both their economic power and 
their standing in civil society suffer.  
Female workers in less-developed nations were marginalized as these nations became 
more economically developed, and their economic gains were much less than men’s economic 
gains (Boserup 1970).  Women were the ones who were primarily responsible for subsistence 
activities, such as collecting firewood, fetching water, and growing and preparing food for their 
households.  These subsistence activities were usually not reported as income or production in 
official government statistics, even though they did have economic value (Boserup 1970).  
Therefore, women’s economic production remained invisible.  For example, one researcher of 
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women who made lace in Narsapur, India found that even though there were roughly 100,000 
women involved in making lace for this booming industry in 1978, the 1971 Census of India did 
not record any of these women as working in a paying occupation (Mies 1982).  WID theorists 
also stressed the need to help relieve or at least compensate women for the extra burdens they 
carried in trying to provide for their households (Tinker 1997).    
Although WID theory and the projects that were initiated under this paradigm addressed 
the issues of gender inequity in the economic sphere, there are some feminist researchers and 
practitioners who criticized the WID paradigm.  Some feminists did acknowledge that WID 
theory brought about a change in the way development is conceptualized, and that development 
planners no longer view women only in their domestic role.  However, other feminists argued 
that WID took too much of a welfarist approach, and couldn’t make a substantial difference in 
women’s lives (Jaquette and Staudt 2006).  Some theorists criticized Boserup and the WID 
theorists because they did not demand that structural changes be made within the current social 
system (Visvanathan 1997).  Others critiqued WID theorists and policymakers for not 
challenging patriarchal cultural norms in their development projects (Jaquette and Staudt 2006).   
Beneria and Sen (1997) critiqued Boserup because she assumed that the process of 
modernization is inevitable and beneficial.  They argued that her modernization assumptions hurt 
her analysis because she ignored how capital accumulation started during colonial times and 
affected women’s work and technological change.  They said that Boserup ignored how 
colonialists’ replacement of subsistence agriculture in African societies with cash crops became a 
catalyst for further exploitation by the capitalist system.  Others argued that the WID-supported 
projects maintained the dominance of Western nations (Mueller 1986, cited in Jaquette and 
Staudt 2006).  Other scholars argued that the WID theory fails to address new problems/issues of 
24 
how trade liberalization affects women (Barker and Feiner 2004).  As Barker and Feiner 
(2004:106) note, under the WID framework, “Women’s subordination was seen as the result of 
conflicts between individual women and men, not the result of the impact of globalization on the 
complex intersections of gender, race, class, and nationality”.  However, some WID scholars 
argued that some of these critiques are unfounded (Jaquette and Staudt 2006).ii 
 
2.1.3 Women and Development (WAD) Theory 
 
Feminist theorists who were critical of the WID approach to development drew upon 
dependency theory and Marx and Engels’ theory of class conflict to formulate the Women-and-
Development, or WAD approach (Visvanathan 1997, Hartwick and Peet 2009).   Both WAD and 
dependency theory were grounded in Marx’s theory of class conflict, and both focused on how 
economic systems affect developing countries.  WAD theorists agreed with dependency theorists 
that the process of modernization has increased the poverty of people in peripheral nations, but 
WAD theorists went a step further and argued that modernization has especially impoverished 
women. Unlike dependency theory, which failed to analyze how peripheral countries’ economic 
dependence on core countries affects men and women differently, WAD theory paid special 
attention to how colonialism and the resulting capitalist accumulation affects the lives of women 
in peripheral countries. 
 WAD theorists such as Etienne and Leacock (1980, cited in Hartwick and Peet 2009) 
emphasized social relations as important in understanding socioeconomic and gender 
inequalities. They especially drew upon Frederick Engels’ (1942) ideas about the development of 
new economic systems and how they led to greater gender inequality.  They used a historical 
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framework of production to explain socioeconomic and gender inequalities.  They agreed with 
Engels’ (1942) argument that the agricultural revolution and the private ownership of property 
gave rise to hierarchies in societies which previously had little social stratification.  As societies’ 
modes of production transformed from agricultural production to pre-industrial and then to 
capitalist modes of production, there was a shift from production for direct use (“use-values”) to 
production for trade for other goods and services (“exchange-values”).  This also led to the 
private ownership of property, an increase in stratified relations, and a heightened distinction 
between women’s domestic roles and men’s public roles (Hartwick and Peet 2009, Engels 1942).  
Engels argued that men’s desire to keep property within the family lineage and their desire to 
control the labor of children led men to try to control their wives’ sexuality.  This desire to retain 
property within the family arose once people no longer had communal ownership of property.  
(Engels 1942).   
Unlike WID theorists, WAD theorists emphasized the importance of women’s work in 
both reproductive and productive spheres.  They argued that reproduction and production are 
inseparable, and that both are necessary for human existence (Hartwick and Peet 2009).  WAD 
theorists went further than Marxist theorists by arguing that productive and reproductive work 
are equally necessary to meet human needs.  Moreover, women engage in both reproductive 
work such as bearing children, providing emotional nurturing to children and men, and providing 
sexual satisfaction to men, and productive work to meet material needs such as clothing, shelter, 
and food (Hartwick and Peet 2009).  Moreover, throughout much of human history, there were 
few distinctions between reproductive and productive work, and these tasks were carried out in 
the same physical space, and at the same time.  It is only in recent history, especially through the 
process of “development,” that productive and reproductive activities have become dichotomized 
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and now occur in separate spaces.  These separate spheres came to be characterized by the 
relegation of women’s reproductive and productive (yet largely unpaid) work to the domestic 
sphere, while men performed “real” paid work in the public sphere.  WAD theorists further 
argued that the surplus production of capitalism is based on women’s unpaid labor, and that the 
processes of development are intersected by class and gender (Hartwick and Peet 2009).  
Beneria and Sen (1997) took the WAD approach and argued that capitalist accumulation 
in developing countries heightened class differentiation, and also lowered women’s status.  They 
also argued that capital accumulation was the cause of increased commercial agriculture, not 
European imperialism.  They also stated that capitalism led to different forms of stratification in 
rural areas of developing countries, such as landless laborers and poor peasants at the bottom, 
and capitalist farmers at the top.  These new forms of class stratification can affect women’s 
work differently in different regions of a country (Beneria and Sen 1997).  Beneria and Sen also 
critiqued Boserup for not taking women’s reproductive roles into account, and how women’s 
domestication as well as exclusion from social production are linked to discrimination against 
women. 
Other feminist scholars have made several critiques of WAD theory.  Some feminists 
criticized WAD researchers for paying attention to women’s experiences only, and ignoring 
men’s experiences (Acevedo 1995).  They argued that WAD researchers have failed to analyze 
the relations between women and men, and thus are one-dimensional.  Other feminist scholars 
argued that WAD researchers have not addressed gender relations within classes, and have not 
fully examined all of the ways in which patriarchal relations are played out, and how they affect 
women, in various “modes of production” (Rathgeber 1990, cited in Hartwick and Peet 2009).  
These critics argued that WAD scholars have focused so much on women’s exploitation in the 
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international economy that they have not addressed patriarchal relations within particular 
societies.  Other critics argued that WAD development planners have made the same mistake 
that WID planners made by classifying all “Third World women” into one category without 
analyzing how race, ethnicity, or class affect women’s lives (Chua et. al. 2000, Hartwick and 
Peet 2009).  Kabeer (1994, cited in Hartwick and Peet 2009) critiqued WAD and other 
dependency feminists for holding to the goal of bringing about structural transformations in 
societies, which Kabeer believed to be unrealistic and too difficult to actually bring about.   
 
2.1.4 Neoliberal Theory 
 
The neoliberal theory of development came to dominate the world stage starting in the 1980s, 
and is still the prevailing development paradigm today.  Neoliberal theory derives some of its 
core assumptions from the classical school of economics of the 1700s and 1800s (Nelson 2006), 
and is also rooted in the economic theories that were popular in Austria and Germany in the late 
1800s to early 1900s (Hartwick and Peet 2009).  Two of the most influential early neoliberal 
theorists were Friedrich Hayek, an economist from Austria, and Milton Friedman.  Hayek wrote 
a book titled The Road to Serfdom (1944) as a warning against what he viewed as the dangers of 
socialism.  Hayek believed that political, economic, and personal freedom are the highest values 
that a society can have, and that Western civilizations since the period of the European 
Renaissance were founded on individual freedom (Hayek 1944).  He argued that the individual 
should be able to express and act on his or her own views, interests, and preferences.  According 
to Hayek, the development of commerce and the rise of capitalism in the West led to greater 
opportunities for individuals to choose their own lifestyle, and to become free from the shackles 
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of tradition.  The political and economic freedom enjoyed by individuals in Western societies has 
led to innovation, an increase in the development of scientific discoveries, and the invention of 
new technologies.  In a free enterprise society, Hayek argued, any individual is free to try out 
new ideas and pursue knowledge in order to be innovative.  He went on to argue that in a 
competitive capitalist economy, people have the incentive to work hard and excel at what they do 
because they know they will be rewarded with higher pay (Hayek 1944).  Hayek did 
acknowledge that in a capitalist society the rich have more opportunities to pursue their interests 
than the poor do.  He also recognized that it is very improbable that an individual born in poverty 
will be able to attain the kind of wealth that someone who inherits wealth has.  However, Hayek 
argued that a poor individual still has the freedom to pursue the goal of accumulating wealth in a 
capitalist society.  Moreover, a poor person in a capitalist society is much freer than a person 
who is well-off materially in a communist society (Hayek 1944). 
Hayek contrasted the liberal definition of freedom with the socialist definition of 
freedom.  According to Hayek, the “new freedom” of socialism is the freedom from need, a re-
distribution of wealth, and equity in the variety of choices that different people have (Hayek 
1944).  Hayek stated that the goals of socialism are to gain social justice, equality, and security 
for all individuals in a society.  However, Hayek argued, a socialist state would place the control 
of production and the ownership of property in the hands of the government.  This means that the 
socialist government would gain a kind of power that it didn’t previously have, which is the 
power to control what occupations individuals held, and what pay they would receive for their 
work.  In a capitalist society in which individuals own property, the power over production is 
spread among many individuals throughout society.  Therefore, a single group of people cannot 
control the economic outcome of the masses. 
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Milton Friedman is another economic theorist who had a profound impact on neoliberal 
economic theory.  Friedman, like Hayek, viewed individual freedom as one of the highest values, 
and argued that competitive capitalism can lead to both economic freedom and political freedom 
(Friedman 1962).  He believed the main challenge of social organization relates to how to 
coordinate the economic activities of the entire population of a society.  In a complex society 
where there is a highly specialized division of labor, individuals are interdependent, yet they still 
value freedom.  Friedman argued that a society can coordinate all of these economic activities 
either through a totalitarian state, which would mean a loss of freedom, or through the voluntary 
transactions of individuals in the marketplace.  He contended that in a competitive capitalist 
economy, people buy and sell goods and services under mutually agreeable terms.  This 
voluntary cooperation between individuals is beneficial to all individuals or groups involved in 
the transaction if all parties are informed and agree to the terms of the transaction.  This 
voluntary cooperation can only occur if there are private enterprises rather than state-run 
enterprises so that individuals are making the exchanges.  Also, all individuals must have the 
freedom to either exchange or not exchange with the other party.  The free market economy 
protects both buyers and sellers in that no one is coerced into buying a certain product or good 
from a particular seller because there are other sellers from whom the individual can buy.  
According to Friedman, a competitive capitalist economy also makes it possible for individuals 
as consumers (rather than as citizens) to collectively make decisions on a greater spectrum of 
issues, thus making it unnecessary for the state to make decisions on all of these issues.   
Friedman advocated for limited government power, and argued that the government’s 
primary function is to protect individual freedom (Friedman 1962).  He also stated that the 
government’s role is to protect the nation from foreign enemies, to preserve the rule of law, 
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including private property, and to promote competitive markets.  The role of the government is 
to interpret laws and enforce laws in order to prevent people from infringing upon another 
individual’s freedom.  Friedman also contended that the government should not enforce minimal 
standards in housing, nutrition, health, and overall standards of living.  This is because this 
would bring about stagnation in society since individuals would no longer have the incentive to 
experiment and invent new ideas, products, and services.  According to Friedman, governments 
should also not impose barriers to international trade, such as tariffs, quotas on different types of 
imported products, or exchange rates (Friedman 1962). 
Neoliberal theorists’ assumptions about economic systems are grounded in the classical 
economic theories developed by Adam Smith in the 1700s and John Stuart Mill in the 1800s 
(Nelson 2006).   Along with Adam Smith, neoliberal theorists take a mechanistic view of 
markets, and assume that markets automatically bring about the greatest social good as 
individuals act out of self-interest.  Moreover, just as John Stuart Mill believed that there are 
laws that govern human nature, neoliberal theorists of today follow the economic theory of John 
Stuart Mill in that they assume that there are laws that govern human nature.  Like Mill, they 
assume that individuals are naturally able to rationally calculate the most efficient way of gaining 
wealth (Nelson 2006).  They argue that humans make choices that maximize their own self-
interest, and that in a society where there is a specialized division of labor they often must 
cooperate with others to increase their productivity (Hartwick and Peet 2009). That is, even as 
rational individuals seek to maximize their own interests, they must consider the needs and well-
being of others so that they can continue to exchange goods and services with them in the future. 
Market forces harmonize relationships between employees and employers, consumers and 
entrepreneurs, etc.  As thousands of individuals throughout a given society make decisions every 
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day on how much to pay for services and commodities and what to buy, the exchange rates for 
goods will naturally adjust so that capital and labor will be paid their true value (Palley 2005, 
cited in Hartwick and Peet 2009).   Also, as these individuals freely make decisions about what 
to buy and for how much, factors of production will be utilized most efficiently (Hartwick and 
Peet 2009).  When all individuals pursue their own interests and well-being, this increases the 
welfare of the whole society.  They particularly argue that states should not regulate business or 
otherwise interfere with the operation of the “invisible hand” by which individual pursuit of 
wealth yields maximum efficiency and benefits for all (Nelson 2006, Hartwick and Peet 2009).  
They believe that a society with a socialist state would lead to economic crises because no group 
of government rulers or officials has enough knowledge about the market and exchange rates to 
allocate resources in an efficient way (Hartwick and Peet 2009).   
Neoliberal scholars contend that free-trade policies have a positive impact on economic 
development, arguing that the “new globalizers” that have greatly increased their trade have also 
had increases in the rates of economic growth, and are catching up economically with the 
wealthy countries (Dollar and Kraay 2001).  These globalizers include nations such as China, 
India and Brazil.  However, “non-globalizing” nations have experienced a decrease in economic 
growth rates during the 1970s and 1980s, and only a small increase in growth rates during the 
1990s.  Moreover, neoliberal policy-makers argue that nations that have squandered the money 
they have borrowed need to exercise fiscal discipline as laid out by the structural adjustment 
programs in order to get their economies in sound fiscal shape (Barker and Feiner 2004).   
Theorists and practitioners adopting the neoliberal perspective agree with modernization 
theorists and practitioners that wealthier, more powerful nations and organizations can give 
power to the poor in less-developed nations. By “power”, and “empowerment”, theorists and 
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policy-makers that take the neoliberal approach to development mean economic empowerment.  
Theorists and practitioners that take the neoliberal perspective argue that the poor are powerless 
due to their “weak economic position” (Wong 2003:312) in society.  They argue that if 
development agencies strengthen the poor economically, they will automatically gain the power 
to start and invest in their own microenterprises, power to build sturdier homes that will hold up 
to the forces of nature, power to provide adequate healthcare for all members in the household, 
power to send all of their children to school—in short, the power to live healthier, more 
productive lives. The goal of the neoliberal approach is to strengthen poor people’s ability to 
participate in the market, such as by giving them a small amount of capital or helping them 
establish a title on land where they may have been squatters.  Although the goal of practitioners 
and policy-makers that take the neoliberal approach is macro-level economic development, their 
focus is on the individual—giving individuals the power to ‘lift themselves out of poverty’.  
Neoliberal practitioners and policy makers view financial assets as the most important resource 
for women, although some do recognize the need for educational and informational resources, 
such as training in finance and entrepreneurship.   
Beginning in the early 1980s, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
started to take a neoliberal approach to lending money to developing countries in response to the 
economic crises in Latin America in the 1970s to early 1980s (Hartwick and Peet 2009).  These 
institutions advocated structural adjustment programs (SAPs) for developing nations 
experiencing economic crises as a condition to receiving loans.  The World Bank and the IMF 
trained local officials in borrower nations, designed SAPs as a way to carry out neoliberal 
policies, and produced publications, research, and courses promoting neoliberal policies (Drake 
2005).  The World Bank and IMF stipulated the terms under which debt-ridden nations were 
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allowed to borrow funds.  These terms for borrowing nations included the exercise of fiscal 
discipline in government expenditures, such as a decrease in public expenditures on government 
subsidies for education, health care, social services, and defense (Hartwick and Peet 2009).  In 
order to receive loans from the IMF and the World Bank, developing nations also needed to 
liberalize trade by decreasing tariffs and eradicating restrictions on the number of imports 
allowed in the country, allowing interest rates and currency values to be determined by the 
market rather than the state, and privatizing state industries.  Moreover, the World Bank and 
other international financial institutions advised borrowing nations to allow foreign direct 
investment because these nations needed the skills and capital that foreign firms can bring.  
Borrowing nations were therefore advised to eliminate barriers to foreign firms, and allow 
competition between domestic and foreign firms.  Latin American nations were the first to take 
up these policy prescriptions to deal with the debt crisis they faced in the early 1980s (Drake 
2005).  They did this partly because they owed debt to U.S. banks, and it made sense to them to 
therefore to comply with the U.S.’s policy prescriptions.   Latin American nations also followed 
the advice of the IMF and World Bank so that they could enter the international market more 
easily and gain access to the funds that these international institutions could provide (Drake 
2005).  Other countries in Asia and Africa later complied with the terms that the World Bank and 
other international financial institutions had set in order for these nations to borrow funds from 
them (Hartwick and Peet 2009).   
  Other scholars like Roy and Sideras (2006) took a more neutral view to trade 
liberalization.  They argued that while increased openness to global markets has had positive 
effects for some countries such as Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand, unrestrained trade 
liberalization has spelled disaster for Latin American nations.  Some scholars pointed out that in 
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some countries such as India, gender discrimination and female deprivation has been occurring 
for centuries, and is not necessarily caused by India’s trade liberalization policies in the 1990s 
(Roy and Sideras 2006).  Roy and Sideras argued that the majority of India’s rural economy is 
still comprised of small-scale farmers, and that therefore cheap food imports from wealthy 
nations into India has not had much negative impact on India’s farmers.  Moreover, they argued, 
increases in information flows into India means that cultural norms of gender discrimination are 
weakening (Roy and Sideras 2006). 
Women and development scholars have debated whether the liberalization of the global 
market has resulted in “pull” factors that draw women to new opportunities in the economic 
realm, or to “push” factors that force women out of their domestic roles and into the workforce to 
help provide for their families (Nisonoff 1997).  Lim (1990) argued that most women working in 
export manufacturing in the developing world have better working conditions and higher job 
security than people working in other sectors within the same countries.  She stated that usually 
women who work in the factories are from wealthier urban areas rather than impoverished rural 
areas.  Those who are from rural areas usually come from families that earn a high enough 
income to pay for them to migrate to the cities.  Most of the women are drawn to work in export 
factories to gain a higher standard of living for themselves and for their families, rather than 
forced to work there because their families live in destitute poverty.  Lim contended that women 
who have these job opportunities are better off than if they did not have them.  In some of the 
newly industrialized countries (NICs) such as S. Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, where there is a 
multitude of export manufacturers, women are able to negotiate their working conditions more 
successfully, and they increase their skill levels.  Often there is a greater demand for employees 
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than supply of workers, so employers create better working conditions and raise wages to attract 
employees to meet their demand for labor (Lim 1990). 
Most WAD scholars who have studied women who work for MNCs have underscored 
the negative conditions that these women experience (Nisonoff 1997).  According to Elson and 
Pearson (1997), the factories in developing countries that are subcontracted to do work for 
MNCs hire a work staff that is made up of a high proportion of women because they have found 
that the costs of production are lower than if they hire men.  Both subcontracted factories and the 
governments that host them say that women are “naturally fitted” for factory work due to what 
they view as women’s natural abilities and personality traits.  Women are viewed as being more 
docile and obedient than men, and therefore more accepting of the harsh working conditions and 
stringent control that employers have over employees.  Women are also seen as better fitted for 
doing the tedious, repetitious work in factories.  In addition to this, women already have lower 
economic status in the developing countries where MNCs subcontract work, and they are paid 
less than men in these factories.  Employers often assume that women work at the factories to 
earn extra spending money, whereas they assume men work there to support their families (Elson 
and Pearson 1997), and don’t consider that these women may work in factories in order to 
survive. 
Most feminist scholars sharply disagreed that integration into the global economy is 
beneficial for women in developing countries.  They argued that neoliberal policies have overall 
had a deleterious effect on both women and men.  They argued that governments’ decreased 
social spending has led to decreases in incomes and increases in male unemployment.  This has 
resulted in more and more women entering the paid labor force, not out of choice, but to 
supplement their husbands’ incomes (Jaquette and Staudt 2006, Marious-Gnanou 2003).  For 
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instance, some feminist scholars observed that when India liberalized its economy in the 1990s 
and focused on developing industries for export, there were decreases in the incomes of rural 
households as well as decreases in government support for rural families, and women had to 
enter the labor market to supplement their husbands’ income (Marius-Gnanou 2003).  Many of 
these newly-employed women entered the casual labor force, doing piece-work such as rope-
making or tailoring.  In rural areas, this non-agricultural “pay-by-piece” work earns the least 
amount of money, yet women are forced into these low positions due to lack of education and 
job skills.  Many feminist scholars argued that the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) 
imposed on borrowing nations by the IMF have led to increased deprivation and hardship for the 
already-poor, and that the greatest burden is borne by women (Barker and Feiner 2004).  This is 
because women must work more hours for the same pay than they had previously received and 
they must do more of the domestic “caring” work as borrowing countries cut spending on social 
services such as health care and education.   
 The neoliberal and modernization paradigms of development share some similarities, but 
also have some differences. Like modernization practitioners, neoliberal practitioners argue that 
the benefits of economic development will trickle down to all members of a society. 
Modernization and neoliberal theorists and policy-makers agree that macro-level economic 
development should be the main goal of development programs.  Both theories also place 
emphasis on having a rational, entrepreneurial outlook to the world.  However, modernization 
theorists emphasize the need to instill this outlook in individuals, whereas neoliberal theorists 
assume that individuals (including women) already have a rational outlook and will use 
economic resources efficiently.   Also, whereas practitioners and policy-makers that take a 
modernization approach advocate the importance of state intervention in the development 
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process, policy-makers that come from a neoliberal perspective advocate withdrawing state 
intervention from the market and opening the nation’s economy to foreign trade.    Many 
theorists and practitioners from the 1980s onward come from a neoliberal framework, and argue 
that the most effective path to economic development for less-developed nations is through a 
decreased role of the state in economic decisions, decreases in state expenditures in areas such as 
health care, education, and welfare services, and increased participation in the global economy.  
The modernization approach, however, does encourage the state to partner in this process.  
Modernization theorists and policy-makers argue that the state should partner with development 
organizations and donors from industrialized, Western nations to introduce modern, Western 
technologies in agricultural and industrial production, and to instill in its citizens the values of 
Western nations in order to spur on economic growth.   
Whereas modernization theorists take an androcentric approach to development, neo-
liberal theorists often take an instrumentalist approach and view women as the means through 
which development occurs most efficiently.  Modernization policy-makers and practitioners 
focused their programs on men, assuming that the benefits that men gained from the programs 
would trickle down to women as well.  Neoliberal policy-makers agree that as societies become 
more economically developed, the benefits will trickle down to all members of society, including 
women.  However, whereas modernization development programs that related to agricultural 
production tended to exclude women, many development programs under the neoliberal 
paradigm not only include women, but target women in order to bring about economic growth. 
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2.1.5 Gender-and-Development (GAD) Theory 
 
The Gender-and-development (GAD) theoretical framework evolved during the 1980s, with the 
convergence of different feminist perspectives.  This framework comes out of feminist activism 
and a division among the Marxist feminists, especially those who did not believe that class 
analysis could completely explain the oppression of women (Visvanathan 1997).  It is also born 
out of feminists’ criticisms that WID has not gone far enough in addressing the needs of women 
in the global South, particularly the unequal power relations between women and men (Jaquette 
and Staudt 2006).  GAD theorists argue that the development process includes more than 
economic development, such as an improvement in individuals’ lives in the political, economic, 
social, and cultural arenas.  This contrasts with the WID framework, which focuses on gender 
relations in the economic and legal/political spheres only.  The development of the GAD 
framework was influenced by socioeconomic and political factors, and is a more holistic 
approach than the WID framework.  GAD proponents argue that gender roles are socially 
constructed, not biologically determined, and may vary greatly in different societies (Jaquette 
and Staudt 2006).  Caroline Moser, one of the founders of GAD theory, emphasized the 
importance of establishing women’s property rights, training women to do traditionally “male” 
occupations, and providing needed services to women workers, such as child care and 
transportation (Moser 1989, cited in Jaquette and Staudt 2006).  GAD policymakers criticize the 
women’s programs started under the auspices of the WID paradigm because they focused 
exclusively upon women rather than bringing women’s issues into other development programs.  
Therefore, GAD policymakers sought to “mainstream” women’s interests into development 
projects that included both women and men.   GAD scholars and practitioners place importance 
39 
on activism, such as strategies for public education, organizing the community, and coalition 
building (Visvanathan 1997). 
 The GAD framework, unlike the WID and WAD frameworks, does not focus solely on 
women’s economic roles in societies (Young 1997).    GAD theorists focus on the social 
relations between women and men, rather than focusing on women alone.  They examine how 
the domestic and public spheres overlap in women’s lives, and how each influences what women 
do in the other sphere.  For example, women’s domestic work may inhibit them from 
participating in the market since they need to fit their waged labor around the work of child care, 
fetching water, cooking, and caring for livestock.  They also look at ascribed relations based on 
individuals’ positions in kinship and marriage networks versus their achieved relations based on 
involvement in the social, economic, and political spheres.  Whereas WID theorists and 
practitioners emphasize women’s need for greater access to credit or waged labor, GAD theorists 
and practitioners argue that women need to organize to gain political power in the economic 
system.  GAD theorists and practitioners also argue that anti-poverty and welfare policies must 
be implemented before equity is achieved in a society, whereas WID theorists emphasize the 
equity approach over the anti-poverty or welfare approach (Young 1997).  Both WID and GAD 
theorists argue that women’s economic independence is important, and that health, education, 
and population programs are not enough to raise gender equality (Jaquette and Staudt 2006).   
Although GAD theorizing contributed a new way of analyzing women’s issues and 
addressed some of the weaknesses of WID theory, GAD is not without its critics.  Some scholars 
argue that because GAD focuses so much on “difference”, that is, the different ways in which 
gender is socially constructed in various cultures, GAD advocates cannot take a solid stance 
against “cultural” arguments for the oppression of women (Jaquette and Staudt 2006).  GAD 
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practitioners cannot argue that there is a universal standard by which we can judge some cultural 
norms or behaviors as oppressive to women, regardless of the differences of societies in which 
women live (Prugl and Meyer 1999, cited in Jaquette and Staudt 2006).  Other scholars argue 
that GAD’s focus on gender rather than women clouds unequal power relations between women 
and men (Jahan 1995, cited in Jaquette and Staudt 2006).   
Some scholars and policy-makers point out the difficulty in implementing GAD 
development strategies.  At the Fourth Women’s Conference in 1995 at Beijing, some women 
from the global South criticized GAD for being process-oriented rather than focusing on the 
results that programs had (Baden and Goetz 1998, cited in Jaquette and Staudt 2006).  Even 
some proponents of the GAD approach find GAD problematic because it is difficult to translate 
theories and distinctions between WID and GAD into actual development programs.  For 
example, the United Nations Development Fund (UNDP) focuses on organizational processes in 
order to mainstream gender into all of its programs to reach the goal of gender equality (Prugl 
and Lustgarten 2006).  However, it does not analyze the causes of gender inequality, nor does it 
outline the impacts they are trying to make.  The UNDP 2003 Report found that by trying to 
“mainstream” gender into all of its programs, there is the danger that women’s issues become 
low on the priority list of any single program.  The authors of the UNDP 2003 Report state, “By 
making gender mainstreaming everybody’s job, it can easily become nobody’s job.  The budget 
implications are significant: cross-cutting issues seldom sit atop dedicated pots of money” 
(UNDP 2003:7, cited in Prugl and Lustgarten 2006:59).  Other scholars criticize both WID and 
GAD programs, stating that programs under both paradigms have been co-opted into the status 
quo, neoliberal agenda.  For instance, they argue that under the UNDP’s gender mainstreaming 
and gender equality programming, gender equality is seen as instrumental in decreasing poverty, 
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increasing economic growth, and rectifying bad governance, rather than being an end in itself 
worth pursuing (UNDP 2002:iv, cited in Prugl and Lustgarten 2006).  
Jaquette and Staudt (2006) also point out that even though GAD practitioners viewed 
development programs that included both women and men as the ideal, they often needed to 
initiate gender-specific programs.  This was due partly to the cultural context in which these 
programs operated.  Men and women often did not have the same work schedules, so programs 
that included both women and men often were not feasible.  Also, it is often easier for women to 
assume leadership positions in exclusively female groups due to patriarchal cultural norms.  
Jaquette and Staudt conclude that in practice, development programs under GAD are not all that 
different than programs under WID (2006).  
Table 2.1 on the following page summarizes the modernization, women-in-development, 
gender-and-development, and neoliberal perspectives on women and development.  In chapter 
four I discuss the gender inequality measures that I include in my study, along with the measures 
I use to test hypotheses related to modernization, WID, GAD, and neoliberal theories. 
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Table 2.1  Modernization, Women-in-Development, Gender-and-Development, and Neoliberal Perspectives 
on Gender and Economic Development 
 Modernization WID GAD Neoliberal 
Causes of 
economic 
development  
Shift from traditional 
 values to modern,  
Western values; shift  
from subsistence to 
 capitalist economy 
Introduction of  new  
farming technology and  
export-led extraction of  
raw materials by 
colonial  
governments in 
colonized societies  
Introduction of new  
farming technology  
by colonial 
governments;   
liberalization of trade 
and  
integration into world 
 economy 
Open markets to foreign  
trade; decrease  
government expenditures,  
decrease government  
control over markets 
Mobilize individual human  
and financial capital 
Effects of 
urbanization 
on women 
and men 
Urbanization has  
greater or equal  
positive impact on  
women as on men. 
Urbanization has  
marginalized  
women and has 
negative  
impact on women 
Urbanization has 
different effects on 
women and men based 
on class, race, caste, etc. 
Globalization of markets  
will spur urbanization 
 and greater opportunities  
for women’s and men’s  
employment. 
Effects of 
development 
programs  
Beneficial to both 
men and women 
through 
 “trickle-down” 
effect; market and 
education alone will 
promote equality 
Not beneficial to 
women 
because they do not 
take  
women’s needs 
into account 
Beneficial to women if  
they challenge 
traditional  
gender roles and 
unequal  
power relations between  
men and women 
Beneficial to both men  
and women if programs 
 focus on bringing them  
into the market 
Women’s 
economic 
activity 
Invisible, discounted Visible, valuable; 
includes unpaid  
subsistence activities 
 
Visible, valuable; 
includes unpaid  
subsistence  
activities 
Visible, valuable if it brings 
in income.  View women’s 
economic activity as 
instrumental for  
development; neoliberal 
programs often target 
women. 
Relations 
between men 
and women 
Will improve as  
individuals in society  
take on Western  
values 
Will improve if women  
involved in wage labor 
Will improve by  
overturning current  
power relations  
between women  
and men 
Will improve if women 
involved in waged labor  
or have access to credit  
and property rights 
Division of 
labor 
Invisible or distinctly  
advantaging men 
Doesn’t question 
current division of 
labor, but does re-value 
women’s labor, esp. 
reproductive and unpaid  
subsistence work 
Questions division  
of labor based on  
sex categories 
Doesn’t question current  
division of labor except to  
encourage commodification  
of subsistence labor 
Women’s 
participation 
in market 
work 
Either discounted as  
unimportant, or else 
women’s 
participation in 
waged labor  
assumed to increase  
as urbanization  
increases 
Encouraged through  
administrative and legal  
changes 
Encouraged, yet need to 
analyze which 
categories of women  
benefit, and what kinds  
of work benefit women. 
Emphasize need for 
women to organize 
labor coalitions to 
improve working 
conditions. 
Encouraged through  
borrowing microcredit  
and starting small  
businesses; marketization  
of subsistence labor 
Women’s 
role in 
household 
and fertility 
decisions 
Invisible, minimal Encouraged through  
economic participation  
and education  
Encouraged through  
raising awareness of  
women’s oppression  
among both men and 
women; need to analyze 
processes that 
determine women’s and 
men’s  
decision-making power 
Assumed to increase as  
women bring income  
into the household 
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2.2 RESEARCH METHODS AND EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF DEVELOPMENT 
There have been numerous studies that researchers have conducted over the years to assess the 
strengths and weaknesses of various development theories in their ability to explain why some 
countries are wealthy while others are poor.  Some are cross-national studies that test the 
development claims of multiple theories, while other studies assess the impact of women’s 
development programs on changes in gender inequality.  Other researchers have developed 
quantitative ways of operationalizing dimensions of women’s status, gender parity, and women’s 
empowerment.  In this section I will first discuss each development theory and the research 
methods that scholars have used to carry out their studies.  I will then highlight a few examples 
of empirical research that scholars have conducted under each development framework. 
 
2.2.1 Modernization Studies 
 
Because modernization researchers came from several social science fields, the research methods 
they employed have been quite varied.  For example, anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1963) used 
ethnographic methods to study two towns in Indonesia, one with traditional cultural traits and 
one with relatively modern cultural traits.  Psychologist David McClelland (1968) used the 
method of content-analysis to analyze folk stories, folk songs, and other popular literature from 
different countries to determine if they reflected the modern value of high achievement 
motivation (McClelland 1968, cited in So 1990).  McClelland believed that a country’s popular 
literature would reflect the overall cultural values of that country.   Inkeles and Smith (1974) also 
took a psychological approach, and studied how certain character traits predispose individuals to 
being more open to modernization. While McClelland focused on individuals’ “achievement 
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motive” and desire to be successful as the main factor leading economic growth, Inkeles and 
Smith conducted a cross-national survey study to determine which psychological traits are 
characteristic of “modern” men.   Some of the earlier modernization researchers took an 
economic approach, and thus used quantitative methods to study the modernization process.  Still 
other researchers, such as Lipset (1963), took a cross-national, quantitative approach to 
analyzing the relationship between economic wealth, industrialization, urbanization, education, 
and the presence of a democratic government (in So 1990:48-52).  Most of the classic 
modernization researchers took a cross-sectional approach in their research (So 1990).  
Although most of the classic modernization researchers took a highly generalized, 
ahistorical approach, the “new” modernization researchers conducted historical case-studies to 
learn how the modernization process occurs in a specific nation (So 1990).  These researchers 
often used comparative methods to analyze why nations experience different development 
trajectories.  Inglehart and Welzel (2005) were among these new modernization researchers, and 
used cross-national, longitudinal methods to analyze the relationship between economic growth 
and the rise of modern cultural values.  However, very few “classic” or “new” modernization 
studies analyzed the different roles that women and men play in the modernization process, or 
how the modernization process affects men and women differently.  Some of these classic 
modernization researchers excluded women altogether from their studies, such as the work of the 
scholars I discuss next.  
In their book, Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries, Alex 
Inkeles and David Smith (1974) emphasized the role of culture and values in the process of 
economic development.  However, they seemed to consider only men’s values as important, 
since they excluded women from their study.  Also, throughout their book they refer to “making 
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men modern”.  They conducted interviews with men in six developing nations that had become 
substantially industrialized: Argentina, Chile, East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), India, Israel, and 
Nigeria.  They interviewed men ranging from those who worked in agriculture to those who 
worked at factories in cities.  The goal of their study was to determine if there are certain 
characteristics of a society that influence individuals to take a more “modern” outlook.  Inkeles 
and Smith examined whether industrialization that has already taken place in a society influences 
people’s values and personality.  They also examined the psychological traits of individuals that 
could lead the society to becoming more industrialized.  After analyzing their data, Inkeles and 
Smith concluded that there are six criteria that cut across societies by which one can know if an 
individual has a modern personality.  First, the “modern man” will be open to new experiences 
and trying new activities.  Second, he has a certain level of autonomy from authorities, and is not 
controlled by what parents or rulers say he must do. Third, an individual with a modern 
personality will have a scientific outlook and believe that humans can develop technology to 
control nature.  Fourth, the modern individual will have a “mobility orientation” – that is, he will 
be ambitious in his career, and will be willing to move to a new location if it means taking a 
higher-status position or a job with better pay.  Fifth, the modern individual tends to plan ahead 
to meet long-term goals, rather than making decisions that affect him only in the present 
moment.  Finally, the modern individual is involved in volunteer organizations or community 
politics.  Inkeles and Smith concluded that one can train people to take on these Western values 
through Western-style education, textbooks, and even movies (Inkeles and Smith 1974).   
I highlight Inkeles and Smith’s study for a couple of reasons.  First, it is considered one 
of the “classic” studies within the modernization school (So 1990), and also because the study 
takes a characteristically androcentric perspective.  Throughout the book, Inkeles and Smith 
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referred to “making men modern”, thus assuming that the subjects of modernization are 
masculine.  Moreover, they excluded women from participating in the study altogether.  Because 
they included only men in their study, they seemed to consider only men’s opinions and values 
to be important in discovering which psychological traits led individuals to take on a more 
modern outlook.  Moreover, they seemed to assume that only men in the six countries of their 
study engaged in waged labor, an assumption that modernization policy-makers and practitioners 
made when implementing development programs.  Inkeles and Smith did not consider how 
gender may have impacted how widespread certain “modern” characteristics were in the six 
countries in their study.  For example, if they had interviewed both men and women, they might 
have found that far fewer of their respondents had a “mobility orientation” or autonomy from 
authority, simply because in many countries women lacked agency to act on their own decisions. 
Inglehart and Norris’s (2003) study is one of the few that gave an explanation of how 
socioeconomic modernization affects women’s status and gender equality.  Like Inglehart and 
Welzel (2005), they argued that economic development causes societal values to change.  These 
changes in cultural values lead to predictable (but not inevitable) decreases in gender inequality.  
They analyzed data from UNDP Human Development Reports and the World Values Surveys 
for a large number of societies around the world.  They found that as nations shift from an 
agricultural to an industrial economy and cultural values change from traditional to secular-
rational values, there are sharp increases in female enrollment in primary and secondary school, 
female literacy rates increase by almost two times, and prevalence of contraceptive use doubles.  
Gender roles in areas of childcare and family begin to change, but are not completely 
transformed (Inglehart and Norris 2003).  Women in these societies are able to enter the paid 
workforce, they gain the right to vote, and they start to participate in government.  Overall, the 
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shift from an agricultural to an industrial economy leads to increases in women’s well-being as 
reflected from increased scores on the UNDP Gender-Related Development Index (Inglehart and 
Norris 2003). 
Inglehart and Norris’ (2003) views on how socioeconomic and cultural modernization 
affects women differed from those of earlier modernizations theorists in several ways.  Whereas 
earlier modernization theorists assumed that the effects of modernization would benefit women 
as much as if not more than it benefits men, Inglehart and Norris argued that socioeconomic and 
cultural modernization are necessary but not sufficient for greater gender equality to occur.  
Other cultural and historical factors influence how much impact economic development has on 
increases in gender equality.  Cultural shifts in people’s attitudes regarding gender equality can 
bolster women’s rights, structural reforms, and support for women’s organizations.  Inglehart 
and Norris (2003) argued that nations also need policy reforms aimed to increase women’s 
opportunities and to reduce discrimination against women.  They recognized that drastic cuts in 
government welfare expenditures (as neoliberals recommended in SAPs) can negatively affect 
women more than men since women tend to be the primary caregivers for the elderly and for 
children.  A decline in a society’s economy may also lead to a decrease in women’s wages and 
employment rates (Inglehart and Norris 2003). Inglehart and Norris (2003) recognized that 
economic development is not the only factor that leads to increases in women’s well-being and 
in gender equality, and that policy decisions also impact how women fare in a society. 
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2.2.2 Women-in-Development Studies 
 
Women-in-Development researchers primarily used quantitative research methods when carrying 
out their studies.  During the late 1970s, WID policymakers in USAID funded studies of sex-
disaggregated data, such as studies analyzing census data of various nations, in order to detect 
trends in women’s changing status from the 1950s onward.  As mentioned earlier, they put 
pressure on national governments to disaggregate national census data by sex (Tinker 1997), and 
they sponsored country studies that utilized anthropological methods and “time budgets” to 
better understand the quality of women’s lives.  Moreover, the UN Statistical Office developed 
the Gender-related Development Index (GDI) and Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) in 
1995 as indices of gender parity for the goal of influencing policy (Jaquette and Staudt 2006; 
UNDP 1995).  The goal of these two measures is “to place the problem of gender inequality 
firmly on the social agenda” (UNDP 1995).  The Gender-related Development Index measures 
gender disparities in living standards and basic capabilities, whereas the Gender Empowerment 
Measure considers women’s political, economic, and professional participation.  The GDI uses 
the same measures as the Human Development Index (HDI), except that it is weighted by the 
level of disparity between women and men on these indicators.  The GDI measures “overall 
achievements of women and men in the three dimensions of the HDI – life expectancy, 
educational attainment, adjusted real income – after taking note of inequalities between women 
and men” (UNDP 1995:73).  The score that a nation receives for the HDI is “penalized” for 
levels of gender disparity so that the GDI score for a nation will be lower than its HDI score, 
depending on how much gender disparity these indicators reveal.  In 1995, GDI estimates were 
calculated for 130 countries.  One of the drawbacks to the GDI is that it does not include data on 
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agricultural wages or wages from the informal sector.  About 17% of India’s gross domestic 
product comes from the agricultural sector (CIA World Factbook 2009).  This means that the 
HDI and GDI scores for India could be skewed downward since the income from the agricultural 
sector is not accounted for.  The GEM includes variables that measure the percentage of 
parliamentary seats held by women, the percentage of professional, technical, administrative, and 
managerial positions held by women, and women’s per capita income in unadjusted purchasing 
power parity (PPP) dollars (UNDP 1995). 
The UN Statistical Office also developed the “Women’s Indicators and Statistics 
Database” (WISTAT) in 1988 (Young et. al. 1994, www.unstats.un.org  2010).  This database 
consists of sex-disaggregated data in a wide range of topics, including population statistics, 
education and literacy; economic activity; households, marital status and fertility (including sex-
disaggregated data for percentage of 15-19 year-olds who have ever been married); health and 
health services; reproductive health and rights; political participation, including year that women 
gained suffrage; and violence (both domestic violence against women and sex-disaggregated 
data on deaths by types of violence); and nations’ GDP.   
Pathak and Biswas (2004) carried out an empirical descriptive study of male and female 
workforce and labor force participation rates in eastern India from 1971 to 1991.  They analyzed 
data disaggregated by sex and by rural/urban area from the Census of India for the states of 
Bihar, Orissa, and West Bengal.  The variables that they analyzed include percentage of the 
population 15-61 years of age in the labor force and percentage of population 15-61 years of age 
in the work force, both disaggregated by sex and urban/rural areas.  Labor force participation 
included everyone between 15-61 years of age who either was employed or was willing to be 
employed, such as those who were unemployed and looking for work.  Work force participation 
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included only those who actually were employed and earning wages.  Pathak and Biswas also 
examined the female/male sex ratios for the various occupational groups recorded in the India 
Census.  Another variable that they included in their analyses is the “sexual equality index for 
labor force participation in the workforce” (Pathak and Biswas 2004:140), which was the ratio of 
female to male workforce participation rates divided by the ratio of female to male labor force 
participation rates.  The researchers found that West Bengal had the highest male labor force 
participation rates of the three states, and that it was even higher than the national average.  
However, sexual equality in labor force participation was the lowest in West Bengal throughout 
the period of 1971-1991.  The female labor force participation rates in all three states decreased 
substantially from 1971 to 1981.  The researchers surmised that this may be due to the mass 
migration of people from Bangladesh into eastern India during this period looking for work.  
Bihar started out with the highest gender parity in labor force participation in 1971, but by 1991 
Orissa had the highest gender equality.  There was improvement in gender equality in labor force 
participation rates for all three states for the period of 1971-1991.   
The authors found that overall the male labor force participation in the workforce was 
higher than that for females, and that there was greater gender disparity in urban areas.  In 
general, female/male sex ratios in labor force participation and workforce participation had 
increased from 1971-1991, especially in rural areas.  However, the female/male sex ratio for 
labor force participation declined in urban Orissa and Bihar from 1981-1991, and the 
female/male workforce participation ratio declined from 1971-1991 in urban West Bengal.  This 
was true even though overall, West Bengal experienced the greatest increase in female/male sex 
ratio in the workforce participation rate from 1971-1991.   
 
51 
2.2.3 Women and Development (WAD) Studies 
 
Most of the research carried out by WAD scholars used qualitative research, especially case 
studies of how capital penetration in one region affects women’s lives and work in both 
productive and reproductive spheres.  WAD scholars focused on both class relations and women 
in their analyses, and sometimes treated women as if they belonged to a single class.  Because 
WAD theory draws on dependency theory, WAD scholars analyzed the relationships between 
women’s participation in the labor market in peripheral countries and the impact that foreign 
capital from core countries has on these women.   Some of these researchers used comparative 
case-study methods, such as Lee’s (1998) study of women factory workers in southeastern China 
and Hong Kong.   Other studies used historical and/or ethnographic methods to study how 
foreign markets affect women in a single developing country, such as Talcott’s (2003) study of 
women in the floriculture industry of Columbia.  These studies stressed the negative impact that 
foreign capital has on Southern women’s conditions in the labor market.   
One of the classic WAD empirical studies is Maria Mies’ book The Lace Makers of 
Narsapur: Indian Housewives Produce for the World Market (1982).  She carried out this 
qualitative case study for the Programme on Rural Women within the International Labor 
Organization.  Mies carried out a qualitative case study in 1978 of the lace making industry in 
Narsapur, which is in West Godavari district, Andhra Pradesh.  At the time of her study, the lace 
trade brought in 90% of Andhra Pradesh’s export revenue in handicrafts, and over 100,000 
women were involved in the lace industry.  She studied the production relations in the lace-
making industry, and interviewed women lace-makers, male exporters, middlewomen and 
middlemen, marketing agents, as well as women who produced and sold lace independently.  
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Mies studied all stages of lace production in great detail, including the materials the women used 
to make lace, the different patterns and styles of lacework, and the types of lacework made by 
women of different skill levels.  She also studied the history of the lace-making industry in 
Narsapur, which had been in existence for at least 100 years.  She found that the beginning of the 
lace export industry was closely connected to British colonial penetration, and that the labor 
force made up of poor women has remained the same since that time.   
In her study, Mies argued that the Green Revolution, with its emphasis on agriculture for 
export rather than for subsistence needs, the use of high-yielding seed varieties, and the heavy 
use of fertilizers and insecticides that farmers could not really afford, caused the “pauperization 
of peasants” (Mies 1982:173).  Many farmers’ crops did not yield as much as they expected and 
they were not able to make up their losses from these capital-intensive farming methods. As a 
result, many of them lost their land.  As agrarian capital changed to merchant capital, there was 
an increase in inequality between marginal peasants and landless laborers on the one hand, and 
rich peasants who benefited economically from capitalist farming on the other.  This 
“pauperization of peasants” led to a large supply of women who were willing to work for very 
low wages in order to help provide for their households.  Women’s subsistence work greatly 
increased, since they were now doing low-paid labor as well as more household production than 
previously so their families could survive.  However, most of the women lace makers were not 
able to get out of poverty. 
Mies found that women lace makers spent 6-8 hours a day making lace, and another 7 
hours on domestic work.  The work life of women who made lace had also lengthened since 
these women usually began working at 8 years of age, and continued working as lace-makers 
until they were 70 or 80 years old.  The detailed, repetitive work of lace making caused physical 
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problems such as worsening eyesight, headaches, dizziness, backaches, fever, and rheumatism.  
Because lace making was so low-paying, daughters were usually required to stay home to help 
make lace instead of going to school.  This only perpetuated the cycle of these women’s misery, 
since the daughters were illiterate and had no alternative but to continue in the lace making 
industry as adults.   
Although women lace makers usually spent a full day at this task, and continued making 
lace throughout their lives, Mies found that there was a widespread belief that these women were 
mainly housewives who made lace in their leisure time.  Exporters, merchants, and middlemen 
did not recognize lace making as waged labor, which made possible the expansion of capital 
accumulation through the lace making industry throughout the 1970s.  The “housewife ideology” 
kept women isolated in their homes so that they could not organize with other lace makers to 
fight for higher wages.  Moreover, the lace makers themselves viewed lace making as part of 
their other domestic tasks, and were unable to see that they were actually working for the 
exporters, not for their own households.  Therefore, they did not value their own work, and were 
reluctant to insist on higher wages.  Because these women lacked education and physical 
mobility, even the women who made and sold lace independently lost their ability to market their 
own products as men increasingly took control of the lace market (Mies 1982). 
 
2.2.4 Neoliberal Studies 
 
The neoliberal paradigm of development has its roots in economic theory.  Most of the 
development studies carried out under this framework come from an economic perspective, use 
quantitative methods, and take the nation as their unit of analysis.  Many of the neoliberal studies 
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are cross-national, longitudinal studies that analyze the relationships between trade openness and 
economic variables such as economic growth, within-nation changes in economic inequality, and 
between-nation changes in economic inequality (Dollar and Kraay 2001, Seshanna and 
DeCornez 2003).  Some studies use a cross-sectional design to analyze cross-national data on 
how international trade is related to intra-national income distributions (Chakrabarti 2000).  One 
of the standard measures of both between-country and within-country economic inequality is the 
Gini coefficient, which measures the difference between completely equal income distribution 
and actual income distribution, with 100 being the highest level of inequality (Marger 2005). 
Levels of economic development are usually measured by countries’ GDP or GDP per capita, 
while trade openness is calculated by such measures as percent of GNP contributed by foreign 
investment, percent of GNP contributed by exports, and inter-country trade/GDP ratio 
(Firebaugh and Beck 1994, Dollar and Kraay 2001, Alderson and Nielsen 2002).  Some studies 
under the neoliberal paradigm also analyze how trade openness affects demographic and health 
indicators in developing countries (Firebaugh and Beck 1994).  Almost none of these researchers 
analyze gender-disaggregated data for the countries in their studies, such as the effects of trade 
openness on income inequality between men and women, or on changes in rates of income 
inequality for men versus women.  This is true even though some neoliberal studies analyze the 
relationship between levels of trade and income inequality as measured by household-level Gini 
coefficients (Alderson and Nielsen 2002).   
Although these studies are useful in giving us a broad picture of how trade openness 
affects average changes in countries’ economic development or income inequality, or even the 
impact that trade liberalization has on regions of the world, they tell us little, if anything, about 
how trade liberalization has affected changes in gender inequality.   One could imagine a 
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scenario in which a world-systems researcher used sex-disaggregated, cross-national data and 
variables for trade openness and the Gini-coefficient to estimate the average effect that 
integration into the world economy has on women worldwide.  However, even with such a study 
one cannot gain insights into how integration into the world-economy affects changes in 
women’s quality of life, such as their health, their ability to leave home without permission, or 
their ability to make decisions about how many children to have.     
Dollar and Kraay (2001), researchers for the World Bank, carried out a cross-national 
study on globalization, trade, and changes in poverty in developing nations.  They first analyzed 
data on changes in tariffs, share of trade as percentage of GDP, and changes in GDP for 103 
countries from the 1970s through the 1990s.  They found that for the developing nations that 
globalized the fastest after 1980, there was an average increase of 17 percentage points in trade 
as percentage of GDP.  These globalizers had also decreased tariffs by an average of 22 
percentage points, and had experienced an average increase in GDP growth rates of 2.1 
percentage points from the 1970s to the 1990s.  In contrast, about two-thirds of the developing 
nations decreased tariffs by an average of 11 percentage points, experienced a decrease in trade 
as a percentage of GDP, and a decrease in growth rates from this same period.  Wealthy nations 
experienced an average increase in trade of 13 percentage points, yet also experienced a decrease 
in GDP growth rates from the 1970s through the 1990s.  From these exploratory analyses they 
found that the “new globalizers” were catching up with the wealthy, industrialized nations in 
terms of GDP.  They therefore concluded that an increase in international trade leads to a 
decrease in between-country economic inequality.  Dollar and Kraay acknowledged that the 
“new globalizers” initiated other policy reforms in addition to decreases in tariffs, such as 
reforms in exchange rates and expansion of private property rights.   
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Once Dollar and Kraay (2001) had carried out these exploratory analyses, they utilized 
fixed-effects panel regression models to analyze within-country changes in GDP and trade 
volumes.  Through the use of this model, they were able to control for time-invariant country 
characteristics such as geography.  They included initial income and trade volume (exports + 
imports/GDP) and other control variables as the independent variables, and average annual 
change in GDP as the dependent variable.  They found that increases in trade volumes were 
strongly related to increases in GDP, and that these results were statistically significant.  This 
was true even after they included lagged independent and dependent variables to control for 
potential endogeneity (Dollar and Kraay 2001).  They found that on average, a 100% increase in 
trade volumes led to a 48% increase in average change in GDP each decade.  In a previous study 
(Dollar and Kraay 2000, cited in Dollar and Kraay 2001), the authors analyzed the relationship 
between globalization, changes in average income within countries, and changes in average 
incomes of the poorest quintile of a country’s population.  They found that there was no 
significant relationship between changes in within-country average per capita GDP and changes 
in inequality (Dollar and Kraay 2001:23).  There was also no relationship between changes in 
trade volumes and changes in within-country income inequality.  Dollar and Kraay therefore 
concluded that for developing nations, increases in trade volumes leads to increases in average 
income, including the average income of the poorest 20% of a country’s population, and do not 
increase the degree of income inequality (Dollar and Kraay 2001). 
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2.2.5 Gender and Development (GAD) Studies 
 
Most GAD studies take a qualitative approach to studying the relationships between women and 
men, and how cultural norms circumscribe the choices and activities that women are able to be 
engaged in, both in the public sphere and the private sphere.  Because GAD researchers 
emphasize the importance in bringing the private sphere into the public, many of them focus 
their attention on gender dynamics within the household, including how patriarchal norms such 
as son preference lead to gender inequities in access to food and nutrition.  Some GAD 
researchers carry out qualitative case studies of gender dynamics and social hierarchies within a 
single development organization.  Qualitative methods lend themselves especially well to GAD 
studies because GAD researchers are interested in studying the relationships between women and 
men, and also the relationships between different classes of women  both in the public sphere 
and the private sphere.  Although it’s sometimes possible to use quantitative methods to study 
aspects of the private sphere, such as Bangladeshi couples’ gender preferences for children 
(Muhuri and Preston 1991), usually qualitative methods are better at picking up the subtle 
nuances in gestures, attitudes, and cultural norms.  Some of these studies evaluate the impact that 
development programs have on women, such as whether women who borrow microcredit have 
greater decision-making power in other areas of their life, and the effect that borrowing has on 
how their husbands treat them.  Researchers who take the GAD perspective examine not just 
changes in women’s status and well-being, but women’s status relative to men, and also their 
status and roles relative to women of other statuses.   
Some GAD researchers carry out studies similar to the studies of WAD researchers, such 
as studies of how women’s living conditions and gender roles are impacted by working for 
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multinational corporations.  One way to distinguish GAD research from WAD research is to note 
that GAD researchers focus not only on the effects of capital accumulation on women’s status, 
but also how this impacts relations between women and men.  One such study is Fernandez-
Kelly’s (1997) case study of a maquiladora, or borderlands assembly plant, in Ciudad Juarez in 
the 1980s.  Maquiladoras are usually small, and subcontract work from U.S. corporations.  
Eighty-five percent of the employees at maquiladoras at the time of her study were women, and 
one-third of the female employees at maquiladoras in Ciudad Juarez were the head of their 
households.   
Fernandez-Kelly carried out participant observations at a garment factory in Ciudad 
Juarez.  At this factory, women worked forty-eight hours a week, sitting at sewing machines on 
metal folding chairs as they sewed clothing.  Many of the women experienced chronic back pain, 
and were paid either minimum wage or by piecework.  Because Mexico had a law requiring that 
women be granted eighty-two days at full-pay during pregnancy leave, the maquiladoras refused 
to hire women who were pregnant.  Small firms sometimes fired women if they learned that they 
were pregnant (Fernandez-Kelly 1997).  Fernandez-Kelly found that some women took jobs at 
these factories in part because of increased rates of male unemployment.  Therefore, they needed 
to take jobs at factories either to help support their children, or to contribute to their parents’ 
income (Fernandez-Kelly 1997).  She also discovered that even though women made up the 
large majority of the workforce at factories subcontracted by MNCs, they still seemed to be 
defined primarily by their domestic role.  In the case of the women working at the garment 
factory in Ciudad Juarez, fathers and husbands often pressured them to quit their jobs and to 
fulfill conventional roles as mothers and caretakers of the home.  They still had to reconcile the 
conflict between possibly becoming the primary breadwinners in their household and the 
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ideological conception that a woman belongs primarily in the domestic sphere (Fernandez-Kelly 
1997).  Also, even though many women worked at factories, including electronics factories, their 
work was still “invisible” in the sense that employers did not recognize the skills that they 
brought to the workplace, but instead believed they were naturally fitted for factory work, and 
thus unskilled.  Her description of the maquiladora can provide a deeper understanding of the 
dynamics between women and men, and between employers and employees in developing 
countries where MNCs have a presence.   
 
2.2.6 Studies testing multiple theories 
 
In the previous sections, I reviewed the research methods of modernization, WID, WAD, 
neoliberal, and GAD theories, along with some empirical studies associated with each theoretical 
tradition.  These studies provide insights into the development process, although not all of them 
examine how development affects women’s status and changes in gender inequality.  All of these 
theories (and the research associated with them) put forth contested visions of how the 
modernization process occurs, which nations benefit, and women’s place in the development 
process.  However, none of these studies have tested the strengths and weaknesses of multiple 
theories in their ability to explain changes in gender inequality in developing nations.  In this 
section, I discuss the research methods and empirical findings of scholars who test hypotheses of 
multiple development theories.  These studies take the nation as the unit of analysis, although 
some studies also cluster nations by region or cultural values.  They are all necessarily 
quantitative studies since they are all macro-level studies and must have comparable measures 
across nations.  All of them are longitudinal studies, although some of them include cross-
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sectional analyses as well.  Several of them use databases of international development 
organizations, such as the Women’s Indicators and Statistics Microcomputer Data Base 
(WISTAT), or indices of women’s status and gender inequality such as the Gender-Related 
Development Index (GDI) or the Gender Empowerment Measure.  I now turn to a review of 
some of these studies.  
Young et al. (1994) argued that there are important differences between measures of 
women’s status and gender inequality.  Indicators of women’s status show the absolute level of 
women’s procurement of resources valued by society.  Studies that measure women’s status may 
show that women have attained higher levels of health and education, for instance, but they do 
not compare how much women’s status has improved compared to the status of men.  Young et 
al. took a GAD perspective, and argued that gender inequality is “the departure from parity in the 
representation of women and men in key dimensions of social life” (Young et al. 1994:57).  
These key dimensions include political systems, health and nutritional systems, economic 
systems, educational systems, and family systems.  Young et al. analyzed quantitative data from 
“Women’s Indicators and Statistics Microcomputer Data Base” (WISTAT), which was published 
by the UN Statistical Office in 1988.  They examined data on physical well-being (number of 
females per 100 males for various age groups, infant mortality rates, percent of births attended 
by health staff), public power (ratio of females to 100 males holding seats in national 
legislatures), family formation (total fertility rate, contraception use by men and women), 
education (ratio of women to 100 men who are illiterate, ratio of women per 100 men enrolled at 
different levels of schooling), and economic activity (ratio of women per 100 men considered 
economically active).  They looked at data from 70 countries, and divided the data into four 
development-level categories based on the World Bank’s (1980) GNP per capita income 
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categories.  They tested the following two hypotheses: 1. Economic development leads to greater 
gender equality (modernization theory), and 2. At all economic development levels there are 
significant gender inequalities (WID and GAD arguments).  Young et al. (1994) found that there 
were greater gender disparities in health at higher income levels than at lower income levels, 
such as the number of females per 100 males.  Infant mortality was lower and the number of 
trained attendants present at births was higher at higher national income levels.  This seems to 
show that women’s needs related to childbearing are neglected in the lowest-income nations.  
There was greater gender inequality in illiteracy and lack of schooling among lower-income 
nations than among higher-income nations.  The researchers found that women in lower-middle 
income nations had less control over their fertility than women in upper-middle income nations.  
They also found that there was poor representation of women in government positions for 
nations at any of the four income levels (Young et. al. 1994).     
 The study by Young et al. (1994) shows mixed support for modernization, WID, and 
GAD theories.  The fact that infant mortality was lower for higher-income nations supports 
modernization theory.  This is because according to modernization theory, as nations become 
more industrialized they will have more advanced forms of technology, including medical 
technology, which should result in lower infant mortality levels.  Young et al. also found that the 
fertility rate of upper-middle income nations is lower than that of lower-middle income nations, 
which supports modernization theorists’ assumption that women in more modernized, 
industrially developed nations will have greater access to birth control than women in less 
developed nations (Jaquette 1982).  The fact that there was less gender inequality in illiteracy 
rates and lack of schooling in higher-income nations than in lower-income nations also lends 
support for modernization theory.  However, the researchers’ finding that the female/male sex 
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ratio was lower for higher-income nations than lower-income nations does not support 
modernization theory.  This finding lends more support to the GAD perspective than the WID 
perspective because GAD proponents measure women’s status relative to men’s status instead of 
using measures of women’s status only.  GAD theorists focus on the relations between women 
and men as the analytical category, whereas WID theorists focus on women alone as the 
analytical category (Visvanathan 1997).  GAD theorists also focus on all aspects of women’s 
lives, whereas WID theorists focus only on the economic and political spheres.  Finally, the 
researchers’ finding that the percentage of government positions held by women is low in nations 
at any income level lends support to both WID and GAD theories.  Although the results of this 
study show mixed support for modernization, WID, and GAD perspectives, the researchers 
conclude that economic growth does not necessarily lead to greater gender equality, and that 
policymakers need to consider the needs of women in developing nations as well as in 
developed, industrialized nations (Young et al. 1994). 
Forsythe et al. (2000) carried out a study to determine: 1. whether economic growth 
strategies have undermined or fostered women’s status, and 2. whether there have been changes 
in gender inequality along with changes in women’s status.  They examined cross-sectional data 
to determine the correlation between economic growth and women’s status and gender 
inequality, and they also examined how economic growth affects changes in women’s status and 
gender inequality over time.  They used the Human Development Index (HDI) and the Gender-
Related Development Index (GDI) created by the United Nations for 130 nations in 1970 and 
1992 (Forsythe et. al. 2000).  They used the GDI as a measure for women’s well-being.  The 
researchers also used the GI, which is the “weight of the [gender] gap relative to a country’s 
HDI” as a measure of gender inequality (Forsythe et. al. 2000:583).    They analyzed cross-
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sectional data for 1970 and 1992, and found that there was a strong, significant relationship 
between GDP per capita and women’s income, educational attainment, and life expectancy.  
They also found that there was a strong relationship between economic growth and an increase in 
women’s status “as measured by the GDI” (Forsythe et. al. 2000:607) for the period of 1970-
1992, and that women’s status improved for all the nations in the study.  These findings seem to 
support modernization theory, since this theory assumes that an increase in a nation’s economic 
development will lead to an increase in women’s status.  However, when the researchers 
analyzed the relationship between economic development and gender inequality as measured by 
the GI, they found mixed results.  Their examination of cross-sectional data at first seemed to 
show that there was a curvilinear (inverted-U) relationship between levels of economic 
development and gender inequality.  However, once the researchers introduced dummy variables 
for nations with majority Muslim population and nations that were Latin American nations, the 
relationship between economic development levels and gender inequality disappeared (Forsythe 
et al. 2000).  The dummy variables for majority Muslim population and for Latin American 
nations were significantly related to gender inequality.  These two variables seemed to explain 
away the relationship between economic development and gender inequality in the cross-
sectional analysis.  Although their longitudinal analysis showed that gender inequality decreased 
for most nations from 1970-1992, gender inequality actually increased for ten nations, including 
India.  Nations with the greatest initial levels of gender inequality tended to have the greatest 
relative decreases in gender inequality.  The longitudinal analysis also showed an inverted-U 
relationship between economic development and gender inequality as measured by the GI.  The 
authors concluded that this finding supports the GAD perspective, since this perspective argues 
that economic growth will not necessarily lead to an increase in gender equality (Forsythe et al. 
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2000).  However, WID theorists also argue that economic development does not necessarily lead 
to an increase in gender equality.  Still, this finding does provide support for the GAD 
perspective because the GI measures women’s relative status compared to men’s status. 
In a third study, Dijkstra and Hanmer (2000) assessed the validity of using the UNDP’s 
Gender-Related Development Index (GDI) as a measure of gender inequality.  Although they did 
not explicitly test the claims of modernization, WID, and GAD theories, they did take a GAD 
perspective in determining the best way to measure gender inequality.  The researchers critiqued 
the GDI because it does not differentiate between a nation’s absolute standards of living and 
gender inequality.  For example, if a nation has a high level of gender equality but a low score on 
human development, it will still receive a low GDI score.  They argued that the GDI assesses 
some aspects of gender-related development, but that this information must be placed in the 
context of a nation’s culture, ideology, and history (Dijkstra and Hanmer 2000).  This reflects the 
holistic nature of the GAD perspective, as opposed to the WID perspective’s focus on women’s 
involvement in the economy (Young 1997).  If one wants to assess women’s levels of well-being 
in various nations, one needs to examine not only human development indicators (HDI) and 
GDP per capita, but also female/male literacy ratios, infant and maternal mortality rates, levels of 
violence against women, and qualitative data regarding gender relations.  This reflects the GAD 
theorists’ claims that one must look at more than just the economic sphere when evaluating the 
development process (Young 1997).  The researchers developed the Relative Status of Women 
(RSW) Index, which is a new measure of women’s status (Dijkstra and Hanmer 2000).  The 
RSW Index includes female/male ratios of life expectancy and education, some of the GDI 
measures, and an income indicator that measures the ratio of “implicit rate of return to women’s 
and men’s labor time” (Dijkstra and Hanmer 2000:52).  They found that for the top ten ranking 
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nations on gender equality, women do score better than men for a long, healthy life and for 
educational levels.  However, they added that the RSW does not measure violence against 
women or other facets of gender relations.  They concluded that they cannot determine whether 
the RSW score for a particular nation increases due to a true increase in women’s well-being or 
due to a decrease in men’s well-being (Dijkstra and Hanmer 2000).  This also reflects a GAD 
perspective since the GAD perspective takes both women’s and men’s concerns into account. 
Clark et al. (1991) conducted a quantitative, cross-national study to examine the impact 
that economic growth, commodity concentration, and culture have on the percentage of the labor 
force comprised of women.  They analyzed data on 75-105 nations that came from Women…A 
World Survey (Sivard 1985, cited in Clark et al. 1991).  Clark et al. included four indicators for 
dependency theory, all which had been measured around 1967.  This provided a sufficient lag 
time to pick up any long-term effects that economic dependency might have on women’s 
participation in the labor force.  They included two variables in order to test the effects of classic 
economic dependency:  foreign-trade structure and commodity concentration.  In order to test the 
effects of dependent development, they used a measure of overall foreign investment and a 
measure of “foreign investment in extraction”.  In order to test the modernization hypothesis that 
economic development will have a positive impact on women’s labor force participation, Clark 
et al. included logged GNP per capita for the year 1965.  They also included a variable 
measuring the ratio of women’s to men’s enrollment in higher education during the years of 
1960 and 1985.  This is because one explanation of economic development’s association with 
women’s increased participation in the labor force is that with economic development comes a 
great increase in people’s educational attainment, including an increase in women’s enrollment 
in higher education, which then leads to women’s increased labor force participation.  The 
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researchers also included dummy variables for the broad cultural categories of Islamic, Latin-
American, non-Islamic African, Marxist, Western, and non-Islamic Asian.   
Clark et al. started with cross-sectional regression analyses of the effects of the economic 
development variables, dependency variables, and female/male enrollment rates in higher 
education on women’s labor force participation rates.  They found that three of the dependency 
variables had a statistically significant, negative relationship with female/male labor force 
participation in 1980.  Logged GNP per capita had a negative, statistically significant 
relationship with female/male labor force participation only when foreign trade structure, which 
was not significant, was included in the model.  Women’s share of higher education had no 
significant relationship with their labor force participation rates.  Once the researchers added the 
dummy variables for cultural regions (with Western nations as the reference category), only one 
of the dependency variables had a negative, statistically significant relationship with women’s 
share of the labor force in 1980.  GNP per capita was positively and significantly related to 
women’s labor force participation in only one of the models.  Overall, women’s share of the 
labor force was much less in Islamic nations and Latin American nations than in Western 
nations, and countries they classified as Marxist had a positive, significant relationship with 
women’s share of the labor force.  African and Asian nations had no significant relationship with 
women’s labor force participation. 
The researchers then ran panel analyses to see how the same independent variables, plus 
female labor force participation in 1960, affected changes in women’s/men’s labor force 
participation from 1960 to 1980.  They found that women’s share of the labor force in 1960 was 
the most strongly associated with women’s share of the labor force in 1980.  They found that 
overall, economic dependency had a negative effect on women’s share of the labor force, 
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women’s enrollment in higher education in 1960 had a positive, weak relationship with their 
share of the labor force in 1980, and that GNP per capita had a positive relationship with 
women’s share of the labor force in 1980.  Once they added the culture variables into the models, 
commodity concentration had a negative, significant effect on changes in women’s share in the 
labor force, and logged GNP per capita continued to have a positive, significant effect on 
changes in women’s share in the labor force.  Islamic nations still had a negative, significant 
effect on changes in women’s labor force participation, even after controlling for all of the 
dependency variables.  The other culture variables were either weakly related to changes in 
women’s share of the labor force, or not significantly related at all.  Women’s share of higher 
education in 1960 had no significant relationship with changes in women’s share of the labor 
force.  Overall, Clark et al. concluded that their study lends the most support for the positive 
impact that economic development has on women’s share of the labor force. 
However, the authors of this study did not go into detail on the types of longitudinal 
models that they used.  They said that they used panel models, but panel models include a range 
of longitudinal models, such as fixed-effects models, difference models, random effects models, 
and mixed effects models.  In the cross-sectional analyses, they included women’s share of 
higher education in 1985 as an independent variable, even though the dependent variable is 
women’s share in the labor market in 1980.  They did not explain why they used an independent 
variable measured at a later time point than their dependent variable.  Moreover, they never 
mentioned using tests for autocorrelation or robust standard errors.  Therefore, it is not clear how 
reliable their results really are. 
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2.2.7 Studies on women and microcredit 
 
Microcredit programs have become an increasingly popular strategy among NGOs, donor 
agencies, and development policy-makers for improving women’s status and lifting families out 
of poverty. Researchers have conducted numerous studies on the impact of women’s microcredit 
programs on women’s status in South Asia (particularly Bangladesh), with mixed results.  Most 
of these are micro-level case studies, and use either qualitative methods or a combination of 
qualitative methods and survey interviews.  The researchers conducting these studies often use a 
quasi-experimental design with a treatment group of women who are borrowers and a control 
group of women who are not borrowers.  Other researchers compare the effects of two NGOs’ 
microcredit programs on women’s status, such as Hashemi et al.’s (1996) study of women 
borrowers from the Grameen Bank and BRAC in Bangladesh.  Some researchers highlight the 
positive effects of microcredit on women, such as increased control over economic resources and 
greater participation in family decision-making (Todd 1996, Hashemi et. al. 1996). Other 
researchers draw more negative conclusions about the effects of microcredit on women’s status, 
arguing that many women borrowers do not retain control over the loans they have taken out, 
and must turn the loans over to their husbands or other male household members (Goetz and Sen 
Gupta 1994, Rahman 1999).  Below I highlight two studies of Grameen Bank borrowers in 
Bangladesh, each of which came from different development paradigms.  While Todd (1996) 
came from a neoliberal approach and came to positive conclusions about microcredit’s 
empowering effect on women borrowers, Rahman (1999) took a GAD approach and emphasized 
how the lending practices of the Grameen Bank re-created patriarchal relations between women 
and men. 
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  Todd (1996) conducted a qualitative study for one year on 40 women in Bangladesh 
who were long-term members of the Grameen Bank centers at Ghatail and at Shajanpur, as well 
as 20 female non-members from the same villages.  She found that the women who borrowed 
microcredit from the Grameen Bank had gained decision-making power within the household, 
were in better physical health, and experienced less domestic violence than women who didn’t 
borrow microloans.  She also found that 27 of the Grameen Bank borrowers in her study were 
actively involved in managing the household, economic activities, and household budget, and 
that some of these women were the primary decision-makers regarding land cultivation and 
leasing in new land.  However, she conceded that since she only studied women from two 
Grameen Bank centers and that these women had borrowed loans for a longer period of time than 
that of most Grameen Bank borrowers, her findings were not representative of all Grameen Bank 
borrowers.   
Todd’s study supports the neoliberal perspective since she found that increasing women’s 
access to credit was sufficient in raising their status and decision-making power in the 
household.  Like neoliberal scholars, she advocated increasing women’s access to economic 
resources within the existing social structure rather than challenging social inequalities, such as 
female seclusion, in order to increase women’s well-being.  While Todd’s study may seem to 
also support WID theory since WID theorists emphasized the need to include women in waged 
labor, her study contradicts WID theory in a couple of ways.  Whereas WID scholars are 
concerned about women’s double burden of domestic and economic responsibilities once they 
start to engage in income-generating activities, Todd (1996) found that the women in her study 
were proud to be doing extra work if it meant bringing more income into the household and did 
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not mind the double burden of work.  In contrast to WID scholars, Todd did not address 
women’s occupational exclusion or their exclusion from suffrage. 
Rahman (1999) took a GAD perspective in his study of the lending structure and lending 
processes of the Grameen Bank.  He studied Grameen Bank workers and borrowers in a village 
of the Tangail zone in which the Grameen Bank had been operating for fifteen years.  Rahman 
found that the Grameen Bank re-created the existing patriarchal system in its organizational 
structure and lending practices.  For instance, he observed that the Grameen Bank targeted 
primarily women because bank workers viewed them as submissive, passive, and easily 
disciplined.  Men made up the majority of bank workers, and were addressed by the women 
borrowers as “sir”, thus reinforcing the men’s higher status.  Women borrowers often had to rely 
on men to invest the loans, and did not have a say in how these loans were used.  Moreover, 
Rahman observed that bank workers faced institutional pressure to persuade borrowers to take 
out successively larger loans.  This often caused the women borrowers to fall into a “debt trap,” 
taking out subsequent loans to pay off prior loans.  This debt burden often led to increased 
tension and violence against the women borrowers within households.  Like other GAD scholars, 
Rahman argued that it is important to examine power relations between men and women within 
households and between male bank workers and female borrowers. 
 
2.3  CONCLUSION 
 
From the myriad of studies that researchers have already conducted related to theories of 
development, it is not apparent which development approach is best in raising gender equality, or 
at least in a particular nation.  There are some cross-national studies that assess the impacts of 
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several development paradigms on gender equality, but none that seem to do this for a single 
nation (a country study).  As pointed out by Roy and Sideras (2006), trade liberalization has 
benefited some nations, but has had disastrous effects on other nations.  It could very well be true 
that development programs of the same paradigm (say, economic growth) will not have the same 
effect on increasing gender equality in different nations.  Even though Inglehart and Norris 
(2003) found that overall economic growth leads to greater gender equality in all regions, their 
analyses do not address how economic growth affects gender equality in any single country. 
There are also micro-level case studies on the impacts of various women’s development 
programs on women’s status in India and Bangladesh, which are appropriate for evaluating the 
impact that a particular program has in a localized region.  However, the findings of these studies 
cannot be generalized to a larger region of the country, much less the entire country.   
My study helps to address some of these issues by analyzing the effects that women’s 
development programs associated with different development paradigms have on district-level 
changes on gender inequality in India. A meso-level study of a single nation such as India is 
advantageous because it incorporates some of the strengths of both micro-level and macro-level 
studies.  Such a study can take into account the particular characteristics of one nation, such as 
cultural norms regarding gender roles, forms of governance, and particular development policies 
that the nation’s government has implemented.  With a meso-level study that takes the district or 
county as the unit of analysis it is possible to compare how development programs affect 
changes in gender inequality across larger regions within the country, such as states or provinces.  
This is a benefit over micro-level studies of a single women’s organization, since it allows one to 
examine how regional variations affect the impact that different development programs have on 
changes in women’s status.  This is important for a vast country like India, since patriarchal 
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norms tend to be stronger in northern states than in southern states (Dreze and Sen 2004). 
Moreover, even the same types of development programs may have different effects on gender 
inequality since each development organization will have a unique organizational culture and its 
own particular way of implementing its women’s programs.  A meso-level study can control for 
the particularities of each development program to assess the overall effect of that type of 
program on raising women’s status.  
However, how does one classify the thousands of development programs that exist in 
India?  This is the issue I take up in the next chapter. 
 
                                                 
NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO 
i Not all scholars agreed with modernization theorists’ explanation for how societies become economically 
developed.  Whereas the modernization theorists stressed the importance of factors that are internal to a society in 
bringing about economic development, the thinkers of the dependency school argued that external factors are 
primarily what determine whether or not a nation becomes developed (So 1990).  They criticized the modernization 
theorists for not taking colonial relations into account when examining why some nations became wealthy, capitalist 
democracies while others remained in poverty and were susceptible to authoritarian regimes.  Dependency theorists 
maintained that the continued exploitation of former colonial nations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America by post-
imperialist nations is the main reason why some nations become wealthy with high levels of education and good 
health care systems, while other nations remain in poverty.  Continued dependency of less-developed or “peripheral” 
nations on wealthy or “core” nations is caused by a flow of economic surplus from less-developed countries to the 
more powerful, industrialized nations.  Therefore, “dependency” is primarily an economic condition.  Moreover, 
dependency theorists argued that less-developed, peripheral nations and wealthy, industrialized core nations are 
becoming more and more polarized in terms of levels of economic development.  Capital flows from the periphery 
to the core causes the less-developed nations to become underdeveloped, and Western nations benefit from this 
unequal economic relationship (So 1990).     
According to dependency theorists, true, long-lasting development cannot occur for developing nations as 
long as they continue economic relations with wealthy, industrialized nations.  Therefore, they argued, peripheral 
countries should sever economic ties with wealthy nations.  They should accept less foreign aid and technology, not 
more, and should not adopt Western values.  Rather, peripheral nations should become self-reliant, carve their own 
path to development rather than following the path set out for them by Western nations.  They should use their own 
resources so that they can gain independence from “core” countries.  Moreover, dependency theorists argued that 
elites in peripheral countries benefit from economic relations with Western nations.  Therefore, the peripheral 
countries need a socialist revolution in order to overthrow the ruling elites and establish a new economic order (So 
1990).   
  Dependency theorists and researchers took a gender-blind approach, and did not include a gender analysis.  
They seemed to assume that peripheral countries’ dependency on core countries affects all citizens of peripheral 
countries the same way, or at least everyone within a particular social class the same way, regardless of their gender.  
The policy suggestions of dependency theorists did not consider how women and men may be affected differently, 
either.  If peripheral nations sever ties with core industrialized nations, how will this affect women?  If peripheral 
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countries increase their own industrialization in order to produce more for their own economies/societies, who will 
be involved in this increased economic production?  Men and women?  Men only?  Dependency theorists are silent 
on this issue.  
 
ii The world-systems perspective emerged in the early 1970s as a response to various scholarly debates that 
were going on from 1945-1970 (Wallerstein 2004).  One of the debates was in regard to the “core-periphery” 
concept that scholars of the dependency school had developed and whether this concept could really explain the 
relationship between wealthy Western countries and less-developed countries. The economies of East Asian nations 
were rapidly expanding, even though some of these East Asian nations had been colonies of other nations in the past 
(So 1990).  These nations clearly did not fit the deterministic pattern of peripheral nations dependent on core 
nations.  Another debate among economic historians of Western nations was over whether feudalistic societies 
transitioned into capitalistic societies because of internal factors such as class relations, or external factors such as 
trade flows (Wallerstein 2004).  Scholars who emphasized external factors suggested that perhaps a larger region 
than the country should be the unit of analysis when examining changes in economic structures of the past.  
World-systems theorists took the historical system as the unit of analysis rather than the state or society.  
According to Wallerstein, the founder world-systems theory, a “world-system” is “…a spatial/temporal zone which 
cuts across many political and cultural units, one that represents an integrated zone of activity and institutions which 
obey certain systemic rules” (Wallerstein 2004:17).  According to world-systems theorists, capitalist world-
economies (world-systems in which market exchanges were most important) started to develop about 1500 A.D.  
World-economies covered a large span of the world, and each world-economy was made up of several political 
structures.  Some of these political structures gained a monopoly in the world-economies, and received more than 
their fair share of the surplus.  By the late 1800s, only one world-economy existed which spanned the globe.   
Like dependency theorists, world-systems theorists argued that core states monopolize the processes of 
production, and that peripheral states have production processes that must compete with the quasi-monopolies of 
core states (Wallerstein 2004).  Wallerstein and other world-systems theorists extended the core-periphery concept 
to include semiperipheral states, or states that have a combination of peripheral-like and core-like production 
processes.  These semi-peripheral states try to keep from slipping into a peripheral relationship with the core 
countries, and must compete with each other to be the hosts of corporations from core states that relocate factories to 
them in order to cut costs of production.  Wallerstein argued that during periods of economic contraction, former 
leading industries are likely to re-locate work to some peripheral countries, but not to all of them.  It is this 
relocation of work to semiperipheral states that Wallerstein referred to as “development.”  This core-periphery-
semiperiphery system can explain why some countries such as Brazil, India, and S. Korea are becoming more 
successful economically while many other peripheral and semiperipheral states are not (Wallerstein 2004). 
Feminist scholars from within the world-systems framework have criticized the theory for excluding 
women’s economic role in the global market (Ward 1993, Dunaway 2002).  Feminist scholars such as Kathryn Ward 
(1993) and Wilma Dunaway (2002) argued that world-systems scholars do not take into account all of feminist 
scholars’ research that shows how economic development has negatively impacted women’s status vis-à-vis men.  
Dunaway (2002) argued that world-systems researchers ignore feminist scholars’ work, even when feminist scholars 
take a world-systems approach to capitalist accumulation.  Moreover, world-systems researchers do not 
acknowledge how important women’s work is to the maintenance of the world-system (Ward 1993).  Feminist 
world-systems scholars critiqued other world-systems researchers for several reasons.  These feminist scholars 
argued that world-systems researchers assume that women are incorporated into the world-system as household 
members (Ward 1993, Dunaway 2002).  These world-systems researchers take an androcentric view of economic 
participation, and ignore women’s work in the informal sector and the domestic sphere (Ward 1993, Dunaway 
2002).  Dunaway (2002) argued that most of the scholars who have done research on agricultural households have 
not paid attention to gender inequities within households or between male and female agricultural laborers, even 
though women have always played an important role in agriculture.  Ward (1993) acknowledged that some 
researchers have tried to bring women into world-systems analysis by using the household as the unit of analysis 
(Wallerstein 1984, Smith 1984, cited in Ward 1993).  These researchers have tried to deal with the fact that women 
do carry out unwaged labor and informal paid labor in the household.  They have also taken into account how 
unpaid labor aids in the “reproduction of the labor force and the capitalist system” (Ward 1993:529).  However, 
Ward argued, these researchers have not acknowledged that women’s unpaid labor and domestic work is not just a 
result of the rise of capitalism, and that women’s subjugation to men existed before the capitalist system.  Dunaway 
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emphasized the importance in using concepts that allow researchers to analyze gender, such as “resource pooling” 
instead of “income pooling”, since “income pooling” implies some sort of paid work, whereas “resource pooling” 
can include women’s non-paid subsistence work. 
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3.0 CHAPTER THREE: THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT AND WOMEN’S 
EMPOWERMENT: A RECONCEPTUALIZATION 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Strategies for increasing gender equality in developing countries that are grounded in 
modernization, WID, GAD, or neoliberal theory operate with different sets of logics.  As 
discussed earlier, WID practitioners focus on integrating women into the development process 
(Tinker 1997).  From the neoliberal perspective, lending small amounts of credit to the poorest 
women so that they can invest in small businesses related to activities they are already doing is a 
very effective strategy for increasing women’s status.  Others coming from a GAD perspective 
argue that increasing women’s access to credit is not enough.  They emphasize collective action, 
public education, and coalition building as the most effective strategies for increasing equality 
between women and men, and argue that women must challenge existing power relations 
between men and women (Young 1997).  There are countless development programs and 
organizations coming from all of these development perspectives in India, which makes it 
possible to test how women’s development programs of different types affect changes in gender 
inequality. Yet how do we classify them into either modernization, WID, GAD, or neoliberal 
programs?  Is there a way of assessing the impact that women’s programs coming from different 
development paradigms have on changes in gender inequality?  One place to start is with the 
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concept of “empowerment”.  Over the past couple decades, “empowerment” has become a 
buzzword in development circles, and is used in both scholarly and popular literature on 
women’s development.  “Empowerment” is briefly defined as “…the process by which the 
powerless gain greater control over the circumstances of their lives” (Presser and Sen 2000:18).  
Beginning in the 1990s, the word “empowerment” became a popular part of the jargon of 
development agencies, and has come to mean different things for groups with conflicting ideas 
(Troutner and Smith 2004, Townsend et al. 1999).  In 1995, the Beijing Platform for Action of 
the Fourth World Conference on Women stated that empowerment is “fundamental for the 
achievement of equality, development, and peace” (Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action 
1996: 8, in Troutner and Smith 2004:9).  However, because there are many conceptions of 
empowerment, the criteria for empowerment are seldom explicit, and therefore empowerment is 
difficult to measure.  Troutner and Smith have this to say about empowerment:  “Why does the 
meaning of ‘empowerment’ matter so much?  It matters because understandings of the term 
affect pursuits of power in the real world and practical programs for change…Dominant 
interpretations of the term thus inform and reinforce policies and practices that in turn strengthen 
the capitalist political-economic system and the capitalist mind-set” (Troutner and Smith 
2004:12).  Empowerment can mean women’s enhancing their entrepreneurial skills, gaining the 
power to challenge inequities that they face in their societies, overcoming the inequalities and 
attitudes that keep them dependent on men, etc. In this chapter, I first discuss women’s 
microcredit programs and Indian women’s social movements.  Partisans in debates over 
development point to both women’s microcredit programs and women’s social movements as 
examples of empowerment.  The fact that the programs come from basically diametrically 
opposite paradigms shows how slippery the concept of “empowerment” is, and the importance in 
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clarifying this concept.  I next move on to a discussion of feminist (and masculinist) conceptions 
of power.  Finally, I give my own re-conceptualization of women’s development programs based 
on variations in a combination of notions of power and theories of development.  I also give 
examples of women’s programs and organizations in order to demonstrate how I use these 
conceptualizations of power to classify women’s development programs as either modernization, 
WID, GAD, or neoliberal-type programs. 
 
3.1.1 Microlending as a strategy for more gender-equitable development 
 
Numerous development programs with a focus on microlending that began in the 1970s have 
drawn increasing attention from donors such as international development agencies (Mayoux 
1995).  Development agencies and practitioners have often hailed microcredit lending to poor 
women in developing countries as a panacea for lifting families out of poverty while 
empowering women, raising women’s status and lowering gender inequality (Deshmukh-
Ranadive and Murthy 2005, Mayoux 1995, Cheston and Kuhn 2002, Ahmed et. al. 2001).  By 
the 1990s, agencies advocated women’s micro-enterprise development as a way to alleviate 
poverty.  There are two reasons for this.  Researchers have discovered that women spend more of 
the money they earn on the needs of their family than men do, such as on children’s healthcare, 
education, clothing, and food (Cheston and Kuhn 2002, Ahmed et. al. 2001, Kristof and 
WuDunn 2009).  Therefore, it makes sense for development programs to target women if they 
want to have the greatest impact on eliminating poverty. 
  Lending small amounts of credit to women also helps increase their employment in 
microenterprises (Ahmed et. al. 2001).  This is because it allows women to invest in homestead-
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based activities such as raising and selling poultry, paddy husking, selling produce, or grinding 
mustard seeds into mustard oil.  These are activities that women often do as unremunerated 
work; with a small amount of capital, it is argued, they can turn these activities into small 
businesses, thus generating cash income that women could potentially control (Ahmed et. al.  
2001).   
The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, founded by Muhammad Yunus in 1972, is one such 
microlending institution that has gained a lot of publicity and support from donor agencies as an 
effective neoliberal economic development scheme.  Other organizations that include 
microlending as part of their development program exist in many parts of the world, such as 
Ghana, Rwanda, and Tanzania in Africa; Columbia, Mexico, and Costa Rica in Latin America; 
and India, Nepal, and Pakistan in South Asia (Cheston and Kuhn 2002).  The Grameen Bank, 
and Grameen Bank replicates in India such as SHARE Microfin Ltd., assumes that poor, landless 
peasants must have access to credit in order to become free from usurious money-lenders and to 
lift themselves out of poverty (Grameen Bank web site).  The overall theory driving the Grameen 
Bank is that it is up to individuals to innovate, work hard, and raise their own standard of living.  
No state intervention is required; in fact, the neoliberal model assumes that state intervention 
undermines market incentives, adds unnecessary layers of bureaucracy and opportunities for 
corruption, creates dependency and reproduces poverty instead of encouraging economic 
development.  All the Grameen Bank does through extending credit to the very poor is overcome 
a market failure, caused primarily by the demonstrably incorrect perception that there is no profit 
to be had in lending to poor people without charging usurious interest.  By “empowerment”, 
microcredit organizations mean increasing people’s economic power (Deshmukh-Ranadive and 
Murthy 2005).  Although the Grameen Bank approach targets women for its lending programs, it 
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does so primarily in order to help families lift themselves out of poverty rather than to address 
structural inequalities in the society based on gender or class. For example, under “Credit 
Delivery System” on the Grameen Bank web site, it states that the priority of the Grameen Bank 
is to make credit available to the poorest people in Bangladesh, and women make up a large 
proportion of this category (Grameen Bank web site). 
Most donors and international development agencies agree on the fundamental aspects of 
women’s micro-enterprise development (Mayoux 1995).  For instance, they agree that 
microfinance institutions need to increase client participation, extend small amounts of credit to 
women, and conduct studies on market viability.  They also agree that development agencies 
should have both micro-level and macro-level programs.  However, various scholars and 
practitioners disagree about the extent to which microlending to women improves their status, 
makes them more empowered, and increases gender equality, or even how to measure these 
concepts.   
 
3.1.2 Women’s collective action as a strategy for equitable development and 
empowerment 
 
According to the GAD theoretical perspective, it is necessary for women to engage in collective 
action and to challenge existing power relations in the economy, polity, and civil society if they 
are to attain gender equality.  In India, the struggles against British colonial rule laid the 
foundation for the women’s movements (Ray 1999, Subramaniam 2006).  There have been 
numerous social movements in India that have fought for women’s rights.  The Constitution of 
India guaranteed equal rights for women (Ganguly-Scrase 2000).  However, these legal 
guarantees were not upheld.  Women’s organizations worked within the political system and 
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helped to frame the first few Five Year Plans (Subramaniam 2006).  They agreed with Indian 
political leaders and the dominant modernization development paradigm that economic growth 
would “trickle down” and benefit everyone in society, including women. Before the 1970s, 
Indian women’s organizations generally had affiliations with both the ruling Congress party and 
with the Communist Party of India (Ganguly-Scrase 2000).  During the 1970s Indian women 
addressed issues related to land rights, working conditions, and inflationary prices (Ganguly-
Scrase 2000).  These women’s groups emphasized basic survival needs, and thus were more 
directly related to development than some of the later women’s organizations.  They also focused 
on the situation of tribal, peasant, and working-class women.  From 1975 to 1977, Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi imposed a national emergency and repressed civil liberties (Ray 1999, 
Subramaniam 2006).  The Communist Party of India had by this time become fragmented into 
two parties, the Communist Party of India and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (Ray 
1999).  The Communist Party of India aligned itself with Indira Gandhi during the Emergency, 
and thus became discredited once Indira Gandhi’s political regime came to an end and the new 
political party in power restored civil rights in 1977.  After the National Emergency, many 
people in India no longer trusted the political institutions due to the suppression of their rights 
during the Emergency, and formed organizations that maintained autonomy from political parties 
(Ray 1999).  A number of autonomous organizations, including many women’s organizations, 
multiplied as a backlash to the loss of freedom under Indira Gandhi’s rule (Subramaniam 2006).  
The political vacuum that was created when Indira Gandhi was voted out of office and the 
Communist Party of India fell into disrepute allowed autonomous women’s organizations in 
many states to remain strong.  Many of the new women’s groups that sprang up after this period 
did not affiliate themselves with political parties (Ray 1999).  However, in some states such as 
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West Bengal, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) remained powerful and continued to 
control the political field even after the Emergency ended.  In these areas, the women’s 
organizations needed to affiliate themselves with the Communist Party of India (Marxist) in 
order to gain legitimacy.  During this period, research organizations for the study of women’s 
issues were founded, such as the Centre for Women’s Development Studies (New Delhi) and the 
Research Centre for Women’s Studies (Mumbai).  During the 1980s, many women’s 
organizations started focusing on issues related to violence against women, such as dowry 
deathsiii, rape, sex-selective abortioniv, and partner-perpetrated violence against women 
(Subramaniam 2006).  Although many of these organizations do not directly deal with 
development issues, there are some women’s development organizations, such as the Working 
Women’s Forum, that have included the women’s rights issues listed above as part of their 
ideology (Mayoux 1995, citing Noponen 1987, 1990).   These women’s rights organizations all 
come from a GAD perspective, since GAD scholars practitioners and practitioners emphasize the 
need to engage in collective action in order to challenge unequal power relations between women 
and men (Young 1997). 
One women’s social movement that addressed the issues of tribal people’ land rights is 
the Chipko movement near the Himalayas (Ganguly-Scrase 2000).  During the period of 1961-
1971, the Indian government started clearing forests and land in order to build dams and to make 
room for large-scale farming.  Many of the rural poor lost their land to these development 
projects, and were then forced to depend on waged labor.  However, agricultural work for men 
grew at over two times the rate that wage work for women grew during this period, which meant 
that many more women were marginalized than before.  Communities that in the past relied on 
gathering produce from the forests had less and less access to these forests that once had been 
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open to them.  In the early 1970s, the protests erupted among people living near the Himalayas 
against contractors planning to chop down trees.  Women hugged the trees to keep logging 
contractors from chopping them down.  By 1975, women from nearby villages formed women’s 
welfare organizations to fight more broadly against the destruction of forests and fields.  Women 
also protested against men who let their livestock graze in the women’s fields, and against 
domestic violence and male alcoholism (Ganguly-Scrase 2000, Agarwal 1994).  The Chipko 
movement shows how women used collective action to respond to androcentric state-sponsored 
welfarist development schemes that negatively impacted the rural women living in the area 
where these projects were taking place.  It also highlights the importance in taking into 
consideration not only women’s development groups, but also the gendered character of 
development projects when assessing the impacts of development organizations and projects on 
women’s well-being and gender inequality.  
An example of a women’s movement that has challenged patriarchal gender relations 
within the family in India is the anti-dowry campaign.  In 1980, feminist protestors began to 
focus on the giving and taking of dowry and on dowry harassment (Ganguly-Scrase 2000).  The 
giving of dowry by the bride’s family to the family of the groom is part of patrilineal kinship 
practices in India.  Because a new bride is seen as an economic burden to her husband’s family, 
her family must compensate the groom’s family by giving gifts of clothes, jewelry, and money.  
In recent decades, there has been an increase in the number of communities that have started 
observing the custom of dowry that had not followed this custom previouslyv.  Since the late 
1970s, there has been a rise in the number of cases in which women have been physically or 
emotionally abused by their husband’s family in order to pressure the women’s parents to give 
additional dowry items to the groom’s family (Ganguly-Scrase 2000, Subramaniam 2006).  If the 
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woman’s parents do not meet the in-laws’ demands, the bride is often murdered as a result 
(Ganguly-Scrase 2000, Subramaniam 2006).  During the late 1970s and in the 1980s, numerous 
feminist organizations in Delhi carried out an anti-dowry campaign that included exhibitions, 
street theater, and demonstrations.  They gained attention from the public and the media to 
dowry crimes, including dowry deaths that had been reported as suicides.  Women are continuing 
to mobilize against dowry-related harassment, and often stage demonstrations in the workplace 
or neighborhood of a husband who is harassing his wife (Ganguly-Scrase 2000). 
Another organization that has challenged patriarchal gender relations is the Forum 
Against Oppression of Women in Mumbai (Ray 1999).  The Forum Against Oppression of 
Women was first formed in 1980 as a response to the rape of Mathura, a sixteen-year-old tribal 
woman, by several policemen (Ray 1999, Subramaniam 2006).  The Mathura rape case led to the 
mobilization of protest groups across the nation, including the Forum Against Oppression of 
Women (at that time called the Forum Against Rape) (Ray 1999).  Since then, the Forum has 
taken on other women’s issues related to domestic violence and unequal treatment of women.  
The Forum Against Oppression of Women and the Women’s Centre, both autonomous groups, 
organized street demonstrations and marches in the neighborhoods of female victims of violence 
such as wife battering and dowry deaths.  Members of the Forum Against Oppression of Women 
have participated in demonstrations, parades, and consciousness-raising activities in regard to 
girls’ equality with boys (Ray 1999).  The Forum, along with the women’s movement in general, 
take a GAD perspective and have emphasized that violence against women occurs in the private 
sphere of the family and should be made known in the public sphere (Ray 1999, Subramaniam 
2006).   
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I give the examples of the anti-dowry campaign and the Forum Against Oppression of 
Women because they highlight the different logics that undergird women’s rights organizations 
and modernization development programs.  Modernization practitioners and policy-makers 
assumed that as people in a developing country adopt “modern” values and outlooks, patriarchal 
norms that justify gender discrimination such as rape and dowry murders would automatically 
disappear.  However, both GAD practitioners and the women’s movements and organizations 
mentioned above contended that the adoption of “modern” Western values and economic growth 
does not automatically lead to more equitable gender relations.  The GAD framework is a 
holistic framework, and like some of the Indian women’s social movement organizations noted 
above, it is concerned about eradicating gender inequalities in the private sphere.  The women 
involved in the anti-dowry campaign and the Forum Against Oppression of Women seek to 
tackle gender hierarchies and cultural norms that subordinate women; so do GAD theorists and 
practitioners.  Moreover, the patriarchal norms that lead to dowry deaths and other forms of 
domestic violence (issues that are concerns of women’s SMOs) are the same cultural norms that 
lead to an unequal distribution of food, health care, and education between boys and girls (issues 
that are concerns of GAD scholars and practitioners).  
 Microcredit institutions and women’s social movement organizations each use a very 
different conception of empowerment.  Microcredit institutions focus on what they call 
empowering women economically so that they can start small businesses engaging in activities 
that they do on a regular basis. They take an instrumental approach; the goal of these programs is 
to give women the economic resources to raise the status of their entire household.  In contrast, 
women’s social movement organizations in India use collective action to challenge institutions, 
social norms and practices that perpetuate gender inequality.  Collective action requires women 
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to develop leadership skills, social solidarity, and to develop the ability to confidently interact 
with public officials, all skills that feminists consider empowering.  These are not the only types 
of women’s organizations and programs that exist in India, however.  In the next section I 
discuss various conceptions of empowerment, and how these can used to categorize the wide 
variety of women’s development programs. 
3.2 CONCEPTIONS OF POWER 
3.2.1 “Power over”, “power to”, “power within”, and “power with” 
 
One feminist conceptualization of empowerment is that of four dimensions of power: “power 
over”, “power to,” “power within,” and “power with” (Townsend et al. 1999).   “Power over,” or 
what Hartsock simply refers to as “power”, “is a means of getting others to act in ways they 
would not otherwise act” (Hartsock 1983:4).  “Power over” is a Weberian conception of power, 
and refers to the capacity to carry out one’s will, even against resistance (Brush 2003).  “Power 
over” in the Weberian sense is held by those who have the most military strength, those who 
hold political sway, and those who have the economic resources to influence others to carry out 
their will (Brush 2003).  “Power over” is a zero-sum game: in order for women and dalits to gain 
power, men and people of upper-castes must lose some of their power (Brush 2003, Townsend et 
al. 1999, Troutner and Smith 2004).  It is also enforced by social norms that require those who 
have less power to do the will of those with more power (Townsend et al. 1999).  It can also be 
enforced by violence, threats, or fear (Townsend et al. 1999).   
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Although some feminist scholars and practitioners emphasize “power over,” and the need 
to challenge existing social hierarchies in order to bring about greater gender equality, other 
feminists associate “power over” with oppression, especially men’s oppression of women 
(Townsend et al. 1999).  They argue that development interventions that focus on “power over” 
will not accomplish much because of the negative connotations that this type of power has 
(Townsend et al. 1999).  Other scholars argue that women do not seek “power over” men, but 
rather an equal balance of power between women and men so that women have space to 
maneuver (Troutner and Smith 2004).   
Nancy Hartsock introduced the concept of “power to” as a feminist conception of power 
(Hartsock 1983, cited in Troutner and Smith 2004).  According to Hartsock, “power to” is a 
productive power, and is “the ability to bring about meaningful change” (Troutner and Smith 
2004:5).  During the 1970s and 1980s, feminists of the global South used the “power to” 
conception of empowerment to analyze gender inequalities in the distribution and control of 
resources (Troutner and Smith 2004).  “Power to” is also the kind of power that neoliberal 
scholars/practitioners refer to when they talk about the merits of microcredit in giving women the 
“power to” start small businesses.  
A third dimension of power is “power within”.  “Power within” is an improvement in an 
individual’s self-image, including an increased perception that she or he has the ability as well as 
the right to make decisions (Townsend et al. 1999).   It also means an increase in one’s self-
esteem, self-confidence, and an enhanced ability to affect change in a sphere broader than 
oneself.  Women gain power within through some form of education, such as learning new skills 
(Troutner and Smith 2004).  Once a woman’s self-concept has been transformed in this way, it 
can give her the courage she needs to rise up against gender inequality.  “Power within” is 
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necessary in order to be involved in decision-making (Rowlands 1997, cited in Troutner and 
Smith 2004). 
A fourth dimension of power is “power with”, which refers to collective action and 
cooperation to reach goals and solve problems, and includes capacity-building, solidarity, and 
social networks (Townsend et. al. 1999, Wong 2003).  Some scholars viewed this kind of 
collective action as also giving women social capital, which refers to “features of social 
organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society 
facilitating coordinated action” (Putnam 1993:167, Townsend et al. 1999). “Power with” is 
closely linked to “power within”.  Some feminist scholars argued that “power over” is an overly 
masculine form of power based on domination and competition, embedded in a history of 
Western patriarchal social relations as far back as ancient Greece (Hartsock 1983).  These 
scholars and practitioners argued that development organizations must focus on “power with” 
rather than “power over” in order to bring about greater gender equality.  “Power with,” they 
argued, is a more communal, feminine conception of power. One of the assumptions of the 
feminist conception of “power with” is that women do not benefit from modernization or 
capitalist development, or male-led, top-down development projects.  Therefore, they must take 
action for themselves and make demands on those who maintain power.  They need to be 
“empowered” to do this skillfully and to get the results they are seeking (Troutner and Smith 
2004).  
Some scholars evaluate and critique the underlying framework, especially notions of 
power, on which development organizations’ policies and practices are based.  Wong (2003) 
used these conceptions of power to evaluate and critique the development policies of the World 
Bank and the IMF during the period when they followed the neoliberal paradigm of development 
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during the 1980s to mid-1990s, the post-Washington Consensus period from the mid-1990s to 
late 1990s, and in 2001 when they placed an emphasis on empowerment as an important 
component of development in the World Development Report (World Bank 2001, cited in Wong 
2003).  Wong critiqued the World Bank and the majority of micro-credit schemes for their 
neoliberal perspective and for focusing primarily on ‘power to’ and ‘power with’, and not giving 
enough attention to ‘power over,’ especially coercive and violent forms of ‘power over’ that 
occur in stratified societies.  She argued that the World Bank takes an instrumental approach to 
empowerment, and tries to include women in the market by helping them get control over 
economic resources.  The World Bank and micro-credit programs do not deal with the unequal 
distribution of power or other inequalities in societies, or how these inequalities help determine 
who has control over resources and decision-making processes (Wong 2003).  This is in contrast 
to many people’s movements in India, such as women’s, dalit, or agricultural movements, which 
do focus on overturning hierarchical power structures. 
Feminist scholars’ conceptualizations of empowerment as “power over,” “power to,” 
“power within”, and “power with” provide insights into how to think about the ways in which 
development organizations from different historical time periods operate under different 
development paradigms as they plan and implement their programs.  These scholars rightly point 
out that different aspects of power can coexist in the same place at the same point in time, and 
that there are no clear boundaries between one dimension of power and another.  The four 
dimensions of power that they discuss are useful conceptual tools for examining the wide array 
of development programs and organizations that have existed in India from the time of India’s 
emancipation from British rule up to the present.  Moreover, Wong’s paper (2003) shows how 
analyzing the ways in which development agencies conceptualize power can shed light on how 
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the paradigms that these agencies operate under are related to the effects that their development 
interventions have on women’s status and gender inequality.   
As useful as the four dimensional model of power is for analyzing organizations’ 
development ideologies and interventions, there are some problems with using these four 
dimensions of power in order to classify different types of development programs.  As several 
feminist scholars have pointed out, these dimensions of power are not mutually exclusive (Wong 
2003).  This means that some development programs may rely on more than one dimension of 
power.  For example, rights-based women’s organizations/programs may use “power over” to 
examine ways in which women are oppressed by patriarchal cultural norms, and then use “power 
with” to collectively challenge these inequalities.  Also, many women’s microcredit self-help 
groups utilize both “power to” and “power with”.   
 
3.2.2 Agency, resources, and opportunity structure 
 
Alsop et al. (2006) conceptualized empowerment very differently.  They defined empowerment 
as “a group’s or individual’s capacity to make effective choices, that is, to make choices and then 
transform those choices into desired actions and outcomes” (2006:10).  They argued that there 
are two factors that affect empowerment – opportunity structure and agency.  Agency refers to a 
group’s or individual’s ability to imagine different options and then choose from among those 
options.  Agency depends on the assets one has, which include human assets (such as education), 
social assets, financial assets, material assets, psychological assets, organizational assets, and 
informational assets.  However, agency is not enough in order for one to be empowered, because 
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there may be aspects of one’s opportunity structure that hold one back from acting on and 
realizing the choices one makes (Alsop et al. 2006). 
Opportunity structure refers to the institutional context that affects individuals’ or groups’ 
ability to act on the choices they desire to make.  Both formal and informal institutions make up 
the opportunity structure in which an individual group acts.  Formal institutions include 
regulatory frameworks, laws, and rules “that govern the operation of political processes, public 
services, private organizations, and markets” (Alsop et al. 2006:12).  Informal institutions 
include informal value systems, cultural practices, and behavioral norms that exist in 
communities and households.  Informal institutions also include “unofficial” rules that govern 
incentives and relationships in organizations such as how Bangladeshi women borrowers from 
the Grameen Bank address male bank workers deferentially, calling them “sir” (Rahman 1999). 
For the process of empowerment to take place, there needs to be an opportunity structure 
that allows people to use their assets (such as education and information) to achieve their 
choices.  Alsop et al. said that empowerment is “a dynamic process through which the interaction 
of agency and opportunity structure has the potential to improve the capacity of individuals or 
groups to make effective choices” (2006:15). 
It is important to note that Alsop et al.’s conceptual framework for empowerment and 
Townsend et al.’s four dimensions of power are not mutually exclusive conceptualizations of 
empowerment.  Rather, Alsop et al.’s resource/agency/opportunity structure subsumes the four 
dimensions of power.  For example, the women’s rights organizations described in the preceding 
paragraphs use collective action, a form of “power with”, to struggle to expand women’s 
opportunity structure so that they are able to act on their choices.  Women’s microcredit groups 
91 
use “power with,” “power to,” and “power within” to utilize the financial resources loaned to 
them in order to start and expand small businesses.   
Kishor and Gupta (2007) stated that empowerment is the power to accomplish one’s 
goals, and is realized when individuals gain increased ability to obtain resources, gain an 
awareness of their own rights, and believe that gender equality can be achieved.  Kishor and 
Gupta argue that in order to assess women’s empowerment, it is important to measure: 1. the 
evidence of empowerment, 2. women’s access to sources of empowerment, and 3. whether 
women are in a social environment where empowerment can take place.  Evidence of 
empowerment includes women’s ability to participate in making decisions in the household, 
women’s financial autonomy, their physical mobility, and measures of beliefs and attitudes that 
women hold regarding women’s subordinate status.  Kishor and Gupta’s sources of 
empowerment were knowledge and any potential access that women may have to resources.  
Kishor and Gupta stressed that sources of empowerment should not be taken as evidence of 
empowerment since women may or may not use the resources available to them.  Conditions of 
empowerment refer to women’s living arrangements, both past and current, and the 
“characteristics of people who directly influence the opportunities available” to women (Kishor 
and Gupta 2007:382).  These conditions of empowerment echo Alsop et al.’s opportunity 
structures, except that opportunity structures refer not to the values and characteristics of 
individual people, but to institutions and social norms. 
I build on Alsop et al.’s and Kishor and Gupta’s conceptualizations of empowerment as 
an analytical framework to classify the myriad of development programs in India into either 
modernization, WID, GAD, or neoliberal programs (see Table 3.1 below).  This table 
demonstrates how development programs that are grounded in different development paradigms 
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fit into the resources/agency/ opportunity structure framework.  In this table and in the next few 
paragraphs, I explain how I use the resources/agency/opportunity structure framework to classify 
development programs as either modernization, neoliberal, WID, or GAD-type programs. 
Table 3.1 Approach to material development and aspects of empowerment 
Theories of  
Development 
Aspects of Empowerment 
Resources for Agency Agency Opportunity Structure 
Modernization: 
Foreign donor 
sponsored 
development 
projects, maternal 
and child welfare 
centers 
Provide material assets, 
technical knowledge to 
men; provide material 
assets to women such 
as shelter, health 
services 
 
Men have agency if 
they are educated to 
make rational choices 
instead of being limited 
by tradition; women’s 
agency is not addressed 
Does not recognize how 
opportunity structure 
bars women and men of 
lower castes from 
benefitting from 
development; does not 
recognize ways in 
which empowering men 
in markets and politics 
without empowering 
women may erode 
women’s status 
Women-in- 
Development:  
Women’s dairy, 
handicraft, and 
other livelihood 
cooperatives; 
employment 
training programs 
Emphasizes need to 
increase women’s 
financial assets, and 
educational assets, such 
as through vocational 
training 
Focuses on importance 
of women’s agency in 
economic sphere 
 
Focuses on limited 
opportunity structure of 
women to act on 
choices and need to 
expand opportunities 
for women’s waged 
employment; addresses 
inequalities unintended 
and largely unnoticed 
by modernization 
theory 
Gender-and- 
Development: 
Mahila Samakhya, 
SEWA, anti-dowry 
campaign 
Focuses on 
informational assets,  
such as legal rights, 
training women in 
interacting with 
government officials, 
raising women’s 
awareness of patriarchal 
norms  
Emphasizes importance 
of women’s agency in 
all spheres: economic, 
domestic, political, 
community 
Stresses importance in 
challenging patriarchal 
structures to enlarge 
women’s opportunity 
structure to act on 
choices 
Neoliberal: 
Grameen Bank, 
Cashpor, USAID 
Gemini Project 
Focuses on financial 
assets (credit and 
property) as most 
important resource for 
women; does recognize 
need for educational 
and informational assets 
such as training in 
finance and 
entrepreneurship 
Focuses on women’s 
agency, especially in 
areas of making 
decisions to benefit 
family; views women 
as rational actors who 
are capable of making 
profitable choices 
Does not pay much 
attention to how 
women’s opportunity 
structure may limit 
choices women can 
make in using credit 
 
93 
3.2.3 Modernization programs: fostering Western values for economic growth 
 
Theorists, policy-makers, and practitioners who take the modernization approach view macro-
level economic growth as the goal of their development interventions.  Policy-makers who take 
the modernization approach to development view individuals as having agency if they have 
adopted modern, Western values such as individualism, a strong achievement-motive, and a 
rationalist, entrepreneurial outlook on the world.  They contrast “modern” societies in which 
individuals are free to move to new locations and raise their social status based on their own 
efforts with “traditional” societies in which individuals do not have agency because they are 
bound by the status they are born into, and therefore have fewer opportunities to act on their 
choices. They view people in less-developed societies as passive recipients of their development 
interventions who are in need of development organizations to give them technological, material, 
educational, and cultural resources so that they can become rational citizens who are liberated 
from the traditions of the past. Once they bring new knowledge and technology from the West to 
individuals in less-developed societies, these individuals will experience increased profits in 
agriculture and higher living standards, thus spurring on economic growth. The irony is that even 
though modernization practitioners argue that individuals are freer to make their own decisions 
and chart their own course in life once they adopt Western values and practices, they denied 
people in developing nations agency because they did not accept the possibility that individuals 
may choose to follow their traditional values and practices rather than those of the industrialized 
West.  They also believed that everyone in the society would reap the benefits of economic 
development, such as better health, more education, and an overall higher living standard, 
regardless of their present position in society.  They did not consider how the formal and 
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informal institutions like female seclusion and son preference limited women’s access to 
resources such as food, health care, and education.  Organizations that come from the 
androcentric modernization approach take men’s experiences and perspectives as their point of 
reference, and view women’s experiences as a deviation from this norm.  They do not consider 
how new agricultural technologies may affect men and women differently, and how they might 
actually disempower women by de-valuing women’s subsistence work.  They assume that even 
if they introduce Western technological advances to men only, women will benefit too. 
The first four Five-Year Plans that India’s government leaders formulated after India won 
its independence in 1947 were grounded in modernization theory.  Prime Minister Jawaharlal 
Nehru and the Congress party implemented policies and programs to bring about industrial and 
agricultural modernization (Berry 2007).  The First Five-Year Plan implemented welfare-
oriented programs, placed an emphasis on agricultural development, and focused on 
disseminating material and financial resources for the well-being of the rural poor (Singh 2005).  
These programs were paternalistic, and viewed the rural poor as passive recipients.  The Third 
and Fourth Five-Year Plans (1961-66 and 1969-1974, respectively) implemented growth-
oriented strategies, and assumed that increases in wealth and production would trickle-down to 
the most impoverished (Singh 2005).  These programs included the Intensive Agricultural 
District Programme, the High Yielding Varieties Programme, and the Intensive Cattle 
Development Programme.  The goal of these programs was to bring about a rapid increase in 
agricultural production through a combination of services and inputs to individual farmers (Singh 
2005).  The government leaders and those who implemented these programs incorrectly assumed 
that women were not involved in agricultural work, and these programs targeted men only (Berry 
2007).  This was despite the fact that many women were involved in agricultural work, either to 
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supplement their husbands’ income or because they were the main providers for their families 
(Berry 2007).  
The policy-makers who created the agricultural development programs were not the only 
ones to take a modernization perspective in their planning during the 1950s-1960s.  The 
Education Commission and other education policy-makers in India took a modernization 
perspective as well.  During the first three Five-Year Plans, the Indian government placed a high 
priority on technical education, and most of the achievements in education after India’s 
independence took place in this area (Naik 1965).  J. P. Naik, the Member-Secretary of the 
Education Commission in 1964, stated that the “relentless pursuit of knowledge” (Naik 1965:94) 
is what sets apart a modern society from a traditional society.  Therefore, he argued, the Indian 
government needed to emphasize university education, and post-graduate research and teaching.  
Naik also maintained that “…education is the most important single factor which leads to 
economic growth…” (Naik 1965:35).  He contended that education should inculcate attitudes 
and values in students that would promote democratic thinking. He stated that teachers should 
encourage discussion, free thinking, and group participation in activities.  Students should also 
develop attitudes that will spur on economic growth, such as working hard, a willingness to do 
manual labor, cooperation, and thriftiness (Naik 1965).  Naik also stated that technology and 
science should be central in the educational system.  He emphasized the importance in teaching 
children to have a rational, secular, empirical outlook.  He also maintained that it was important 
to teach science to adults as well, so that they would develop scientific attitudes that they could 
apply to their work in agriculture and industry.  Naik argued that this would lead to an increase 
in efficiency and therefore an increase in production (Naik 1965).   He also stated that it was 
important to have a strong family-planning program in which adults are educated and motivated 
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to limit the number of children they have. He said this was important so that the overall birth rate 
would decrease to 50% of what it currently was. They stated that at the secondary level of 
education (grades 9-10), there should be an expansion in the number of facilities that provide 
vocational and technical education, and that this education should be designed around the current 
employment needs of India.   
One example of a modernization program is the Community Development Programme 
(CDP) started by Nehru in 1952 to encourage farming households to implement modern 
agricultural and home science practices (Berry 2007).  He patterned the CDP after the programs 
of the U.S. Agricultural Extension Service.  The Ford Foundation funded the Comparative 
Extension Project, which was part of the Community Development Programme.  The 
Comparative Extension Project promoted modern, capital-driven agricultural practices that were 
also being promoted in the U.S.  Project workers encouraged Indian farmers to change the crops 
that they grew according to market demand rather than planting the same crops season after 
season.  Project workers also promoted capital-intensive methods of farming that they viewed 
more progressive than farmers’ traditional practices of investing little money.  They encouraged 
farmers to make agricultural decisions apart from religious or social considerations, and to 
produce crops to sell on the market rather than for subsistence needs (Berry 2007).  Like other 
modernization practitioners, those who implemented the Comparative Extension Project assumed 
that rural Indian farmers utilized traditional farming methods unreflexively, and must be taught 
to take a more rational, entrepreneurial approach to farming in order to spur on economic growth 
(Berry 2007).  The Comparative Extension Project was clearly androcentric since project 
workers only provided men with agricultural knowledge and inputs, even though there were 
women who worked as farm laborers or who participated in agricultural production for 
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subsistence needs of their households (Berry 2007).  It also promoted “progressive” agriculture, 
which was seen as connected to the market, consumerism, and the desire to accumulate material 
wealth.  These project workers did not consider how these “modern” farming methods robbed 
women of their agency and their access to resources, and also lowered their status.  
Although the agricultural programs of the First through Fourth Five-Year Plans were 
primarily for men, the Indian government did create some programs for women.  The First Five-
Year Plan (1951-56) and Second Five Year Plan (1956-1961) took a welfarist approach to 
women and development (Subramaniam 2006).  During this period, the Planning Commission 
put forth the “Plans and Prospects for Social Welfare in India, 1951-61,” which stated that social 
services were to be provided for any group of people that were handicapped in some way, either 
physically, mentally, socially, or economically (Chaudhuri 2007).  This statement included 
women as a class of handicapped people.  The Indian state viewed women as beneficiaries of 
development programs, but did not consult women in the formulation of the policies or in 
implementing them (Subramaniam 2006).  The Third and Fourth Five-Year Plans continued to 
provide welfare services for women, but still excluded women from the policy-making process.  
Men in government positions designed the women’s programs and defined what they believed to 
be “women’s interests.”  They viewed women as dependents of the state, and did not address 
women’s rights.  The government leaders who designed the welfare programs assumed that 
women would have access to them, and did not consider how unequal gender relations 
constrained women’s access to the services (Subramaniam 2006). 
 During the same period that Nehru founded the Comparative Extension Project, foreign 
donors and development organizations provided training and education for rural Indian women 
(Berry 2007).  These donors and organizations trained women in the areas of Western, modern 
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forms of health and nutrition, contraceptive use, and how to be better home-makers and mothers 
(Berry 2007).  Rural Indian women were the targets of these development programs, and were 
not participants in deciding how to implement these programs (Berry 2007).  Development 
planners assumed that they had to “give” the Indian women resources.  Like other practitioners 
coming from a modernization perspective, they assumed that the Western value of small family 
size is superior to values of less-developed societies.  Development interventions included 
introducing contraceptives to women and encouraging them to limit the size of their families.  
They did not recognize the possibility that rural, Indian women might choose to have many 
children to help provide for them in their old age (Tinker 1997). 
 
3.2.4 WID programs: empowering women to participate in the labor force 
 
The WID approach to development focuses on the importance of women’s agency in the 
economic sphere, and also emphasizes the need to increase women’s educational and financial 
assets, such as through vocational training.  As do those who take the modernization approach, 
those who take the WID approach see power as something that development organizations can 
give to people in less-developed nations, and that this power is economic power.  Unlike 
modernization advocates, however, WID proponents stress that women’s opportunities to act on 
their choices is limited, and that it’s necessary to expand opportunities for women to participate 
in the market.  Scholars and practitioners also argue that economic institutions are not gender-
neutral, and that women do not have equal access to paid labor as men. They argue that in many 
cases industrialization, the shift from subsistence agriculture to agriculture for export, and the 
introduction of new farming technology and techniques has had a negative impact on women’s 
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economic position and overall well-being (Boserup 1970).    Although WID practitioners argue 
that it is important to expand women’s opportunities to participate in waged labor, they neglect 
other aspects of women’s empowerment.  Like modernization practitioners, WID practitioners 
do not challenge traditional gender roles, and they don’t pay attention to how women’s limited 
choices within the household negatively impact their well-being.  WID practitioners attempt to 
expand the opportunities for women in the economic sphere, but they do not challenge the 
power-holders in institutions who maintain unequal power relations between women and men. 
One example of a development organization that takes the WID approach to women’s 
programs is India Development Service.  India Development Service (IDS) was founded in 1979 
in Dharwad district, Karnataka, in an especially poor, drought-prone blockvi (Viswanath 1991).  
The goal of IDS is to develop people’s skills, create cooperatives, bring new life to traditional 
occupations, and to provide employment opportunities that the people did not already have.  All 
of the women’s programs of IDS are geared toward giving women more opportunities to be 
involved in paid labor and to increase their incomes.  Like other WID projects, IDS has let 
traditional gender roles in occupations guide them in their decisions about what types of 
programs to implement.  Some of the projects that they have started for women include the dairy 
project, the spinning project, and the leather project.   
The dairy project started in 1981, and serves only women because women are the ones 
who traditionally care for livestock.  The women needed a supplementary form of income source 
due to low agricultural yields, and there was a market for milk in nearby towns.  The goal of this 
project is to help women buy livestock through access to bank loans, to provide veterinary care 
and training so that women can properly care for livestock, to increase fodder production, and to 
increase avenues for collecting, distributing, and marketing milk.  IDS started dairy cooperatives 
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and rented buildings for the refrigeration of the milk.  The dairy cooperative members brought 
their milk to the dairy every day and were paid once a week, and one member of the cooperative 
was paid to distribute the milk to customers.  Some women were trained and paid to test the milk 
for quality that was brought to the dairy each day. 
The spinners project started in 1984-85, and assists 70-75 spinners.  The goal of the 
project is to provide women employment security as they pursue their traditional occupation of 
spinning.  The villages of the block that IDS serves had been well-known for decades for their 
wool production, spinning, and weaving of wool products.  Because the wool industry is 
comprised of shepherds, spinners and weavers, IDS provides assistance to people in all three of 
these occupations.  In a single household, women will card and spin the wool, and men will 
weave it into kamblis, or blankets, to be sold.  IDS assists spinners in accessing credit from 
banks, which allows them greater decision-making power when they purchase wool.  With the 
cash they borrow from the bank, the women are able to buy higher-quality wool at the best price 
rather than being forced to buy wool at usurious rates from dishonest wool merchants.  IDS has 
also provided the women with material resources in the form of improved technology for storing 
and spinning the wool, and has provided educational resources by helping them with improving 
and marketing their product.  Although the spinners project has empowered women to escape the 
exploitation of dishonest wool merchants, IDS does not help the women to organize and directly 
challenge the power of these exploitative merchants. 
The leather project was originally started for men since leatherwork is traditionally a 
Scheduled Caste, male occupation.  However, in 1986 IDS decided to switch to training women 
only since the Scheduled Caste women needed a reliable income source.  The goal of the 
program is to train women so that they can start their own leather-making businesses.  The 
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women’s training program began in 1986, and included training in literacy, marketing and 
manufacturing.  The women were trained in making leather slippers, and spent the first year 
learning how to create different styles and produce the slippers.  In the second year, they learned 
how to improve the quality of their work and how to market their products (Viswanath 1991).  
The women also receive a stipend while in the training program that is twice as much as they 
could make doing agricultural labor. 
The women’s programs of IDS have had mixed success.  For instance, even though in 
1985 the amount of milk that was being produced and brought to the dairy was as high as 105 
liters a day, this amount dropped to only 30 liters a day by 1987.  Also, when the dairy project 
initially started, women often used the bank loans that were meant for buying cattle to pay off 
other expenses instead.  Even though IDS helps women in the spinners project to procure bank 
loans to buy wool, ultimately any increases in household income will go to the entire household 
rather than to the women themselves. This is because the men are the ones who weave the spun 
yarn into the final product to be sold.  The spinners project may help increase the income of the 
entire household, but it is not clear how much women benefit from this.  Even though women 
spinners are brought into the market, they may not have gained decision-making power in how 
the money is spent.  Also, in the area that IDS serves, women are usually the last to eat at 
mealtimes, and they get whatever is left after everyone else has eaten (Viswanath 1991).  
Women’s unequal access within the household to basic resources needed to survive is not 
addressed by the spinners’ project, nor by the other projects for women.  The leather project has 
some positive aspects, such as making it possible for women to set up their own leather units 
near their homes.  This will ensure better working conditions than if these women worked as 
agricultural laborers.  Another aspect of this project that is cited as being beneficial is that it 
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means they can work close to home and look after young children, so that older children can 
attend school instead of baby-sitting.  The leather project empowers women to gain access to 
economic resources through waged labor.  However, IDS does not address the challenges may 
face as they try to produce leather products at the same time as carrying out their other domestic 
tasks, and how their dual roles in both economic and domestic work may inhibit them from 
producing as much as they might otherwise.  One potential drawback is that the leather that 
women have access to in the training program is of mediocre quality, so the quality of their final 
products suffers.  Also, they could face potential competition from well-established leather 
companies in the area that produce higher-quality leather (Viswanath 1991). 
A prime example of an organization that takes the WID approach to development is the 
Shri Mahila Griha Udyog Lijjat Papad (hereafter SMGULP).  Although SMGULP is not a 
development organization per se, it does fit under the WID framework because its focus is on 
bringing women into the paid labor force.  Moreover, the work that the women do is work that 
women traditionally do in India.  It was started by seven young women in 1959 (Ramanathan 
2007).  The seven women started a business making papad, a thin flatbread, on their terraces in 
Mumbai.  They chose to make and sell papads because they had the ingredients readily available 
in their own kitchens, the papads were easy to make and stayed fresh a long time, and because 
people throughout India eat papads with meals or as snacks.  The women decided not to ask 
anyone for donations so that the organization could remain independent of the political interests 
of donor agencies (Ramanathan 2007).  More than 150 women worked with the organization 
within two years of when the original seven women founded it.  In three years there were over 
300 women members, and the leaders of the organization began distributing rolls of dough to the 
women in the morning, which the women returned the next morning in the form of freshly-made 
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papads.  The women are paid daily for the papads they make.  There are no employers or 
employees per se, and all of the members who make papads own the organization.  All of the 
members share any losses or profits that the organization makes, thus encouraging the members 
to try to increase sales and production (Ramanathan 2007).  SMGULP therefore emphasizes the 
“power-with” dimension of power.  The organization began to diversify production into other 
areas in the 1970s, such as divisions for printing, milling flour, making spices, and making 
packaging. 
Shri Mahila Griha Udyog Liggat Papad is clearly a WID organization because it takes 
women’s needs into account, such as allowing women to make papads at home so they can 
fulfill their dual roles as economic producers and housewives, and it utilizes a skill that almost 
all Indian women have (making papads).  It provides the material resources (dough) women 
need to earn money, and it certainly provides economic resources to women.  SMGULP also 
draws on “power-with,” since the institution operates as a large collective with branches in 
various states, and all of the decisions are consensual-based (Ramanathan 2007).  SMGULP has 
successfully expanded the opportunity of many women to be involved in the market, and has also 
strengthened women’s agency.  By working together, the women members of the organization 
have exercised their power to expand the business, diversify production into related divisions 
such as flour milling, printing, and packaging, and increase employment from seven members at 
its inception to about 40,000 members in 2007 (Ramanathan 2007).  SMGULP only allows 
women to become members, and thus the decisions are made by women and for women.  This is 
in contrast to some development organizations that take a gender-blind approach to development, 
such as the Grameen Bank, in which most of the people in leadership positions are men.  
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SMGULP does not take a GAD approach to development because it does not challenge current 
gender roles or unequal power relations between women and men.  
  
3.2.5 GAD programs: empowering women to transform institutions 
 
Gender and Development (GAD) programs and organizations consider both women’s agency 
and the opportunity structure in which they live/find themselves to be vital for gender equality.  
These programs and organizations stress the importance in challenging men’s “power over” 
women in order to enlarge the opportunity structure for women to act on their decisions.  
Moreover, they emphasize the need to educate women about their legal rights, and many seek to 
educate women in how to interact with police officers, government officials, and others who are 
part of formal institutions in order to expand women’s opportunities to participate in the public 
sphere.  Some GAD programs focus on the process of empowerment, such as bringing to 
women’s attention how cultural norms such as dowry reinforce girl children’s lower status vis-à-
vis boy children.  Others focus on transforming formal institutions so that women can gain 
greater space to act and make their voices heard, such as in panchayat raj (village council) 
institutions.  The GAD approach to development contrasts with the WID approach to 
development because the GAD approach says that including women’s needs in the development 
process and integrating women into the paid labor force (formal or nonformal) is not enough to 
raise women’s status and bring about greater gender equality.  Moreover, unlike modernization 
or neoliberal practitioners, organizations and practitioners that take the GAD approach do not see 
macro-level economic growth as the goal that development agencies should be pursuing, and 
they critique the blind pursuit of economic growth.  GAD scholars and practitioners challenge 
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traditional gender roles and gender hierarchies, and work toward overturning cultural values and 
norms that place a higher value on men and boys than on women and girls.  They argue that it is 
also important to examine relations between males and females within the household, such as 
how boys are privileged over girls in terms of access to health care and education.   
Development interventions that take a GAD approach educate women about their legal 
rights, as well as educate the public about issues such as violence against women, women’s 
reproductive rights, and women’s literacy and education.  Some GAD organizations are social 
movement organizations that put pressure on governments to change or enforce laws that are 
meant to enlarge the spaces in which women have to act and make decisions.  Development 
interventions taking the GAD approach often emphasize the importance of making the private 
sphere public.  These organizations and social movements include anti-dowry and anti-rape 
campaigns (Subramaniam 2006), certain women’s labor union movements such as SEWA 
(Crowell 2003), and women’s social movement organizations that struggle to uphold the equality 
of female and male children (Ray 1995).  
The Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) in India is an example of a social 
movement organization that takes the GAD approach to development.  The Self Employed 
Women’s Association (SEWA) in India was founded in 1972 and is primarily a labor union 
whose members fight to gain fair wages for poor women in the informal sector, such as 
headloaders, bidi (cigarette) rollers, cart pullers, and vegetable vendors (Mayoux 1995; Crowell 
2003).  During the 1970s, vegetable vendors organized to fight for their right to sell vegetables in 
the market free from police harassing them or forcing them to pay bribes.  During the past thirty 
years or so, SEWA has challenged men’s “power over” women, and has helped women organize 
to obtain minimum wages for self-employment and to pressure the government to pass laws 
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against exploitation of home-based workers (Bhowmik and Jhabvala 1996).  SEWA is especially 
a feminist organization because it views meeting needs and rights of women as essential for 
development to take place.  The women themselves are not only members of SEWA; they also 
decide who will lead the organization and create development strategies (Crowell 2003).  Thus, 
SEWA places a high priority on women’s agency and on widening the space in which women 
can act and lead.  SEWA organizers also educate women about their legal rights, and SEWA 
produces a magazine called “Ansuya” with women’s success stories that are read at group 
meetings (Bhowmik and Patel 1996).  SEWA also provides financial resources in the form of 
microloans through SEWA Mahila Sahakari Bank which it founded in 1974 (Mayoux 1995; 
Crowell 2003), but this is only one of several programs for women.  SEWA, like other GAD 
theorists and practitioners argue that women need to mobilize and fight for political and 
institutional change in order to eradicate gender inequality. 
As a labor union and social movement organization, SEWA is doing just that. For 
instance, women who collect gum from trees to sell to the Gujarat state government have 
mobilized to pressure the government into paying them a fair wage for the gum (Crowell 2003).  
Ela Bhatt, one of the founders of SEWA, states that the organization fights against direct 
exploitation of women in the nonformal sector, as well as against government support of those 
who exploit these women (Bhatt 1989). 
Another development organization that operates under the GAD paradigm is the 
government-sponsored program Mahila Samakhya.  Mahila Samakhya is a “hybrid” organization 
in that it is government-sponsored at the national level, but is run through NGOs at the local 
level (Sharma 2008).  It was started around the same period that the Indian government started to 
liberalize the economy and cut expenditures on welfare programs.  It was organized by feminists 
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and sponsored by the civil servant, Anil Bordia, and initially funded by the Dutch government in 
1989.  The feminists who created Mahila Samakhya believed that the main impediments to 
development are social hierarchies and women’s lack of knowledge about their rights and the 
various government programs they could turn to for support.  Feminists saw Mahila Samakhya 
as an opportunity to further their goals of gender equality in the political arena, and a way of 
promoting gender equality on a much larger scale than what they had been doing (Sharma 2008).  
At the federal level, Mahila Samakhya falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Human 
Resource Development and is run by development activists and feminists.  At the state level, 
Mahila Samakhya’s work is carried out by NGOs (Sharma 2008).  The objective of Mahila 
Samakhya is to educate women to enable them to gain greater control over their own lives 
(Subramaniam 2006).  This is accomplished through the process of organizing women into 
sanghas (groups), consciousness-raising to help women interpret their experiences in new ways, 
and discussion of cultural norms that reinforce women’s low status.   
I next highlight two researchers who conducted qualitative studies on Mahila Samakhya, 
who came to very different conclusions in terms of how empowering Mahila Samakhya really is 
for the women who are involved with the organization.  Sharma (2008) carried out her study in 
Uttar Pradesh, a northern state known for its strong patriarchal norms.  Subramaniam (2006) 
conducted her study in the southern state of Karnataka, which has more egalitarian gender norms 
compared to Uttar Pradesh.  I seek to highlight how even the same women’s organization or 
program may have different success rates in lowering gender inequality in different regions of 
the country.    
Sharma (2008) carried out a qualitative study of the Mahila Samakhya program in the 
state of Uttar Pradesh to examine how “empowerment is conceptualized and implemented as a 
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strategy of development and governance and what it does on the ground” (Sharma 2008:xix.)  
She spent over 20 months carrying out ethnographic fieldwork, mostly during 1998-1999.  She 
interviewed women who were either sangha (group) members or who worked for Mahila 
Samakhya.  She conducted participant observation in two adjacent villages, one with Mahila 
Samakhya present, and one without.  She also conducted institutional ethnographic work to 
analyze the practices and organization of Mahila Samakhya by making visits to MS locations in 
Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Assam, Rajasthan, and Maharashtra.  She went to staff meetings, went 
with program functionaries on their daily rounds, and in total interviewed over 90 people from 
all institutional levels of Mahila Samakhya.  Although the purpose of Mahila Samakhya is to 
empower women to take greater control over their lives, Sharma found that there are gender and 
class inequalities between women who staff Mahila Samakhya and the men who serve as state 
bureaucrats, and that MS bureaucrats reproduce gender inequalities (Sharma 2008).  For 
instance, state bureaucrats conceive of the empowerment “social work” that staff workers do as 
being “naturally” feminine work, and therefore non-skilled labor.  The women staff workers of 
MS are also not considered “heads of households,” even though in reality many staff workers 
were divorced, widowed, or evicted from their homes by their husbands.  As a result, these 
women were not paid enough to live on.  In two states where Mahila Samakhya first started, the 
staff tried to unionize in order to get more regular pay.  However, the mobilizations were 
quelled, and many of the staff workers in one state were fired.   One of her informants stated that 
the Indian government “does not integrate the element of struggle that lies at the heart of 
empowerment” (Sharma 2008:67).  This can be seen in how women staff workers are not 
allowed to get involved in any protests or mobilization efforts against the state, even if the 
sangha members that the staff workers oversaw planned the protests.  Sangha members’ matters 
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were usually related to legal issues, land titles, meeting basic needs, and dealing with police, all 
of which were matters related to bureaucracies.  The MS employees were disempowered by state 
authorities from helping the women in the sanghas (Sharma 2008). 
Subramaniam (2006) also conducted a qualitative case study of Mahila Samakhya, but 
she came to very different conclusions from those Sharma drew.  Subramaniam carried out her 
fieldwork in 1998-99 and 2001-2002 in four districts of Karnataka state.  She took both a macro 
and micro approach.  At the macrolevel, she examined party politics and the women’s movement 
in India, and analyzed the Indian state’s Five-Year Plans, as well as the three government 
“Reports on Women”.  At the microlevel, she carried out ethnographic work on a sample of 31 
women’s sanghas under the Mahila Samakhya program in Karnataka in 1998 (MSK hereafter).  
The sanghas in Karnataka are informal groups of scheduled caste and scheduled tribe women 
with about 20 women per group.  The MSK program is not target-driven and desired outcomes 
are defined at the village-level by the women in the sanghas rather than by the state.  MSK’s 
goal is to bring about changes in formal and informal institutions so that women have a broader 
space in which to act and make their voices heard.  Sangha members discuss their beliefs, local 
cultural norms, and the importance in schooling for girls.  One of the goals of MSK is to create a 
demand for educating girls, with the aim of changing gender relations in the society.  
Subramaniam discovered that some aspects of MSK did help women challenge gender 
inequalities in their lives and communities.  The sangha leaders, or sahayoginis, provide 
information on laws, women’s rights, and assistance from government programs to the sangha 
members.  Being a part of these collectives helps to increase the women’s self-confidence and 
self-esteem (psychological resources).  MSK also conducts training workshops and programs 
where women from different sanghas and villages come together and meet other women.  At 
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these training meetings the women learn about aspects of social life that lead to gender 
inequality, such as child marriage.  There are also village, taluk, and district-level meetings that 
create a space for women to express their ideas, and for consciousness-raising to take place.  
Consciousness-raising helps the women to interpret their experiences in new ways, and helps 
them to think of themselves as individuals and also as members of a collective instead of just 
members of a family.  Once they see themselves as individuals who can take on roles other than 
that of wife or mother, the women begin to see how they can take action in order to bring about 
change in their lives.  They gain “power within” in the form of courage and a changed identity, 
and they gain “power with” in the form of solidarity in order to challenge those who have 
“power over them”.  The women in the sanghas share information and experiences, which 
creates solidarity among the women so that they can fight injustice, such as caste hierarchies.  
The sangha members that Subramaniam observed did start challenging caste-based 
discrimination in their villages, and in some cases the men joined them in this struggle.  
Although MSK is successful in many ways in empowering women, Subramaniam found 
that new forms of inequality developed at intermediate organizational levels (Subramaniam 
2006).  The sahayoginis learn how to interact with local-level officials and gain new knowledge 
through their positions as MSK staff workers, which leads to their own empowerment.  
However, this often leads to unequal power relations between the sahayoginis and the sangha 
members since the sahayoginis have a greater access to knowledge and information than the 
sangha members do.  Also, even though the sahayoginis provide information to sangha members 
and stress that the village members themselves must decide whether to form a sangha, what 
goals to set, and how to take action, there is a tendency for the sanghas to become overly 
dependent on the leadership of the sahayoginis.  The sahayoginis themselves must deal with 
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threats from powerful groups in the villages as they carry out their work.  Additionally, even 
though MSK holds training programs for women running for office and elected to the Panchayat 
Raj, many times men discourage the women from attending the training sessions.  Moreover, 
men often try to coerce the women elected to the Panchayat Raj to be mere signatories for the 
plans that men in the Panchayat Raj want to carry out (Subramaniam 2006). 
 
3.2.6 Neoliberal programs: empowering women to help themselves 
 
Like development programs that come from the modernization perspective, development 
programs that come from the neoliberal perspective have economic growth as their ultimate goal.  
With the neoliberal approach to development, the focus is on integrating as many people as 
possible into the market, whether as business owners, wage laborers, or farmers growing cash 
crops rather than crops for subsistence needs. However, whereas modernization practitioners and 
policy-makers stressed the importance of state intervention in order to bring about economic 
growth, neoliberal policy-makers stressed the need for governments to decrease spending on 
welfare programs to encourage individual responsibility (Hyatt 2001, Goldstein 2001).  
According to neoliberal ideology, government intervention to alleviate poverty is disempowering 
for the poor because it perpetuates the poor’s dependence on state support, thus robbing them of 
the self-confidence that they would gain by relying on themselves to meet their own needs (Hyatt 
2001).  Empowerment, then, for the neoliberal policy-maker means the withdrawal of state 
intervention so that the individual can realize self-management, take over responsibility for his or 
her own needs, as well as work with others to take care of the needs of the community such as 
maintaining infrastructure  and educational facilities (Hyatt 2001, Goldstein 2001, Sharma 2008).  
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According to the neoliberal paradigm, any kind of economic failure or success is dependent on 
the individual, not on structural factors (Goldstein 2001).vii In the Indian context, these structural 
factors include widespread discrimination against dalits or women, government corruption, and 
the state’s failure to enforce laws such as women’s property rights. 
The development interventions of organizations and practitioners that take a neoliberal 
approach often center on microfinance—lending small amounts of capital to people and 
encouraging them to start small businesses.  Development programs and practitioners that take 
this approach are concerned with economic efficiency and spurring on as much economic growth 
in a society as possible.  These development organizations, and especially microfinance 
institutions, overwhelmingly target women because women make up 70% of the world’s poorest, 
they tend to use the economic resources they bring into the household for the entire family rather 
than on luxury items for themselves, and they are seen as more docile and cooperative with MFI 
rules (Cheston and Kuhn 2002, Ahmed et. al. 2001, Kristof and WuDunn 2009).  That is, they 
take an instrumental approach by giving women credit since they believe this is the most 
efficient way to alleviate poverty and raise the living standards of the poor.  Microcredit 
programs and organizations that come from a neoliberal perspective take individual women’s 
agency as a given, and assume that if they are given financial resources in the form of credit, 
they can and will make profitable decisions in investing those resources.  However, they do not 
consider how structural factors limit the choices that women are able to make, such as how 
women’s unequal access to waged labor and their limited mobility in the public sphere may 
leave them no option other than economic work in the informal sector, the very work that 
microcredit loans are generally used for.  Unlike organizations that take the GAD approach to 
development, organizations that use the neoliberal approach to development do not attempt to 
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challenge patriarchal social structures to expand women’s opportunities to participate in the 
public sphere, such as in waged employment or politics.  
Microcredit organizations and programs assert that they empower women by giving them 
a way to increase their income and to provide for their families’ needs.  However, in some 
respects, these neoliberal microcredit programs may actually disempower women.  For example, 
microcredit programs usually require women to form small groups in order to take out loans.  
This is because the women targeted for loans have nothing to use as collateral against the default 
of the loan.  The women in these small groups, it is argued, put pressure on one another to pay 
back their share of the loan in a timely manner, and therefore act as “social collateral” so that the 
group can take out subsequent loans (Todd 1996).   Women exercise disciplinary power over 
themselves and other group members (Lairap-Fonderson 2002).  They must attend regular 
meetings, make small re-payments on a regular basis (regardless of whether they have just faced 
a crisis such as a major illness) and face constant surveillance and group pressure so that they 
can take out subsequent loans.  Moreover, while MFIs that take a neoliberal approach mainly 
target women to take out loans, the majority of the bank workers are men (Rahman 1999).  Thus, 
women have very little power to decide how the MFIs should be managed, or the conditions 
under which borrowers can take out loans.     
Although the international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank began enforcing neoliberal structural adjustment policies on borrower nations 
starting in the 1980s, India did not follow neoliberal economic policies until 1991 (Singh 2005).  
India’s New Economic Policy consisted of de-regulation, privatization, and globalization of 
businesses, and emphasized increased integration into the global economy.  The reasoning 
behind the New Economic Policy is that globalization will increase economic growth, and that 
114 
economic growth is the best way to decrease poverty and unemployment.  The Indian 
government therefore focused on developing industries for export (Marius-Gnanou 2003).  Prior 
to the 1990s, the Indian government had taken the primary responsibility in initiating and 
overseeing development programs (Marius-Gnanou 2003).  For instance, in the 1970s the Indian 
government started several employment schemes, such as the Rural Works Programme, the Pilot 
Intensive Rural Employment Projects, the National Rural Employment Programme, and the 
Rural Landless Employment Guarantee Programme (Singh 2005). Beginning in the early 1990s, 
the government began to assign more and more development programs over to the care of 
development NGOs. This included government-sponsored microcredit programs, which 
previously had been overseen by government bureaucrats (Marius-Gnanou 2003).  The 
government of India also started to organize micro-credit self-help groups (SHGs hereafter) and 
to link them to banks beginning in 1992 (Kalpana 2008).  Prior to 1999, there were other self-
employment programs in existence, such as the Development of Women and Children in Rural 
Areas (DWCRA) and the Training of Rural Youth for Self-Employment (TRYSEM) (Singh 
2005).  In 1999, the government organized all of the state-sponsored rural development programs 
under the national Swarnjayanti Gram Swarozar Yojana (SGSY) program, and focused on 
lending credit and subsidies to women of below-poverty level households (Kalpana 2008).  The 
SGSY program replaced the DWCRA and TRYSEM programs that had existed earlier (Tapan 
2005).  Formal banking institutions are reluctant to lend to the rural poor because it is not 
profitable for them to do so and it is difficult for banking institutions to reach them in such 
remote areas.  Institutions in the formal banking sector also believe that the rural poor have no 
resources, do not know how to manage their money, and have too many immediate needs to be 
able to invest the loans.  The Indian government created the SGSY program to meet the rural 
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poor’s need for credit that the formal banking system could not fulfill.  SGSY encompasses a 
range of micro-enterprise development activities, such as the formation of women’s credit self-
help groups, marketing, and training (Singh 2005).  SGSY provides government subsidies and 
credit to individuals with the goal of raising the borrower’s family above the official poverty line 
within three years (Tapan 2005).  The Indian government stipulates that 50% of the program’s 
recipients should come from scheduled tribes or scheduled castes.  Under the SGSY, women’s 
SHGs are linked to banks through the District Rural Development Agency (DRDA) and the 
Block Development Offices (BDO) in order to receive both microcredit and government 
subsidies.  The banks that provide microcredit include national commercial banks, cooperative 
banks, and rural banks. Tamil Nadu is one state in India that has actively promoted women’s 
microcredit programs under SGSY (Kalpana 2008).   
In the next few paragraphs I discuss in detail two different studies of women’s 
microcredit programs, one in Tamil Nadu state and one in West Bengal state.  Like the 
researchers who studied Mahila Samakhya, the two researchers who studied these microcredit 
programs came to very different conclusions about the impacts that the microcredit programs had 
on raising the status of women who borrowed from them.  I discuss these two cases because they 
bring to light some methodological issues in studying the impact of women’s microcredit 
programs on raising gender equality.  The microcredit groups that both researchers studied were 
facilitated directly by NGOs, although the microcredit groups in the Tamil Nadu study operated 
under the auspices of a state-run scheme.  Both of the researchers built an argument either for or 
against the empowering effects that the formation of microcredit groups has on women.  
However, they did not discuss whether the NGOs that oversee the microcredit groups also have 
other types of women’s programs.   
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Kalpana (2008) carried out a qualitative study of women’s microcredit groups in the state 
of Tamil Nadu, which is one state that has been actively promoting women’s microcredit 
programs starting in the 1990s.  In Tamil Nadu, NGOs are linked to the Tamil Nadu Women’s 
Development Corporation (TNWDC) through the Tamil Nadu state scheme, Mahilar Thittam.  
Mahilar Thittam trains NGOs and provides them with financial and technical help from the 
Women’s Development Corporation.  The NGOs then organize, train, and supervise microcredit 
self-help groups (SHGs hereafter).  About seventy percent of the SHGs in Tamil Nadu operate 
through this state-NGO partnership, although it’s hard to obtain exact numbers (Kalpana 2008).  
Kalpana conducted interviews with staff at several types of NGOs that have microcredit 
programs operating under the SGSY in Tamil Nadu.  She also carried out fieldwork in one 
district of Tamil Nadu to study 27 women’s SHGs that were from 3-7 years old.  Kalpana found 
that there are a number of contraints on potential SHG members.  Banks often require women to 
repay their husband’s or relatives’ previous bank loans before the bank would give a loan to their 
SHG.  Many banks required a “no-objection” letter from all of the nearby banks stating that none 
of the SHG members have relatives that owe any of these banks money.  Banks often force SHG 
members to drop out of the group if they have relatives who owe money as a condition for the 
group to receive the loan.  This is despite the fact that official SGSY rules state that “non-willful 
defaulters” can still receive loans through SHGs.  This pressure from the banks often leads to 
conflict within families as SHG members pressure relatives to repay their loans.  There is often 
distrust between SHG members and bank staff because the bank staff don’t clearly explain the 
interest rates on the loans to the women.  Bank managers are also not understanding of the costs 
that women make in order to visit the bank, since the women must take time away from waged 
labor.  Moreover, some of the SHGs comprised of Scheduled Caste members experienced caste-
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based discrimination when trying to access loans, even though there is no evidence to support the 
bank managers’ fears that these SHGs would not repay the loans.  Kalpana found that there are 
often tensions within SHGs as well.  For instance, SHG coordinators often hold their own group 
members to even more stringent repayment standards than the banks required, such as fining 
members for every day their payment is late, sometimes even if a group member faced a family 
emergency.  SHG coordinators often demanded that the group members repay the loan in half the 
amount of time that they were actually allowed by the bank  
Although Kalpana found that there were many unintended negative consequences to 
these microcredit groups, she also discovered that there are some positive aspects as well.  The 
women who belong to SHGs experience an increase in their social status because of their 
contacts with banks and other state institutions.  For example, SHGs with links to banks are 
invited to all village governance meetings.  SHGs also use their “official” status as leverage to 
threaten abusive husbands.  Also, police are more likely to listen to a complaint brought to them 
by an entire SHG than to a complaint brought by an individual woman who is being harassed by 
her husband or in-laws (Kalpana 2008).   
Samyal (2009) conducted a qualitative case study in 2004 of women involved in a 
microcredit program run by two different NGOs in the state of West Bengal.  Samyal’s main 
research question driving her research was, “Does microfinance promote women’s capability to 
address social problems in their communities and influence social norms?” (Samyal 2009:531).  
She interviewed 400 women across 59 different microcredit groups.  There are very restrictive 
cultural norms regarding women’s behavior in West Bengal, and women often must remain in 
seclusion or be accompanied by a male relative if they go to the market.  They also generally do 
not have much interaction with women outside of their husband’s family, and aren’t able to 
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develop social ties with non-family members.  She examined the social impact of microcredit, 
and also the impact that borrowing made on the empowerment of individual women.    Samyal 
also discovered that women’s membership in the microcredit programs led to the development of 
social capital among the women, which she defines as “the ability and tendency to offer or draw 
on help in the event of personal problems and to address public problems in the community, 
whether through individual or collective action” (Samyal 2009:535).  Microcredit groups met 
every other week, and at the meeting the women discussed members’ loan requests, as well as 
personal problems and community issues.  The NGOs running the microcredit programs held 
microfinance training and leadership training once a year.  At these training programs, the 
women learned about their legal rights, and how to critique social norms, as well as finance-
related skills such as bookkeeping methods.  The women attended these conventions in large 
numbers, and had a greater opportunity to interact in public than they had before.  The 
microcredit groups are federated into village clusters, making it easier for women to organize 
with women from other neighborhoods, thus increasing their collective strength. 
Overall, Samyal found that one-third of the microcredit groups were involved in 
collective action to solve some community problem.  When she interviewed these women, she 
found that none of the women had taken part in collective action before joining the microcredit 
groups.  Some groups took collective action to counter domestic violence, sanction men involved 
in extramarital affairs or men who had abandoned their wives, and to sanction under-age 
marriages.  Still other groups conducted anti-liquor campaigns in villages where male alcoholism 
was associated with domestic violence.  Some groups mobilized to repair village roads and 
attended village council meetings to demand public goods, such as water pumps and sanitation 
facilities.  Samyal argued that the financial incentive of receiving credit is very important in 
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recruiting and retaining group membership, but that obtaining credit is not what causes women to 
engage in collective action.  She argued that frequent contact with other group members fosters 
intimacy, trust, and concern for other group members.  Also, women in one group get to know 
women in groups from nearby neighborhoods.    Moreover, these social networks can lead to an 
increase in women’s reputation when their groups are involved in collective action (Samyal 
2009).  
It is important to note that the NGOs in Samyal’s study included education about legal 
rights, and taught the women to analyze social norms that promoted gender inequality.  Thus, 
membership in a microcredit group that fosters social networks in itself may not lead to women 
gaining the collective strength that they need to challenge unequal power relations and to enlarge 
the space they have in which to act.  Samyal did not discuss whether the NGOs that she studied 
also have women’s rights-based programs that challenge gender hierarchies, or if the NGOs only 
have women’s microcredit programs.  It is important to consider how all of an organization’s 
programs for women may influence women to engage in collective action.  If Samyal had chosen 
to study two types of NGOs, one with only women’s microcredit programs and one with 
women’s microcredit programs and women’s rights programs, she may have found that women’s 
microcredit groups from only the second NGO engaged in collective action.   
Organizations that sponsor/run women’s microcredit programs may have a range of 
programs for women other than just microcredit.  Other organizations may provide only 
microcredit and no other programs for women.  It is necessary to analyze the impact of the range 
of these different programs on changes in women’s status.  Researchers have conducted 
numerous case studies of various women’s microcredit programs in India, and very few have 
found that microcredit group members have engaged in the type of collective action that the 
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women in Samyal’s study were engaged in. For example, one researcher studied SHARE 
Microfin, which is a Grameen-style microcredit organization in Andhra Pradesh (Rajivan 2005).  
The researcher found that SHARE does not have women’s empowerment as one of its 
objectives, and it does not provide gender training to its staff or borrowers.  Although the 
researcher stated that the women’s microcredit groups have the ability to bring their needs before 
local political bodies, there was no group involvement in local politics, and there were very few 
incidents of women’s groups engaging in collective action to deal with grievances.   
The DHAN Foundation in Tamil Nadu stands in contrast to the example of SHARE 
Microfin.  The DHAN Foundation not only provides women with microcredit and finance-
related training; it also focuses on helping women address gender inequalities (Padia 2005, 
DHAN web site).  Before DHAN introduces a women’s microcredit program into a new area, 
staff workers begin by meeting with women and discussing social issues such as female 
infanticide, suicide, and other gender and civic issues.  Once the staff have established a rapport 
with the women, they begin the microcredit programs.  Women’s microcredit groups have raised 
issues before the local governing bodies, such as needs for electricity and facilities for potable 
water.  In some cases, they have solved community problems themselves if, after voicing the 
problems at the village council meetings, the village council did nothing.  Federations of 
women’s microcredit groups have started programs for girls’ education and initiated 
reproductive health awareness camps (Padia 2005).  
  I have highlighted all of these studies of microcredit programs in India because even 
though the microcredit programs themselves would be considered neoliberal programs, the 
findings of the studies are very different.  At first glance, it may appear that these examples show 
that not all microcredit programs have the same outcomes for the women who borrow from 
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them.  However, some of the development organizations that run the women’s microcredit 
programs also work towards expanding women’s rights and challenging patriarchal norms, while 
other organizations do not.    It is therefore important to analyze whether combinations of 
different types of programs impact changes in gender inequality differently.  Moreover, 
microlevel case studies cannot tell us about the overall effect of women’s microcredit groups on 
changes in gender inequality, whether within states or across the entire country of India.  
Therefore, it would be useful to examine the effects of women’s neoliberal programs 
(microcredit), GAD programs, and WID programs on changes in gender inequality over larger 
regions of India, such as states or regions.   
3.3 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have discussed how many development organizations stress the importance of 
women’s “empowerment,” notwithstanding the fact that this word has taken on different 
meanings for organizations that come from different development paradigms.  I have highlighted 
women’s microlending organizations and women’s rights organizations in India and Bangladesh 
as examples of how some organizations equate “empowerment” with economic power, whereas 
others equate it with challenging social structures that reinforce gender inequalities.  I have also 
reviewed various conceptualizations of power, and explained how conceptualizations of power 
and empowerment can help us classify development programs as modernization, WID, GAD, or 
neoliberal-type programs.  Modernization policy-makers and practitioners provided material 
assets and informational assets such as training in new agricultural methods to men.  They did 
not recognize how opportunity structures of women and lower-caste men prevented them from 
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benefitting from these development programs.  WID practitioners emphasized women’s agency 
in the economic sphere and focused on the need to expand women’s opportunity structure so that 
they are able to participate more fully in waged employment. They provided educational assets 
such as vocational training and also created development programs that provided greater 
employment opportunities for women.  GAD practitioners emphasized women’s agency in all 
spheres, including the domestic, economic, and political spheres.  They stressed the importance 
of challenging patriarchal structures in order to enlarge women’s opportunity structures to act on 
their own choices in all areas of their lives.  GAD practitioners also focused on providing women 
with informational assets such as education about their legal rights.  Neoliberal practitioners 
focused on providing women with financial assets in the form of credit, and assumed women 
have the ability to make profitable business choices with the money they are given.  They did not 
pay attention to how women’s opportunity structures may limit the choices that women are able 
to make in how to use this credit.   
Finally, I have provided examples of Indian development programs of each type.  In the 
next chapter, I discuss my study hypotheses, data, and research methods that I use to assess the 
impact of women’s programs coming from differing development paradigms and employing 
different definitions of empowerment on changes in gender inequality in India.
                                                 
NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE 
iii Traditionally the family of the bride must give a large sum of money and other material assets, such as household 
goods, to the family of the groom (Subramaniam 2006, Ganguly-Scrase 2000).  From the 1950s onward, grooms’ 
families have demanded larger and larger dowries from brides’ families, so much so that it is often very difficult for 
brides’ families to afford the dowries demanded of them.  Often the groom’s family continues to make requests of 
the new bride’s family, even after she is married.  If the bride’s family is unable or refuses to meet these additional 
requests, the new bride is often harassed or even burned to death.  By the late 1970s, this had become a common 
enough problem to earn the name “dowry murders” (Subramaniam 2006). 
 
iv For many years, son preference has led many Indian families/parents to kill their female children through 
poisoning, neglect, suffocation, and other means (Ray 1999).  In 1974, amniocentesis tests were introduced as a new 
123 
                                                                                                                                                             
medical technology in Mumbai at the All-India Institute for Medical Sciences.  These tests were originally meant to 
uncover congenital abnormalities.  However, a study conducted in the mid-1970s revealed that the main reason why 
Indian couples had amniocentesis tests done was to learn the sex of the fetus.  Ninety percent of couples who learned 
that the fetus was female desired to have an abortion (Gandhi and Shah 1991:128, cited in Ray 1999:103).  
Beginning in the mid-1980s, the Forum Against Oppression of Women and the Forum Against Sex Determination 
and Sex Preselection held campaigns against the use of amniocentesis as a sex-determination test.  The Forum 
Against Sex Determination and Sex Preselection carried out these campaigns into the early 1990s. 
 
v Traditionally in some lower-caste communities, the groom’s family was required to pay a bride-price to the bride’s 
family (Ganguly-Scrase 2000).  Women generally played a major role in agricultural work in communities that 
observed this custom.  According to brahmanical ideology, the custom of bride-price is considered morally inferior 
to the custom of dowry.  In recent decades, more and more communities that previously had practiced the giving of 
bride-price have taken up the practice of giving dowry instead.  Some scholars believe this is due to 
“sanskritisation”.  This refers to the observance of higher-caste customs by a lower caste so that the lower caste may 
raise its status.  Other scholars believe the increased commodification of the economy is the main impetus for lower-
caste communities have increasingly taking up the custom of dowry (Srinivas 1984, Ram 1991:185-199, Randeria 
and Visaria 1984, cited in Ganguly-Scrase 2000:94). 
 
vi “Blocks” and “taluks” (or “tahsils”) are administrative divisions of districts.  A taluk is a higher-order division 
than a block, and may be comprised of a few blocks. 
 
vii There is a growing body of literature that uses Foucault’s theory of power and governance to critique the 
neoliberal project.  According to Foucault, “government” refers to more than just the institutions that carry out 
political functions (Foucault 1991, cited in Hyatt 2001).  Government also refers to “forms of expert intervention 
characteristic of modernity, including systems of welfare, social services, medicine, and urban planning, that 
encourage individuals to behave in ways commensurate with the interests of a liberal, well-tempered, regulated 
society” (Hyatt 2001:205).  According to Rose (1996, cited in Hyatt 2001), the liberal state uses a variety of 
technologies that will inculcate the values of individual citizenship that will ensure security for the society at large.  
Rose goes on to argue that neoliberal states have not withdrawn from governing their societies.  Rather, they have 
created new techniques, such as the ideology of self-discipline and self-empowerment that will enable the state to 
meet its objectives (Rose 1996, cited in Hyatt 2001; Rose 1993, cited in Goldstein 2001:236).  Sharma (2006) argues 
that the neoliberal hegemony uses the rhetoric of empowerment as a form of governmentality in order to shape 
individuals into self-governing, entrepreneurial subject-citizens who meet the objectives of the state.  Cruikshank 
(1996:233, cited in Sharma 2006:17) argues that self-help, self-esteem, and empowerment are all techniques that 
neoliberal states use to guide people to act in ways conducive of the state’s goals.   
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4.0 CHAPTER FOUR – DEVELOPMENT AND GENDER INEQUALITY: FROM 
THEORY TO HYPOTHESES 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In chapter two, I provided a brief history of development theories as they pertain to the impact of 
economic development strategies on women’s status and changes in gender inequality.  I 
discussed how modernization, women-in-development, gender-and-development, and neoliberal 
theorists have made competing claims about how the process of development impacts women, 
and the best ways of eradicating gender inequality and female oppression in developing nations.  
In chapter three, I discussed different conceptualizations of empowerment, including Alsop et 
al.’s (2006) argument that there are three important aspects of empowerment: resources, agency, 
and opportunity structure.  I used Alsop et al.’s formulation of empowerment as an analytical 
framework to sort through the many types of women’s development programs in India and to 
categorize them as modernization, WID, GAD, or neoliberal-type programs.  In this chapter, I 
describe the socio-cultural context of gender inequality in India, including variation in gender 
inequality by region and state.  I next provide a detailed discussion of three measures of gender 
inequality in India: the female/male sex ratio, female/male child sex ratio, and female/male 
literacy ratio.  I explain how these measures of gender inequality are connected to the 
modernization, WID, GAD, and neoliberal development paradigms, and how they are connected 
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to conceptualizations of empowerment. Finally, I derive hypotheses to test the competing claims 
of development theorists regarding changes in these three measures of gender inequality. 
4.2 SOCIO-CULTURAL CONTEXT OF GENDER INEQUALITY 
4.2.1 National-level changes related to gender inequality 
 
India has undergone a number of changes from Independence in 1947 to the present that relate to 
changes in women’s status and gender inequality, including rapid economic growth, legal 
reforms to expand women’s rights, women’s increased political participation, changes in 
women’s workforce participation rates, and changes in survival rates of both men and women.  
In the next few paragraphs, I discuss the legal reforms to expand women’s rights and I also 
discuss women’s political participation and workforce participation.  I discuss the demographic 
changes in section on measures of gender inequality.  I begin here by discussing the legal 
reforms that India’s leaders passed in the decades following India’s independence from Britain.   
The leaders of newly independent India passed several laws to guarantee that women had 
equal rights as men.  They drafted what was known as the Hindu Code bill in 1946, which was to 
supercede the former personal laws grounded in Hinduism that discriminated against women and 
people of lower castes (Guha 2007).  They passed this bill as several separate laws from 1950 to 
1955 (Forbes 1996).  The main purposes of the Hindu Code were to increase the status of women 
and expand their legal rights, and also to eradicate caste-based inequality (Guha 2007, Forbes 
1996).  The Hindu Marriage Act was passed in 1955, and the Hindu Succession Act, Minority 
and Guardianship Act, Adoption Act, and Maintenance Act were all passed in 1956 (Guha 
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2007).  Under the Marriage Act, divorce was legalized and polygamy was outlawed.  The Hindu 
Marriage Act also pronounced that inter-caste marriages had equal legal status as intra-caste 
marriages. Under the Hindu Succession Act, a deceased man’s wife, daughters, and sons were 
guaranteed equal inheritance rights to the man’s property, and widows and daughters were given 
the right to do what they wished with the property they inherited (Agarwal 2002).  The 
Maintenance Act ruled that if a wife was separated from her husband because he had some kind 
of serious disease or he was cruel to her, the husband must provide for the material needs of his 
wife (Guha 2007).  The Hindu Adoption Act legalized the adoption of girls and of children from 
other castes (Guha 2007, Stern 2003).  Women also gained the right to vote under the Hindu 
Code (Forbes 1996).  In 1961, the Dowry Prohibition Act made it illegal for families to give or 
take dowry when their children married (Stern 2003). 
Although India’s leaders passed several laws to help bring about greater gender equality 
in society, these laws have fallen short of their goals.  For instance, although the Hindu 
Succession Act guranteed women equal inheritance rights to their husband’s or father’s property, 
it did not guarantee women’s inheritance rights to agricultural land (Agarwal 2002).  Also, the 
laws that comprised the Hindu Code applied to Hindus, Jains, Buddhists, and Sikhs, but it did not 
apply to Muslims (Guha 2007).  As a result, Muslims continued to have their own personal laws 
based on a conservative interpretation of Islamic laws that severely limited women’s rights.  
During the 1970s, the Ministry of Education and Social Welfare appointed a committee to 
investigate women’s social status (Ministry of Education and Social Welfare 1974, cited in 
Forbes 1996).  This committee found that although important gains were made in terms of 
women’s legal rights, the status of many women had worsened since 1947 because many of them 
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were unaware of their new legal rights.  Finally, even though the Dowry Prohibition Act was 
passed in 1961, the giving and taking of dowry is still widely practiced throughout India today. 
Women played an important role in the struggle for independence, and they also played 
an important role in politics after India gained independence in 1947.  During the 1960s and 
1970s, the Indian government often sent women to other nations as ambassadors, and appointed 
women to represent India at the United Nations (Forbes 1996).  Women held political positions 
such as that of Union Health Minister in 1947, the United Nations General Assembly president in 
1953, and the Congress party general secretary in 1959.  The government also asked well-known 
women’s organizations to contribute in creating the Five-Year Plans for India’s economic 
development.  Most of the women who were involved in the creation of the Five-Year Plans 
were middle and upper-class women, and many of the women were also involved in the political 
and social reforms from the 1920s to 1940s.  
Indira Gandhi, daughter of India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, succeeded in 
gaining the highest government position of any woman in India. In 1959, she was elected as the 
Indian National Congress Party’s president (Forbes 1996).  Nehru died in 1964, and in 1966 
Indira Gandhi was elected as Prime Minister of India.  She held this position from 1966 to 1977, 
and again from 1980-1984.  She was the second woman in the world to hold the most powerful 
national government position during the twentieth century (Forbes 1996).     
 Women were elected to only 4-5% of seats in the Lok Sabha (Lower House) of 
Parliament during India’s second election (Forbes 1996).  During the 1980s, this percentage rose 
to about 7-8%.  In the Rajya Sabha (Upper House) of Parliament, women have regularly been 
elected to 7-10% of seats.  In 1991, Indian women held 7.1% of seats in Parliament, which is 
similar to the percentage of national government seats that women held in some Western nations. 
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During the same year, women held 6.3% of Parliament seats in the U.K., 5.7% of government 
seats in France, and 6.4% of national government seats in the U.S. (Forbes 1996).  In 2008, 
women held 9.2% of seats in Parliament in India (UN HDR 2010).  This percentage is lower than 
that of some Western nations such as the Sweden (47%), Spain (33.6%), France and the U.K. 
(19.6%), and the U.S. (17.0%).  However, the percentage of Indian women holding 
Parliamentary seats is similar to the percentage of women holding seats in the national 
governments of some high-income Asian nations such as Japan (12.3%) and S. Korea (13.7%) 
(UN HDR 2010). 
Although women have made great strides in their political participation, their gains in 
labor force participation are not so impressive. In 1983-84, the national average for women’s 
workforce participation rates was 34% of women in rural areas and about 15% of women in 
urban areas (NSSO 1993-94).  The average workforce participation rates for men during this 
same time period were almost 55% in rural areas and about 51% in urban areas.   Rural women’s 
average workforce participation rates fluctuated slightly between 1983 and 1993, but by 2004-05 
rural women’s workforce participation rate was 32.7% (NSSO 2004-05).  This is slightly less 
than what it was in 1983-84. Urban women’s average workforce participation rates gradually 
increased from 15.1% in 1983-84 to 16.6% in 2004-05 (NSSO 1993-94, NSSO 2004-05).   
 
4.2.2 Regional context of gender inequality 
 
India is a country with a great diversity in regional cultural norms related to gender inequality 
such as marriage and kinship patterns, sex preference, and seclusion patterns.  There are also 
regional variations in restrictions on women’s property rights, the prevalence of female child 
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neglect, and strong norms of son preference.  Northwestern states have a history of 
institutionalized gender inequality; in this region, men are likely to impose purdah (female 
seclusion), limit women’s property rights, and exhibit strong son preference. In some southern 
states, in contrast, these gendered social organizational forms are less common. Consequently, in 
the southern states, measures of inequality such as female/male sex ratios and female literacy 
rates are higher than the national average (Dreze and Sen 2004).   
In northwestern states of India, exogamous marriage patterns (marriage between partners 
who are not blood-related and who are not from the same village) tend to prevail, and the new 
bride moves into her in-laws’ household as a stranger, far from her natal family (Basu 1992; 
Agarwal 1994).  Although a young bride brings resources into the groom’s household in the form 
of a large dowry provided by her parents, these resources do not give her any kind of leverage to 
guarantee that her husband’s family will treat her well.  Her parents give the dowry directly to 
the groom’s household, and the bride has no access to these resources in the event that her living 
conditions become too unbearable for her to continue living with her in-laws (Sharma 1980, 
cited in Kandiyoti 1988).  She faces greater restrictions in her behavior in the household of her 
in-laws than in her natal household.  Her husbands’ relatives greatly curtail her freedom of 
movement, including her freedom to visit her parents.  The new bride occupies the lowest social 
position among the adults of the household, and her mother-in-law exercises a lot of control over 
her. The bride’s status among her husband’s relatives does not rise until she bears children, 
especially sons (Dyson and Moore 1983). The new bride is socialized to put the needs and 
desires of her in-laws’ household above her own needs.  This social pressure from the new wife’s 
in-laws to bear sons can often result in the new wife suffering health problems due to multiple 
child births.  
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Often marriage in northwestern states is used as a strategy to create alliances between 
different patrilineal groups of men from different lineages (Dyson and Moore 1983).  According 
to the patrilineal kinship pattern of northern India, men’s power and reputations are based on 
producing male heirs.  Since the ability to trace the lineage of sons rests on the knowledge/belief 
that female family members have had sexual relations only with their husbands, the reputation 
and honor of male kin is based at least in part on the sexual fidelity of their wives.  This is why 
the practice of purdah, or female seclusion, is much more prevalent in the northwestern region 
than the southern region of India (Basu 1992, Agarwal 1994).  One study from the Committee on 
the Status of Women in India (1974, cited in Dyson and Moore 1983:49) highlights this regional 
variation in female seclusion practices.  In 1974, the percentage of women who were in seclusion 
in Gujarat, Rajasthan, and Madhya Pradesh was about 42%, 62%, and 43%, respectively.  The 
percentage of women who were in purdah in the southern states of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, 
and Karnataka was below 10%. Institutionalized forms of gender inequality such as female 
seclusion, son preference, and dowry also obstruct the ability of women and girls to get an 
education or participate in the paid labor force (Agarwal 1994).  Therefore, female literacy rates 
tend to be much lower than male literacy rates in northwestern states where institutionalized 
gender inequality is more prevalent (Dreze and Sen 2002). 
Rajasthan state is a typical example of patriarchal norms in northwestern India.  
Rajasthan was historically dominated by the Rajputs, who belonged to the Kshatriya, or warrior 
caste just below the Brahmins at the top of the caste hierarchy (Unnithan-Kumar 1997).  The 
Rajput rulers controlled their own nation-states up until India’s Independence in 1947, and the 
social and cultural practices of the Rajputs still influence the people of Rajasthan today.  The 
Rajput clans were warriors, and created a feudal society by conquering land and peasants.  
131 
Kinship relations and loyalty to the rulers of “brotherhoods” were the basis for their right to own 
land, and there was much rivalry between kin to gain control of land and thus increase their 
prestige and power.  Two of the tenets of the Rajput ethical code were to maintain the solidarity 
of the brotherhood, and to protect women and other dependents of the brotherhood.  Members of 
a brotherhood viewed outside groups’ violation of “their” women as a challenge to that 
brotherhood’s position of power.  Moreover, both men’s and women’s power and honor are 
linked to power over women.  “Sati” (the act of a widow dying on her husband’s funeral pyre) 
and “jauhar” (collective suicide) are the most extreme examples of how women’s identity was 
linked to the honor of Rajput men.  Historically, if a particular lineage fell to military defeat, 
women sometimes committed mass suicide in order to maintain the status of the brotherhood that 
had been shamed by defeat.  Among royal Rajput families, a common view was that widows 
who burned to their death on their husband’s funeral pyre increased the status of themselves as 
well as the status of their relatives.  A much more common form of gender oppression among 
Rajputs today is the practice of purdah, which requires women to remain secluded in the 
household and bars them from going out in public.  The seclusion of higher-status women within 
the household signifies the status of the household.  Thus, in Rajput society only lower-status 
women work in the public sphere (Unnithan-Kumar 1997). 
 In southern states, on the other hand, endogamous marriage (marriage between partners 
within the same village) and marriage between cross-cousins is more prevalent (Dyson and 
Moore 1983; Basu 1992; Agarwal 1994), and the bride can depend on her own relatives if she 
has marital problems (Basu 1992, Agarwal 1994).  A newly-wed woman in southern India is also 
much more likely to know her husband and his family before they marry than a newly-wed 
woman from northern India (Dyson and Moore 1983). Since daughters in southern states 
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typically live much closer to their parents than daughters in northern states, daughters in the 
southern states can help support their aging parents much more than daughters of northern states 
can.  Moreover, in southern states the bride’s family is not in a lower social position than the 
family of the groom.  Also, nuclear families are more common in the south than in the north.  
Men are just as likely to establish political, economic, and social relations with male relatives 
related through marriage as with other men related by blood (Dyson and Moore 1983).  Andhra 
Pradesh, Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu all follow this southern kinship pattern, whereas Gujarat 
and Rajasthan follow the northern kinship pattern (Dyson and Moore 1983).  Madhya Pradesh is 
an “intermediate” state, and has kinship patterns that fall somewhere between the northern and 
southern regions.    
Although there are regional differences in patriarchal norms and practices, not all states 
fit neatly into the general patterns that characterize northwestern versus southern regions. Kishor 
and Gupta (2007) used a sub-set of data collected from the National Family Health Survey in 
1998-99 (NFHS-2) to study how much control Indian women had over various aspects of their 
lives.  When ever-married women respondents were asked about their ability to go to the market 
without asking permission, about one-fifth of respondents from Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh 
(both northern states), and Andhra Pradesh (a southern state) said they could go to the market 
without permission.  Not surprisingly, in the southern state of Tamil Nadu almost 79% of 
respondents stated that they could go to the market without permission.  However, in the 
northern state of Gujarat 55% of the women interviewed responded in the affirmative to this 
question, whereas in the southern state of Karnataka only 43% of respondents stated they could 
go to the market without permission.  The women were also asked about whether they participate 
in making decisions regarding their own health.   Only about 37% of women in Madhya Pradesh 
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about 41% of women respondents in Rajasthan, stated that they participate in making decisions 
about their health care.  In Gujarat, about 71% of women were involved in making decisions 
about their health, which is the highest percentage of the six states.  In southern states, about 
56% of respondents in Andhra Pradesh, 49% of respondents in Karnataka, and about 61% of 
respondents in Tamil Nadu were involved in making decisions about their health care.   
What is truly troubling is the percentage of women surveyed who agreed with at least one 
reason justifying a husband beating his wife, and the percentage of married women who had ever 
experienced violence at the hands of their husband.  Possible reasons given on the NFHS survey 
for husbands beating their wives included “wife shows disrespect for in-laws”, “wife neglects 
house or children”, “wife does not cook food properly,” and “wife goes out without telling 
husband” (Kishor and Gupta 2007:391).  Gujarat had the lowest percentage of women who 
agreed with at least one reason for husbands beating their wives, at about 37% (Kishor and 
Gupta 2007).  The percentage of women in Rajasthan and Karnataka who agreed with at least 
one reason for wife-beating was about 51%.  About 72% of women in Madhya Pradesh and 
about 73% of women in Tamil Nadu agreed with at least one reason for wife-beating.  Andhra 
Pradesh had the highest percentage of surveyed women who agreed with at least one reason 
given for husbands beating their wives at almost 80%.   
Married women were also asked if their husband had ever beaten or physically mistreated 
them.  Of the women surveyed in the northern states of Gujarat and Rajasthan, about 10% of 
respondents or less had experienced domestic violence, which is the lowest of the six states.  In 
Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh, around one-fifth of the women surveyed 
reported experiencing domestic violence. In Tamil Nadu, about 35% of women reported 
experiencing violence, which was the highest percentage of the six states.  What is surprising is 
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that in general, a greater percentage of women in the southern states than in the northern states 
reported being victims of domestic violence.  Kishor and Gupta do bring up the issue of how the 
way in which women defined what it meant to be physically mistreated could have determined 
how many women responded that they had answered yes to these questions.  Therefore, it is 
possible that there are many women who have experienced violence, such as being slapped, who 
did not recognize this as being physically mistreated when they answered the survey questions.  
It is also possible that women in different regions of India may define physical mistreatment 
differently.  Kishor and Gupta cited the India SAFE survey, another survey that had been 
conducted around the same time as the NFHS-2 survey (International Clinical Epidemiology 
Network 2000, cited in Kishor and Gupta 2007).  This survey asked a sample of 9,938 married 
women throughout India if their husband had ever hit, beaten, kicked, or slapped them.  About 
20% of the women had been hit, beaten or kicked.  This is close to the 18% of women who 
reported on the NFHS-2 that they had been beaten or physically mistreated by their husbands.  
However, once the category of being slapped is included in the percentage of women who had 
experienced violence from their husbands, the percentage of women who have experienced 
violence from their husbands increased to 40%.   
Patriarchal norms and institutions vary greatly across regions in India.  In northwestern 
states such as Gujarat and Rajasthan, institutionalized patriarchy such as female seclusion, strong 
son preference, restrictions on women’s property rights, exogamous marriage, and dowry are 
prevalent.  The parents of a young bride typically must give a large dowry to the groom’s family 
when their daughter gets married, and their daughter moves into the household of her in-laws.  
While sons bring resources into the household and support their parents in their old age, 
daughters deplete resources from their parents’ household. Therefore, parents have less incentive 
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to allocate household resources such as food or money for education and health care for their 
daughters than for their sons.  In southern states such as Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Tamil 
Nadu, these patriarchal norms are not as widespread.  In the south, endogamous marriage 
patterns are more prevalent, and married daughters help support their aged parents.  
Consequently, female/male sex ratios, child sex ratios, and literacy ratios are higher in southern 
states than in northern states.   
4.3 MEASURES OF GENDER INEQUALITY 
 
In this section, I discuss each of the dependent variables I have chosen for my study, including 
why I find them to be good measures of gender inequality in India, how they specifically relate 
to the paradigms of development and conceptualizations of empowerment from the previous 
chapter, and how I measure them.  I start here with a discussion of the overall female/male sex 
ratio, followed by a discussion of the female/male child sex ratio.  I then move on to an 
examination of the female/male literacy ratio, followed by a consideration of other measures of 
gender inequality that I do not use in this study. 
 
4.3.1 Female/male sex ratio 
 
In nations where women and men have equal access to nutrition and health care, mortality rates 
for women are lower than for men at each age bracket (Sen 2005).  Moreover, in European and 
North American countries, the overall female/male sex ratio is 1,050 females/1,000 males.  
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However, in many parts of the world, including India, women and girls face discrimination in 
access to nutrition and health care, and women’s mortality rates are unnaturally high.  The 
female/male sex ratio in India is unnaturally low. The overall female/male sex ratio in India 
declined steadily from 970 females/1,000 males in 1901 to 930 females/1,000 males in 1971 
(Dreze and Sen 2002).  The female/male sex ratio remained close to 930 from 1971 to 2001.  By 
1991 the overall sex ratio had dropped to 927, but by 2001 it increased to 933 females/1,000 
males (Census of India website 2001).  Provisional population totals for the 2011 Census of India 
show that the female/male sex ratio increased to 940 females/1,000 males by 2011 
(Chandramouli 2011).  The adult female/male mortality ratio has decreased, which is partly due 
to a decrease in maternal mortality rates (Dreze and Sen 2002).  During the period of 1970-72, 
the female/male mortality ratio was highest for women 20-24 years of age at 165 women per 100 
men who died.  By 1996-98, the female/male mortality ratio for people ages 20-24 had dropped 
to 130 women per 100 men who died.  Also, the maternal mortality rate dropped from 407 
women per 100,000 live births in 1997-98 to 301 women per 100,000 live births in 2001-2003 
(UNICEF 2011).  Although the overall female/male sex ratio seems to have stabilized around 
930 females/1,000 males, this is still much lower than expected. 
As a measure of gender inequality, the female/male sex ratio is most closely related to 
modernization theory and WID theory.  According to the modernization approach to 
development, the benefits of development programs, economic growth, and urbanization 
enhance the well-being of both women and men alike.  Modernization theorists and practitioners 
contended that an increase in urbanization leads to greater employment opportunities for women 
and greater exposure to modern values such as competency and achievement (Rosen and LaRaia 
1972, cited in Jaquette 1982). As urbanization and the rate of economic growth increase, the state 
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can invest more in infrastructure and public goods, such as medical facilities and hospitals.  
Modernization practitioners and policy-makers assumed that technological advances, whether in 
agricultural production or health care, would benefit women and men alike.  They did not 
consider the possibility that women’s lack of agency or limited opportunity structure might 
prevent them from obtaining access to gainful employment or health care.  If modernization 
theorists are correct, increased urbanization and economic growth will lead to an enhancement in 
women’s well-being, such as less gender-based oppression, better health, and lower mortality 
rates.  In this case, the female/male sex ratio will increase with economic growth and increased 
urbanization.  The fact that the female/male mortality ratio for individuals in the 20-24 age 
bracket dropped from 165 women/100 men in 1970-72 to 130 wome/100 men in 1996-98 (Dreze 
and Sen 2002) is evidence in support of modernization theory.  
According to the WID approach to development, an increase in urbanization and the shift 
from a subsistence to a market economy lead to a deterioration in women’s status.  This is 
because women are alienated from their traditional economic roles and are forced to work in the 
market economy where their pay is lower than the amount necessary to meet their survival needs 
(Jaquette 1982).  WID theorists argued that women’s opportunity structure limits the types of 
employment that women can obtain. Then economic growth and an increase in urbanization will 
limit rather than enhance the range of employment opportunities that women may choose from.  
If WID theorists are correct, then economic growth and increased urbanization actually should 
lead to a decrease in the female/male sex ratio as women’s well-being declines and their 
mortality rates increase.  In order to address women’s deteriorating status, WID theorists and 
practitioners advocated for the expansion of economic opportunities for women so that they 
could meet their basic needs for well-being. 
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4.3.2 Female/male child sex ratio 
 
Although the female/male child sex ratio is a similar measure of gender inequality as the overall 
female/male sex ratio, it differs enough to warrant including it as a separate measure of gender 
inequality. First, the trends of female/male child sex ratio and overall female/male sex ratio have 
not followed the same trajectory.  While the overall female/male sex ratio has fluctuated up and 
down since 1971, the female/male sex child ratio has declined steadily from 1901 to 2001 (Dreze 
and Sen 2002).  Also, mortality rates are generally higher among very young children than 
among older children or adults.  In countries with very little gender inequality such as European 
and North American countries, about 950 girls per 1,000 boys are born (Sen 2005).  Sen uses 
Germany’s female/male child sex ratio of 948 females/1,000 males as a rough cut-off point of 
what a biologically “natural” child sex ratio is in a society with very little gender discrimination 
in terms of health care and other basic needs.  In India the female/male child sex ratio in 1991 
was 945 girls/1,000 boys, and by 2001 this ratio had dropped to 927 girls/1,000 boys under age 
six.  The provisional population totals from the 2011 Census of India suggest that the child sex 
ratio has continued to decline to 914 females/1,000 males by 2011 (Chandramouli 2011). 
One cause of this unnaturally low female/male child sex ratio in India is the neglect of 
female children.  In India there is a cultural norm of son preference, leading parents to give 
preferential treatment to sons in terms of nutrition, health care, and education (Dreze and Sen 
2002).  Since typically daughters move to their husband’s household when they are married and 
parents of daughters must pay a large dowry, giving birth and raising daughters is seen as a 
liability.  Unlike daughters, sons bring resources into their parents’ households when they marry, 
and traditionally they continue to care for their parents in their old age (Dyson and Moore 1983).   
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Therefore, parents place more importance in investing in the well-being of sons than of 
daughters.  For example, one study of female child mortality in Punjab revealed that mortality 
rates among second-born daughters were 50% higher than mortality rates among other children 
(such as first-born daughters or second-born sons), and that mortality rates were lowest for eldest 
sons (Das Gupta 1987).  Among many poor families that cannot afford to feed, clothe, and 
properly care for all of their children, this preferential allocation of resources to sons often results 
in the death of their daughters (Bhan 2001, Kristof and WuDunn 2009).  Another possible cause 
of lower than normal female/male child sex ratios that is often cited is the practice of female 
infanticide, which can occur any time during the first year of life, but usually happens soon after 
a female infant is born (Dreze and Sen 2002) .  However, most cases of female child deaths 
occur after female children are one year old.  Therefore the majority of female child deaths must 
be due to causes such as child neglect rather than female infanticide.   
The unnaturally low female/male child sex ratio is not only due to female child neglect.  
It can be attributed in part to the growing prevalence of sex-selective abortion.  According to the 
United Nations Secretariat, the biologically natural female/male birth ratio of humans is about 
943-971 females/1,000 males (UN Secretariat 1998, cited in Shepherd 2008).  However, in India 
in 2010 the female/male sex ratio at birth was 922 females/1,000 males (UN HDR 2010). 
Shepherd (2008) analyzed India regional data from the National Family Health Survey-II 
collected in 1998-99.  She found that in the Central cultural region (Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, 
Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar), on average there were of 927 female births per 1,000 male births, and 
that in the Western cultural region (Goa, Gujarat, Maharashtra), on average there were 938 
female births per 1,000 male births.  The average female/male birth ratio in these two regions of 
India was well below even the lower bound of 943 female per 1,000 male births considered to be 
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biologically natural.  Since these skewed ratios are for the number of children being born (and 
not the female/male child sex ratio), it is safe to conclude that many Indian parents are choosing 
to use ultrasound and abortion as methods to determine the sex of the fetus and abort it if it is a 
female.  In the Southern region (Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu), the 
average female/male birth ratio was 953 female births per 1,000 male births, which is in the 
biologically natural range.   
In India, sex-selective abortion has become a socially acceptable way for couples to attain 
the family composition that they desire (Arnold et.al. 2002, cited in Shepherd 2008) and still 
limit family size.  Although the Indian government legalized abortion in 1971, it is illegal to use 
ultrasound as a method to determine the sex of a fetus (Shepherd 2008). However, ultrasound 
had become a widely-used and relatively inexpensive technique to determine the sex of a fetus 
by the mid-1980s (Claycraft 1989, cited in Shepherd 2008).  Moreover, portable ultrasound 
equipment has made it possible for women in rural areas to undergo this test (Shepherd 2008).  
According to results of a survey about ultrasound and sex-selective abortion, about 106,000 sex-
selective abortions were/are performed per year (Arnold et. al. 2002, cited in Shepherd 2008). 
Moreover, some studies have shown that today Indian couples desire to have smaller families 
than they did in the past.  However, many families still desire to have at least one son (if not 
two). For instance, one recent study of changing family composition in a village near Delhi 
found that the majority of younger couples considered two to three children to be the ideal, 
preferably one girl and two boys or one girl and one boy (Khanna 2010). This is in contrast to 
older couples in the village who thought it was ideal to have four children, two girls and two 
boys. For families that already have at least one girl but no sons, the use of ultrasound and 
abortion services become a way to eliminate an unwanted female fetus.  If the fetus is a female, 
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the pregnant woman can get an abortion in the hopes that the next time she is pregnant the fetus 
will be a male (Das Gupta 1987, cited in Shepherd 2008; Khanna 2010).   
Northwestern states have unusually low female/male child sex ratios.  In Punjab, 
Haryana, Delhi, and Gujarat, the child sex ratio ranges from 793 to 878 females per 1,000 males 
(Sen 2005).  Moreover, the child sex ratio has been rapidly declining in the states of Punjab, 
Haryana, and Gujarat.  Most southern states and northeastern states have female/male child sex 
ratios that are above the benchmark of 948 females/1,000 males.  For example, Kerala, Andhra 
Pradesh, West Bengal, and Assam all have child sex ratios that fall within the range of 963 to 
966 females per 1,000 males.  Basu (1999) found that in southern India there were low to 
moderate fertility levels, yet there has been an increase in excess female child mortality levels. 
Tamil Nadu was an exception with a child sex ratio that was a little below 940 females/1,000 
males.  However, even this is higher than any of the child sex ratios of the northwestern states.  
Basu (1999) observed that the highest level of gender discrimination exists among the classes 
experiencing upward mobility (Shepherd 2008).  Northern cultural marriage practices are 
becoming more prevalent in southern India, such as the giving of dowry to the groom’s family, 
marriage exogamy, and marriages in which the groom is of a higher caste than the bride.  Sen 
also observed that urban areas tend to have lower child female/male sex ratios than rural areas.  
For example, urban areas of Karnataka had a child sex ratio of 939, whereas rural areas of 
Karnataka had a child sex ratio of 954 (Sen 2005). 
The female/male child sex ratio is closely connected to the GAD approach to 
development.  Many GAD researchers focus on gender dynamics within the household, 
including how patriarchal norms such as son preference lead to gender inequities in the access to 
food and nutrition.  GAD practitioners and scholars stress the need to challenge patriarchal social 
142 
structures in order to enhance women’s opportunities to act on their choices.  Some women’s 
rights practitioners that take a GAD approach inform women about their legal rights, some 
practitioners carry out campaigns against dowry, sex-selective abortion, or domestic violence, 
while still others raise awareness among women and their communities about how patriarchal 
norms oppress women and girls.  If the GAD practitioners and programs are effective in eroding 
patriarchal norms such as son preference, one would expect that Indian parents would place 
equal value on daughters as on sons and would also allocate resources such as food, clothing, and 
health care equally among both daughters and sons.  As a result, one would expect that survival 
rates of girl children would increase and the female/male child sex ratio would increase as a 
result. 
The female/male child sex ratio is also closely related to the neoliberal approach to 
development.  Many neoliberal policy-makers and practitioners target women for their 
development programs because women are more likely to invest in the needs of their households, 
such as food, housing, education, and nutrition for their children (Cheston and Kuhn 2002, 
Kristoff and WuDunn 2009b).  Neoliberal practitioners argue that providing financial assets to 
women in the form of microcredit increases women’s ability to make decisions that will benefit 
their families (Kristoff and WuDunn 2009b).  As women bring income into the household, the 
argument goes, other family members such their husband or mother-in-law value and respect 
these women more.  With the income from their small businesses, microcredit borrowers are able 
to provide for all of the needs of their family, including the needs of their daughters.  If the 
neoliberal argument is correct, than this should lead to a decrease in girls’ mortality rates and a 
more equal female/male child sex ratio among women who are members of microcredit 
programs. 
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4.3.3 Female/male literacy ratio 
 
Institutionalized forms of women’s subordination such as female seclusion and son preference 
not only negatively impact women’s and girls’ survival rates; they also hinder women’s and 
girls’ access to education.  Article 45 of the Indian Constitution states, “…the State shall 
endeavor to provide, within a period of 10 years from the commencement of the Constitution, 
free, and compulsory education of all children until they complete the age of 14 years” (cited in 
Visaria and Ramachandran 2004:32).  This was written in 1950; however, gender inequities in 
access to education persist.  The female literacy rate rose from only about 9% in 1950-51 to 
about 54% in 2001 (Dreze and Sen 2002). According to the National Family Health Survey-II 
that was conducted in 1998-99, 83% of men 15-29 years of age were literate, but only 59% of 
women in the same age range were literate (International Institute for Population Sciences 
2000:28, cited in Visaria and Ramachandran 2004:33).  There were also questions on the NFHS-
II that asked women about their views on educating boys and girls (Kishor and Gupta 2007).  In 
the southern states of Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, a little more than 60% of the respondents 
stated that boys and girls should receive an equal level of education.  The same percentage of 
respondents from the northern state of Madhya Pradesh said that boys and girls should receive 
equal amounts of education.  Rajasthan and Gujarat had the lowest percentage of respondents 
who agreed that girls and boys should receive equal amounts of education at about 46% and 57% 
of respondents, respectively.  In Karnataka, 70% of the women said boys and girls should receive 
equal levels of education.   
There are several reasons for Indian parents’ tendency to show preference to educating 
boys over girls.  Parents are more likely to send boys to school than girls (or for more years than 
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girls) because they believe there will be greater economic return from boys’ education than from 
girls’ education (Vaid 2007).  Boys have more opportunities to engage in waged labor after 
completing school than girls do (Sathar and Lloyd 1994, cited in Vaid 2007).  Also, spending 
money on the education of girls does not benefit Indian parents because when girls get married, 
they move from their parents’ home to their in-laws’ home (Vaid 2007, Dutta 2004).  Therefore, 
any economic resources that parents may have spent on their daughters’ education will benefit 
their daughters’ in-laws rather than the daughters’ own parents.  A large number of girls in rural 
areas must engage in domestic labor such as caring for younger siblings, cooking, fetching water, 
and collecting fodder for animals, and gathering fuel wood (Vaid 2007, Dutta 2004).  Girls’ 
domestic responsibilities make it difficult for them to attend school.  Additionally, many parents 
believe that if their daughters go to school, they will shirk their household responsibilities (Dutta 
2004).  Since Indian society places a high value on women’s virginity before marriage, parents 
take extra precautions to control their daughters’ sexuality (Desai 1994, cited in Dutta 2004).  
Many parents do not allow their daughters to attend school because the schools are co-
educational, there are no female teachers, and the distance to the schools is greater than parents 
feel comfortable allowing their daughters to walk alone. In Gujarat, Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu, 
women make up about 33% of all teachers, and in Madhya Pradesh women make up only 25% of 
teachers (Ramachandran 2004).  In Madhya Pradesh, 77% of the population lives in rural areas, 
but only 67% of schools are in rural areas.  Moreover, about 7% of the population does not live 
within one kilometer of a primary school, which is the distance set by the Government of India 
as a reasonable distance for children to walk to school (Panchamukhi 2006, Ray 2006).  
Moreover, about 21% of villages in Rajasthan do not have primary schools or non-formal 
145 
education centers (Ray 2006).  This lack of adequate educational facilities/centers highlights the 
difficulty that children, especially girls, may face in attending school. 
In some states, female literacy rates and school enrollment rates tend to be much greater 
in urban areas than rural areas.  For instance, in Madhya Pradesh about 59% of urban women 
were literate in 1991, but only about 20% of rural women were literate that same year 
(Panchamukhi 2006).  In urban areas, the net enrollment rate (NER) for girls was 87%, but girls’ 
NER in rural areas was only 67%.  The female/male enrollment ratios are also substantially 
higher in urban areas than in rural areas.  The female/male upper primary school enrollment ratio 
was unusually high in urban areas at 102%, whereas in rural areas the upper primary female/male 
enrollment ratio was about 77%.   
Girls’ enrollment rates and female/male enrollment ratios in Rajasthan follow a similar 
pattern.  According to a survey conducted by UNICEF in 1999-2000, while almost 89% of girls 
in 6-10 years old who lived in urban areas were enrolled in school, only about 67% of girls in 
rural areas were enrolled in school (Ray 2006).  The female/male enrollment ratios are higher in 
urban areas than rural areas as well.  In urban areas, the female/male enrollment ratio for children 
aged 6-10 years was 97%, whereas in rural areas the enrollment ratio was about 76%. 
Although Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan historically have had literacy rates that were 
below the national average (Mehotra 2006), both states have made significant gains in literacy 
rates and in female/male literacy ratios.  This is due to some innovative educational programs 
that the governments of the two states initiated in the late 1980s through the 1990s.  In 1994, the 
Indian government initiated the District Primary Education Programme (DPEP), which was a 
donor-funded program aimed at improving school facilities and quality of education at a low cost 
(Panchamukhi 2006).  DPEP started in 33 low-literacy districts in Madhya Pradesh.  In 1997, the 
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Madhya Pradesh state government started the Educational Guarantee Scheme (EGS).  Under this 
scheme, the state government guaranteed to provide a trained teacher to any area with no school 
within a one kilometer radius, and to tribal areas with no school.  The community with no school 
must propose the name of a community member that they want as a teacher and provide a 
building for the school.  The state government provides teacher training and academic 
monitoring.  Moreover, the community in which an EGS school is started is involved in the 
planning and assessment of students’ progress.  The Rajiv Gandhi Prathamik Shiksha Mission 
provided over 30,000 primary schools during the period of 1994-1998.  Households that send 
children to the EGS schools are not required to pay for any of the usual school expenses such as 
for books, uniforms, or stationery.  The Madhya Pradesh state government also initiated a 
program to increase adult literacy.  Through this program, adults formed groups and were then 
taught for one year by a group member who was literate.  The state government provided the 
learning and teaching materials and also held a literacy exam at the end of one year.  Over 3 
million people gained literacy within one year through this program.  These innovative programs 
in Madhya Pradesh have resulted in an increase in the state literacy rate of 20 percentage points 
between 1991-2001, and an increase in the female literacy rate of 22 percentage points during the 
same period. 
In Rajasthan, the state government initiated the “shiksha karmi” project in 1987-1988 to 
help solve the problem of teacher absenteeism (Ray 2006).  Through this program, Village 
Education Committees choose two people, one woman and one man, whom they want to become 
para-teachers.  These two individuals are people who have had no previous training as teachers, 
but they complete a training program of 41-50 days and receive periodic training thereafter.  
These para-teachers then teach at the village primary school, and also teach evening classes for 
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children who are unable to attend day school.  During the mid-1990s, the state government began 
the Rajiv Gandhi Swarna Jayanti Pathshalas scheme due to difficulties children had in gaining 
access to education.  The program was modeled after the EGS in Madhya Pradesh, and the state 
government created schools in villages where none previously existed within a one kilometer 
radius and where there were more than 40 children 6-11 years of age.  During 1999-2000, over 
12,000 new schools were officially recognized by the state.  These state-sponsored educational 
programs in Rajasthan have led to an increase of 24 percentage points in the female literacy rate 
between 1991-2001 (Ray 2006).   
According to modernization theorists and practitioners, an increase in urbanization and 
economic growth make it possible for the Indian government to invest more in education, such as 
in building more schools so that more children have access to education within a walkable 
distance from their home.  Modernization theorists assumed, however, assumed that the benefits 
of education would reach both boys and girls, and they did not consider how patriarchal cultural 
norms such as keeping girls at home to care for siblings and carry out domestic tasks might limit 
girls’ opportunities for education.  In contrast, GAD theorists and practitioners stressed the 
importance of raising awareness in communities and among families of the patriarchal norms 
that lead parents to send their sons to school while keeping their daughters at home.  According 
to GAD theorists, the availability of educational facilities alone is not enough to raise gender 
equality in educational opportunities.  As mentioned earlier, WID theorists argued that economic 
growth and urbanization spurred on by the shift from a subsistence to a market economy leads to 
a deterioration in women’s status.   This is because they are forced to work in the market 
economy where their pay is lower than the amount necessary to meet their survival needs 
(Jaquette 1982).  Therefore, an increase in the number of schools and other educational 
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institutions will not necessarily lead to an increase in girls’ access to education if their mothers 
cannot afford to provide for their families’ subsistence needs, much less for their children’s 
school fees.  Neoliberal theorists and practitioners argue that women’s access to credit alone will 
enable women to start or expand small businesses.  This in turn will give them the ability to 
provide for the needs of their families, including education for both their daughters and sons.  If 
neoliberal theorists are correct, then we can expect that as more and more women gain access to 
credit through microlending programs and invest in their own small businesses, the female/male 
literacy ratio among the next generation of children will increase.  However, neoliberal theorists 
assume that women already have the ability to decide how to invest their loans and how to spend 
the money that they make from their businesses.  Neoliberal theorists do not consider how 
patriarchal norms may curtail women’s ability to decide how her earnings are spent. 
    
4.3.4 Measures of gender inequality not included in this study 
 
There are several measures of gender inequality that other researchers commonly use in gender 
and development studies that I do not use in my study.  As discussed in section 2.2 of chapter 
two, there are national-level indices such as the Gender-related Development Index (GDI) and 
the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM).  The GDI measures gender disparities in living 
standards, such as those related to educational attainment, life expectancy, and adjusted real 
income (UNDP 1995).  The GEM includes variables that measure the percentage of national 
government seats held by women, the percentage of professional, technical, administrative, and 
managerial positions held by women, and women’s per capita income in unadjusted purchasing 
power parity dollars (UNDP 1995).  Some researchers also use the “Women’s Indicators and 
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Statistics Microcomputer Database” (WISTAT) developed by the UN Statistical Office (Young 
et al. 1994, www.unstats.un.org 2010).  This database consists of national-level, sex-
disaggregated data on a number of different topics, such as infant mortality rates, percentage of 
births attended by health staff, total fertility rates, contraceptive use, education and literacy, 
women’s economic activity, the ratio of women to men that hold seats in national legislatures, 
the year that women gained suffrage, domestic violence, and national GDP.   The GDI, GEM, 
and WISTAT include a wide range of gender inequality measures, only some of which I include 
as dependent variables in my study.  In the next few paragraphs, I discuss some of the 
commonly-used gender inequality measures that I do not use in my study and why I do not 
include them.  
The female/male labor force participation ratio is one commonly used measure that I do 
not include in my study.  This is because previous studies on India have shown that women’s 
participation in the labor force is often a sign of women’s declining status, not rising status (Mies 
1982, Marius-Gnanou 2003).  Researchers have found that many Indian women enter the labor 
force not out of choice, but to supplement the income of under-employed male members of their 
households.  Moreover, usually labor-force participation rates are higher among lower-caste 
women who must work in the public sphere to survive than among higher-caste women who do 
not need to do so.   
There are some measures of gender inequality that I do not use because the data are not 
available at the district level or they are not available for the entire time period of my study.  One 
of these measures is women’s political participation. The Election Commission of India provides 
sex-disaggregated data for national Parliamentary elections on its web site.  The Election 
Commission of India also provides published reports starting in the 1950s for state assembly 
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elections that include include data on the number of women candidates running for election, as 
well as the number of women who were elected.  However, data is not available on zilla 
panchayat (district-level council) elections for 1961-2001, which is the time period of my study. 
Some of the other commonly used measures of gender inequality and women’s status that 
I do not include in my study are women’s contraception use, percentage of births attended by 
health staff, women’s adjusted real income, and percentage of professional, technical, 
administrative, and managerial positions held by women.  I do not include women’s 
contraception use or percentage of births attended by health staff as measures of women’s status 
because these data is not readily available at the district level from 1961 to 2001.  District-level 
data are also not available for women’s adjusted real income, nor for percentage of professional, 
technical, administrative, and managerial positions held by women. 
Many researchers carrying out micro-level studies use measures of women’s 
empowerment and gender inequality such as women’s decision-making power in household 
decisions, their ability to go out alone in public, their attitudes toward wife-beating, whether they 
have been beaten by their husbands, and their attitudes toward educating their sons and daughters 
(Kishor and Gupta 2007).  Although these are useful measures of gender inequality, these data 
are not available at the district level for the entire time period of my study. 
4.4 HYPOTHESES 
In this section, I discuss the hypotheses I use to test the claims of modernization, women-in-
development, gender-and-development, and neoliberal theories regarding changes in gender 
inequality in India.  Because regional differences in patriarchal norms are so important in India, I 
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also formulate hypotheses that take region and state into account.  I begin by stating the null 
hypothesis, and then move on to a discussion of how I test modernization theory.  The null 
hypothesis ( ) is:  There are no differences (beyond those associated with the passage of time) 
in the effects of levels of economic growth, urbanization, the presence of women’s rights 
programs, the presence of women’s microcredit programs, or the presence of women’s market-
based programs on district-level female/male sex ratios, female/male child sex ratios, and 
female/male literacy ratios. 
According to classical modernization theorists, changes in culture lead to economic 
growth and greater urbanization, and that increased economic growth and urbanization have a 
positive impact on women’s status.  As I discussed in chapter 2, Inglehart and Welzel argued that 
the causal relationship between changes in cultural values and economic growth is reversed; that 
is, as nations experience economic growth and a shift from an agricultural economy to an 
industrial economy, they will transition from holding traditional, religious values to holding 
secular-rational values (Inglehart and Welzel 2005).  They argued that economic growth leads to 
an increase in people’s economic security and their ability to act on a wider range of choices.  
Economic growth also leads to an increase in people’s educational levels, increased exposure to 
mass media, and increased specialization of occupations, all of which make people aware of a 
greater range of possible choices they may make. Both classical modernization theorists and 
Inglehart and Welzel argued that economic growth and increased urbanization leads to an 
increase in women’s status, regardless of whether the “modernization” of cultural values leads to 
economic growth or economic growth leads to changes in cultural values.  Inglehart and Welzel 
used five waves of cross-national data from the World Values Survey to test their hypotheses on 
economic growth, urbanization, and value change.  Yet the fifth wave of World Values Survey 
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results for India reveal that the general population of India tends to hold more traditional-
religious and survival values rather than secular-rational and self-expression values 
(www.worldvaluessurvey.org).  Moreover, while in 2009 almost 55% of India’s GDP was from 
the services sector, almost 55% of India’s labor force population worked in the agricultural 
sector (CIA World Factbook 2009).  The question remains, therefore, whether in general India 
has experienced enough of a shift from an agricultural economy to an industrial or post-
materialist economy to really have a positive impact on women’s status. My first hypothesis 
( ) tests the claims of modernization theory:  An increase in urbanization and per capita SDP 
will lead to an increase in female/male sex ratios, female/male child sex ratios, and female/male 
literacy ratios. 
Hypothesis  is a regional corollary to :  An increase in urbanization and economic 
growth will have a greater impact on increases in female/male sex ratios, female/male child sex 
ratios, and female/male literacy ratios in southern states than in northern states. 
Women-in-development theorists have argued that increased modernization (such as 
urbanization, the use of new farming technologies, and the rise of capitalism) has led to rising 
gender inequality in developing nations (Boserup 1970, Jaquette 1982).  This claim is the exact 
opposite of modernization theorists’ claim that economic growth and urbanization helps to raise 
women’s status. I derive hypothesis  from this claim:  An increase in urbanization and 
economic growth alone will lead to a decrease in female/male sex ratios, female/male child sex 
ratios, and female/male literacy ratios.  This hypothesis is the opposite of the modernization 
hypothesis .  Therefore, if the results of my analyses indicate that economic growth and 
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urbanization has a negative impact on the female/male sex ratios and female/male literacy ratios, 
I must reject the modernization hypothesis  and accept the WID hypothesis . 
However, WID theorists assumed that industrialization and the rise of capitalism are both 
inevitable and beneficial to all societies as long as women are included in this process (Boserup 
1970, Tinker 1997).  As I discussed in chapter three, WID theorists and practitioners focused on 
the importance of women’s agency in the economic sphere and on the limited opportunity 
structure of women to act on choices, as well as on the need to expand opportunities for women’s 
waged employment.  Therefore, hypothesis  states: The presence of women’s market 
programs will lead to increases in female/male sex ratios, female/male child sex ratios, and 
female/male literacy ratios.   
Since WID practitioners emphasized the need to increase women’s economic 
opportunities through both waged employment and microcredit, I develop hypothesis  to test 
this:  The presence of women’s market programs and women’s microfinance programs jointly 
will have a greater impact than women’s market programs alone on raising female/male sex 
ratios, female/male child sex ratios, and female/male literacy ratios.   
Finally hypothesis  is: The presence of women’s market programs and women’s 
microfinance programs will have a greater impact on increases in female/male sex ratios, 
female/male child sex ratios, and female/male literacy ratios in southern states than in northern 
states. 
GAD theorists argue that the development process includes more than economic 
development, such as an improvement in individuals’ lives in the political, economic, social, and 
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cultural arenas (Jaquette and Staudt 2006).  Whereas WID theorists and practitioners emphasize 
women’s need for greater access to waged labor, GAD theorists and practitioners stress the 
importance on challenging patriarchal structures to enlarge women’s opportunity structure to act 
on choices.  GAD practitioners focus on informational assets, such as legal rights, training 
women in interacting with government officials, raising women’s awareness of patriarchal 
norms.  Therefore, hypothesis  is: The presence of women’s rights programs will lead to 
increases in female/male sex ratios, female/male child sex ratios, and female/male literacy 
ratios. 
It is possible that in northern regions, women’s rights programs will have the most 
difficulty in making headway in challenging patriarchal norms such as female seclusion and son 
preference.  In this case, one might expect that the presence of women’s programs will have less 
of an impact on raising gender equality.  Alternatively, the proliferation of women’s rights 
programs may have a greater impact on rates of positive change in female/male sex ratios and 
literacy ratios in northern areas where sex ratios and literacy ratios are initially the lowest.  
Hypothesis  tests this:  Region will have a mediating effect on the impact of women’s rights 
programs on increases in female/male sex ratios, female/male child sex ratios, and female/male 
literacy ratios. 
Since GAD practitioners emphasize the importance of enhancing women’s opportunity 
structure in all aspects of life, including the economic sphere, I formulate hypothesis  to test 
the impact of all three types of women’s programs on gender inequality:  The presence of 
women’s rights programs, women’s market programs, and women’s microfinance programs 
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jointly will have a greater impact than women’s rights programs alone on raising female/male 
sex ratios, female/male child sex ratios, and female/male literacy ratios. 
Neoliberal theorists argue that if development agencies strengthen the poor economically, 
they will automatically gain the power to start and invest in their own microenterprises and the 
power to live healthier, more productive lives. The goal of the neoliberal approach is to 
strengthen poor people’s ability to participate in the market, such as by giving them a small 
amount of capital.  Although the goal of practitioners and policy-makers that take the neoliberal 
approach is macro-level economic development, their focus is on the individual—giving 
individuals the power to ‘lift themselves out of poverty’.  Neoliberal practitioners view women 
as rational actors who are capable of making profitable choices, and do not pay much attention to 
how women’s opportunity structure may limit the choices that women can make in using credit.  
Hypothesis  tests this theory:  The presence of women’s microfinance programs will lead to 
increases in female/male sex ratios, female/male child sex ratios, and female/male literacy 
ratios. 
Neoliberal policy-makers agree that as societies become more economically developed, 
the benefits will trickle down to all members of society, including women.  Therefore, 
hypothesis  is: The presence of women’s microfinance programs will have a greater impact 
on increases in female/male sex ratios, female/male child sex ratios, and female/male literacy 
ratios in areas that have greater economic growth than in areas that have less economic growth. 
Finally, I test the impact that region may have on the extent to which women’s 
microfinance programs impact changes in gender inequality with hypothesis :  The presence 
of women’s microfinance programs will have a greater impact on increases in female/male sex 
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ratios, female/male child sex ratios, and female/male literacy ratios in southern regions than in 
northern regions. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have discussed the cultural context of gender inequality in India, including how 
variation in regional patriarchal norms affects the status of women and girls.  I have also 
discussed how cultural norms such as marriage patterns, son preference, and female seclusion 
have negatively impacted female/male sex ratios, child sex ratios, and literacy ratios in India.  I 
then developed my hypotheses to test the claims of modernization, WID, GAD, and neoliberal 
theorists regarding gender inequality as measured by sex ratios and literacy ratios.  In chapter 
five, I explain my methods of data collection, as well as how I measure my variables.  I also 
discuss my analytic methods for testing the hypotheses that I developed in this chapter.
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5.0 CHAPTER FIVE: DATA AND METHODS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In chapter 4, I discussed the socio-cultural context of gender inequality in India, including 
variation in gender inequality by region and state.  I provided a detailed discussion of the 
female/male sex ratio, female/male child sex ratio, and female/male literacy ratio in India, and 
how these reveal the effects that gender bias in terms of women’s and girls’ access to food, 
health care, and education negatively affects their quality of life.  I also explained how I derived 
my hypotheses to test the competing claims of modernization, WID, GAD, and neoliberal 
theories regarding changes in female/male sex ratios, female/male child sex ratios, and 
female/male literacy ratios.   
In this chapter, I discuss my data collection processes, including the states I chose for the 
study, the unit of analysis, and sources of data.  I discuss how I collected the data on women’s 
programs, on the measures of gender inequality, and on measures of urbanization and economic 
growth.  Next, I talk about how I deal with time and issues of causality using longitudinal data 
and analyses.  After this, I discuss the analytic methods I employ, including descriptive statistics 
and the statistical models I use to test the hypotheses. 
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5.2 DATA COLLECTION 
To carry out my research on the effects of economic modernization, women’s rights programs, 
women’s microcredit programs, and women’s market programs (excluding microcredit 
programs) on gender inequality in India, I collected district-level India Census data, as well as 
data on development programs that have existed in at least one of the six Indian states in my 
study.  I collected data for six states, three in southern India (Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and 
Tamil Nadu), two in northern India (Gujarat and Rajasthan), and one in north-central India 
(Madhya Pradesh).  I chose these particular states in order to capture regional differences in 
cultural norms, thus allowing me to test whether the impact that economic growth, urbanization, 
or various types of women’s development programs have on changes in gender inequality varies 
by region or states. Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh both are known for their strong patriarchal 
norms and high levels of gender inequality.  Gujarat is also a northern state, but it has a history 
of social activism; for instance, Gujarat is where Mahatma Gandhi initiated India’s struggles for 
independence.  Gandhi started an ashram, or spiritual community, in Gujarat where he taught his 
followers the principles of nonviolent protest (Polak et al. 1949).  He led his first civil 
disobedience campaign in Gujarat state, during which he and members of the ashram marched 
200 miles from Ahmedabad to the ocean in order to collect free sea salt in defiance of the British 
salt tax (Polak et al. 1949). Therefore, I expected that Gujarat might have a greater proliferation 
of women’s rights programs than either Rajasthan or Madhya Pradesh.  I collected data at the 
district level so that I would have enough cases in my study to carry out my analyses.  I chose the 
above-mentioned states partly because they are some of the largest states in India, and therefore 
have the most districts.  The number of districts per state is as follows:  Andhra Pradesh (21), 
Gujarat (17), Karnataka (18), Madhya Pradesh (43), Tamil Nadu (13), and Rajasthan (26).  
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Altogether there are 138 districts in my sample.  These states comprised roughly 37% India’s 
total population in 2001 (Census of India 2001).  
I also chose these six states because I wanted to compare districts that have at least two 
types of women’s programs to those that have only one, and to those that have none.  In order to 
do this, I needed to choose states comprised of some districts in which none of these types of 
programs existed and some districts in which at least one of these types of programs existed.  
The Self Employed Women’s Association is an organization that operates primarily in Gujarat 
state and has several types of programs, including a women’s labor union, women’s 
cooperatives, and microcredit programs. It began in 1972, which makes it the oldest of the 
organizations in my study.  It is also a well-known organization that is often cited in the literature 
on women and development and social movements in India.  The Working Women’s Forum, a 
women’s organization with microcredit programs and women’s rights programs, operates in the 
southern states of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and Karnataka.  The Working Women’s Forum 
was officially registered with the Indian government in 1981.  Its primary service is extending 
credit to women, although it also has taken a strong stand against exploitation related to caste 
and dowry, and has fought for women’s reproductive rights (Mayoux 1995).    
I collected data from the Census of India for the years 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, and 2001.  
I use a longitudinal design in order to be able to analyze changes in gender inequality over time.  
A longitudinal design also allows me to examine how the proliferation of women’s development 
programs under modernization, WID, GAD, and neoliberal frameworks affects changes in 
gender inequality over time.  For example, it was not until 1991 that the Indian government 
started to pursue neoliberal policies and also started to promote women’s microcredit programs 
as a strategy for development.  By collecting and analyzing data prior to and after 1991, I can see 
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if the sudden proliferation of women’s microcredit programs has a significant impact on 
measures of gender inequality.  I can also control for the impacts of development programs that 
started in earlier decades.  First, I want to analyze the effects of various development 
organizations and programs that take different approaches to materialist development on changes 
in gender inequality over time.  In order to determine if these organizations and programs are 
affecting changes in gender inequality, I need to analyze data starting in a period before most of 
these women’s development programs existed in the districts.  I chose 1961 as my initial period 
because it is the earliest year in which the India census was taken that is comparable to census 
data collected in subsequent years (Srivastava 1983, Mitra 1994).  
  
5.2.1 Data from Census of India 
 
The Census of India has been conducted fourteen times from 1872 through the year 2001 (India 
Census web site).  The Census of India is carried out once a decade, and is a rich source of data.  
For the 2001 India Census, March 1st at sunrise is considered the “census moment”.  
Enumerators include anyone born before the census moment in the census count, and exclude 
anyone who has died before the census moment (Census of India 2001).  The 2001 Census of 
India was carried out according to the Census Act of 1948.  The Houselisting Operation was the 
first phase, and was conducted from April to September 2000.  Researchers collected data on 
household assets, amenities, and housing conditions during this phase.  Researchers undertook 
the Population Enumeration phase (the second phase) from February 9-28, 2001, and collected 
data on every individual in the country (Census of India 2001).  The Census of India includes 
data at the state and district levels, as well as smaller units such as the census block and village.  
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State-level data include information on slum and houseless populations, number of people 
belonging to a Scheduled Tribe or Scheduled Caste, household assets and amenities, migration, 
age, marital status, educational levels, and religion, among other topics (Census of India 2001 
web site).  District-level data include information on total population, sex ratio, and age groups; 
educational attainment and number of literate males and females; Scheduled Caste and 
Scheduled Tribe populations; number of people working in various employment sectors; type of 
housing; and number of villages with various types of infrastructure and amenities (Census of 
India 2001 web cite).  There is also district-level data on educational attainment and marital 
status disaggregated by age and gender. 
I collected data for my variables on gender inequality, urbanization, and percentage of 
district comprised of Scheduled Castes (a control variable) from the Census of India for the years 
of 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, and 2001.  I was easily able to collect 2001 census data from the 
Census of India websiteviii.  However, the data for previous years has not been put in digital 
form, so I collected these data from published volumes of the Census of India.  I gathered 
district-level data for measures of gender inequality and urbanization from the state-wise Social 
and Cultural Tables for 1961-1991.  Some of these data I also collected from the District Census 
Handbooks. 
Many of the districts in my study divided into geographically smaller districts over time.  
In 1961 there were a total of only 138 districts in the six states of my study, but by 2001 the 
districts totaled 198.  Also, in 2000, an entire state was carved out of Madhya Pradesh to form 
the state of Chhattisgarh (Nag 2001).  In order to ensure that I had consistent and comparable 
units across time, I used the original district jurisdictional areas in 1961 as my units of analysis.ix  
For the purposes of this study, I also included the districts in Chhattisgarh as part of Madhya 
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Pradesh since it was only just before 2001 that it became a separate state.  I made use of various 
atlases of India to determine how district borders changed over time and to re-construct the 
original districts in 1961x.  Districts from earlier periods generally divided into more units in 
later periods.  A table showing how districts divided over time is given in Appendix A. 
 
5.2.2 Data on women’s development programs 
 
I collected data on women’s development programs from numerous sources such as journal 
articles and other scholarly literature that discussed women’s programs in India.  Some of these 
programs and organizations are well-known and widely cited in the literature on women and 
development in India, such as the Self-Employed Women’s Association in Gujarat state.  The 
Self Employed Women’s Association web site has links to numerous publications, including 
publications with information on when and in which districts SEWA’s programs began their 
work.  My primary sources for information on women’s development programs were the 
Directory of Organisations Working on Gender Issues (1996) and Voluntary Organisations 
Working for Children and Women: Some Profiles (Sood et al. 1992).  I researched the year when 
each of these organizations started providing services in each district where they currently work.  
Most of the listings in these directories provided information on the state and district in which 
the organization was headquartered, as well as the year it was founded.  It is important to 
determine when the organizations began providing services in various areas because the length 
of time that an organization has been lending credit to women or educating them about their legal 
rights in a certain area could impact how much gender inequality is reduced in that area.  For 
instance, one organization may have provided services in a particular area for over 30 years, 
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whereas another organization may have provided services in a region for only 10-15 years.  I 
would expect that the 30-year organization would have started to impact changes in gender 
inequality earlier on than the 10 or 15-year old organization.  Many of the listings also stated 
which districts the organizations served.  If a listing for an organization stated that the area it 
served was “regional” or “entire state”, I recorded only the district in which the organization’s 
main office was located.  For listings that did not provide the year in which the women’s 
organization started, I searched for the organization on the internet to see if the organization had 
a web-site that provided the necessary information.   
I collected a large part of my data on women’s programs from directories and 
organizations’ websites on-line.  I found the on-line Directory of Development Organizations 
2008, Vol. IIA: Asia and the Middle East (www.devdir.org) to be especially useful.  The 
Directory of Development Organizations alone had about 2,000 listings that I needed to scroll 
through in order to find organizations that sounded relevant.  Many of the listings in this 
directory provided web sites and email addresses of the organizations.  Many of the development 
organizations in this directory had a variety of programs, only some of which were women’s 
programs.  Many of the organizations’ web sites provided information on when their women’s 
programs started and in which districts.  There were also a number of organizations’ web sites 
that did not provide this information, or only provided the year the women’s programs started but 
not the exact districts where they operated.  If I could determine the year in which the women’s 
programs started but not the districts in which they operated, I took the conservative route and 
recorded only the district in which the organization’s office/headquarters was located.  Since I 
coded each of the types of women’s programs as either present or absent in a district, I needed 
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only to determine if there was at least one women’s program of a certain type in each district for 
any given year of my study.  
As I had expected, there were some districts for which I found no evidence of women’s 
development programs of any type for 1961-2001.  I used state-wise listings of development 
organizations from the Government of India’s Department of Women and Child Development 
web site to cross-check my work and make sure that there truly were no women’s programs in 
the districts that I had recorded as having no women’s programs.  There are over 2,000 
organizations listed on this web site just for the six states in my study.  I used this list to 
determine if there are any districts that potentially have a women’s development program, but for 
which I have recorded no women’s programs present.  I show the results in Table 5.1below.   
 
Table 5.1 Districts with no development organizations versus districts with missing 
data on organizations 
State 
Districts with No Development 
Organizations 
Districts with Missing  
Data on Organizations 
Andhra Pradesh 
0 1 
Gujarat 1 1 
Karnataka 0 0 
Madhya Pradesh 
2 6 
Tamil Nadu 
0 0 
Rajasthan 0 1 
 
If a government list of over 2,000 NGOs from as recent as 2010 shows that there are 
some districts with no NGOs, it is highly plausible that there were no development NGOs and no 
women’s programs in these districts prior to 2001.  As can be seen above, there are some 
districts that, according to the government NGO list, have no NGOs.  Some districts for which I 
had no record of women’s programs actually have only 1-3 NGOs, while others have over 45 
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development organizations.  I recorded information on women’s programs as “missing data” for 
these districts. 
5.3 VARIABLES 
5.3.1 Independent variables 
 
The main independent variables are the presence or absence of a women’s rights program, and 
the presence or absence of a women’s market-based program (other than microcredit), the 
presence or absence of a women’s microcredit program, levels of urbanization, and net state 
domestic product per capita.  I operationalize presence or absence of “women’s rights program,” 
“women’s market-based program (other),” and “women’s microcredit program” each as separate 
dummy variables: (1=present, 0= absent).   
I use two main independent variables in order to test my hypotheses on modernization 
theory.  These are “percentage of district population living in urban areas” and “net state 
domestic product per capita”.  The India Census defines an urban area or town as a place with 
“…a municipality, corporation, cantonment board or notified town area committee, etc.” and 
with “i.) a minimum population of 5,000; ii) at least 75 percent of male working population 
engaged in non-agricultural pursuits; and iii) a density of population of at least 400 [people] per 
sq. km (1,000 per sq. mile)” (Census of India 2001 web site).  The Reserve Bank of India 
provides state-wide yearly financial statistics starting from 1960-61 to 2008-09, including net 
state domestic product measured in 1961 constant prices, which corrects for inflation over time.  
I divide state domestic product by a state’s total population to obtain per capita state domestic 
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product. I use the natural log-transformed per capita state domestic product in my statistical 
models.  Although this variable is at the state level rather than the district level, I can use it as an 
independent variable in my analyses.   
My units of analysis are districts as they existed in 1961, but a number of districts have 
divided into smaller units over time.  In order to obtain the percentage of district population in 
urban areas for districts with 1961 jurisdictional boundaries, I needed to aggregate data from the 
districts that divided over time.  For example, by the 1981 census, Hyderabad district had divided 
into Hyderabad and Rangareddi districts. I re-calculated percentage of district population living 
in urban areas for districts that had been a single district in earlier decades.  In order to do this, I 
first added the total population of Hyderabad to the total population of Rangareddi to get the total 
population of Hyderabad district.  I then added the urban population of Hyderabad to the urban 
population of Rangareddi districts and divided this sum by the combined total population of 
Hyderabad and Rangareddi to obtain the percentage of population living in urban areas for 
Hyderabad district with 1961 jurisdictional boundaries.  
I include “region” as an independent variable since regional variation in kinship and 
patriarchal norms has such a strong impact on the status of women and girls in India. The 
variable “region” is a proxy measure of historical variation in these kinship patterns and 
patriarchal norms.  This allows me to test the interaction effects between region and the other 
independent variables in this study.  This makes conceptual sense since Inglehart and Welzel 
(2005) have found that nations’ paths of modernization depend in part on historical/cultural 
factors.  I discuss this further in the “Analytic Methods” section.  I code region as (1= district 
belongs to Southern region, 0 =otherwise) since Southern states tend to have greater gender 
equality than Northern states.  I code a district as “1” if it belongs to Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, or 
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Andhra Pradesh, and I code a district as “0” if a district belongs to Rajasthan, Gujarat, or 
Madhya Pradesh.  I also code each state as a separate dummy variable.  For instance, for the 
variable “Madhya Pradesh,” I code all the districts that belong to Madhya Pradesh as “1,” and all 
the districts that do not belong to Madhya Pradesh as “0.”  I code each state in this way, so that I 
can include these states as separate control variables in my statistical models, omitting one state 
as the reference category.  This is so that I can discover if there are more localized patterns of 
gender inequality than the broader categories of “North” and “South”.  
 
5.3.2 Dependent variables 
 
I measure district-level change in gender inequality with three variables: change in total 
female/male sex ratio, change in female/male child sex ratio, and change in female/male literacy 
ratio.   
The Census of India defines the sex ratio as “the number of females per 1,000 males in 
the population” and the child sex-ratio as “number of females in age-group 0-6 years per 1,000 
males in the same age-group in the population” (Census of India 2001 web cite).  The sex-ratio is 
calculated by dividing “number of females” by “number of males”, and then multiplying that 
number by 1,000.  This gives the female/male sex ratio with a high level of precision, and also 
eliminates the decimal places. 
Similarly, the Census of India calculates the child sex-ratio (0-6 years) by dividing 
“number of female children (0-6)” by “number of male children (0-6)”, and multiplying the 
resulting figure by 1,000.  The way in which the Census of India has measured female/male child 
sex ratio and percentage of females and males who are literate has changed slightly across 
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decades.  In census years prior to 1991, the female to male child sex ratio was based on the 
number of female and male children ages 0-4 years.  In 1991 and 2001, however, female/male 
child sex ratio is based on the number of female and male children who are aged 0-6 years. 
The 2001 Census of India defines a literate person as “a person aged 7 years and above 
who can both read and write with understanding in any language”, including people who have 
learned to read informally and blind people who read Braille (Census of India 2001 web cite).  I 
also include district-level female literacy rate and male literacy rate as separate variables, at least 
in my descriptive analyses.  This is to uncover whether changes in the female/male literacy ratio 
is due to a faster rate of change in female literacy than male literacy, or if it is due to a decline or 
leveling off of male literacy rates. 
  The female and male literacy rates in 1961-1981 are based on the percentage of females 
and males over 4 years of age who can read and write.  In 1991 and 2001, a literate person is 
defined as someone at least 7 years of age who can read and write.  These changes in 
measurement should not make a significant difference in the results of my analyses, but it is 
important to mention it here.  The India Census reports district-level data for the total number of 
people who are literate, and also the number of literate males and literate females.   
The fact that many districts have divided over time means that I have had to re-calculate 
sex ratios, child sex ratios, female/male literacy ratios, female literacy rates, and male literacy 
rates for districts that had been a single district in earlier decades.  For example, since Hyderabad 
and Rangareddi districts had been one district at an earlier time period, I have added together the 
total number of females in both districts and divided this by the total number of males in both 
districts in order to get the female/male sex ratio of the jurisdictional area 
Hyderabad+Rangareddi. 
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5.3.3 Control variable 
 
During India’s pre-independence period, the female/male sex ratio was much higher for 
Scheduled Castes than the national female/male sex ratio (Dreze and Sen 2004).  Since India’s 
independence, the female/male sex ratio among Scheduled Castes has been declining, and by 
1991 it had converged with the all-India female/male sex ratio. Some researchers have noted that 
over the past few decades, lower-caste groups (including Scheduled Castes) have been 
increasingly adopting higher-caste cultural norms and practices as a way to raise the status of 
their castes, a process they call “sanskritization” (Dreze and Sen 2004).  Such norms include 
female seclusion and the giving and taking of dowry. For this reason, I include “percentage of 
district population comprised of scheduled castes” as a control variable in my study.   
The way in which the India Census has defined membership of a Scheduled Caste is 
rather complicated, and thus I give a detailed explanation.  The President of India defines which 
castes in each State or Union Territory are considered Scheduled Castes for those states.  This 
means that each state or union territory may have its own list of Scheduled Castes which is 
distinct from any other state.  According to the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order of 1950, 
only Hindus could be considered members of Scheduled Castes.  An amendment in 1956 ordered 
that both professing Hindus and Sikhs could be considered for Scheduled Caste membership.  A 
further amendment in 1990 ordered that Buddhists as well as Hindus and Sikhs can be 
considered for membership of Scheduled Castes (Census of India 2001).  This means that district 
percentages of Scheduled Castes for years after 1991 may be higher simply because “Scheduled 
Caste” has been defined more broadly.  For the purposes of my study, I operationalize 
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“Scheduled Caste” as the percentage of the district population made up of Scheduled Caste 
members. 
 
5.3.4 Dealing with time 
 
The existence of women’s rights programs, microcredit programs, and other market-based 
programs may very well begin in years other than when the India Census data is collected.  
Because all of my dependent variables are measured during India Census years, I can still have a 
“time-structured” data set (Singer and Willett 2003:12).  I record presence/absence of women’s 
development programs that existed prior to 1961 as occurring during 1961.  In order for the 
presence/absence of women’s programs to cause or predict changes in gender inequality, 
measurements for the women’s program variables must precede measurements of gender 
inequality.  However, for women’s programs that came into existence during a Census year (i.e. 
1961 or 1971), I cannot determine if they came into existence before or after the census was 
taken in that year.  Therefore, I record women’s development programs that started during the 
period of 1961 to 1970 as existing in 1971.  I code the women’s development programs that 
came into existence in subsequent Census years in the same way.  I set up my database as a time-
structured, “district-period” data set in order to treat my data set as longitudinal panel data 
(Singer and Willett 2003:17-19,  Allison 2009:15) as in Figure 5.1 below. 
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ID Year Period WRP MFI 
22 1961 0 0 0 
22 1971 1 0 0 
22 1981 2 1 0 
22 1991 3 1 0 
22 2001 4 1 1 
Figure 5.1 Sample set-up for district-period data set 
I assign an ID number to each district in the study.  There are 5 periods of data 
corresponding to the census years of the five decades that I include in my study.  However, 
districts that have a women’s rights program and/or a women’s microcredit program have waves 
of data for each year that a women’s organization began to exist in those districts.  Many 
women’s rights programs, microcredit programs, and market programs have started in years 
between India Census years.  I record these programs’ existence in the following Census year.  In 
figure 3 above (a hypothetical example), district 22 has data starting in 1961, which is the first 
year of India Census data that I am including in my study. A women’s rights program started in 
this district sometime between 1971 and 1980.  A women’s microcredit program began 
sometime between 1991 and 2000.  I give a more detailed account of how I deal with time and 
causality in the next section.  
 
5.3.5 Causality 
 
If I test my hypotheses and find that economic growth, urbanization, or the presence of women’s 
development programs is correlated with changes in gender inequality over time, I will have a 
strong sense of the explanatory power of each model compared to the baseline model testing the 
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null hypothesis.  However, I may not know the true causal direction between these independent 
variables.  It is possible that there is a spurious relationship between presence of women’s 
programs and changes in gender inequality, and that there are other factors that are causing both 
variation in gender inequality and variation in presence/absence of women’s programs.  
Alternatively, some types of women’s programs may flourish in areas that have lower levels of 
gender inequality prior to their existence in those areas.  In this instance, gender inequality 
predicts the presence or absence of women’s programs rather than the other way around.  
Another possibility is that there may be more NGOs with women’s programs present in more 
economically developed states than in less economically developed states.  In this case, states 
that have more economic resources may attract NGOs that need sources of funding in order to 
operate.  Moreover, some states may implement policies that encourage the proliferation of some 
types of women’s programs.  There is certainly evidence that this may be the case.  According to 
one report, 61% of NGOs in India are in Southern states (Dasgupta 2001, cited in Singh 2007).  
Moreover, 74% of microcredit SHGs are associated with NGOs existing in Southern states, and 
78% of microcredit goes to SHGs in the Southern region.  In contrast, only 6.9% of microcredit 
goes to SHGs in the Central region, which includes the central state of Madhya Pradesh 
(Dasgupta 2001, cited in Singh 2007).  The so-called “BIMARU” states (Bihar, Madhya 
Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh) are poorer than the southern states, so it could be that the 
relative abundance of economic resources in southern states makes it possible for NGOs to start 
more women’s microcredit programs than is possible in the central and northwestern states.  
Also, it is important to consider other state-wide historical trends or policy changes that may 
affect changes in female/male sex ratios or female/male literacy ratios apart from urbanization, 
per capita SDP, or the presence of women’s development programs.  For instance, Rajasthan and 
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Madhya Pradesh states implemented innovative educational programs between the late 1980s 
and mid-1990s (Panchamukhi 2006, Ray 2006).  Both states saw jumps in statewide female 
literacy rates of over 20 percentage points between 1991 and 2001 (Panchamukhi 2006).  In this 
section, I describe how I will deal with these issues. 
There are a few steps that I must take in order to establish causal relationships between 
the variables in my study. The first step that I take in establishing causality is to determine the 
temporal order among the independent variables.  In order to determine if the values of an 
independent variable X predict values of a dependent variable Y, the independent variable X 
must be measured prior to the dependent variable Y (Inglehart and Welzel 2005).  It is possible 
that an increase in levels of urbanization lead to an increase in the female/male literacy ratio over 
time.  However, it is also possible that an increase in urbanization occurs at the same time as an 
increase in the female/male literacy ratio so that the two variables are correlated without there 
being a causal relationship between the two. In order to test if increases in urbanization predict 
an increase in the female/male literacy ratio, I must run statistical models with lagged values of 
urbanization (Singer and Willett 2003).  For example, in Figure 5.1, if I recorded lagged values 
of urbanization I would record the level of urbanization from 1961 as if it were the level of 
urbanization at wave 2 in 1971.  I also code the values of urbanization for the years they actually 
occur, so that I have both lagged and unlagged data for the urbanization variable.  If the results of 
a statistical model with unlagged urbanization show that the relationship between urbanization 
and female/male literacy ratio is statistically significant, but the relationship between lagged 
urbanization and female/male literacy ratio is not significant, then I can be quite certain that 
urbanization does not lead to an increase in the female/male literacy ratio.   
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There are other possible causal relationships to consider.  For example, the results of a 
statistical model may lead one to believe that the presence of women’s microcredit programs 
leads to an increase in the female/male child sex ratio.  However, one needs to consider how 
other variables such as urbanization or economic growth may impact both the presence of 
microcredit programs and the female/male child sex ratio.  If the relationship between women’s 
microcredit programs and the female/male sex ratio disappears once one introduces per capita 
SDP into the model (and per capita SDP is significant), then the relationship between microcredit 
programs and female/male sex ratio are both caused by per capita SDP.  In this case, the 
relationship between presence of microcredit programs and female/male sex ratio is spurious 
(Agresti and Finlay 1997).   
Yet another possible causal relationship is a chain relationship (Agresti and Finlay 1997).  
For instance, there may appear to be a causal relationship between per capita SDP and 
female/male sex ratio, but the relationship disappears once one introduces presence of women’s 
market programs into the model.  In this case, presence of women’s market programs is an 
intervening variable and the direct cause of change in female/male sex ratio.  In both the case of 
chain relationships and spurious relationships, it is important to consider the temporal order, as 
well as what theory and prior studies would suggest.  It is highly implausible that a change in the 
female/male child sex ratio causes change in the number of sex-selective abortions that are 
performed, but it is possible that a change in the number of sex-selective abortions performed 
leads to change in the female/male child sex ratio.  
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5.4 ANALYTIC METHODS 
5.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Before I run my statistical models, I first carry out some exploratory analyses of my data.  This is 
because I must first examine how much variation over time and between regions there is in the 
values of my variables in order to make decisions about the appropriate statistical methods later 
on (Frees 2004).  I first calculate the overall means and standard deviations as well as minimum 
and maximum values for all of my continuous variables: per capita SDP, logged per capita SDP, 
percentage of district population in urban areas, percent of population comprised of Scheduled 
Castes, female/male sex ratio, female/male child sex ratio, male literacy rate, female literacy rate, 
and female/male literacy ratio.  The standard deviation tells me the spread of the distribution.  
The smaller the value of a variable’s standard deviation is, the smaller the spread of all the values 
are about the mean. 
Once I generate overall means and standard deviations for my continuous variables, I 
then generate counts and percents of each type of women’s program by region (north and south) 
to determine if regional variation in the number of districts that have a certain type of women’s is 
statistically significant.  I generate separate region-wise crosstabulations for women’s rights 
programs, women’s market programs, and women’s microfinance programs. 
I use two-sample t-tests in order to determine if there is statistically significant variation 
by region for each of the continuous independent variables and dependent variables.  I calculate 
t-tests for each of the following variables: per capita SDP, logged per capita SDP, percentage of 
population in urban areas, percentage of district population comprised of Scheduled Castes, 
female/male sex ratio, female/male child sex ratio, and female/male literacy ratio.  I also 
176 
calculate two-sample t-tests for male literacy rate and female literacy rate to see if there is 
statistically significant regional variation for each of these separately. 
Once I explore regional variation in all of the variables, I examine regional variation in 
each variable by state.  I first tabulate counts and percents for each women’s program by state, 
just as I do for each women’s program by region.  This is important because even if there is not 
statistically significant regional variation in the number of districts with women’s programs, 
there may be statistically significant state-wise variation in presence of women’s programs.  It is 
possible that there may be one state in the north or south that has an uncharacteristically low or 
high number of districts with women’s programs and that this state is causing regional variation 
in presence of women’s programs to be statistically insignificant.   
After this, I use one-way ANOVAs to examine whether state-wise variation in each of 
the continuous variables is statistically significant.  I use the Bonferroni multiple comparison 
procedure to determine which pairs of states are significantly different in their mean values for 
all of these variables (Agresti and Finlay 1997, Acock 2006).  One of the assumptions of 
ANOVA is that the variances of all groups being compared are equal (Acock 2006).  I use 
Bartlett’s test for equal variances to determine whether this assumption holds for the inter-state 
comparison of means.  If this assumption does not hold for any of the variables, I must interpret 
the ANOVA results for that variable with caution. 
My next step is to produce a correlation matrix of all of my variables, including lagged 
independent variables.  This is an important step because it gives me an initial sense of how the 
variables are related to one another, including the extent to which any of the independent 
variables are correlated with each other.  If any of the independent variables are too strongly 
correlated with each other, this is an indication that they are collinear.  In this case, I must 
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include interaction terms along with the main effects of the collinear variables in the statistical 
models (Arceneaux and Huber 2007).  If I include only the main effects of the collinear variables 
in my models, the estimates of the coefficients may be biased.  Another reason why it is 
important to run a correlation matrix before estimating the statistical models is because the 
correlation matrix will provide clues to causal relationships that I do not consider in my original 
hypotheses.  For instance, one of my hypotheses is that the presence of women’s market 
programs leads to an increase in female/male sex ratios and female/male literacy ratios. If the 
presence of women’s market programs is indeed significantly related to an increase in 
female/male sex ratios and literacy ratios, it is possible that the market programs are not causing 
these changes. Another plausible explanation is that per capita SDP explains both an increase in 
presence of women’s market programs and an increase in the female/male literacy ratios. In this 
case, any apparent relationship between women’s market programs and female/male literacy 
ratios is actually a spurious relationship (Agresti and Finlay 1997).    If I find that there is no 
correlation between per capita SDP and female/male literacy ratio, but there is a relationship 
between women’s market programs and literacy ratio, I can be certain that the relationship 
between women’s market programs and literacy ratio is not a spurious relationship (Agresti and 
Finlay 1997).    
Once I explore the variation in all of the variables by region and state, I investigate 
variation in the variables across time periods.  I first tabulate counts and percents for each type 
women’s program by time period.  I tabulate separate tables of counts and percents for types of 
women’s programs in the northern region and in the southern region.  This allows me to 
determine if the variation in the presence of women’s programs is statistically significant across 
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time periods within a given region.  After this, I tabulate counts and percents for each type of 
women’s program across time periods and within each of the six states. 
After I examine the variation in the presence of each type of women’s program over time, 
I calculate means and standard deviations by time period and state for all of the continuous 
independent and dependent variables except per capita SDP and logged per capita SDP.  (Since 
there is no district variation in per capita SDP and logged per capita SDP, I do not report means 
and standard deviations for these variables.)  I calculate means and standard deviations of each of 
these variables separately by state.  This gives me a better sense for how the variables change 
over time within each state. I can also see if there is a consistent pattern in how these variables 
(especially the dependent variables) change over time, and if the rate of change varies drastically 
during some time periods.  For example, I am able to tell if the female/male sex ratio increases or 
decreases steadily over time, or if it fluctuates up and down over time.  I am also able to 
determine if the female/male sex ratio increases in some states while it decreases in others.   
Once I run means and standard deviations for my continuous variables, I then create a 
trellis plot (Frees 2004), or series of line graphs depicting how individual districts vary over time 
on each of the dependent variables.  I accomplish this by randomly selecting a sample of districts 
for each dependent variable and plotting changes in the variables over time.  Creating trellis plots 
for a large number of districts allows me to visually detect time trends for each dependent 
variable, such as how much the female/male literacy ratio changes over time, whether that 
change is positive or negative, and whether there is a linear or curvilinear relationship between 
female/male literacy ratio and time period.  This informs my later decisions in statistical 
modeling.  For example, if there is a curvilinear relationship between female/male literacy ratio 
and time period and I try to fit a linear model to the data, I might falsely conclude that there is no 
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change in female/male literacy ratio over time.  These line graphs also show how much between-
district variation there is in initial values of my dependent variables and rates of change over 
time.  This is important because it provides a clue as to whether I should pay more attention to 
between-district changes or within-district changes in the dependent variables over time.  
I use change-scores to determine the amount of change in each of the continuous 
independent and dependent variables from 1961 to 2001.  I use the t-test to determine if this 
absolute change from time period 1 (1961) to time period 5 (2001) is statistically significant.   
While the change score analyses tell me which variables vary significantly over time, they do not 
tell me the strength of the relationship between time and each of these variables.  For this I 
estimate OLS regression models of each continuous variable on time period.  OLS regression 
models tell me both the strength of the relationship between each variable and time, and also the 
average magnitude of change per time period for each variable.  The coefficients for each 
variable tell me how much each variable changes over time, and the adjusted R-squared tells me 
the strength of the relationship between each variable and time.  Both the change score analyses 
and the OLS regressions can determine which variables, if any, do not vary significantly over 
time.  This is especially important to determine because if any of the dependent variables does 
not significantly change over time, then I cannot include it as a dependent variable for further 
statistical models that include independent variables. Also, if there are any independent variables 
that do not vary significantly over time, I must treat these variables as time-invariant variables in 
further statistical models. 
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5.4.2 Statistical modeling 
 
Although ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is a common data analytic method among 
social scientists, it is not appropriate for analyzing longitudinal data.  One can use OLS 
regression with longitudinal data to describe the relationship between the independent variable 
“time” and changes in the dependent variable as I describe above (Singer and Willett 2003), or to 
explain the relationship between independent variables and the dependent variable for cross-
sectional data.  However, OLS regression is inappropriate for analyzing longitudinal data 
because there are a few assumptions of OLS that the structure of longitudinal data does not 
fulfill.  The first assumption of OLS is that the error terms associated with the actual 
observations will be completely uncorrelated, and that the error terms taken together will have a 
mean of zero (Schroeder et al. 1986).  The second assumption is that variability in the error terms 
is not correlated with any of the independent variables, and that the error term itself is not related 
to the independent variables.  Third, with OLS regression the error residuals must be 
homoskedastic; that is, the variance must not become greater or lesser over time (Singer and 
Willett 2003).  The structure of longitudinal data violates all of these assumptions.  Although the 
error terms of different units may be uncorrelated, the error terms across time points for the same 
unit will be correlated (Schroeder et al. 1986, Finkel 2007).  For example, the error terms for 
female/male literacy ratios at time 2 are likely to be correlated with the error terms for literacy 
ratios at time 1.  Second, the residuals for my longitudinal data may be heteroscedastic (Singer 
and Willett 2003).  This means that the variance in error may become larger or smaller over time.  
Third, the error terms of my data may be related to at least some of the independent variables.  
This is because there may be unobserved, time-invariant characteristics that are unique to 
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individual districts, and that are also related to the independent variables (Halaby 2004, Finkel 
2007).  For example, districts that are drought-prone (a geographical feature) may be less likely 
to become more urbanized over time than districts that are not prone to drought.  In an OLS 
model, these unmeasured, time-invariant characteristics are treated as part of the error term.  If 
one uses OLS regression for data that does not fulfill the above assumptions, it can affect the 
regression coefficients’ standard errors and bias the results (Schroeder et al. 1986).  Either fixed-
effects or random-effects models allow for the heteroskedasticity characteristic of longitudinal 
data without introducing bias.  Fixed-effects models allow for correlation between the time-
invariant, unit-specific error and the independent variables as well (Halaby 2004, Finkel 2007). 
 
5.4.3 Fixed-effects models 
 
I use fixed-effects models to analyze the data and to test the hypotheses. There are several 
advantages of using fixed-effects models, which I describe below.  Fixed-effects longitudinal 
models allow one to control for time-invariant characteristics of units (Allison 2009), such as 
unique characteristics of nations, states, or even districts.  These can include a wide range of 
characteristics that one cannot directly measure, such as geographical attributes, cultural norms, 
or historical attributes of states or districts.  Fixed-effects models “pool” data from across time 
periods to estimate “average” coefficients that explain how the dependent variable changes with 
the independent variable over time (Finkel 2007). The basic equation of the fixed-effects model 
is (Finkel 2007:479):    .  
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In this model, there are two parts to the error term.  The “U” term represents the time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity unique to each district (Finkel 2007).  The “ ” represents 
the idiosyncratic error that is assumed to have a random distribution.  This idiosyncratic error 
varies across time and across districts.  “ ” represents the coefficient of the first independent 
variable “ ”.  “  ” is the value of the first independent variable for “i” individuals at “t” 
time periods.  Thus,  refers to the effect of the first independent variable for “i” districts 
at “t” time points.   
The strength of using fixed-effects models is that they allow me to estimate the effects of 
women’s development programs on changes in gender inequality and control for these 
unmeasured district-level characteristics.  In OLS regression, in contrast, one cannot control for 
these unmeasured characteristics (Allison 2009).  In fixed-effects regression models, each unit 
(in my study, each district) acts as its own control.  The fixed-effects model essentially 
“differences out” the time-invariant, between-district variation in values of the independent 
variables.  This between-district variation in values of the observed independent variables may 
be confounded by unmeasured characteristics of those districts.  For example, it may be possible 
that some district-specific, unmeasured characteristic such as geographical conditions or cultural 
norms cause variation in presence/absence of women’s programs and also cause changes in 
gender inequality.  The advantage of “differencing out” these unmeasured characteristics is that 
it allows me to more accurately estimate the relationships between my independent variables and 
dependent variables.  If I use a model that does not separate the unmeasured, time-invariant 
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district characteristics from the random error term, this could result in biased estimators for my 
independent variables (Allison 2009, Finkel 2007). 
There are some drawbacks to using a fixed-effects regression model, however.  Since a 
fixed-effects model controls for any time-invariant characteristics of districts, I cannot directly 
estimate the effects of observable time-invariant variables on the dependent variables, such as 
the effects of “region” or “state” on gender inequality (Allison 2009).  However, I can still 
estimate the interaction effects of time-invariant variables and the passage of time, such as the 
interaction effect of “state*period”.  Another disadvantage of fixed-effects models is that they 
usually produce larger p-values and standard errors than those of random-effects models.  This is 
because fixed-effects models use only information related to within-district variation and 
discards information on between-district variation.  This means that if there is a lot of between-
district variability in values of the independent variables but not much change over time, the 
fixed-effects coefficients will not be precise (Allison 2009).  This can result in coefficients of 
independent variables that are not statistically significant (even if they are unbiased).   
 
5.4.4 Model specification 
 
In this section, I describe in detail the models that I estimate to test each set of hypotheses. I 
estimate fixed-effects models to test all of my hypotheses.  For each set of hypotheses, I estimate 
a final, complete model that includes all of the variables from the previous models.  This is so 
that I can test the relative goodnesss-of-fit of each of the previous reduced models against the 
goodness-of-fit of the final complete model (Agresti and Finlay 1997).  I also estimate models 
with lagged independent variables for each set of hypotheses. This is to determine whether 
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independent variables that are statistically significantly related to the dependent variables remain 
statistically significant once the lagged values of the independent variables are used in the 
models instead.  If there is no statistically significant relationship between the lagged 
independent variables and the dependent variables, then the independent variables cannot be said 
to cause variation in the dependent variables.  I start this section by describing how I test the first 
set of hypotheses, which are derived from modernization theory. 
Hypotheses  and  test the claims of modernization theory.    states, “An 
increase in urbanization and per capita SDP will lead to an increase in female/male sex ratios, 
female/male child sex ratios, and female/male literacy ratios.”  In order to test this hypothesis, I 
estimate fixed-effects models for each of the dependent variables, and include logged per capita 
SDP and percent of population in urbanized areas as the independent variables.  I also include 
the variable “period” to control for the effect of the passage of time on changes in the dependent 
variables. 
 states, “An increase in urbanization and economic growth will have a greater impact 
on increases in female/male sex ratios, female/male child sex ratios, and female/male literacy 
ratios in southern states than in northern states.”  I test this hypothesis by first estimating a 
fixed-effects model that includes all of the variables from the previous model, plus the following 
interaction terms: region*urban, region*logged per capita SDP.  In the final model, I add 
“percentage of population comprised of Scheduled Castes”, region*period, women’s rights 
programs, market programs, and microfinance programs.  This is so that I can determine if the 
effects of the variables of interest (logged per capita SDP, urbanization, region*logged per capita 
SDP, region*urbanization) remain the same after I control for these other variables.  Since each 
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previous model is nested within each successive model, I can use the F-statistic to compare the 
goodness-of-fit of each model to successive models.  I explain the F-statistic in greater detail in 
the Statistical Methods section. 
Hypotheses  through  test the claims of WID theory.   states, “An increase in 
urbanization and economic growth alone will lead to a decrease in female/male sex ratios, 
female/male child sex ratios, and female/male literacy ratios.”  In order to test this hypothesis, I 
can simply refer to the results of the model testing hypothesis 1a.  If the results for the model that 
tests  show that urbanization and logged per capita SDP are significantly related to increases 
in female/male sex ratio, child sex ratio, and literacy ratio, then I will accept hypothesis 1a and 
reject hypothesis 2a.  If the model that tests hypothesis 1a shows that urbanization and logged 
per capita SDP are significantly related to decreases in the female/male sex ratio, child sex ratio, 
and literacy ratio, then I will accept hypothesis 2a and reject hypothesis 1a. 
 states, “The presence of women’s market programs will lead to increases in 
female/male sex ratios, female/male child sex ratios, and female/male literacy ratios.”  In order 
to test this hypothesis, I estimate fixed-effects models that include “women’s market programs” 
as the independent variable and “period” as the control variable.  
 states, “The presence of women’s market programs and women’s microfinance 
programs jointly will have a greater impact than women’s market programs alone on raising 
female/male sex ratios, female/male child sex ratios, and female/male literacy ratios.”  To test 
this hypothesis, I include “market programs”, “microfinance programs”, and the interaction term 
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“market*microfinance”, as well as the control variable “period”.  The interaction term tests for 
the joint effect of market and microfinance programs on changes in the dependent variables. 
 states, “The presence of women’s market programs and women’s microfinance 
programs will have a greater impact on increases in female/male sex ratios, female/male child 
sex ratios, and female/male literacy ratios in southern states than in northern states.”  To test 
this hypothesis, I include all of the variables from the previous model, as well as the interaction 
effects of market*region, microfinance*region, and market*microfinance*region.  Since 
“region” is a time-invariant variable, I do not include it as a main effect in the model.  The last 
model that I estimate includes all of the previous independent variables, as well as the interaction 
effect of region*period to control for any changes in the dependent variables that are caused 
solely by the changing effect of region over time.  I also include the main effects of urbanization, 
logged per capita SDP, and Scheduled Castes.  I include all of these variables in this last model 
so that all previous models are nested in this model.  This is so that I can compare the goodness-
of-fit of all previous models to one final model. 
My third set of hypotheses (  through  ) test the claims of GAD theory.   states, 
“The presence of women’s rights programs will lead to increases in female/male sex ratios, 
female/male child sex ratios, and female/male literacy ratios.   To test this hypothesis, I estimate 
fixed-effects models for each of the dependent variables that include only “women’s rights 
programs” as the independent variable and “period” to control for any change in the dependent 
variables that is due solely to the passage of time. 
 states, “Region will have a mediating effect on the impact of women’s rights 
programs on increases in female/male sex ratios, female/male child sex ratios, and female/male 
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literacy ratios.  To test this hypothesis, I estimate a model that includes women’s rights 
programs, women’s rights*region, and period.  I then estimate a model that includes these 
variables, plus the Scheduled Castes variable and the interaction effect of region*period.  I 
include an interaction term for region and period to determine if region (apart from women’s 
rights programs) can at least partly explain variation in the rates of change of female/male sex 
ratios and literacy ratios.  
 states, “The presence of women’s rights programs, women’s market programs, and 
women’s microfinance programs jointly will have a greater impact than women’s rights 
programs alone on raising female/male sex ratios, female/male child sex ratios, and female/male 
literacy ratios.  For the fixed-effects models that I estimate to test this hypothesis, I include the 
main effects for women’s rights programs, market programs, and microfinance programs.  I also 
include the interaction effects between each of the women’s program types, as well as the joint 
effect of all three women’s program types: women’s rights*market, women’s 
rights*microfinance, market*microfinance, and women’s rights*market*microfinance.  Even 
though I am not specifically testing the joint effect of each pair of women’s program types, I still 
include interaction effects of each pair of women’s program types.  This is because I must 
include all components of an interaction term in order to ensure that the model does not yield 
biased results (Arceneaux and Huber 2007).  Once I estimate this model, I then estimate a fixed-
effects model that includes all of these variables, as well as urbanization, logged per capita SDP, 
percentage of population comprised of Scheduled Castes, and region*period.  This is so that I 
can determine whether the effects of the women’s program variables change or remain the same 
as in the previous model.   
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My last set of hypotheses  (  through ) test the claims of neoliberal theory.   
states, “The presence of women’s microfinance programs will lead to increases in female/male 
sex ratios, female/male child sex ratios, and female/male literacy ratios.” To test this hypothesis, 
I estimate fixed-effects models for each of the dependent variables that include only “women’s 
microfinance programs” as the independent variable and “period” to control for any change in 
the dependent variables that is due solely to the passage of time. 
 states, “The presence of women’s microfinance programs will have a greater impact 
on increases in female/male sex ratios, female/male child sex ratios, and female/male literacy 
ratios in areas that have greater economic growth than in areas that have less economic 
growth.”  To test this hypothesis, I estimate fixed-effects models that include the main effects for 
logged per capita SDP and women’s microfinance programs, and the interaction effect for 
microfinance programs*logged per capita SDP, as well as the control variable “period”. 
 states, “The presence of women’s microfinance programs will have a greater impact 
on increases in female/male sex ratios, female/male child sex ratios, and female/male literacy 
ratios in southern regions than in northern regions.”  I test this hypothesis by estimating fixed-
effects models that include the main effect of microfinance programs, the interaction effect of 
microfinance*region and region*period, plus the “period” control variable.  Once I estimate this 
model, I estimate a model that includes all of the variables from the previous model, as well as 
all of the variables from the model that tests .  Since both the models that test   and  
are nested within this subsequent model, I can compare the goodness-of-fit of both models to the 
goodness-of-fit of this subsequent model.  Finally, I estimate a model that includes all of the 
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variables in the previous model (microfinance, logged per capita SDP, microfinance*logged per 
capita SDP, microfinance*region, region*period, and period) plus women’s rights programs, 
women’s market programs, urbanization, and Scheduled Castes.  I add these last four variables 
as a way of testing whether the effects of the variables of interest are statistically significant even 
after I control for the effects of these last four variables.   
 
5.4.5 Statistical methods 
 
The usual method of estimating a fixed-effects model is to first estimate the model  
  and then estimate a model with the district-
level means for all of the variables (Finkel 2007:480).  That is, for every variable in the equation, 
each district’s values across time periods are averaged to come up with a district-specific 
average. This model estimates the between-district variation controlling for time, and is shown 
below (Finkel 2007:480).  
  
The next step is to subtract this equation from the previous equation to arrive at the equation for 
within-unit variation across time.   Since the average district-specific effects are differenced out 
of the equation and the U term is comprised of unchanging district characteristics, the U term is 
also differenced out of the equation.  One estimates this final fixed-effects model below using 
OLS regression (Finkel 2007). 
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Stata reports within-R², between R², and overall R² as goodness-of-fit measures (Allison 
2009).  However, since fixed-effects models discard all information on between-district variance 
in gender inequality, the within-R² is the appropriate goodness-of-fit statistic to examine and 
report.  The within-  tells one the percentage of within-district variation in the dependent 
variable that is explained jointly by all of the independent variables in the model.  For example, 
if the within-  = 0.40, then this means that the statistical model explains 40% of the within-
district variation in the dependent variable (Acock 2006).  The F-test statistic that is reported by 
Stata tells one whether the  values could have occurred just by chance. If the F-value is large, 
then the probability that the  values occurred by chance is small.  For example, if the 
probability (or p-value) that the    values occurred by chance is less than 0.05, one can be quite 
certain that the   values are statistically significant. 
The coefficients reported for each independent variable tell how large of an effect each 
independent variable has on the dependent variable (Acock 2006).  One uses the t-statistic for 
each coefficient to determine whether the value of that coefficient could have occurred by 
chance.  If the p-value, or probability that the value of the coefficient is less than 0.05, one can 
be 95% confident that the value of the coefficient did not occur just by chance.  That is, the value 
of the coefficient is statistically significant. 
 Rho (ρ) is a measure of the proportion of variance in the composite error term that is due 
to the time-invariant component (that is, ).    
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One can also use the F-test statistic to determine whether the goodness-of-fit of the 
complete model is statistically significantly better than the goodness-of-fit of the reduced model 
(Agresti and Finlay 1997).  The complete model includes all of the independent variables 
included in the reduced model, plus additional variables.  In order to test whether these 
additional independent variables in the complete model lend more explanatory power than if they 
were excluded, one must test the null hypothesis that the coefficients of these additional 
variables are equal to 0.  The null hypothesis is: 
:   , where g is the number of independent variables in the 
reduced model and k is the number of independent variables in the complete model.  The 
alternative hypothesis states that the coefficient of one or more of these additional variables in 
the complete model is not equal to 0.  The F-statistic is calculated using the following formula:  
F = , where  is the sum of the standard errors for the reduced model and 
 is the sum of the squared errors for the complete model, and  is the number 
of degrees of freedom in the complete model.  If the p-value for the observed value of the F-
statistic is less than 0.05, one can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients for the additional 
variables in the complete model are equal to 0.  In this case, the complete model is a better fit for 
the data than the reduced model (Agresti and Finlay 1997). 
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5.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have laid the groundwork for the following chapters in which I discuss the 
descriptive analyses and the results of the statistical models that I estimate.  I have discussed my 
data collection processes, including the states I chose for the study, the unit of analysis, and 
sources of data.  I have also explained how I deal with time using longitudinal data, as well as 
how I deal with issues of causality.  I have summarized the statistical methods I utilize to analyze 
the data, including descriptive statistics and the statistical models I estimate in order to test the 
hypotheses.  In chapter six, I will focus on the descriptive analyses of my variables, such as the 
overall means and standard deviations of the continuous variables, as well as the variation in the 
presence of women’s rights programs, market programs, and microfinance programs by region 
and state.  I will also discuss variation in the continuous independent variables and in the 
dependent variables by region and state.  After this, I will describe the regional and state-wise 
variation in the presence of the women’s programs over time, as well as the variation in the 
continuous independent variables and the dependent variables over time within each state.  I will 
end the next chapter by presenting and discussing change scores and OLS regression models of 
each continuous variable’s average change over time. 
                                                 
NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE 
viii The official Census of India website is www.Censusindia.gov.in.  This website provides drop-down menus from 
which one may choose particular states and districts with demographic information.  This website link is: 
www.Censusindia.gov.in/Tables_Published/Basic_Data_Sheet.aspx. 
  
ix I had considered using 2001 district boundaries in order to maintain constant boundaries from 1961-2001.  
However, other scholars on India at the University of Maryland at College Park have used the 1961 district 
boundaries as their constant units for their “Indian District Database.”  Scholars at Duke University have also used 
1961 district boundaries when compiling data for their longitudinal  “Indian Agriculture and Climate Data Set”.  By 
using 1961 district boundaries it is possible for me to merge data from these two data bases with my own data base 
for future research purposes. 
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x I first started with the state-wise maps from the Census of India website 
(www.censusindia.gov.in/maps/State_Maps_links) that showed the district boundaries in 2001.  I then used the 
following atlases to compare the state and district boundaries of prior periods to the state and district boundaries in 
2001:  T. T. Maps. Muthiah, S., editor-in-chief. 1990. An Atlas of India, pp. 17, 44, 64, 77, 112, and 121.  Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  For information on changes in state boundaries, I consulted this source:  Nag, Prithvish, 
ed. Socio-Economic Atlas of India, pp. 2-3.  Kolkata: Director, National Atlas and Thematic Publishing 
Organisation. 
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6.0 CHAPTER SIX: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous two chapters, I discussed the hypotheses and the variables of my study, and I 
outlined the descriptive statistics and the analytic methods that I use to test my hypotheses.  In 
this chapter, I focus on the descriptive analyses of my variables.   I start out by presenting and 
discussing overall means and standard deviations of the continuous independent variables (per 
capita SDP, urbanization, Scheduled Castes) and the dependent variables (female/male sex ratio, 
female/male child sex ratio, and female/male literacy ratio).  Next, I discuss variation in the 
presence of women’s rights programs, market programs, and microfinance programs by region 
and state.  I also discuss variation in the continuous independent variables and in the dependent 
variables by region and state, as well as pairwise correlations between these variables.  After this, 
I move on to a discussion of regional and state-wise variation in the presence of the women’s 
programs over time.  I then describe how the continuous independent variables and the 
dependent variables change over time within each state.  Finally, I present and discuss change 
scores and OLS regression models of each continuous variable’s average change over time.  
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6.1.1 Means and distributions of continuous independent and dependent variables 
 
The average per capita SDP in India across decades and states was about 41,952 rupees per 
capita.  Rajasthan state had the lowest per capita SDP of all the states in 1961 at Rs. 627 per 
capita.  Tamil Nadu had the highest per capita SDP of all the states in 2001 at Rs. 232,404 per 
capita.  The standard deviation of per capita SDP was (plus or minus) 78,864 rupees per capita, 
which is almost twice as high as the mean value for per capita SDP.  Because the distribution of 
per capita SDP was so skewed, I took the natural log of this variable to get a more normal 
distribution.  The mean value of logged per capita SDP across time periods and districts was 
8.60, and the standard deviation was 1.92, which is much less than the mean.  Therefore, I will 
use log-transformed per capita SDP in the statistical models that I will estimate. 
Table 6.1 Means and Standard Deviations of Independent and Dependent Variables 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
     
Per capita SDP (in Rupees) 41952 78864.28 627 232404 
ln(per capita SDP) 8.60 1.92 6.44 12.36 
% Population in Urbanized Areas 22.3 14.6 0.0 100.0 
% Population comprised of Scheduled Castes 14.4 5.8 0.4 31.2 
Female Literacy Rate 26.3 18.6 1.2 85.3 
Male Literacy Rate 49.0 19.8 9.1 90.4 
Female/Male Literacy Ratio 47.1 18.4 8.1 97.8 
Female/Male Sex Ratio 946 46.0 802 1082 
Female/Male Child Sex Ratio 965 39.2 824 1095 
 
In India the average level of urbanization across time periods and districts is only 22% of 
the population.  For the majority of observations, the percentage of district population living in 
urban areas falls between about 8% and 37%. The question remains, however, whether there is 
enough change in urbanization over time to have a statistically significant impact on changes in 
gender inequality over time.  As one can see from Table 6.1 above, the lowest percentage of 
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population living in urban areas is 0%, and the highest percentage is 100%.  I further examined 
which districts had these most extreme values, and found that Dangs district in Gujarat state had 
0% of its population living in urban areas for most decades, whereas Madras district (now 
Chennai) in Tamil Nadu had 100% of its population living in urban areas from 1971-2001.  It is 
possible that the extreme values of these two districts may skew the results of statistical models 
later on.  One strategy that I can take to deal with this is to estimate models both with and 
without these extreme cases and see if there is a statistically significant difference between the 
two resulting models.  If there is a difference between the two models, then I will keep the model 
that excludes the two cases.  It is not likely that including these two districts from the statistical 
models will bias the results since the mean and standard deviation for percent of population in 
urban areas do not differ much when these cases are excluded compared to when they are 
included (see Table 6.2). 
From Table 6.1, one can see that on average, the percentage of district population that is 
comprised of Scheduled Castes is about 14%, with a standard deviation of about 6 percentage 
points.  Dangs district in Gujarat state had the lowest percentage of Scheduled Castes at less than 
1% of its population, while Nilgiris district in Tamil Nadu had the highest percentage of 
Scheduled Castes at about 31% of its population.  It is possible that these two outliers could skew 
the results of statistical models that include the Scheduled Castes variable.  For example, if 
female/male sex ratios or literacy ratio tend to be low for Nilgiris district, the results of the 
statistical models may show that there is no statistically significant relationship between 
percentage of population comprised of Scheduled Castes and female/male sex ratios or literacy 
ratio.  However, as can be seen from     Table 6.2 below, the mean and standard deviation for 
percentage of population comprised of Scheduled Castes when these two districts are omitted 
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differs very little from the mean and standard deviation when the two districts are included. Still, 
I will handle this potential problem the same way I handle the extreme cases for the urbanization 
variable.  I will estimate models with and without the two districts that have extreme values for 
Scheduled Castes, and then I will determine whether there is a statistically significant difference 
between the two models.  If there is a significant difference between them, I will keep the model 
that excludes the two extreme cases.  
    Table 6.2 Means and Standard Deviations of Independent and Dependent Variables, Outliers Omitted 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
% Population in Urbanized Areas 22.0 13.3 0.9 77.9 
% Population comprised of Scheduled Castes 14.5 5.7 2.7 30.2 
Female/Male Literacy Ratio 47.2 18.3 12.9 93.8 
Female/Male Sex Ratio 946 43.7 816 1060 
Female/Male Child Sex Ratio 965 38.3 828 1085 
 
The mean female/male sex ratio averaged across decades, regions, and districts was 946 
females/1,000 males.  However, there is quite a bit of spread about the mean, as the standard 
deviation is 46.03.  This means that the female/male sex ratio was between around 900 to about 
992 females/1,000 males for 68% of the observations across the decades.  Both the lowest and 
highest observed female/male sex ratios occurred in 1961:  Jaisalmer district in Rajasthan had a 
sex ratio of 802 females/1,000 males, and Dakshin Kannad district in Karnataka had 1,082 
females/1,000 males.  Dakshin Kannad district in Karnataka had an unusually high female/male 
sex ratio for all time points in my study.  When I compared Dakshin Kannad’s sex ratio to the 
average sex ratio of Karnataka at each time period (Table 6.52), I found that in 1961 Dakshin 
Kannad’s female/male sex ratio was over two standard deviations above Karnataka’s average sex 
ratio, and in 1971-2001 Dakshin Kannad’s sex ratio was more than three standard deviations 
higher than Karnataka’s average sex ratio for those years.  The female/male sex ratio for 
Jaisalmer district was more than two standard deviations below the average sex ratio in 
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Rajasthan state in 1961 (see Table 6.56).  However, once I compared the mean and standard 
deviation for female/male sex ratio with these two districts omitted to the mean and standard 
deviation when they are included, I found that the two means were almost the same (    Table 
6.2).  Even though it is not likely that including these two cases would bias the results of my 
statistical models later on, I will still estimate models both with and without these two cases and 
determine whether there is a statistically significant difference between the two models.    
Surprisingly, the average female/male child sex ratio was about 965, which was higher 
than the average female/male sex ratio.  The standard deviation of the female/male child sex ratio 
was 39.23.  This means that the majority of observations on child sex ratio were between 926 
and 1,005 females per 1,000 males.  The lowest observation was in a district of Madhya Pradesh 
in 1981 at 824 females/1,000 males, which was more than three standard deviations below the 
mean female/male child sex ratio for Madhya Pradesh in 1981 (see Table 6.63).  The highest 
observation was in Andhra Pradesh in 1971 at 1,095 females/1,000 males, which was well over 
three standard deviations above Andhra Pradesh’s mean child sex ratio in 1971 (see Table 6.58).  
Once I compared the mean female/male child sex ratio with these two extreme cases omitted to 
the mean female/male child sex ratio with the cases included I found that there was almost no 
difference between the two.  I will still estimate statistical models both with and without these 
two cases to determine whether the two models are statistically significant as an added caution.    
I examined the means and standard deviations for male literacy rate and female literacy 
rate to get a better sense of how much they differed.  The average male literacy rate across time 
periods and districts was almost 49% with a standard deviation of 19.78, and the average female 
literacy rate was only about 26% with a standard deviation of 18.61.  The highest male literacy 
rate and female literacy rate were in Tamil Nadu in 2001, at 90% and 85%, respectively.  The 
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average female/male literacy ratio was about 47%, and the standard deviation was 18.38%.  This 
means that on average, less than half as many females were literate as compared to males.  The 
majority of observations on female/male literacy ratio were between about 29% and almost 92%.  
The lowest observed value for female/male literacy ratio was in 1961 in Madhya Pradesh at 
8.08%, which is slightly more than two standard deviations below the mean female/male literacy 
ratio for Madhya Pradesh in 1961 (see Table 6.69).  The highest female/male literacy ratio was in 
1981 in Gujarat at almost 98% in Sabarkantha district. This was more than two standard 
deviations above the mean female/male literacy ratio for Gujarat in 1981.  Once I examined the 
data for Sabarkantha district more closely, I found that the female/male literacy ratio in 1971 was 
about 40%, and in 1991 it was about 58%.  It is highly unlikely that the female/male literacy 
ratio would have dropped by about 30 percentage points from 1981 to 1991.  Therefore, I will 
run statistical models both with and without the female/male literacy ratio for Sabarkantha in 
1981 and determine whether the two models are significantly different.     
6.2 REGIONAL AND STATE-WISE VARIATION 
6.2.1 Women’s development programs by region 
 
I inspected the number and percentage of districts by region (North versus South) that had at 
least one women’s rights program, women’s market program, or women’s microfinance program 
present.  There was a women’s rights program present in about 32% of the district-period cases 
in northern India.  In southern India, there was a women’s rights program present in about 35% 
of the district-period cases, which is not substantially or statistically significantly higher than in 
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northern India.  About 33% of all district-period cases (North and South combined) had a 
women’s rights program present.  There was no statistically significant difference in the 
percentage of northern districts versus southern districts with a women’s rights program since the 
p-value was .50, much higher than the .05 significance level.   
 
 
 
This finding has important implications for my statistical modeling later on.  I can rule out the 
possibility that those who start women’s rights programs are either drawn to or deterred from 
starting the programs in either northern or southern regions.   That is, I can be certain that there 
are not unmeasured characteristics of northern versus southern regions that affect both variation 
in presence of market programs and variation in gender inequality.  Therefore, even if I include 
both region and presence/absence of women’s rights programs in my statistical models and both 
of these variables are statistically significantly related to changes in gender inequality, I can be 
sure that there is not a spurious relationship between presence of women’s rights programs and 
gender inequality.  
  Region 
WRP 
Absent 
WRP 
Present Total 
North    
Frequency 266 125 391 
Percentage 68.0% 32.0% 100% 
South    
Frequency 167 88 255 
Percentage 65.5% 34.5% 100% 
Total    
Frequency 433 213 646 
Percentage 67.0% 33.0% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = .451,  
Pr = .502   
Region 
Market 
Absent 
Market 
Present Total 
North    
Frequency 288 102 390 
Percentage 73.9% 26.2% 100% 
South    
Frequency 184 71 255 
Percentage 72.2% 27.8% 100% 
Total    
Frequency 472 173 645 
Percentage 73.2% 26.8% 100% 
Pearson Chi2 = .224,  
Pr = .636   
Table 6.4 Count and Percent of Women's 
Market Programs by Region 
Table 6.3 Count and Percent of 
Women's Rights Programs by Region 
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There was a women’s market program in about 26% of the district-period cases in 
northern India, and in about 28% of the district-period cases in southern India (see Table 6.4). 
About 27% of all district-period cases (North and South combined) had a women’s market 
program present, which is less than the percentage of district-period cases that had a women’s 
rights program present.  Since the p-value was about .64 (well over .05), there was no 
statistically significant difference in percentage of district-period cases with a women’s market 
program in northern India versus southern India.  Therefore, if my statistical models reveal that 
both region and presence of women’s market programs are significantly related to changes in 
gender inequality, I can be sure that region is not causing gender inequality to increase or 
decrease because there are more women’s market programs in one region or the other.  Also, I 
can be certain that there are not unmeasured characteristics of northern versus southern regions 
that affect both variation in presence of market programs and variation in gender inequality.  
This does not rule out the possibility of an interaction effect between region and women’s market 
programs.  For instance, it could still be possible that women’s market programs have a greater 
impact on raising female/male child sex ratio in southern regions than in northern regions.  If 
there is an interaction effect, it is not because there are more women’s market programs in the 
south than in the north, however. 
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Table 6.5 Count and Percent of Women's 
Microfinance Programs by Region 
Region 
MFI 
Absent 
MFI 
Present Total 
North    
Frequency 327 63 390 
Percentage 83.9% 16.2% 100% 
South    
Frequency 188 67 255 
Percentage 73.7% 26.3% 100% 
Total    
Frequency 515 130 645 
Percentage 79.8% 20.2% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 9.814,  
Pr = .002   
  
Overall, only about 20% of the district-period cases had a women’s microfinance 
program present, which is less than the percentage of district-period cases with either a women’s 
rights program or a women’s market program present.  In northern India, there was a 
microfinance program in about 16% of the district-period cases, and in southern India there was 
a microfinance program in about 26% of the district-period cases.  There was a statistically 
significant difference in the percentage of district-period observations with a microfinance 
program present in northern India versus southern India (p < .01).  Therefore, it is possible that 
there are unmeasured characteristics of the southern region that attract the initiators of women’s 
microfinance programs, and characteristics of northern regions that deter them from starting 
women’s microfinance programs there.  Moreover, it is possible that these regional 
characteristics also affect both the presence of microfinance programs and changes in gender 
inequality.  Therefore, if region and the presence/absence of women’s microfinance programs are 
both significantly related to variation in gender inequality, I cannot conclude that it is the 
presence of microfinance programs that is causing change in gender inequality.  
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6.2.2 Continuous independent variables and measures of gender inequality by region 
 
The average per capita SDP in northern India across time periods was about Rs. 39,600, whereas 
in southern India the average per capita SDP was about Rs. 45,800 (Table 6.6).  This means that 
the average per capita SDP in northern India was about Rs. 6,200 lower than the per capita SDP 
in southern India.  As mentioned earlier, since the standard deviation for this variable was greater 
than the mean value, I logged per capita SDP to get a more normal distribution. 
Table 6.6 Two-Sample T-Test for per capita SDP by Region 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 
North 430 39,600.66 3,582.42 74,286.64 
South 260 45,839.48 5,327.89 85,909.67 
combined 690 41,951.52 3,002.31 8,864.28 
Diff (North - South)  -6,238.82 6,420.29  
Pr( | T | > | t | ) = .332     
t = -0.97     
df = 486.14     
 
After taking the natural logarithm of SDP per capita, I found that the average logged per capita 
SDP for northern India was 8.56 and for southern India the mean logged per capita SDP was 
8.66 (Table 6.7).  I found that for both logged and unlogged per capita SDP there was no 
statistically significant difference between northern and southern India.   
Table 6.7 Two-Sample T-Test for Logged per capita SDP by Region 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 
North 430 8.56 0.09 1.91 
South 260 8.66 0.12 1.94 
Combined 690 8.60 0.07 1.92 
Diff (North - South)  -0.10 0.15  
Pr ( | T | ) > | t | = 0.495              
t = -0.68     
df = 688     
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The mean percentage of population living in urbanized areas in northern districts 
averaged across time periods was about 20% with a standard deviation of about 13 percentage 
points.  In southern districts the mean percentage of population living in urbanized areas was 
almost 26% with a standard deviation of almost 16 percentage points (Table 6.8).  I found that 
there was a statistically significant difference between northern districts and southern districts in 
their mean levels of urbanization (p < .001).  However, substantively there is not a large 
difference in mean percentage of population living in urban areas in the north versus the south.  
It would be useful to examine the state-wise comparisons of average percent of population in 
urban areas to determine if all southern states have a higher percentage of population in urban 
areas than northern states, or if there are just one or two southern states that have particularly 
high percentages of their populations in urban areas.  It is also possible that one or more northern 
states have particularly low percentages of their populations living in urbanized areas.  It is also 
important to consider the possibility that initiators of women’s microfinance programs may be 
drawn to urban regions, and that this may be why there is a higher percentage of districts in the 
southern region of India compared to the northern region that have women’s microfinance 
programs.    
Table 6.8 Two-Sample T-Test for Urbanization by Region 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 
North 430 20.3 0.65 13.48 
South 255 25.6 0.99 15.84 
combined 685 22.3 0.56 14.61 
Diff (North - South)  -5.3 1.19  
Pr ( | T | > | t | ) = .000     
t = -4.43     
df = 467.98     
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The mean percentage of population comprised of Scheduled Castes in northern districts 
was about 14% with a standard deviation of about 6 percentage points (Table 6.9).  The mean 
percentage of population comprised of Scheduled Castes in southern districts was two percentage 
points higher at about 16% with a standard deviation of about 5 percentage points.  The 
difference between northern and southern India in their Scheduled Caste composition was 
statistically significant (p < .001), even though substantively the difference is quite small. 
Table 6.9 Two-Sample T-Test for % Pop. Comprised of Scheduled Castes by Region 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 
North 430 13.6 0.29 6.09 
South 259 15.8 0.32 5.09 
Combined 689 14.4 0.22 5.83 
Diff (North - South)  -2.2 0.45  
Pr ( | T | > | t | ) = .000     
t = -4.77     
df = 687     
 
Table 6.10 Two-Sample T-Test for Female/Male Sex Ratio by Region 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 
North 430 929 2.21 45.90 
South 259 974 1.87 30.13 
Combined 689 946 1.75 46.03 
Diff (North - South)  -45 2.90  
Pr ( | T | > | t | ) = .000     
t = - 15.35     
df = 681.99     
 
Whereas the mean female/male sex ratio in northern India averaged across time periods 
was about 929 females/1,000 males, in southern India the mean sex ratio was about 974 
females/1,000 males (Table 6.10).  On average, there were about 44 more females per 1,000 
males in southern districts than in northern districts, which is a substantial difference.  This is as 
I would have expected, since patriarchal norms are stronger in the northern states than in the 
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southern states.  There was greater variation in female/male sex ratio across time periods and 
districts in northern India than in southern India.  In northern India, the female/male sex ratio for 
the majority of district-period cases was between about 883 and 975.  In southern India, the sex 
ratio for the majority of district-period cases was between about 944 and about 1,004 females per 
1,000 males.  Overall, there was a statistically significant difference in the female/male sex ratio 
of northern districts and southern districts (p < .001). 
Table 6.11 Two-Sample T-Test for Female/Male Child Sex Ratio by Region 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 
North 426 956 2.08 42.93 
South 259 980 1.65 26.48 
Combined 685 965 1.50 39.23 
Diff (North - South)  -24 2.65  
Pr ( | T | > | t | = .000     
t = -8.83     
df = 682.85     
 
The mean female/male child sex ratio in northern India was about 956 females/1,000 
males, and in southern India the mean female/male sex ratio was about 980 females/1,000 males 
(Table 6.11).  The variation in child sex ratio was greater in the northern region than in the 
southern region of India, just as the variation in overall female/male sex ratio was higher in the 
north than in the south.  In northern India, the female/male child sex ratio for the majority of 
district-period cases was between 913 and 999 females/1,000 males.  In southern India, the child 
sex ratio for the majority of district-period cases ranged from about 953 to 1,006 females per 
1,000 males.  There was a statistically significant difference in the average female/male child sex 
ratio of the northern region versus the southern region (p < .001). 
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Table 6.12 Two-Sample T-Test for Male Literacy Rate by Region 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 
North 430 46.8 0.98 20.32 
South 259 52.6 1.14 18.33 
Combined 689 49.0 0.75 19.78 
Diff (North - South)  -5.8 1.50  
Pr ( | T | ) > | t | = .000     
t = -3.80     
df = 587.58     
 
Table 6.13 Two-Sample T-Test for Female Literacy Rate by Region 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. 
Std. 
Dev. 
North 430 22.9 0.84 17.42 
South 259 31.9 1.19 19.17 
Combined 689 26.3 0.71 18.61 
Diff (North - South)  -9.0 1.46  
Pr ( | T | ) > | t | = .000     
t = -6.19     
df = 503.62     
 
Even though I do not include male literacy rate and female literacy rate as dependent 
variables in my statistical models in subsequent chapters, I find it useful to give a brief 
description of them here (Table 6.12 and Table 6.13).  The average male literacy rate in northern 
India across time was almost 47%, and in southern India the male literacy rate was about 53%.  
This is a difference of about six percentage points.  The average female literacy rate in northern 
India was about 23%, and in southern India the female literacy rate was about 32%.  The 
difference in female literacy rates in northern India and southern India is about nine percentage 
points.  The differences between the northern region and southern region for both male literacy 
rates and female literacy rates are statistically significant (p < .001). 
The mean female/male literacy ratio averaged across district-period cases in northern 
India was about 42%, and the mean female/male literacy ratio in southern India was about 55% 
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(Table 6.14).  For both northern and southern regions the standard deviation was about 17 
percentage points.  The average female/male literacy ratio was about 13 percentage points higher 
in southern India than in Northern India.  The difference in female/male literacy ratio between 
the northern region and southern region is also statistically significant (p < .001). 
Table 6.14 Two-Sample T-Test for Female/Male Literacy Ratio by Region 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 
North 430 42.2 0.83 17.26 
South 259 55.2 1.08 17.31 
Combined 689 47.1 0.70 18.38 
Diff (North - South)  -13.0 1.36  
Pr ( | T | > | t | = .000     
t = -9.59     
df = 687     
 
 
6.2.3 Variation in presence of women’s programs by state 
 
After I analyzed variation in all of the variables by region, I examined variation in all of the 
variables by state.  I first looked at state-wise variation in the presence of women’s programs.  
The following three tables show the mean percentage of districts in each state with women’s 
rights programs, market programs, and microfinance programs present averaged across time 
periods.  What is interesting to note is that even though there was no significant difference in 
percentage of districts with women’s empowerment programs or market programs by region 
(north versus south), there was a statistically significant difference in percentage of districts with 
these women’s programs across states.  Therefore, although there do not seem to be widespread 
regional characteristics that either draw or deter initiators of women’s rights programs and 
market programs from  starting programs in the north or south, there may very well be state-wide 
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characteristics that either attract or repel initiators of women’s rights programs or market 
programs.  Such characteristics could include the political climate of individual states, as well as 
other historical factors.  For instance, Mahatma Gandhi, the leader of India’s struggles for 
independence from Britain, was from Gujarat state.  This may have created a political climate in 
Gujarat state that was more conducive for women’s rights programs to start and flourish than in 
other states.    
Table 6.15 shows the average percentage of districts for each state that have at least one 
women’s empowerment program.  Overall, the state-wise variation in presence of women’s 
rights programs was statistically significant (p < .01).  Tamil Nadu and Gujarat states had the 
highest percentage of districts with at least one women’s rights program present.  On average, 
44.6% of districts in Tamil Nadu and 42.5% of districts in Gujarat had women’s rights programs.  
In Madhya Pradesh, the average percentage of districts with at least one women’s rights program 
was almost 24%, which was the lowest of the six states.  This is not surprising given the fact that 
Madhya Pradesh is one of the “BIMARU” states that historically ranked low on socioeconomic 
indicators such as net SDP, educational attainment, and the status of women and girls.  What is 
surprising, however, is that Andhra Pradesh has the second lowest percentage of districts with a 
women’s rights program at 28%.  I would have expected that Rajasthan, another BIMARU state, 
would have had the lowest or second-lowest percentage of districts with women’s rights 
programs.   
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Table 6.15 Count and Percent of Women's Rights Programs by State 
State WRP Absent WRP Present Total 
AndhraPradesh    
Frequency 72 28 100 
Percentage 72% 28% 100% 
Gujarat    
Frequency 46 34 80 
Percentage 57.5% 42.5% 100% 
Karnataka    
Frequency 59 31 90 
Percentage 65.6% 34.4% 100% 
MadhyaPradesh   
Frequency 142 44 186 
Percentage 76.3% 23.7% 100% 
Rajasthan    
Frequency 78 47 125 
Percentage 62.4% 37.6% 100% 
TamilNadu    
Frequency 36 29 65 
Percentage 55.4% 44.6% 100% 
Total    
Frequency 433 213 646 
Percentage 67.0% 33.0% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 16.996, Pr = .005  
 
Table 6.16 below shows the average percentage of districts for each state that have at 
least one women’s market program.  Overall, the state-wise variation in presence of women’s 
market programs was statistically significant (p < .05).  Just as with women’s rights programs, 
Tamil Nadu (a southern state) had the highest average percentage of districts with at least one 
women’s market program at about 43%.  Madhya Pradesh (a northern state) had the second 
highest percentage of districts with market programs at almost 29% of its districts, although this 
was still about 14 percentage points lower than in Tamil Nadu.  Karnataka, a southern state, had 
the lowest percentage of districts with market programs present at 20% of its districts.  It is clear 
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that the presence of women’s market programs vary much more by individual states than by 
northern or southern regions of India. 
Table 6.16 Count and Percent of Women's Market Programs by State 
State Market Absent Market Present Total 
AndhraPradesh    
Frequency 75 25 100 
Percentage 75% 25% 100% 
Gujarat    
Frequency 60 20 80 
Percentage 75% 25% 100% 
Karnataka    
Frequency 72 18 90 
Percentage 80% 20% 100% 
MadhyaPradesh    
Frequency 132 53 185 
Percentage 71.4% 28.7% 100% 
Rajasthan    
Frequency 96 29 125 
Percentage 76.8% 23.2% 100% 
TamilNadu    
Frequency 37 28 65 
Percentage 56.9% 43.1% 100% 
Total    
Frequency 472 173 645 
Percentage 73.2% 26.8% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 12.339, Pr = .030  
 
Table 6.17 below shows the average percentage of districts for each state that have at 
least one women’s microfinance program.  Overall, the state-wise variation in presence of 
women’s microfinance programs was statistically significant (p < .001).  Tamil Nadu and 
Andhra Pradesh, both southern states, had the highest average percentage of districts with 
women’s microfinance programs present at almost 34% and 30% of their districts, respectively.  
In Madhya Pradesh, the average percentage of districts with at least one microfinance program 
present was only about 11%, the lowest of the six states.  The overall state-wise percentages of 
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districts with microfinance programs were lower than the state-wise percentages of districts with 
either market programs or women’s rights programs.  This is probably due to the fact that the 
proliferation of women’s microfinance programs did not occur until the late 1980s to early 
1990s. 
Table 6.17 Count and Percent of Women's Microfinance Programs by State 
State MFI Absent MFI Present Total 
AndhraPradesh    
Frequency 70 30 100 
Percentage 70% 30% 100% 
Gujarat    
Frequency 64 16 80 
Percentage 80% 20% 100% 
Karnataka    
Frequency 75 15 90 
Percentage 83.3% 16.7% 100% 
MadhyaPradesh   
Frequency 164 21 185 
Percentage 88.7% 11.4% 100% 
Rajasthan    
Frequency 99 26 125 
Percentage 79.2% 20.8% 100% 
TamilNadu    
Frequency 43 22 65 
Percentage 66.2% 33.9% 100% 
Total    
Frequency 515 130 645 
Percentage 79.8% 20.2% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 23.218, Pr = .000  
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6.2.4 Continuous independent variables and measures of gender inequality by state 
 
Once I examined the state-wise variation in presence of women’s development programs, I used 
one-way ANOVAs to analyze state-wise variation in the other independent variables as well as 
variation in my measures of gender inequality.  One-way ANOVAs tell me whether overall there 
are statistically significant differences between states on these variables.  I give the results in  
Table 6.18 below. All of the inter-state comparisons for these variables were significant except 
for per capita SDP and logged per capita SDP.  I used the Bonferroni multiple comparison 
procedure to determine which pairs of states were significantly different in their mean values for 
all variables except for per capita SDP and logged per capita SDP (Agresti and Finlay 1997, 
Acock 2006).  One of the assumptions of ANOVA is that the variances of all groups being 
compared are equal (Acock 2006).  I used Bartlett’s test for equal variances to determine whether 
this assumption held for the inter-state comparison of means in given in Table 6.17, and found 
that this assumption held only for the inter-state comparison of female/male literacy ratio.  This 
means that I must interpret all of the other ANOVA results with caution.     
I found that there were no statistically significant differences in per capita SDP or logged 
per capita SDP across the six states in my study.  This surprised me because the states of Madhya 
Pradesh and Rajasthan (among other northern states) are known as poorer states in India.  There 
were statistically significant differences in levels of urbanization across the six states, however.  
In Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, the average percentage of each state’s population living in 
urbanized areas was a little less than 19%.  These two states had the lowest levels of urbanization 
of all six states, which is as I would have expected.  Tamil Nadu had the highest level of 
urbanization, with almost 36% of its population living in urban areas on average.  It’s interesting 
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to note that Tamil Nadu also had the highest mean number of districts with women’s 
empowerment programs, market programs, and microfinance programs present.  The percentage 
of population comprised of Scheduled Castes in Tamil Nadu is about 18%, which is the highest 
of all six states.  The percentage of population comprised of Scheduled Castes in Andhra 
Pradesh, Karnataka, and Madhya Pradesh are all about 15%, while Gujarat state has the lowest 
percentage of Scheduled Caste population at about 7%. 
 
Table 6.18 Inter-State Comparison of Means for Continuous Independent and Dependent Variables 
 
Tamil Nadu had the highest average female/male sex ratio, with about 982 females/1,000 
males, while Rajasthan had the lowest average female/male sex ratio with about 918 
females/1,000 males.  All three southern states (Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu) 
had female/male sex ratios that were significantly higher than any of the northern states (Gujarat, 
Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan).  Andhra Pradesh had the highest average female/male child 
sex ratio with about 990 females/1,000 males, while Gujarat had the lowest average child sex 
ratio with about 945 females/1,000 males.  However, there was no statistically significant 
Independent 
Variables 
A.P. Gujarat Karnataka M.P. Rajasthan T.N. F prob. p < .05 
Per capita 
SDP  
44091 47691 45587 36735 39050 49013 0.47 No 
Ln 
(per capita 
SDP)  
8.67 8.85 8.64 8.48 8.50 8.69 0.59 No 
Urbanization 21.1 26.7 23.8 18.9 18.6 35.7 18.46 Guj > MP/Raj 
TN > AP/Guj/Kar/MP/Raj 
% Scheduled 
Castes 
15.2 7.0 14.7 14.5 16.4 18.1 48.4 AP/Kar/MP/Raj > Guj 
TN > AP/Guj/Kar/MP 
Raj > MP 
Dependent 
Variables 
        
F/M Sex 
Ratio 
977 943 965 931 918 982 45.89 AP/Kar/TN > Guj/MP 
AP/Guj/Kar/MP/TN > Raj 
F/M Child 
Sex Ratio 
990 946 974 967 946 972 23.3 AP/Kar/MP/TN > Guj/Raj 
AP > MP/TN 
F/M Literacy 
Ratio 
50.7 57.3 56.0 41.1 34.2 61.6 47.72 AP/Guj/Kar > MP 
AP/Guj/Kar/MP/TN >Raj 
TN > AP 
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difference in child sex ratio between Tamil Nadu and Madhya Pradesh, nor between Karnataka 
and Madhya Pradesh.  Tamil Nadu did have the highest average female/male literacy ratio at 
almost 62%.  This means that the percentage of literate females in Tamil Nadu was less than 
two-thirds of the percentage of literate males. Rajasthan had the lowest average female/male 
literacy ratio at about 34%.  All three southern states as well as Gujarat had significantly higher 
average female/male literacy ratios than Madhya Pradesh or Rajasthan. 
 
6.2.5 Correlations between all continuous independent variables and measures of gender 
inequality 
 
After examining variation in all of the independent variables and measures of gender inequality 
by region and by state, I next analyzed the relationships among all of the continuous independent 
variables and the measures of gender inequality.  It is important to inspect the correlations among 
the independent variables to determine whether any of them are collinear.  For future statistical 
models, the main effects as well as interaction terms of any collinear independent variables must 
be included (Arceneaux and Huber 2007).  If any of the collinear variables are excluded from the 
models, the coefficients of the collinear variables that are included will be biased.  Another 
reason for inspecting the pairwise correlations between independent and dependent variables is 
to assist in determining possible causal relationships between independent variables and 
measures of gender inequality.  In Table 6.19 below I describe the pairwise correlations among 
all of the lagged and unlagged continuous independent variables as well as the gender inequality 
measures.  Since almost all of the pairwise correlations are significant at the .001 level and very 
few correlations are not statistically significant, I break with convention in how I report 
statistical significance.  I leave all pairwise correlations that are significant at the .001 level 
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unmarked with an asterisk, and instead use three asterisks to denote all correlations that are not 
statistically significant.  I also note this directly below the table. 
 
Table 6.19 Pairwise Correlations of Lagged and Unlagged Independent Variables and 
Unlagged Dependent Variables 
 
After examining the pairwise correlations among independent variables, I found that 
multicollinearity existed only between per capita SDP and logged per capita SDP, and between 
lagged per capita SDP and lagged logged per capita SDP.  This is to be expected since logged 
Variables 
Per 
capita 
SDP 
Ln (per 
capita 
SDP) Urban 
Sched. 
Castes 
Lag per 
capita 
SDP 
Lag ln 
(per 
Capita 
SDP) 
Lag 
Urban 
F/M 
Sex 
Ratio 
F/M 
Child 
Sex 
Ratio 
F/M 
Lit. 
Ratio 
Independent  
Variables         
  
Per capita 
 SDP 1.00***        
  
Ln(per  
capita SDP) 0.94*** 1.00***       
  
Urban 0.17*** 0.21*** 1.00***      
  
Scheduled 
 Castes 0.06 0.07 0.09* 1.00***     
  
Lagged 
Indep. 
Variables         
  
Lagged  
per capita  
SDP 0.52*** 0.61*** 0.21*** 0.01 1.00***    
  
Lagged ln 
(per capita 
 SDP) 0.53*** 0.64*** 0.19*** 0.05 0.97*** 1.00***   
  
Lagged  
Urban 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.98*** 0.09* 0.23*** 0.22*** 1.00***  
  
Dependent  
Variables         
  
F/M  
Sex Ratio 0.06 0.05 -.15*** -.30*** 0.07 0.06 -.15** 1.00*** 
  
F/M Child  
Sex Ratio -.41*** -.46*** -.27*** -.21*** -.46*** -.45*** -.25*** 0.53*** 
1.00***  
F/M  
Literacy  
Ratio 0.57*** 0.66*** 0.56*** -.07 0.59*** 0.57*** 0.54*** 0.18*** 
-.308*** 1.00*** 
* p < 0.05 
 
         
** p < 0.01 
 
         
*** p < .001 
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per capita SDP is a transformation of per capita SDP.  Thus, I would only include one of these 
two variables in any given statistical model.  Lagged values of per capita SDP, logged per capita 
SDP, and urbanization were all strongly correlated with unlagged values of per capita SDP, 
logged per capita SDP, and urbanization, respectively.  However, there was only a weak to 
moderately weak relationship between lagged or unlagged values of urbanization and lagged or 
unlagged values of per capita SDP. This suggests that current levels of per capita SDP and 
urbanization cause subsequent levels of per capita SDP and urbanization.  Since there is only a 
weak to moderately weak relationship between urbanization and per capita SDP, any possible 
causal relationship between these two variables would also be weak.  Percentage of population 
comprised of Scheduled Castes significantly and weakly related only to urbanization. 
The overall female/male sex ratio was statistically related to only urbanization and 
Scheduled Castes.  There was a negative, weak relationship between sex ratio and urbanization, 
and a negative, moderate relationship between sex ratio and Scheduled Castes.  There was a 
strong, negative relationship between female/male child sex ratio and lagged and unlagged per 
capita SDP.  There was a moderately weak to moderate relationship between child sex ratio and 
lagged and unlagged urbanization.  There was a strong relationship between overall female/male 
sex ratio and female/male child sex ratio.  This means that districts that have a relatively high 
female/male sex ratio also have a relatively high female/male child sex ratio.  Female/male 
literacy ratio was very strongly correlated with both lagged and unlagged values of per capita 
SDP and urbanization.  However, there was no significant relationship between female/male 
literacy ratio and Scheduled Castes.  Oddly, there was a moderate, negative relationship between 
female/male child sex ratio and female/male literacy ratio.  This means that districts that have 
relatively higher child sex ratios tend to have lower female/male literacy ratios.  It is possible 
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that increases in per capita SDP lead simultaneously to lower female/male child sex ratios and 
higher female/male literacy ratios. 
6.3 VARIATION IN INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES BY TIME PERIOD 
In the previous sections, I explored variation in per capita SDP, urbanization, percentage of 
population comprised of Scheduled Castes, presence of women’s development programs, and 
measures of gender inequality by region and state.  Although these exploratory analyses 
described differences between states or regions in the average level of urbanization, per capita 
SDP, or percentage of districts with certain types of women’s programs, they could not tell us if 
there were differences between states or regions during different time periods.  For example, 
there was no statistically significant difference in per capita SDP between northern and southern 
regions, but is there significant change in per capita SDP over time?  Also, there was no 
significant difference between northern and southern regions in the presence of women’s rights 
programs and women’s market programs.  Yet is there significant change in presence of these 
types of women’s programs within regions over time?   In the next few sections of this chapter, I 
explore variation in the independent variables and dependent variables between regions, states, 
and time periods.  I begin with a discussion of how the presence of women’s programs varies by 
region and year. 
 
 
 
 
219 
6.3.1 Variation in presence of women’s programs by region and year 
 
Although there was no significant difference between regions in the average percentage of 
districts that had at least one women’s rights program, there was significant change within 
regions in percentage of districts with women’s rights programs over time (Table 6.20 and Table 
6.21).  In the northern region, the percentage of districts with women’s rights programs in 1961 
was only about 5%, but by 2001 almost 71% of districts had at least one women’s rights 
program.  Between 1981 and 1991 the percentage of northern districts with women’s rights 
programs increased by about 36 percentage points.  In the southern region, the percentage of 
districts with women’s rights programs was only about 2%, but by 2001 that percentage rose to 
about 82%.  There was no change in percentage of southern districts with women’s rights 
programs between 1961 and 1971.  In the southern region, the largest gains were made between 
1981 and 1991 when the percentage of districts with women’s rights programs present rose by 
about 47 percentage points. 
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Just as with women’s empowerment programs, there was a statistically significant 
increase within regions over time in the percentage of districts that had at least one women’s 
market program present (Table 6.22 and Table 6.23).  In the northern region, the percentage of 
districts with women’s market programs in 1961 was only about 3%, but by 2001 almost 68% of 
districts had at least one women’s market program.  Between 1981 and 1991 the percentage of 
northern districts with a women’s rights program rose by about 24 percentage points, and 
between 1991 and 2001 this figure increased by about 29 percentage points.  In the southern 
Year 
WRP 
Absent 
WRP 
Present Total 
1961    
Frequency 74 4 78 
Percentage 94.9% 5.1% 100% 
1971    
Frequency 69 9 78 
Percentage 88.5% 11.5% 100% 
1981    
Frequency 64 14 78 
Percentage 82.1% 18.0% 100% 
1991    
Frequency 36 42 78 
Percentage 46.2% 53.9% 100% 
2001    
Frequency 23 56 79 
Percentage 29.1% 70.9% 100% 
Total    
Frequency 266 125 391 
Percentage 68.0% 32.0% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 120.04,  
P r= .000  
Year 
WRP 
Absent 
WRP 
Present Total 
1961    
Frequency 50 1 51 
Percentage 98.0% 2.0% 100% 
1971    
Frequency 50 1 51 
Percentage 98.0% 2.0% 100% 
1981    
Frequency 41 10 51 
Percentage 80.4% 19.6% 100% 
1991    
Frequency 17 34 51 
Percentage 33.3% 66.7% 100% 
2001    
Frequency 9 42 51 
Percentage 17.7% 82.4% 100% 
Total    
Frequency 167 88 255 
Percentage 65.5% 34.5% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 127.81, Pr=.000  
Table 6.21 Count and Percent of Women's  
Rights Programs in South by Year 
Table 6.20 Count and Percent of Women’s 
Rights Programs in North by Year 
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area, the percentage of districts with women’s market programs in 1961 was only about 4%, but 
by 2001 about 59% of districts had at least one women’s market program.  The greatest gains in 
percentage of southern districts with women’s market programs occurred between 1981 and 
1991, when this figure increased by about 43 percentage points. 
 
 
Year 
Market 
Absent 
Market 
Present Total 
1961    
Frequency 76 2 78 
Percentage 97.4% 2.6% 100% 
1971    
Frequency 72 6 78 
Percentage 92.3% 7.7% 100% 
1981    
Frequency 67 11 78 
Percentage 85.9% 14.1% 100% 
1991    
Frequency 48 30 78 
Percentage 61.5% 38.5% 100% 
2001    
Frequency 25 53 78 
Percentage 32.1% 68.0% 100% 
Total    
Frequency 288 102 390 
Percentage 73.9% 26.2% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 118.77,  
Pr = .000  
 
 
Table 6.24 and Table 6.25 show that there was a statistically significant change over time 
within regions in the percentage of districts with women’s microfinance programs present.  In 
both the north and the south, no districts had a microfinance program present in 1961.  However, 
Year 
Market 
Absent 
Market 
Present Total 
1961    
Frequency 49 2 51 
Percentage 96.1% 3.9% 100% 
1971    
Frequency 48 3 51 
Percentage 94.1% 5.9% 100% 
1981    
Frequency 44 7 51 
Percentage 86.3% 13.7% 100% 
1991    
Frequency 22 29 51 
Percentage 43.1% 56.9% 100% 
2001    
Frequency 21 30 51 
Percentage 41.2% 58.8% 100% 
Total    
Frequency 184 71 255 
Percentage 72.2% 27.8% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 77.57,  
Pr = .000  
Table 6.23 Count and Percent of Women's 
Market Programs in South by Year 
Table 6.22 Count and Percent of Women's 
Market Programs in North by Year 
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by 2001 about 51% of northern districts and about 75% of southern districts had at least one 
women’s microfinance program.  In both the northern and southern regions, there was very little 
change in percentage of districts with microfinance programs between 1961 and 1981.  The 
northern region experienced an increase in percentage of districts with market programs of about 
23 percentage points between 1981 and 1991, and an increase in almost 26 percentage points 
between 1991 and 2001.  The greatest gains in percentage of southern districts with women’s 
microfinance programs occurred between 1981 and 1991, when it increased by 49 percentage 
points.  
 
 
*Percentages total slightly more than 100% 
due to rounding. 
Year 
MFI 
Absent 
MFI 
Present Total 
1961    
Frequency 78 0 78 
Percentage 100% 0% 100% 
1971    
Frequency 77 1 78 
Percentage 98.7% 1.3% 100% 
1981    
Frequency 76 2 78 
Percentage 97.4% 2.6% 100% 
1991    
Frequency 58 20 78 
Percentage 74.4% 25.6% 100% 
2001    
Frequency 38 40 78 
Percentage 48.7% 51.3% 100% 
Total    
Frequency 327 63 390 
Percentage* 83.9% 16.2% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 114.65,  
Pr = .000  
Year 
MFI 
Absent 
MFI 
Present Total 
1961    
Frequency 51 0 51 
Percentage 100% 0% 100% 
1971    
Frequency 51 0 51 
Percentage 100% 0% 100% 
1981    
Frequency 49 2 51 
Percentage 96.1% 3.9% 100% 
1991    
Frequency 24 27 51 
Percentage 47.1% 52.9% 100% 
2001    
Frequency 13 38 51 
Percentage 25.5% 74.5% 100% 
Total    
Frequency 188 67 255 
Percentage 73.7% 26.3% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 129.48,  
Pr = .000  
Table 6.25 Count and Percent of Women's 
Microfinance Programs in South by Year 
Table 6.24 Count and Percent of Women's 
Microfinance Programs in North by Year 
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6.3.2 Variation in presence of women’s programs by state and year 
 
Table 6.27 through Table 6.42 describe variation in the presence of women’s microfinance 
programs, empowerment programs, and market programs within states over time.  In all states, 
there have been statistically significant increases over time in percentages of districts that have 
all of these types of women’s programs.  I begin this section by discussing changes in 
percentages of districts with women’s rights programs over time (Table 6.27 - Table 6.31).  In 
1961, there were no districts with at least one women’s rights program in Andhra Pradesh and 
Karnataka.  Gujarat had the highest percentage of districts with a women’s rights program in 
1961 at 12.5% of its districts.  By 2001, the percentage of districts in Gujarat state with a 
women’s rights program was almost 94%, followed by Tamil Nadu at 92% of its districts with a 
women’s rights program.  Madhya Pradesh had the lowest percentage of districts with a 
women’s rights program present in 2001 at about 58% of its districts.  All six states experienced 
the greatest gains in percentage of districts with women’s rights programs between 1981 and 
1991.  In Tamil Nadu and Gujarat states, the percentage of districts with women’s rights 
programs increased by about 54 percentage points and 56 percentage points, respectively. 
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Year 
WRP 
Absent 
WRP 
Present Total 
1961    
Frequency 20 0 20 
Percentage 100% 0% 100% 
1971    
Frequency 20 0 20 
Percentage 100% 0% 100% 
1981    
Frequency 17 3 20 
Percentage 85% 15% 100% 
1991    
Frequency 9 11 20 
Percentage 45% 55% 100% 
2001    
Frequency 6 14 20 
Percentage 30% 70% 100% 
Total    
Frequency 72 28 100 
Percentage 72% 28% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 41.96,  
Pr = .000  
 
 
 
 
Year 
WRP 
Absent 
WRP 
Present Total 
1961    
Frequency 18 0 18 
Percentage 100% 0% 100% 
1971    
Frequency 18 0 18 
Percentage 100% 0% 100% 
1981    
Frequency 15 3 18 
Percentage 83.3% 16.7% 100% 
1991    
Frequency 6 12 18 
Percentage 33.3% 66.7% 100% 
2001    
Frequency 2 16 18 
Percentage 11.1% 88.9% 100% 
Total    
Frequency 59 31 90 
Percentage 65.6% 34.4% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 53.34,  
Pr = .000  
Table 6.27 Count and Percent of Women's 
Rights Programs in Karnataka by Year 
Table 6.26 Count and Percent of Women's 
Rights Programs in Andhra Pradesh by Year 
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Year 
WRP 
Absent 
WRP 
Present Total 
1961    
Frequency 14 2 16 
Percentage 87.5% 12.5% 100% 
1971    
Frequency 14 2 16 
Percentage 87.5% 12.5% 100% 
1981    
Frequency 13 3 16 
Percentage* 81.3% 18.8% 100% 
1991    
Frequency 4 12 16 
Percentage 25% 75% 100% 
2001    
Frequency 1 15 16 
Percentage* 6.3% 93.8% 100% 
Total    
Frequency 46 34 80 
Percentage 57.5% 42.5% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 39.59, Pr = .000  
  *Percentages total slightly more than  
        100% due to rounding. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 
WRP 
Absent 
WRP 
Present Total 
1961    
Frequency 12 1 13 
Percentage 92.3% 7.7% 100% 
1971    
Frequency 12 1 13 
Percentage 92.3% 7.7% 100% 
1981    
Frequency 9 4 13 
Percentage 69.2% 30.8% 100% 
1991    
Frequency 2 11 13 
Percentage 15.4% 84.6% 100% 
2001    
Frequency 1 12 13 
Percentage 7.7% 92.3% 100% 
Total    
Frequency 36 29 65 
Percentage 55.4% 44.6% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 35.74, Pr = .000  
Table 6.29 Count and Percent of Women's 
Rights Programs in Gujarat by Year Table 6.28 Count and Percent of Women's Rights Programs in Tamil Nadu by Year 
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Year 
WRP 
Absent 
WRP 
Present Total 
1961    
Frequency 24 1 25 
Percentage 96% 4% 100% 
1971    
Frequency 21 4 25 
Percentage 84% 16% 100% 
1981    
Frequency 17 8 25 
Percentage 68% 32% 100% 
1991    
Frequency 10 15 25 
Percentage 40% 60% 100% 
2001    
Frequency 6 19 25 
Percentage 24% 76% 100% 
Total    
Frequency 78 47 125 
Percentage 62.4% 37.6% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 38.39, Pr = .000  
Year 
WRP 
Absent 
WRP 
Present Total 
1961    
Frequency 36 1 37 
Percentage 97.3% 2.7% 100% 
1971    
Frequency 34 3 37 
Percentage 91.9% 8.1% 100% 
1981    
Frequency 34 3 37 
Percentage 91.9% 8.1% 100% 
1991    
Frequency 22 15 37 
Percentage 59.5% 40.5% 100% 
2001    
Frequency 16 22 38 
Percentage 42.1% 57.9% 100% 
Total    
Frequency 142 44 186 
Percentage 76.3% 23.7% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 49.41, Pr = .000  
Table 6.31 Count and Percent of Women's 
Rights Programs in Rajasthan by Year 
Table 6.30 Count and Percent of Women's 
Rights Programs in Madhya Pradesh by Year 
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Table 6.32 through Table 6.36 describe variation in the presence of women’s market 
programs within states over time.  In 1961, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Rajasthan had no 
districts where at least one women’s market program was present.  In Tamil Nadu, about 15% of 
the districts had a women’s market program in 1961, which was the highest percentage of the six 
states.  Tamil Nadu had the greatest percentage of districts with a women’s market program in 
2001 at almost 85%, while about 39% of Karnataka’s districts had a women’s market program in 
2001.  Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, and Rajasthan experienced no increase in 
percentage of districts with women’s market programs between 1961 and 1971.  However, Tamil 
Year 
Market 
Absent 
Market 
Present Total 
1961    
Frequency 18 0 18 
Percentage 100% 0% 100% 
1971    
Frequency 17 1 18 
Percentage 94.4% 5.6% 100% 
1981    
Frequency 15 3 18 
Percentage 83.3% 16.7% 100% 
1991    
Frequency 11 7 18 
Percentage 61.1% 38.9% 100% 
2001    
Frequency 11 7 18 
Percentage 61.1% 38.9% 100% 
Total    
Frequency 72 18 90 
Percentage 80% 20% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 15.00, Pr = .005  
Year 
Market 
Absent 
Market 
Present Total 
Year 
Market 
Absent 
Market 
Present Total 
1961    
Frequency 20 0 20 
Percentage 100% 0% 100% 
1971    
Frequency 20 0 20 
Percentage 100% 0% 100% 
1981    
Frequency 18 2 20 
Percentage 90% 10% 100% 
1991    
Frequency 9 11 20 
Percentage 45% 55% 100% 
2001    
Frequency 8 12 20 
Percentage 40% 60% 100% 
Total    
Frequency 75 25 100 
Percentage 75% 25% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 38.4, Pr = .000  
Table 6.33 Count and Percent of Women's 
Market Programs in Karnataka by Year 
Table 6.32 Count and Percent of Women's Market 
Programs in Andhra Pradesh by Year 
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Nadu and Andhra Pradesh did experience the most dramatic increases in percentage of districts 
with at least one women’s market program.  From 1981 to 1991, the percentage of districts in 
Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh with a women’s market program increased by about 69 
percentage points and 45 percentage points, respectively.  In both Madhya Pradesh and 
Rajasthan, the percentage of districts that had a women’s market program increased by about 32 
percentage points between 1991 and 2001. 
 
 
 Year 
Market 
Absent 
Market 
Present Total 
1961    
Frequency 11 2 13 
Percentage 84.6% 15.4% 100% 
1971    
Frequency 11 2 13 
Percentage 84.6% 15.4% 100% 
1981    
Frequency 11 2 13 
Percentage 84.6% 15.4% 100% 
1991    
Frequency 2 11 13 
Percentage 15.4% 84.6% 100% 
2001    
Frequency 2 11 13 
Percentage 15.4% 84.6% 100% 
Total    
Frequency 37 28 65 
Percentage 56.9% 43.1% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 30.49, Pr = .000  
       *Percentages total slightly more than 100% 
       due to rounding. 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 
Market 
Absent 
Market 
Present Total 
1961    
Frequency 15 1 16 
Percentage* 93.8% 6.3% 100% 
1971    
Frequency 15 1 16 
Percentage* 93.8% 6.3% 100% 
1981    
Frequency 13 3 16 
Percentage* 81.3% 18.8% 100% 
1991    
Frequency 10 6 16 
Percentage 62.5% 37.5% 100% 
2001    
Frequency 7 9 16 
Percentage* 43.8% 56.3% 100% 
Total    
Frequency 60 20 80 
Percentage 75% 25% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 16.00, Pr = .003  
Table 6.35 Count and Percent of Women's 
Market Programs in Gujarat by Year 
Table 6.34 Count and Percent of Women's 
Market Programs in Tamil Nadu by Year 
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*Percentages total slightly more than 100% 
due to rounding. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 
Market 
Absent 
Market 
Present Total 
1961    
Frequency 36 1 37 
Percentage 97.3% 2.7% 100% 
1971    
Frequency 32 5 37 
Percentage 86.5% 13.5% 100% 
1981    
Frequency 30 7 37 
Percentage 81.1% 18.9% 100% 
1991    
Frequency 23 14 37 
Percentage 62.2% 37.8% 100% 
2001    
Frequency 11 26 37 
Percentage 29.7% 70.3% 100% 
Total    
Frequency 132 53 185 
Percentage* 71.4% 28.7% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 50.93,  
Pr = .000  
Year 
Market 
Absent 
Market 
Present Total 
1961    
Frequency 25 0 25 
Percentage 100% 0% 100% 
1971    
Frequency 25 0 25 
Percentage 100% 0% 100% 
1981    
Frequency 24 1 25 
Percentage 96% 4% 100% 
1991    
Frequency 15 10 25 
Percentage 60% 40% 100% 
2001    
Frequency 7 18 25 
Percentage 28% 72% 100% 
Total    
Frequency 96 29 125 
Percentage 76.8% 23.2% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 57.65,  
Pr = .000  
Table 6.37 Count and Percent of Women's 
Market Programs in Rajasthan by Year 
Table 6.36 Count and Percent of Women's Market 
Programs in Madhya Pradesh by Year 
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Table 6.38 through Table 6.42 describe variation in the presence of women’s 
microfinance programs within states over time.  Of the three types of women’s programs, the 
presence of microfinance programs has followed the steepest upward trajectory over time.  
Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan did not have women’s microfinance programs in any 
of their districts from 1961 to 1981.  Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu did not have women’s 
microfinance programs in any districts from 1961 to 1971.  However, by 2001 80% of districts in 
Andhra Pradesh and 100% of districts in Tamil Nadu had at least one microfinance program.  
From 1981 to 1991, the percentage of districts in Andhra Pradesh with a microfinance program 
increased by 60 percentage points, while the percentage of districts in Tamil Nadu with a 
Year 
MFI 
Absent 
MFI 
Present Total 
1961    
Frequency 18 0 18 
Percentage 100% 0% 100% 
1971    
Frequency 18 0 18 
Percentage 100% 0% 100% 
1981    
Frequency 18 0 18 
Percentage 100% 0% 100% 
1991    
Frequency 12 6 18 
Percentage 66.7% 33.3% 100% 
2001    
Frequency 9 9 18 
Percentage 50% 50% 100% 
Total    
Frequency 75 15 90 
Percentage 83.3% 16.7% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 28.80, Pr = .000 
  
Year 
MFI 
Absent 
MFI 
Present Total 
1961    
Frequency 20 0 20 
Percentage 100% 0% 100% 
1971    
Frequency 20 0 20 
Percentage 100% 0% 100% 
1981    
Frequency 19 1 20 
Percentage 95% 5% 100% 
1991    
Frequency 7 13 20 
Percentage 35% 65% 100% 
2001    
Frequency 4 16 20 
Percentage 20% 80% 100% 
Total    
Frequency 70 30 100 
Percentage 70% 30% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 58.57,  
Pr = .000  
Table 6.38 Count and Percent of Women's 
Microfinance Programs in Andhra Pradesh by Year 
Table 6.39 Count and Percent of Women's 
Microfinance Programs in Karnataka by Year 
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microfinance program increased by about 54 percentage points.  This rapid increase in 
microfinance programs did not take place in all six states, however.  By 2001, only about 43% of 
Madhya Pradesh’s districts had at least one women’s microfinance program, and only 50% of 
districts in Karnataka and Gujarat had a microfinance program in the same year. 
 
 
Year 
MFI 
Absent 
MFI 
Present Total 
1961    
Frequency 13 0 13 
Percentage 100% 0% 100% 
1971    
Frequency 13 0 13 
Percentage 100% 0% 100% 
1981    
Frequency 12 1 13 
Percentage 92.3% 7.7% 100% 
1991    
Frequency 5 8 13 
Percentage 38.5% 61.5% 100% 
2001    
Frequency 0 13 13 
Percentage 0% 100% 100% 
Total    
Frequency 43 22 65 
Percentage* 66.2% 33.9% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 47.14,  
Pr = .000  
*Percentages total slightly more than 100% due to rounding. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 
MFI 
Absent 
MFI 
Present Total 
1961    
Frequency 16 0 16 
Percentage 100% 0% 100% 
1971    
Frequency 15 1 16 
Percentage* 93.8% 6.3% 100% 
1981    
Frequency 14 2 16 
Percentage 87.5% 12.5% 100% 
1991    
Frequency 11 5 16 
Percentage* 68.8% 31.3% 100% 
2001    
Frequency 8 8 16 
Percentage 50% 50% 100% 
Total    
Frequency 64 16 80 
Percentage 80% 20% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 16.72,  
Pr = .002  
Table 6.41 Count and Percent of Women's 
Microfinance Programs in Gujarat by Year 
Table 6.40 Count and Percent of Women's 
Microfinance Programs in Tamil Nadu by Year 
232 
 
 
 
 
Year 
MFI 
Absent 
MFI 
Present Total 
1961    
Frequency 37 0 37 
Percentage 100% 0% 100% 
1971    
Frequency 37 0 37 
Percentage 100% 0% 100% 
1981    
Frequency 37 0 37 
Percentage 100% 0% 100% 
1991    
Frequency 32 5 37 
Percentage 86.5% 13.5% 100% 
2001    
Frequency 21 16 37 
Percentage 56.8% 43.2% 100% 
Total    
Frequency 164 21 185 
Percentage* 88.7% 11.4% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 51.78,  
Pr = .000  
*Percentages total slightly more than 100% 
due to rounding. 
 
 
 
6.3.3 Variation in continuous independent variables and measures of gender inequality 
by state and year 
 
 
In this section I discuss within-state variation over time in per capita SDP, urbanization, 
percentage of district population comprised by Scheduled Castes, overall female/male sex ratio, 
female/male child sex ratio, and female/male literacy ratio.  As with earlier sections, I first 
discuss variation in the independent variables.  I begin this section by discussing the state-wise 
Year 
MFI 
Absent 
MFI 
Present Total 
1961    
Frequency 25 0 25 
Percentage 100% 0% 100% 
1971    
Frequency 25 0 25 
Percentage 100% 0% 100% 
1981    
Frequency 25 0 25 
Percentage 100% 0% 100% 
1991    
Frequency 15 10 25 
Percentage 60% 40% 100% 
2001    
Frequency 9 16 25 
Percentage 36% 64% 100% 
Total    
Frequency 99 26 125 
Percentage 79.2% 20.8% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 53.61,  
Pr = .000  
Table 6.43 Count and Percent of Women's 
Microfinance Programs in Rajasthan by Year 
Table 6.42 Count and Percent of Women's 
Microfinance Programs in Madhya Pradesh by Year 
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variation over time in per capita SDP.  Since there is no district variation in per capita SDP, I do 
not report means and standard deviations.  I provide tables for both state-wise variation in per 
capita SDP and logged per capita SDP (Table 6.44 and Table 6.45), even though I only discuss 
the results for per capita SDP. 
Table 6.44 Per Capita SDP for Census Years 1961-2001 (in 1961 Constant Rupees) 
State 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 
Andhra Pradesh 1155 1261 4674 4633 208,732 
Karnataka 644 1779 4949 4778 215,787 
Tamil Nadu 722 1670 5111 5158 232,404 
Gujarat 847 2313 6630 5833 222,834 
Madhya Pradesh 1044 993 4069 3520 174,050 
Rajasthan 627 1641 3867 3954 185,159 
 
In 1961, Rajasthan had the lowest per capita SDP at Rs. 627 per person, while Andhra 
Pradesh had the highest per capita SDP at Rs. 1,155 per person.  Madhya Pradesh had the second 
highest per capita SDP in 1961, but by 2001 Madhya Pradesh had the lowest per capita SDP of 
the six states.  The greatest increase in growth rates in all of the states occurred between 1991 
and 2001.  Per capita SDP for Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and Gujarat increased by 
over Rs. 200,000 per capita from 1991 to 2001.    
Table 6.45 Ln(Per Capita SDP) for Census Years 1961-2001 
State 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 
Andhra Pradesh 7.05 7.14 8.45 8.44 12.25 
Karnataka 6.47 7.48 8.51 8.47 12.28 
Tamil Nadu 6.58 7.42 8.54 8.55 12.36 
Gujarat 6.74 7.75 8.80 8.67 12.31 
Madhya Pradesh 6.95 6.90 8.31 8.17 12.07 
Rajasthan 6.44 7.40 8.26 8.28 12.13 
 
Table 6.46 through Table 6.51 show the means, standard deviations, and skewness for 
state-wise levels of urbanization for the years 1961-2001.  It is important to remember that the 
means represent the average percentage of districts’ population living in urban areas.  Tamil 
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Nadu had the highest average percentage of district-level population living in urbanized areas 
throughout the period of this study, starting with an average of about 26% of the population in 
1961 and ending with an average of almost 47% of the population in 2001.  Madhya Pradesh had 
the lowest average district-level percentage of population in urban areas in 1961 (about 14%), 
and Rajasthan had the lowest average percentage of population living in urban areas in 2001 
(about 21%).  In Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Gujarat, and Madhya Pradesh, the average 
percentage of districts’ population living in urban areas increased by only about 7 to 9 
percentage points between 1961 and 2001.  Tamil Nadu experienced an increase in percentage of 
population in urban areas of about 20 percentage points during this time period, while Rajasthan 
experienced an increase of about 5 percentage points from 1961 to 2001.  The distributions of 
average percent population in urban areas are skewed to the right for all six states from 1961-
2001.  This means that for each state, there are a few districts that have exceptionally high 
population percentages in urban areas.   
 
Year Mean Std. Dev. Skewness  Year Mean Std. Dev. Skewness 
         
1961 16.5 11.67 3.15  1961 19.7 10.04 2.34 
1971 17.8 12.24 3.02  1971 21.2 10.03 2.34 
1981 22.1 12.48 2.72  1981 24.5 11.65 2.35 
1991 24.5 13.76 2.70  1991 25.5 12.05 2.68 
2001 24.2 14.02 2.83  2001 28.0 13.19 2.29 
Total 21.1 13.05 2.70  Total 23.8 11.60 2.35 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.47 Percent of Urbanization for Karnataka 
Table 6.46 Percent of 
Urbanization for Andhra Pradesh 
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Year Mean Std. Dev. Skewness  Year Mean Std. Dev. Skewness 
         
1961 26.4 8.02 0.88  1961 22.8 14.34 0.86 
1971 32.8 22.39 2.25  1971 25.1 14.97 0.69 
1981 34.6 21.96 2.16  1981 26.2 15.88 0.79 
1991 35.6 22.15 1.98  1991 29.5 16.29 0.88 
2001 46.9 19.91 1.36  2001 30.0 18.16 0.50 
Total 35.7 20.50 1.94  Total 26.7 15.83 0.77 
 
 
 
 
Year Mean Std. Dev. Skewness  Year Mean Std. Dev. Skewness 
         
1961 14.2 12.50 1.95  1961 15.5 10.14 1.24 
1971 15.8 13.02 1.94  1971 16.7 9.93 1.06 
1981 19.1 13.44 1.83  1981 19.0 10.42 0.94 
1991 22.0 13.67 1.83  1991 20.8 10.00 0.77 
2001 23.2 13.36 1.90  2001 20.8 10.00 0.70 
Total 18.9 13.53 1.74  Total 18.6 10.17 0.88 
 
 
 Table 6.53 through Table 6.56 show the means, standard deviations, and skewness for 
state-wise female/male sex ratios for the years 1961-2001. The average female/male sex ratios 
for most of the six states fluctuated over the period of 1961-2001, decreasing and increasing 
several times.  For Andhra Pradesh, the mean sex ratio in 2001 was about the same as it was in 
1961 at about 980 females/1,000 males.  For Rajasthan, the average female/male sex ratio was 
only 911 females/1,000 males in 1961, but increased to 926 females/1,000 males by 2001.  In 
Karnataka, the sex ratio increased steadily from 1961 to 2001, whereas in Madhya Pradesh it 
steadily declined throughout the same time period.  The average female/male sex ratios of 
Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka were skewed to the right from 1961-2001, while the average sex 
Table 6.49 Percent of Urbanization for Gujarat 
Table 6.48 Percent of Urbanization 
for Tamil Nadu 
Table 6.51 Percent of Urbanization for Rajasthan 
Table 6.50 Percent of Urbanization 
for Madhya Pradesh 
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ratios of Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan were somewhat left-skewed throughout the same time 
period. 
 
Year Mean Std. Dev. Skewness  Year Mean Std. Dev. Skewness 
         
1961 980 24.86 0.35  1961 956 45.76 0.56 
1971 976 20.88 0.18  1971 959 32.64 1.28 
1981 974 20.31 0.22  1981 966 29.71 1.47 
1991 973 19.48 0.47  1991 968 29.43 1.72 
2001 980 17.48 0.02  2001 975 28.74 1.17 
Total 977 20.51 0.30  Total 965 33.79 0.82 
 
 
 
 
Year Mean Std. Dev. Skewness  Year Mean Std. Dev. Skewness 
         
1961 985 45.50 -0.20  1961 946 39.04 0.19 
1971 976 37.65 0.26  1971 942 31.56 -0.37 
1981 978 30.04 0.81  1981 950 25.97 -0.34 
1991 978 28.82 0.45  1991 942 25.42 -0.13 
2001 994 29.88 -0.10  2001 935 28.93 -0.18 
Total 982 34.53 0.13  Total 943 30.25 -0.07 
 
 
 
 
Year Mean Std. Dev. Skewness  Year Mean Std. Dev. Skewness 
         
1961 942 49.31 -0.12  1961 911 43.13 -0.54 
1971 931 50.05 -0.19  1971 914 44.18 -0.08 
1981 931 50.31 -0.27  1981 923 50.01 -0.07 
1991 922 50.17 -0.25  1991 914 44.29 -0.51 
2001 929 49.06 -0.12  2001 926 45.85 -0.25 
Total 931 49.74 -0.19  Total 918 45.21 -0.24 
 
 
Table 6.58 through Table 6.62 show the means, standard deviations, and skewness for 
state-wise female/male child sex ratios for the years 1961-2001. The average female/male child 
Table 6.53 Female/Male Sex 
Ratio for Karnataka 
Table 6.52 Female/Male Sex 
Ratio for Andhra Pradesh 
Table 6.55 Female/Male Sex 
Ratio for Gujarat 
Table 6.54 Female/Male Sex 
Ratio for Tamil Nadu 
Table 6.57 Female/Male Sex 
Ratio for Rajasthan 
Table 6.56 Female/Male Sex 
Ratio for Madhya Pradesh 
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sex ratio decreased steadily over the decades for Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu 
(all southern states).  The average female/male child sex ratio in Andhra Pradesh was over 1,000 
from 1961 to 1981, which is higher than the child sex ratios of any of the other five states.  The 
child sex ratio decreased for the most part in Madhya Pradesh.  The child sex ratio of Gujarat, 
Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan fluctuated up and down, though overall there was a downward 
trend.  In Gujarat, the biggest decline occurred between 1991 and 2001, when the child sex ratio 
dropped from 932 females/1,000 males to 892 females/1,000 males.  This is the worst child sex 
ratio of the six states in my study. 
 
 
 
 
   
Year Mean Std. Dev. Skewness  Year Mean Std. Dev. Skewness 
         
1961 994 14.16 -0.12  1961 977 26.46 0.19 
1971 984 8.17 0.09  1971 961 28.73 -0.01 
1981 977 19.80 -1.51  1981 966 22.36 0.35 
1991 953 27.17 -2.23  1991 932 29.45 0.88 
2001 950 29.95 -2.09  2001 892 37.93 0.29 
Total 972 27.15 -1.80  Total 945 42.06 -0.53 
 
 
 
 
 
Year Mean Std. Dev. Skewness  Year Mean Std. Dev. Skewness 
         
1961 1012 13.38 -0.01  1961 996 16.43 -0.74 
1971 1002 27.00 1.93  1971 987 21.31 0.61 
1981 1001 17.29 -0.16  1981 979 19.79 0.19 
1991 974 13.12 -1.06  1991 961 7.59 0.39 
2001 960 8.50 0.68  2001 949 12.94 -0.15 
Total 990 25.58 0.61  Total 974 23.45 0.32 
Table 6.59 F/M Child Sex 
Ratio for Karnataka 
Table 6.58 F/M Child Sex 
Ratio for Andhra Pradesh 
Table 6.61 F/M Child Sex 
Ratio for Gujarat 
Table 6.60 F/M Child Sex 
Ratio for Tamil Nadu 
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Table 6.64 through Table 6.68 show the means, standard deviations, and skewness for 
state-wise female/male literacy ratios for the years 1961-2001.  The average female/male literacy 
ratio increased steadily from 1961-2001 in all six states.  In Tamil Nadu and Gujarat the initial 
female/male literacy ratios were about 43%, which were the highest female/male literacy ratios 
of all six states in 1961.  Tamil Nadu also had the highest average literacy ratio in 2001 at about 
79%.  In Madhya Pradesh, the literacy ratio increased by 18 percentage points from 1991-
2001,and  in Rajasthan, the literacy ratio increased by 21 percentage points during this same time 
period.  Despite the great gains that these two states made in average female/male literacy ratios 
from 1991 to 2001, they still had the lowest literacy ratios of the six states in 2001.  The average 
female/male literacy ratio for Madhya Pradesh in 2001 was about 65%, and in Rajasthan it was 
even lower at about 56%. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Year Mean Std. Dev. Skewness  Year Mean Std. Dev. Skewness 
         
1961 991 30.23 -0.36  1961 971 27.84 0.35 
1971 978 44.76 -0.59  1971 953 35.72 -0.11 
1981 984 41.32 -1.54  1981 977 30.48 0.39 
1991 946 32.33 -0.68  1991 918 28.65 0.17 
2001 938 35.10 -1.01  2001 912 27.67 -0.28 
Total 967 42.44 -0.54  Total 946 40.16 0.04 
Table 6.63 F/M Child Sex 
Ratio for Rajasthan 
Table 6.62 F/M Child Sex 
Ratio for Madhya Pradesh 
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Year Mean Std.Dev. Skewness  Year Mean Std.Dev. Skewness 
         
1961 42.6 13.35 1.50  1961 42.7 9.92 -0.71 
1971 53.8 11.98 1.28  1971 49.9 10.32 -0.69 
1981 61.5 11.04 1.12  1981 59.6 13.86 0.64 
1991 70.9 8.97 1.09  1991 63.8 9.36 -0.98 
2001 79.3 6.29 1.10  2001 70.5 8.19 -0.52 
Total 61.6 16.53 -0.10  Total 57.3 14.30 -0.18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Year Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Skewness  Year Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Skewness 
         
1961 35.3 13.07 0.86  1961 38.0 12.93 0.38 
1971 43.0 13.48 0.83  1971 48.8 13.64 0.18 
1981 48.3 12.80 0.73  1981 54.7 12.66 0.14 
1991 56.3 11.54 0.72  1991 64.5 11.57 0.11 
2001 69.6 9.50 0.72  2001 73.7 8.65 -0.18 
Total 50.7 16.76 0.20  Total 56.0 17.11 -0.17 
  
Year Mean Std. Dev. Skewness  Year Mean Std. Dev. Skewness 
         
1961 23.5 7.67 1.00  1961 23.0 6.91 0.67 
1971 31.8 8.34 0.86  1971 27.8 7.09 0.94 
1981 37.2 8.94 0.53  1981 29.6 7.54 0.76 
1991 47.5 8.89 0.30  1991 35.0 7.96 0.19 
2001 65.5 6.58 -0.09  2001 55.7 7.46 0.33 
Total 41.1 16.59 0.38  Total 34.2 13.59 0.77 
Table 6.65 F/M Literacy 
Ratio for Karnataka 
Table 6.64 F/M Literacy 
Ratio for Andhra Pradesh 
Table 6.67 F/M Literacy 
Ratio for Gujarat 
Table 6.66 F/M Literacy 
Ratio for Tamil Nadu 
Table 6.69 F/M Literacy 
Ratio for Rajasthan 
Table 6.68 F/M Literacy 
Ratio for Madhya Pradesh 
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6.3.4 Overall Change in Continuous Independent Variables and Measures of Gender 
Inequality over Time 
 
In the previous two sections I discussed the state-wise and regional variation in each of the 
independent and dependent variables over time.  Yet is the change in these variables over time 
statistically significant?  And if so, what is the magnitude of this change?  In this section, I 
discuss the absolute amount of change in each continuous variable that takes place from 1961 to 
2001.  I also use OLS regression to determine whether change for each variable is statistically 
significant.  First, however, I present and discuss line graphs that depict how the female/male sex 
ratio, female/male child sex ratio, and female/male literacy ratio change over time.  For each of 
these dependent variables, I chose a random sample of districts and plotted their change over 
time.  This is useful because it gives me a visual representation of changes in female/male sex 
ratio, child sex ratio, and literacy ratio. 
Figure 6.1 depicts change in the female/male sex ratio over time for a random sample of 
districts (n = 20).  Overall, the change trajectories tend to be almost flat, especially compared to 
the change trajectories for female/male child sex ratio and female/male literacy ratio depicted in 
Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3.  There are a few districts that have change trajectories that do not fit 
this pattern.  For example, the sex ratio of district 118 rises sharply from 1971 to 1981.  District 
69’s sex ratio decreased relatively sharply from 1981 to 1991, and then started rising from 1991 
to 2001.  The sex ratio of district 129 fluctuated over time. 
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Figure 6.1Variation in Female/male sex ratio over time 
One can see from Figure 6.2 that the change trajectories for female/male child sex ratio 
are much more pronounced than those for overall female/male sex ratio.  For the most part there 
is a downward trend in number of female children per 1,000 male children.  For 16 out of the 20 
districts, there is a decrease in absolute child sex ratio from 1961 to 2001.  Even for some of the 
districts that have child sex ratios that fluctuate over time, there is still a net decrease in 
female/male child sex ratio (districts 76, 126, 127, and 128).  Only 4 districts experience either 
no net change in child sex ratio or very little change from 1961 to 2001 (districts 45, 100, 112, 
and 118). 
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Figure 6.2 Variation in female/male child sex ratio over time 
 
In Figure 6.3, there is a clear upward trend in female/male literacy ratio for all 20 districts 
in the sample.  Overall, the slopes for change in literacy ratio are much more uniform than the 
slopes for change in female/male child sex ratio.  There are a few districts that are worth 
mentioning.  The female/male literacy ratio for district 116 increased from about 20% in 1991 to 
60% in 2001.  Districts 129 and 132 also experienced a more rapid increase in literacy ratio from 
1991 to 2001 compared to earlier time periods, though not as steep an increase as district 116.  
All three of these districts are in Rajasthan. 
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Figure 6.3 Variation in female/male literacy ratio over time 
 
 
 
Table 6.70 Change Scores for Continuous Independent and Dependent Variables 
Variables 
Mean 
1961 
Mean 
2001 
Change 
(2001-1961) 
Std. Err 
(Change) 
Std. Dev. 
(Change) T 
 
p > | t | 
Indep. Variables        
Per Capita SDP  875.55 198371.40 + 197495.80 1829.63 21493.28 107.94 0.000 
Ln(Per Capita SDP)  6.75 12.19 5.45 0.03 0.29 219.70 0.000 
Urban 17.55 26.09 8.54 0.55 6.32 15.63 0.000 
Scheduled Castes 13.65 15.11 1.47 0.23 2.71 6.35 0.000 
Dependent  
Variables       
F/M Sex Ratio 948.15 948.72 0.57 2.77 32.38 0.21 0.837 
F/M Child Sex Ratio 989.35 933.2 -56.15 2.06 24.11 -27.25 0.000 
F/M Literacy Ratio 31.21 67.29 36.07 0.69 8.09 52.21 0.000 
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Table 6.70 describes the absolute change in the continuous independent and dependent 
variables from 1961 to 2001.  For all variables except female/male sex ratio this change is 
statistically significant.  On average, the per capita SDP increased by about Rs. 197,500 
(measured in constant 1961 rupees).  Percentage of districts’ population living in urban areas 
increased by about 8.5 percentage points, on average.  Although this change is statistically 
significant (p < .001), substantively it is a very small change considering that it is the amount of 
change that took place over a span of four decades.  The average percentage of districts’ 
population comprised of Scheduled Castes increased by only about 1.5% from 1961 to 2001, 
which is a miniscule amount of change.  The absolute change in average female/male child sex 
ratio decreased by 56 females/1,000 males from 1961 to 2001.  The average female/male child 
sex ratio in 1961 was about 989 females/1,000 males, but by 2001 the child sex ratio was only 
933 females/1,000 males.  The average female/male literacy ratio increased by about 36 
percentage points from 1961 to 2001. 
Before starting to estimate the statistical models that will test my hypotheses, I must first 
run OLS regressions of each continuous variable on time period.  While the change score 
analyses tell me which variables vary significantly over time, they do not tell me the strength of 
the relationship between time and each of these variables.  OLS regression models can tell me 
both the strength of the relationship between each variable and time, and also the average 
magnitude of change per time period for each variable.  Both the change score analyses and the 
OLS regressions can determine which variables, if any, do not vary significantly over time.  It 
does not make sense to carry out further statistical analyses of how the independent variables 
may affect change in the dependent variable if in fact the dependent variable does not 
significantly change over time.   
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Also, if there are any independent variables that do not vary significantly over time, I must treat 
these variables as time-invariant variables in further statistical models.   
Table 6.71 OLS Regressions of Continuous Variables on Time Period 
Variables Constant Coeff. 
Std. 
Err. T p > | t| 
Adjusted 
R-Squared 
Per Capita SDP  -37624.75 39788.14 1487.44 26.75 0.000 0.509 
Ln(Per Capita SDP)  6.20 1.20 0.02 49.56 0.000 0.781 
Urbanization 17.62 2.32 0.39 6.00 0.000 0.049 
Scheduled Castes 13.44 0.49 0.16 3.15 0.002 0.013 
F/M Sex Ratio 946.17 -0.05 1.24 -0.04 0.970 -0.002 
F/M Child Sex Ratio 993.92 -14.28 0.91 -15.74 0.000 0.266 
F/M Literacy Ratio 29.93 8.58 0.37 23.03 0.000 0.435 
 
Table 6.71 shows OLS regressions for change in each of the continuous independent and 
dependent variables over time.  They show the average change trajectory for each variable, and 
do not allow the slopes to vary.  Thus, even though from Table 6.43 we can observe that per 
capita SDP for all six states skyrocketed from 1991 to 2001, the coefficient for per capita SDP in 
the OLS regression is the average change in per capita SDP per decade.  On average, for the 
period of 1961 to 2001 per capita SDP has increased by about Rs. 39,300 per decade.  There is a 
strong and statistically significant relationship between per capita SDP and time period (R-
squared = .51, p < .001).  On average, the percentage population living in urban areas increased 
by only 2 percentage points per decade.  Even though this change is statistically significant (p < 
.001), there is a weak relationship between urbanization and time period (R-squared = .05).  The 
percentage of population comprised of Scheduled Castes increased by about 0.5 of a percentage 
point per decade, on average.  There is a very weak relationship between Scheduled Castes and 
time period (R-Squared = 0.01, p < .01).  Because the change in percentage of population 
comprised of Scheduled Castes is so miniscule, I may need to treat this variable as if it were 
time-invariant in future statistical models.  There is no statistically significant variation in 
female/male sex ratio over time, which is not surprising given the fact that absolute change in 
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female/male sex ratio from 1961 to 2001 is also not statistically significant (see Table 6.70).  
Because the female/male sex ratio does not vary significantly over time, I cannot include it as a 
dependent variable in my models.  On average, there is a decrease in female/male child sex ratio 
of about 14 females/1,000 males for each time period.  The strength of the relationship between 
female/male child sex ratio is moderate (R-squared = .27) and this is statistically significant (p < 
.001).   The female/male literacy ratio increases by about 8.6 percentage points per decade, on 
average.  The relationship between female/male literacy ratio and time period is both strong (R-
squared = .44) and statistically significant (p < .001).   
6.4 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have laid the groundwork for the statistical models that I present in the next two 
chapters by carrying out descriptive analyses on all of my variables.  I have found that although 
there is no statistically significant variation in the presence of women’s rights programs and 
market programs by region, there is significant variation in the presence of these women’s 
programs by state.  The presence of women’s microfinance programs varied significantly by both 
region and state.  Urbanization and percentage of population comprised of Scheduled Castes 
varied significantly by both region and state, whereas SDP per capita did not.  The presence of 
women’s rights programs, market programs, and microfinance programs all varied significantly 
over time.  This variation in presence of women’s programs over time was significant for both 
regions and for all six states.  Change-score analyses and OLS regressions revealed that changes 
over time in SDP per capita, urbanization, female/male child sex ratio, and female/male literacy 
ratio were all statistically significant.  However, change in the female/male sex ratio over time 
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was not significant.  Therefore, I will not keep female/male sex ratio as one of my dependent 
variables.  Change in percent of population comprised of Scheduled Castes was significant, so I 
can treat this variable as a time-varying variable. 
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7.0 CHAPTER SEVEN: VARIATION IN THE FEMALE/MALE CHILD SEX RATIO 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter I discuss the results of the fixed-effects models for female/male child sex ratio.  I 
first present and discuss the results of models that test the modernization hypotheses, followed 
by results of models that test the WID hypotheses.  Next, I discuss the results of models testing 
the GAD hypotheses and the models testing the neoliberal hypotheses.  For each set of 
hypotheses, I present models with both lagged and unlagged independent variables, as well as 
models with regional interaction effects and state-wide interaction effects.  I report robust 
standard errors for each model, as well as the within-district R-squared and the significance level 
of the F-statistic below each model.  The “P > | F |” tests whether a more complete model is 
significantly different than the previous model.  I test the hypotheses in such a way such that 
previous models are nested within subsequent models.  This allows me to use the F-statistic to 
determine whether a subsequent model is statistically significantly different (and therefore 
better) than the previous model. 
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7.2 MODERNIZATION AND THE FEMALE/MALE CHILD SEX RATIO 
7.2.1 Models with unlagged independent variables and regional interaction effects  
 
I begin by discussing the models testing the modernization hypotheses.  Table 7.1 shows results 
for the models testing the modernization hypotheses with regional interaction effects.   
Table 7.1 Fixed-Effects Models Testing Modernization Hypotheses for Female/Male Child Sex Ratio 
(Unlagged Independent Variables) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
         
Urban -0.03 0.27 -0.40 0.42 -0.53 0.46 -.38 0.54 
ln(Per capita SDP) -0.37 -0.48 -1.17 0.61 -0.32 0.76 0.21 0.94 
Period -13.85*** 0.86 -13.22*** 0.97 -11.87*** 1.32 -12.87*** 1.77 
Urban*region   0.43 0.47 0.78 0.48 0.53 0.60 
ln(Per capita SDP) 
* region   1.65* 0.84 1.08 0.89 -.19 1.13 
Women's rights      -3.24 2.74 -3.30 2.76 
Microfinance      -5.92* 2.94 -6.03* 2.95 
Market      -7.01* 2.10 -7.20* 3.02 
Scheduled Castes     0.93 0.53 0.87 0.53 
Region*period       2.54 2.02 
Constant 996.79 6.50 1001.22*** 7.16 982.89***  982.86 13.39 
N 681  681  636  636  
Within-R-Squared  0.555  0.561  0.574  0.575 
P > | F |    0.016  0.000  0.211 
Rho   0.657  0.596  0.630  0.633 
         
* p < .05         
**p < .01         
***p < .001         
 
Model 1 tests hypothesis 1a, which states that economic growth and increased 
urbanization lead to an increase in the female/male child sex ratios.  One can see that there is no 
statistically significant relationship between urbanization, logged per capita SDP, and changes in 
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the child sex ratio.  Time is the only variable that is statistically significantly related to the child 
sex ratio (p < .001).  For the passage of each decade, the female/male child sex ratio decreases by 
almost 14 females per 1,000 males.  Model two tests the hypothesis that urbanization and 
increased per capita SDP will have a greater effect on increases in the child sex ratio in southern 
districts than in northern districts.  Although the percentage of population living in urban areas 
has no statistically significant impact on changes in the child sex ratio, the interaction effect 
between logged per capita SDP and region is statistically significantly related to variation in the 
female/male child sex ratio.  In southern regions, the female/male child sex ratio increases by 
about 1.7 females per 1,000 males more than in northern regions for every tenfold increase in per 
capita SDP.  Although the difference is statistically significant (p < .05), and thus not due to 
chance, substantively this is a very small difference.  The F-test shows that there is a statistically 
significant difference between the second model and the first model (p < .05), indicating that the 
second model is a better fit for the data even though it includes more variables and the same 
number of observations.  The third model controls for the effects of women’s rights programs, 
market programs, microfinance programs, and the percentage of population comprised of 
Scheduled Castes.  Once these variables are controlled for, the interaction effect of logged per 
capita SDP and region is no longer statistically significant.  The presence of microfinance 
programs and market programs are both significantly and negatively related to the female/male 
child sex ratio (p < .05).  The passage of time has the strongest negative effect on the 
female/male child sex ratio ratio (p < .001), with a decrease of almost 12 females per 1,000 
males for each passing decade.  The F-statistic reveals that there is a statistically significant 
difference between the third model and the second model (p < .001), which means that the third 
model is a better fit for the data than the previous model.  There is no statistically significant 
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difference between this model and the fourth model, which controls for the interaction effect of 
region and time period.  Therefore, the third model, which controls for the presence of women’s 
rights programs, market programs, microfinance programs, and percentage of population 
comprised of Scheduled Castes, is more parsimonious than the fourth model.  This entire model 
is strongly related to within-district variation in the female/male child sex ratio (R-squared = 
0.57).  Therefore, one can conclude that there is no statistically significant relationship between 
values of logged per capita SDP that are contemporaneous with variation in the female/male 
child sex ratio, and one can also conclude that there is no significant relationship between the 
percentage of population in urbanized areas and the child sex ratio.  It is useful to compare this 
set of models that includes regional interaction effects with models that include state-wise 
interaction effects to determine whether there is between-state variation in the female/male child 
sex ratio.  I turn now to a discussion of these models. 
 
7.2.2 Models with unlagged independent variables and state-wise interaction effects  
 
Table 7.2 shows model results for the modernization hypotheses that include state-wise 
dichotomous variables rather than the region dichotomous variable.  Model 2 of Table 7.2 is very 
similar to model 2 of Table 7.1 Fixed-Effects Models Testing Modernization Hypotheses for 
Female/Male Child Sex Ratio (Unlagged Independent Variables). In both models, the coefficient 
for time period is highly significant (p < .001) and is of the same magnitude (-13.85).  In the 
second model of Table 7.1, the interaction term of logged per capita SDP*region is significantly 
related to variation in the child sex ratio.  Likewise, in the second model of Table 7.2 the 
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interaction effects of logged per capita SDP*Gujarat and of logged per capita SDP*Tamil Nadu 
are significantly related to variation in the child sex ratio.   
Table 7.2 Fixed-Effects Models Testing Modernization Hypotheses for Female/Male Child Sex Ratio 
(Unlagged Independent Variables) 
  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Urban -0.03 0.27 0.08 0.73 0.13 0.79 0.85 0.96 
ln(Per capita SDP) -0.37 0.48 -1.23 1.04 0.09 1.03 3.04** 1.11 
Period -13.85*** 0.86 -13.26*** 1.08 -11.71*** 1..36 -17.10*** 3.01 
Urban* 
AndhraPradesh   0.43 0.77 0.49 0.82 -0.63 1.18 
Urban* 
Gujarat   -0.77 0.81 -0.83 0..9 -2.21 1.09 
Urban* 
Karnataka   0.52 1.06 0.60 1.07 -0.15 1.29 
Urban* 
MadhyaPradesh   -0.74 0.83 -1.10 0..91 -1.77 1.31 
Urban* 
TamilNadu   -1.01 0.83 -0.82 0.87 -1.53 1.02 
ln(Per capita SDP)* 
AP   0.41 1.22 -0.27 1..22 -4.26** 1.60 
ln(Per capita SDP)* 
Gujarat   -3.96* 1.6 -5.09** 1..59 -12.35*** 1.91 
ln(Per capita SDP)* 
Karnat   1.19 1.7 -0.34 1..63 -3.36* 1.53 
ln(Per capita SDP)* 
MP   2.02 1.15 1.57 1..22 -1.28 1.61 
ln(Per capita SDP)* 
TN   5.30*** 1.49 4.48** 1..38 1.91 2.33 
Women's rights      -1.54 2.67 -1.70 2.81 
Microfinance      -6.58* 2..97 -6.55* 2.99 
Market      -8.31** 3..02 -8.29* 3.00 
Scheduled Castes     0.72 0..51 0.72 0.52 
AndhraPradesh* 
period       7.82* 3.89 
Gujarat* 
period       12.86** 3.73 
Karnataka* 
period       5.59 3.45 
MadhyaPradesh* 
period       5.13 4.03 
TamilNadu* 
period       4.78 4.45 
Constant 996.79*** 6.50 1000.76*** 6.92 985.42*** 12..31 986.52*** 12.29 
N 681  681  636  636  
Within-R-Squared  0.555  0.580  0..596  0.601 
P > | F |    0.000  0.000  0.022 
Rho   0.657  0.680  0.732  0.853 
*p < .05         
**p < .01         
***p < .001         
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For every tenfold increase in per capita SDP, the child sex ratio in Gujarat state is lower than the 
child sex ratio of Rajasthan (the reference category) by 4 females per 1,000 males.  In Tamil 
Nadu, the child sex ratio is higher than that of Rajasthan by about 5 females per 1,000 males for 
every tenfold increase in per capita SDP. 
Since Gujarat state is in the north and Tamil Nadu is in the south, the direction of these 
relationships fits the results of logged per capita SDP*region in Table 7.1.  This is because in 
table 7.1, the child sex ratio is higher in southern areas than in northern areas for every tenfold 
increase in per capita SDP.  Model 3 of table 7.2 is also similar to model 3 of table 7.1.  In both 
models, the coefficient for period is highly statistically significant (p < .001) and of the same 
magnitude.  The relationships between women’s market programs and women’s microfinance 
programs and variation in the child sex ratio are negative and statistically significant in model 3 
of both tables 7.1 and 7.2, although at somewhat different significance levels.  However, whereas 
the interaction effect of logged per capita SDP*region is no longer statistically significant in 
model 3 of table 7.1, the interaction effects of logged per capita SDP*Gujarat and logged per 
capita SDP*Tamil Nadu remain statistically significant.  Unlike the fourth model of table 7.1, the 
fourth model of table 7.2 is statistically significantly different from the third model.  Model 4 in 
table 7.2 includes interaction terms for each state*period.  The interaction effects for logged per 
capita SDP*region and region*period are not significant in model 4 of table 7.1.  In contrast, in 
model 4 of table 7.2 the interaction effects of logged per capita SDP*Andhra Pradesh, logged per 
capita SDP*Gujarat, and logged per capita SDP*Karnataka are all statistically significant.  
Moreover, in model 4 of table 7.2, the interaction effects of Andhra Pradesh*period and 
Gujarat*period are also statistically significantly related to changes in the child sex ratio.  The 
interaction effects of the logged per capita SDP*state variables seem to offset the interaction 
254 
effects of the state*period variables.  For instance, in Rajasthan the child sex ratio increases by 
about 3 females per 1,000 males with every tenfold increase in per capita SDP.  For every 
tenfold increase in per capita SDP, the child sex ratio in Gujarat state is lower than that of 
Rajasthan state by about 12 females per 1,000 males, and the child sex ratio in Andhra Pradesh is 
lower than that of Rajasthan by about 4 females per 1,000 males.  However, with the passing of 
each decade, the child sex ratio in Rajasthan decreases by about 17 females per 1,000 males.  In 
Gujarat state, the passing of each decade is associated with a child sex ratio that is higher than 
that of Rajasthan by about 13 females per 1,000 males, and in Andhra Pradesh the passage of 
each decade is associated with a child sex ratio that is higher than that of Rajasthan by about 8 
females per 1,000 males.  This means that the passage of each decade leads to a decrease in the 
child sex ratio in Gujarat state of about 4 females per 1,000 males, and a decrease in the child sex 
ratio in Andhra Pradesh state of about 9 females per 1,000 males.  Also, the interaction effects of 
log per capita SDP*Madhya Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh*period, and Karnataka*period are not 
statistically significant.  It seems plausible that the reason why the interaction effects of logged 
per capita SDP*region and region*period are not statistically significant in the fourth model of 
table 7.1 is that the state*region variables of table 7.2 have a mediating effect on the logged per 
capita SDP*state variables.  It is important to examine the results for the models with lagged 
values of the independent variables. Models with unlagged independent variables can determine 
if the values of any of the independent variables change along with variation in the child sex 
ratio, but they cannot establish causality between the independent variables and the female/male 
child sex ratio.   
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7.2.3 Models with lagged independent variables and regional interaction effects  
 
Table 7.3 shows the results for the fixed-effects models with lagged independent variables that 
test the modernization hypotheses.  Unlike the models with unlagged independent variables, the 
results of Table 7.3 show that there is a statistically significant relationship between lagged log 
per capita SDP and the female/male child sex ratio (p < .01 for models 1 and 2, p < .05 for model 
3).  However, the lagged log per capita SDP leads to a decrease in the child sex ratio, which is 
the opposite of what the modernization hypotheses predict.  Once the interaction effects of 
lagged log per capita SDP*region and lagged urbanization*region are controlled for in the 
second model, the negative impact of lagged log per capita SDP on female/male child sex ratio 
increases.  A tenfold increase in lagged log per capita SDP leads to a decrease of almost 10 
females per 1,000 males (p < .01).  The passage of time also has a strong negative effect on the 
child sex ratio (p < .001), with a decrease in the child sex ratio of about 10 females/1,000 males 
for every decade that passes.  The second model is statistically significantly better than the first 
model (p < .05), and all of the independent variables taken as a whole have a strong relationship 
with within-district variation in the female/male child sex ratio (R-squared = .52). 
The third model, which controls for the presence of women’s rights programs, market 
programs, microfinance programs, percentage of population comprised of Scheduled Castes, and 
the interaction effect of region*time period, is not statistically significantly different from the 
second model.  Therefore, the second model is more parsimonious than the third model, and is 
the best fit for the data.  Because lagged log per capita SDP causes a decrease in the female/male 
child sex ratio rather than an increase in the child sex ratio, there is no evidence supporting the 
modernization hypotheses that economic growth leads to an increase in the female/male child 
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sex ratio.  This also means that there is supporting evidence for the first WID hypothesis, which 
states that economic growth and increases in urbanization will lead to a decrease in the 
female/male child sex ratio.  Moreover, the presence of women’s rights programs, market 
programs, and microfinance programs are not statistically significant.  This means that although 
there is a statistically significant correlation between the contemporaneous presence of women’s 
market programs and microfinance programs and a decrease in the female/male child sex ratio, 
there is not a causal relationship between the presence of these women’s programs and child sex 
ratio. 
Table 7.3 Fixed-Effects Models Testing Modernization Hypotheses for Female/Male Child Sex Ratio (Lagged 
Independent Variables) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
       
Lagged Urban -0.76 0.44 -0.92 0.52 -0.83 0.58 
Lagged ln(Per capita SDP) -7.10** 2.44 -9.75** 2.74 -8.00* 3.83 
Period -10.77*** 2.00 -10.40*** 1.93 -11.00** 3.34 
Lagged Urban*region   0.26 0.80 0.14 0.87 
Lagged ln(Per capita SDP)* region   5.78 3.14 -0.61 4.69 
Lagged Women's rights      -1.27 4.11 
Lagged Microfinance      -7.57 3.50 
Lagged Market      1.95 4.16 
Lagged Scheduled Castes     -0.59 0.76 
Region*period     5.75 3.73 
Constant 1057.08*** 15.91 1060.77*** 15.50 1070.05 19.48 
N 543  543  507  
Within-R-Squared  0.513  0.521  0.521 
P > | F |    0.02  0.174 
Rho   0.656  0.629  0.611 
* p < .05       
**p < .01       
***p < .001       
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7.2.4 Models with lagged independent variables and state-wise interaction effects 
 
Table 7.4 shows the results for the lagged models testing the modernization hypotheses that 
include the state-wise interaction terms.  In model 2 of table 7.4, lagged log per capita SDP is not 
statistically significantly related to variation in the child sex ratio, which is in contrast to model 
two of table 7.3.  Whereas in Table 7.3 the interaction term of lagged log per capita SDP*region 
is not statistically significant, in table 7.4 one of the lagged log per capita SDP*state variables is 
statistically significant.  In model 2 of table 7.4, there is a statistically significant relationship 
between lagged log per capita SDP and Madhya Pradesh (p < .05).  In the second model of both 
tables 7.3 and 7.4, there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between time 
period and change in the child sex ratio (p < .001).  Model 4 of table 7.4, which includes 
interaction terms for each state*period, is substantially different than model 3 of table 7.3.  While 
there is no statistically significant difference between model 3 and model 2 in table 7.3, there is a 
statistically significant difference between model 4 and model 3 in table 7.4 (p < .001).  Model 3 
of table 7.3 includes the lagged value for the interaction effect of region*period, while model 4 
of table 7.4 includes the lagged values for the interaction effects of the state*period variables.  
Once these new variables are included in the model, lagged log per capita SDP*Andhra Pradesh, 
lagged log per capita SDP*Gujarat, lagged log per capita SDP*Madhya Pradesh, and lagged log 
per capita SDP*Tamil Nadu are all statistically significantly related to variation in the child sex 
ratio.  Just as in model 4 of table 7.2, in model 4 of table 7.4 the interaction effects of the 
state*period variables seem to have a mediating effect on the interaction effects of the lagged log 
per capita SDP*state variables.  For instance, for every tenfold increase in per capita SDP, the 
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child sex ratio in Andhra Pradesh is lower than that of Rajasthan by about 17 females per 1,000 
males ten years later.   
Table 7.4 Fixed-Effects Models Testing Modernization Hypotheses for Female/Male Child Sex Ratio (Lagged 
Independent Variables) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Lagged Urban -0.76 0.44 -1.54 1.08 -1.18 1.04 -0.64 1.05 
Lagged  
ln(Per capita SDP) -7.10** 2.44 -4.40 4.44 -4.93 4.85 4.96 5.43 
Period -10.77*** 2.00 -11.63*** 2.08 -10.46 2.90 -18.95*** 3.96 
Lagged  
Urban*A.P.   0.87 1.55 0.60 1.53 -0.86 1.89 
Lagged  
Urban*Gujarat   -1.15 1.52 -1.40 1.44 0.20 1.31 
Lagged  
Urban*Karnataka   1.35 1.58 1.41 1.58 0.81 1.72 
Lagged  
Urban*M. P.   2.45 1.27 1.79 1.27 -0.01 1.44 
Lagged  
Urban*T.N.   1.33 1.44 1.01 1.36 0.28 1.39 
Lagged  
ln(Per capita SDP)*AP   -0.61 5.59 0.25 5.65 -17.24** 6.3 
Lagged  
ln(Per capita SDP)*Gujarat   -0.78 5.28 -1.55 5.49 22.12** 6.78 
Lagged  
ln(Per capita SDP)*Karnat   3.09 5.76 2.29 5.85 -5.78 6.63 
Lagged  
ln(Per capita SDP)*MP   -11.78* 4.91 -11.40* 5.33 -26.52*** 6.64 
Lagged  
ln(Per capita SDP)*TN   0.49 5.95 1.01 5.82 -20.97** 7.22 
Lagged 
 Women's rights      -1.72 3.98 1.66 3.91 
Lagged  
Microfinance      -5.97 3.34 -5.80 3.08 
Lagged 
 Market      2.49 4.05 1.04 4.10 
Lagged  
Scheduled Castes     -0.52 0.85 -0.47 0.79 
AndhraPradesh*period       16.01** 5.49 
Gujarat*period       -22.97*** 6.16 
Karnataka*period       6.67 5.03 
MadhyaPradesh*period       15.45** 5.39 
TamilNadu*period       17.66*** 4.45 
Constant 1057.08 15.91 1060.09*** 16.12 1064.68 20.70 1048.59*** 17.54 
N 543  543  507  507  
Within-R-Squared  0.513  0.535  0.532  0.567 
P > | F |    0.005  0.324  0.000 
Rho   0.656  0.804  0.805  0.965 
*p < .05         
**p < .01         
***p < .001         
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However, with the passage of each decade, the child sex ratio in Andhra Pradesh is higher than 
the child sex ratio of Rajasthan by about 16 females per 1,000 males.  Likewise, for every tenfold 
increase in per capita SDP, the child sex ratio in Gujarat is higher than the child sex ratio in 
Rajasthan by about 22 females per 1,000 males ten years later (p < .01).  With the passage of 
each decade, however, the child sex ratio in Gujarat state is lower than that of Rajasthan by about 
23 females per 1,000 males (p < .001).  The interaction effects for Madhya Pradesh and Tamil 
Nadu follow this same general pattern.  One unusual finding is that in Gujarat state, although 
contemporaneous values of log per capita SDP are correlated with a female/male child sex ratio 
that is lower than that of Rajasthan, lagged values of log per capita SDP lead to a child sex ratio 
in Gujarat that is higher than that in Rajasthan. Moreover, the state-wise interaction terms for 
lagged log per capita SDP and time period do not necessarily fit the expected regional pattern.  
That is, the coefficients for lagged log per capita SDP*Andhra Pradesh and lagged log per capita 
SDP*Tamil Nadu are negative, even though both states are in the southern region of India.  This 
seems to indicate that it is the state-wise effects of logged per capita SDP (either lagged or 
unlagged) on variation of the child sex ratio that matters rather than the regional (northern versus 
southern) effects of logged per capita SDP on variation in child sex ratio.  
7.3 WOMEN-IN-DEVELOPMENT AND FEMALE/MALE CHILD SEX RATIO 
7.3.1 Models with unlagged independent variables and regional interaction effects 
 
Table 7.5 shows results for models that test the WID hypotheses (hypotheses 2b through 2d) and 
also include regional interaction effects.  As mentioned in the last section, there is a statistically 
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significant relationship between logged per capita SDP and a decline in the female/male child 
sex ratio.  Therefore, there is support for the first WID hypothesis, which states that an increase 
in per capita SDP and an increase in urbanization lead to a decrease in the female/male child sex 
ratio.   
Table 7.5 Fixed-Effects Models Testing WID Theory (Unlagged Independent Variables) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Coeff. 
Robust 
Std.Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std.Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std.Err. 
         
Market  -9.67** 2.84 -8.66* 4.09 -10.05* 4.64 -7.35 4.95 
Period -12.75*** 0.74 -12.29*** 0.82 -12.25*** 0.82 -13.39*** 1.22 
Microfinance    -4.07 3.48 -8.45* 3.75 -6.11 3.89 
Market*Microfinance    0.07 5.69 -0.35 5.35 -0.45 5.22 
Microfinance*region     7.96 5.23 1.37 5.20 
Market*region     4.40 5.05 0.81 5.72 
Urban       -0.11 0.30 
ln(Per capita SDP)       0.26 0.62 
Women's rights        -3.24 2.80 
Scheduled Castes       0.82 0.54 
Region*period       3.16* 1.45 
Constant 993.490*** 1.14 993.10*** 1.16 993.02*** 1.14 982.13*** 12.65 
N 640  640  640  636  
Within-R-Squared  0.562  0.564  0.569  0.574 
P > | F |    0.336  0.047  0.022 
Rho   0.659  0.659  0.648  0.656 
* p < .05         
**p < .01         
***p < .001         
 
Hypothesis 2b states that women’s market programs will lead to an increase in the female/male 
child sex ratio. Model 1 tests this hypothesis, while model 2 tests the hypothesis that the joint 
effect of women’s market programs and women’s microfinance programs will have a greater 
impact on raising the child sex ratio than the presence of women’s market programs alone will 
have in raising the child sex ratio.  In both of these models, the presence of women’s market 
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programs is statistically significantly related to a decrease in the child sex ratio.  However, the F-
statistic indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between model 2 and model 1 
(p > .05).  Moreover, there is no significant relationship between the interaction effect of 
market*microfinance programs and variation in child sex ratio.  Therefore, there is no evidence 
in support of the hypothesis that the joint effect of women’s market programs and women’s 
microfinance programs is greater in raising the child sex ratio than the impact of market 
programs alone.   
Model 3 tests hypothesis 2d, which states that the presence of women’s market and 
microfinance programs will have a greater positive impact on the female/male child sex ratio in 
southern districts than in northern districts.  Although this model is statistically significantly 
better than model 2 (p < .05), the relationships between the interaction effects of market 
programs*region and microfinance programs* region and variation in the female/male child sex 
ratio are not statistically significant.  Once these interaction effects are controlled for, however, 
the presence of market programs and microfinance programs are significantly related to a 
decrease in the child sex ratio in the third model (p < .05).  In the fourth model, once I control for 
logged per capita SDP, percentage of population comprised of Scheduled Castes, the presence of 
women’s rights programs, and the interaction effect of region*time period, the presence of 
market programs and microfinance programs are no longer statistically significant.  In this final 
model, the passage of time and the interaction effect of region*time period are the only variables 
that are significantly related to a decrease in the female/male child sex ratio.  The passage of 
each decade is correlated with a decrease in the child sex ratio of about 13 females per 1,000 
males in northern regions, and a decrease in the child sex ratio of about 10 females per 1,000 
males in southern regions. There is a statistically significant difference between this model and 
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model 3 (p < .05).  This model with all of the variables taken together is strongly related to 
variation in the female/male child sex ratio (R-squared = .57).  Overall, the results of these 
models do not lend support to the WID hypotheses related to the presence of women’s programs. 
The WID hypotheses predict that the presence of women’s market programs will have a positive 
impact on the female/male child sex ratio, and that the joint effect of women’s market programs 
and microfinance programs will have an even greater positive effect on the child sex ratio than 
the effect of market programs alone.  However, once all other variables are controlled for, there 
is no relationship between the presence of women’s market programs nor the presence of 
microfinance programs with the female/male child sex ratio. However, the results of the 
modernization models show that an increase in log per capita SDP leads to a decrease in the 
female/male child sex ratio. This does support the first WID hypothesis that states that an 
increase in economic growth will lead to a decrease in the child sex ratio. While there is no 
statistically significant relationship between log per capita SDP and contemporaneous variation 
in the female/male child sex ratio, an increase in log per capita SDP leads to a decline in the 
child sex ratio ten years later.  With every tenfold increase in the per capita SDP, the 
female/male child sex ratio declines by about 10 females/1,000 males a decade later.  Moreover, 
the passage of each decade is correlated with a decrease in the child sex ratio of about 10 
females/1,000 males. 
 
7.3.2 Models with unlagged independent variables and state-wise interaction effects  
 
Table 7.6 shows model results for the WID hypotheses that include the state-wise interaction 
terms rather than the region-wise interaction terms.  Since the first two models do not include 
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interaction terms for market programs*state, microfinance programs*state, or state*period, these 
models are the same as the first two models in Table 7.5.  Model 3 of table 7.6, which includes 
interaction effects for market programs*state and microfinance programs*state, is similar to 
model 3 in table 7.5.  In model 3 of both table 7.5 and 7.6, there is a statistically significant 
relationship between the main effects women’s market programs and the main effects of 
microfinance programs and variation in the child sex ratio at the 0.05 level.  There is also a 
statistically significant relationship between time period and change in the child sex ratio at the 
0.001 level in both models.  In the third model of both tables 7.5 and 7.6, the passage of each 
decade is significantly related to a decrease in the child sex ratio of about 12 females per 1,000 
males.  There is a statistically significant difference between the third and second models of both 
tables 7.5 and 7.6. 
The fourth model of Table 7.6 diverges more from the fourth model of Table 7.5.  In the 
fourth model of table 7.5, there is a statistically significant relationship between only two 
independent variables and the child sex ratio: time period and region*period.  In the fourth model 
of table 7.6, however, there are four independent variables that are statistically significantly 
related to variation in the child sex ratio: women’s market programs, women’s microfinance 
programs, time period, and the interaction effect of Gujarat state*period.  While in table 7.5 the 
coefficient of time period increases in magnitude somewhat from the third to the fourth model, in 
table 7.6 the magnitude of the coefficient for time period decreases from the third to the fourth 
model.  In the fourth model of table 7.6 the coefficients for market programs and microfinance 
programs increase in magnitude, and continue to have a negative relationship with the 
female/male child sex ratio.   
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Table 7.6 Fixed-Effects Models Testing WID Hypotheses for Female/Male Child Sex Ratio (Unlagged 
Independent Variables) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Market  -9.67** 2.84 -8.66* 4.09 -10.46* 5.07 -15.24* 5.99 
Period -12.75*** 0.74 -12.29*** 0.82 -12.35*** 0.81 -9.28** 2.82 
Microfinance   -4.07 3.48 -9.51* 4.16 -13.73* 5.58 
Market* 
microfinance   0.07 5.69 0.04 5.21 2.46 5.25 
Market* 
A.P.     13.04 7.64 14.22 8.89 
Market* 
Gujarat     -5.89 10.09 8.71 11.06 
Market* 
Karnataka     2.75 6.96 4.84 7.93 
Market* 
M.P.     3.45 6.48 10.25 7.71 
Market* 
T.N.     -5.79 10.23 -2.98 8.94 
Microfinance* 
A.P.     1.44 6.47 1.29 7.57 
Microfinance* 
Gujarat     -6.58 9.53 4.64 11.26 
Microfinance* 
Karnataka     11.56 6.39 11.99 7.51 
Microfinance* 
M.P.     8.03 8.00 13.17 8.73 
Microfinance* 
T.N.     18.54* 7.48 12.18 8.36 
Urban       -0.31 0.29 
ln(per capita SDP)       0.01 0.61 
Women's rights       -2.60 2.79 
Scheduled Castes       0.49 0.53 
AndhraPradesh* 
period       -0.13 2.79 
Gujarat* 
period       -8.15* 3.10 
Karnataka* 
period       -0.63 2.92 
MadhyaPradesh* 
period       -3.20 2.78 
TamilNadu* 
period       2.57 3.27 
Constant 993.490*** 1.14 993.10*** 1.16 993.32*** 1.17 991.57*** 12.72 
N 640  640  640  636  
Within-R-Squared  0.562  0.564  0.577  0.590 
P > | F |    0.336  0.037  0.001 
Rho   0.659  0.659  0.647  0.651 
*p < .05         
**p < .01         
***p < .001         
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In both tables 7.5 and 7.6, there is a statistically significant difference between the fourth and 
third models.  However, even the models that include state-wise interaction effects do not lend 
support to the WID hypotheses. 
 
7.3.3 Models with lagged independent variables and regional interaction effects 
 
Table 7.7 shows results for the models with lagged values of the independent variables that test 
the WID hypotheses.  The results of these models are not very different than the results of the 
models shown in Table 7.5.   
Table 7.7 Fixed-Effects Models Testing WID Hypotheses for Female/Male Child Sex Ratio (Lagged 
Independent Variables) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err. 
     
Lagged Market  1.81 3.67 4.09 4.84 1.58 7.20 2.61 7.20 
Period -16.82*** 1.05 -16.68*** 1.07 -16.66 1.07 -11.12*** 2.90 
Lagged Microfinance   -1.15 5.69 -6.17 7.94 -6.45 8.29 
Lagged Market* 
Microfinance -3.92 7.64 -3.62 7.34 -1.51 7.24 
Lagged Microfinance* 
region   7.58 7.24 -0.19 6.81 
Lagged Market* 
region   5.43 7.43 -0.68 8.17 
Lagged Urban    -0.78 0.43 
Lagged ln 
(Per capita SDP)    -8.11* 3.10 
Lagged Women's  
rights     -1.25 4.18 
Lagged Scheduled  
Castes    -.58 0.76 
Region*period    5.77** 2.02 
Constant 1001.10*** 2.39 1000.76*** 2.43 1000.77 2.42 1069.48*** 19.87 
N 512 512 512 507 
Within-R-Squared  0.497  0.498  0.501  0.522 
P > | F |   0.556  0.173  0.001 
Rho   0.657  0.657  0.649  0.609 
* p < .05     
**p < .01     
***p < .001     
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The first model in Table 7.7 tests the hypothesis that women’s market programs lead to an 
increase in the child sex ratio.  In contrast to the first model in Table 7.5, in the first model of 
Table 7.7 there is no statistically significant relationship between the presence of women’s 
market programs and variation in the child sex ratio.  Model 2 of both Table 7.5 and Table 7.7 
are not statistically significantly different than the first model.  Moreover, the presence of 
women’s market programs, presence of women’s microfinance programs, and the interaction 
effect between market programs and microfinance programs are not statistically significantly 
related with change in the female/male child sex ratio in any of the models of table 7.7.  Model 4 
controls for percentage of population in urban areas, logged per capita SDP, percentage of 
population comprised of Scheduled Castes, the presence of women’s empowerment programs, 
and the interaction effect of region*time period.  The F-statistic indicates that model 4 is 
significantly different (and better) than the previous model (p < .01).  The only variables that are 
statistically significant in this final model are time period, lagged log per capita SDP, and the 
interaction effect of region*time period.  Lagged values of log per capita SDP are also 
statistically significantly related to change in the child sex ratio (p < .05).  With every tenfold 
increase in per capita SDP, the child sex ratio decreases by about 8 females per 1,000 males ten 
years later.  Overall, these models support the first WID hypothesis, which is that economic 
growth will lead to a decrease in the female/male child sex ratio. 
 
7.3.4 Models with lagged independent variables and state-wise interaction effects 
 
Table 7.8 shows the results for the lagged models testing the WID hypotheses that 
include the state-wise interaction terms.  The results for the lagged models with the state-wise 
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interaction terms and the lagged models with region-wise interaction terms are more consistent 
with each other than the unlagged models with state-wise interaction terms and region-wise 
interaction terms are with each other.   
Table 7.8 Fixed-Effects Models Testing WID Hypotheses for Female/Male Child Sex Ratio (Lagged 
Independent Variables) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Lagged Market  1.81 3.67 4.09 4.84 3.20 9.09 0.81 8.70 
Period -16.82*** 1.05 -16.68*** 1.07 -16.63*** 1.07 -10.66** 3.11 
Lagged Microfinance   -1.15 5.69 -1.80 7.40 -3.62 7.76 
Lagged 
Market*microfinance   -3.92 7.64 -2.97 6.86 -0.13 6.89 
Lagged Market*A.P.     6.26 9.90 6.75 10.95 
Lagged Market*Gujarat     -17.65 17.87 -8.11 16.67 
Lagged Market*Karnataka     3.99 9.59 -1.69 10.17 
Lagged Market*M.P.     1.93 12.86 4.20 13.44 
Lagged Market*T.N.     -1.50 10.87 -6.84 9.10 
Lagged Microfinance*A.P.     -0.61 9.15 -3.21 8.90 
Lagged 
Microfinance*Gujarat     -14.11 17.19 -4.66 16.82 
Lagged 
Microfinance*Karnataka     2.86 8.95 -3.52 8.92 
Lagged Microfinance*M.P.     -0.03 11.35 -0.42 11.19 
Lagged Microfinance*T.N.     9.33 10.97 -1.07 9.10 
Lagged Urban       -0.84 0.44 
Lagged ln(per capita SDP)       -7.06* 3.26 
Lagged Women's rights       -0.11 4.16 
Lagged Scheduled Castes       -1.01 0.81 
AndhraPradesh*period       2.68 3.16 
Gujarat*period       -5.47 3.46 
Karnataka*period       6.29* 2.83 
MadhyaPradesh*period       0.41 2.94 
TamilNadu*period       6.33 3.93 
Constant 1001.10*** 2.39 1000.76*** 2.43 1000.91 2.43 1069.60*** 20.75*** 
N 512  512  512  507  
Within-R-Squared  0.497  0.498  0.509  0.533 
P > | F |    0.556  0.542  0.008 
Rho   0.657  0.657  0.645  0.609 
*p < .05         
**p < .01         
***p < .001         
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In both Table 7.7 and Table 7.8, there is no statistically significant difference between model 2 
and model 1, and there is also no statistically significant difference between model 3 and model 
2.  In both tables, there is a statistically significant difference between model 4 and model 3.  In 
model 4 of table 7.7, there is a statistically significant relationship between three independent 
variables and variation in the child sex ratio:  time period (p < .001), lagged log per capita SDP 
(p < .05), and the interaction effect of region*period (p < .01).  Likewise, in model 4 of table 7.8 
there is a statistically significant relationship between three independent variables and the child 
sex ratio: time period (p < .01), lagged log per capita SDP (p < .05), and the interaction effect of 
Karnataka*period (p < .05).  Both the coefficients of the interaction terms for region*period and 
Karnataka*period are positive and close to the same magnitude.  There is a statistically 
significant relationship between lagged log per capita SDP and a decrease in the female/male 
child sex ratio (p < .05) in model 4 of both tables 7.7 and 7.8.  Therefore, the results of the 
models in table 7.8 also provide evidence for the WID hypothesis that an increase in lagged log 
per capita SDP will lead to a decrease in the female/male child sex ratio.   
7.4 GENDER-AND-DEVELOPMENT AND THE FEMALE/MALE 
CHILD SEX RATIO 
7.4.1 Models with unlagged independent variables and regional interaction effects 
 
Table 7.9 shows results for fixed-effects models that test the GAD hypotheses that include 
regional interaction effects.  Hypothesis 3a states that the presence of women’s rights programs 
will lead to an increase in the female/male child sex ratio.  The first model tests this hypothesis.  
However, as can be seen from the model results, there is no statistically significant relationship 
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between the presence of women’s rights programs and variation in child sex ratio in any of the 
models.  The second model tests hypothesis 3b, which states that the presence of women’s rights 
programs will have a greater positive effect in southern districts than in northern districts in 
raising the child sex ratio.   
Table 7.9 Fixed-Effects Models Testing GAD Hypotheses for Female/Male Child Sex Ratio (Unlagged 
Independent Variables) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
         
Women's rights  -5.37 2.75 -5.79 3.88 -6.48 4.25 -6.75 4.22 
Period -13.26*** 0.82 -14.59*** 1.04 -12.84*** 1.15 -13.09*** 1.29 
Women's rights* 
Region   -1.73 5.21 -0.77 5.01 -.16 4.87 
Region* 
Period   3.99* 1.57 4.07** 1.49 3.54* 1.49 
Microfinance      -9.28 5.78 -8.63 5.70 
Market      -11.93* 5.11 -12.29* 5.20 
Women's rights* 
Microfinance     7.89 6.34 6.91 6.30 
Women's rights* 
Market     9.45 6.38 10.51 6.46 
Market* 
Microfinance     9.83 7.80 8.02 8.13 
WRP*Market* 
MFI     -17.16 9.45 -15.53 9.61 
Urban       -0.11 0.29 
ln(Per capita 
SDP)       0.20 0.60 
Scheduled Castes       0.85 0.54 
Constant 993.68*** 1.15 993.57*** 1.11 992.82*** 1.11 982.30*** 12.32 
N 641  641  640  636  
Within-R-
Squared  0.556  0.564  0.576  0.576 
P > | F |    0.005  0.01  0.337 
Rho   0.657  0.638  0.638  0.658 
* p < .05         
**p < .01 
 
***p < .001         
 
The F-statistic indicates that this model is significantly better than the previous model (p < .01), 
and thus a better fit for the data.  However, there is no statistically significant relationship 
between the interaction effect of women’s rights programs* region and variation in the child sex 
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ratio.  This model also includes the interaction effect of region*time period, which is statistically 
significantly related to variation in the child sex ratio (p < .05).  The third model tests hypothesis 
3c, which states that the joint effect of women’s rights programs, market programs, and 
microfinance programs will have a greater positive impact on the female/male child sex ratio 
than women’s rights programs alone will have on the child sex ratio.  There is a statistically 
significant difference between this model and model 2 (p < .05), indicating that this model is a 
better fit for the data than the previous model.  The joint effect of women’s rights programs, 
market programs, and microfinance programs are not significantly related to variation in the 
female/male child sex ratio.  However, after controlling for the women’s program interaction 
effects, the main effect of the presence of women’s market programs is significantly related to a 
decrease in the child sex ratio (p < .05).  The final model (model 4) controls for the effects of 
percentage of population in urbanized areas, percentage of population comprised of Scheduled 
Castes, and logged per capita SDP.  However, this model is not statistically significantly 
different than model 3.  Therefore, model 3 is more parsimonious than model 4, and is the best of 
these fixed-effects models.   
 
7.4.2 Models with unlagged independent variables and state-wise interaction effects 
 
The results of Table 7.10, which include interaction effects of women’s rights programs*states 
and states*period, are very similar to the results of Table 7.9.  In both tables 7.9 and 7.10, the 
only model that is not statistically significantly different than previous models is model 4.  In 
model 2 of both tables, there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between time 
period and change in the child sex ratio (p < .001).  In model 2 of table 7.9, there is a statistically 
271 
significant relationship between the interaction effect of region*period and child sex ratio, but in 
model 2 of table 7.10 there is no statistically significant relationship between any of the 
interaction effects of states*period and child sex ratio.   
Table 7.10 Fixed-Effects Models Testing GAD Hypotheses for Female/Male Child Sex Ratio (Unlagged 
Independent Variables) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Women's rights -5.37 2.75 -7.26 6.23 -7.93 6.82 -8.41 6.78 
Period -13.26*** 0.82 -13.56*** 2.06 -11.15*** 2.17 -11.03*** 2.36 
Women's rights* 
A.P.   8.35 7.99 11.00 7.89 11.83 7.76 
Women's rights* 
Gujarat   -9.60 9.73 -5.46 9.54 -5.66 9.22 
Women'srights* 
Karnataka   -4.45 8.22 -1.63 8.26 -2.10 8.32 
Women's rights* 
M.P.   11.22 8.41 12.18 8.55 12.70 8.58 
Women's rights* 
T.N.   -9.86 8.52 -7.12 8.56 -4.98 8.17 
AndhraPradesh* 
Period   0.43 2.54 0.18 2.42 -0.17 2.49 
Gujarat* 
Period   -2.83 3.11 -4.42 3.20 -4.19 3.08 
Karnataka* 
Period   4.50 2.70 3.01 2.82 2.65 2.91 
MadhyaPradesh* 
Period   -1.10 2.48 -1.69 2.49 -1.73 2.53 
TamilNadu* 
Period   5.83 3.08 5.88 3.02 5.67 3.00 
Microfinance     -9.43 5.24 -8.93 5.31 
Market     -12.37* 5.16 -12.73* 5.26 
WRP*MFI     5.05 5.91 4.43 5.97 
WRP*Market     7.32 6.14 8.17 6.26 
Market*MFI     11.76 7.42 10.09 7.86 
WRP*Market* 
MFI     -15.21 8.86 -13.79 9.00 
Urban       -0.23 0.28 
ln(Per capita SDP)       0.09 0.62 
Scheduled Castes       0.82 0.52 
Constant 993.68*** 1.15 993.71 1.05 992.90*** 1.08 985.39*** 11.98 
N 641  641  640  636  
Within-R-Squared  0.556  0.579  0.591  0.592 
P > | F |    0.000  0.007  0.214 
Rho   0.657  0.644  0.644  0.664 
*p < .05         
**p < .01         
***p < .001         
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Time period remains statistically significant in model 3 of both tables, although in both cases the 
magnitude of the relationship between time period and child sex ratio decreases somewhat.  
Moreover, in model 3 of both tables, there is a negative and statistically significant relationship 
between the presence of women’s market programs and variation in the child sex ratio (p < .05).  
In model 3 of table 7.9, there continues to be a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between the interaction effect of region*period and change in the child sex ratio.  In model 3 of 
table 7.10, the interaction effect of Tamil Nadu*period is positive and almost significant with a 
p-value of 0.054.  However, the results of the models described in tables 7.9 and 7.10 do not lend 
support to any of the GAD hypotheses.   
 
7.4.3 Models with lagged independent variables and regional interaction effects 
 
Table 7.11 shows the results for the models with lagged independent variables that test the GAD 
hypotheses.  As with the previous models with unlagged independent variables, table 7.11 shows 
that in all of the models, there is no statistically significant relationship between the presence of 
women’s rights programs and variation in the female/male child sex ratio. Therefore, there is no 
evidence for hypothesis 3a, which states that the presence of women’s rights programs will lead 
to an increase in the female/male child sex ratio.  Results for these lagged models are very 
similar to the results for the unlagged models with regional interaction effects.  Time period and 
the interaction effect of region*time period continue to be statistically significantly related to 
changes in the child sex ratio.  Model 3 includes main effects and interaction effects for the 
women’s programs, none of which are significantly related to variation in the child sex ratio.  
The F-statistic also indicates that this model is not an improved fit compared to the previous 
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model.  Model 4 controls for the effects of lagged percentage of population in urbanized areas, 
lagged percentage of population comprised of Scheduled Castes, and lagged log per capita SDP.  
Once these variables are controlled for, time period and the interaction effect of region and time 
period are still statistically significant (p < .001 and p < .05, respectively).  Lagged log per capita 
SDP is also statistically significant (p < .01).  Therefore, the evidence from these models does 
not support any of the GAD hypotheses. 
Table 7.11 Fixed-Effects Models Testing GAD Hypotheses for Female/Male Child Sex Ratio (Lagged 
Independent Variables) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
         
Lagged  
Women's rights  0.43 3.72 -1.17 5.80 1.39 5.87 -0.13 6.19 
Period -16.64*** 1.10 -18.22*** 1.43 -18.39*** 1.52 -10.95*** 3.02 
Lagged  
Women's rights* 
Region   1.17 7.23 2.04 7.79 3.65 7.75 
Region*Period   4.40* 2.15 4.63* 2.08 5.11* 2.09 
Lagged  
Microfinance     -1.68 8.90 -4.84 8.88 
Lagged Market      6.66 5.16 5.18 5.19 
Lagged WRP* 
MFI     -5.76 11.36 -4.31 11.55 
Lagged WRP* 
Market     -7.85 9.09 -7.43 8.99 
Lagged Market* 
MFI     -5.90 10.36 -0.97 10.05 
Lagged WRP* 
Market*MFI     9.20 14.28 3.77 14.42 
Lagged Urban       -0.79 0.44 
Lagged ln 
(Per capita SDP)       -8.20** 3.09 
Lagged  
Scheduled Castes       -0.69 0.76 
Constant 1000.89*** 2.40 1000.71*** 2.35 1000.47*** 2.40 1071.76*** 20.19 
N 512  512  512  507  
Within-R-Squared  0.496  0.506  0.509  0.523 
P > | F |    0.039  0.597  0.006 
Rho   0.656  0.630  0.627  0.609 
* p < .05         
**p < .01 
***p < .001         
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7.4.4 Models with lagged independent variables and state-wise interaction effects 
 
Table 7.12 Fixed-Effects Models Testing GAD Hypotheses for Female/Male Child Sex Ratio (Lagged 
Independent Variables) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Lagged  
Women's rights 0.43 3.72 12.36 9.31 13.72 9.70 13.39 10.03 
Period -16.64*** 1.10 -19.63*** 2.11 -19.48*** 2.09 -11.74*** 3.20 
Lagged  
Women's rights*A.P. 
 
  -4.15 11.35 -1.97 11.10 -0.43 11.54 
Lagged 
Women's rights*Gujarat   -33.12** 12.27 -32.65** 11.96 -36.72** 12.35 
Lagged  
Women's 
rights*Karnataka   -14.59 10.98 -14.16 10.93 -15.92 11.00 
Lagged  
Women's rights*M.P.   -10.63 13.38 -10.03 12.97 -11.53 13.35 
Lagged  
Women's rights*T.N.   -22.71 12.42 -22.48 12.67 -20.82 11.46 
AndhraPradesh*Period   3.06 3.54 2.76 3.50 3.01 3.58 
Gujarat*Period   -0.94 3.74 -1.07 3.67 0.26 3.80 
Karnataka*Period   6.96* 2.98 6.88* 3.01 8.89** 3.37 
MadhyaPradesh*Period   3.08 3.06 2.50 3.09 2.37 3.29 
TamilNadu*Period   9.44** 2.86 9.63** 2.91 9.55** 2.78 
Lagged 
Microfinance     -2.76 6.82 -6.01 6.77 
Lagged  
Market     5.78 5.22 4.73 5.26 
Lagged  
WRP*MFI     -3.65 8.53 -2.37 8.55 
Lagged  
WRP*Market     -5.28 8.04 -5.32 7.90 
Lagged  
Market*MFI     -1.02 10.08 3.85 9.76 
Lagged  
WRP*Market*MFI     2.79 12.90 -2.16 12.81 
Lagged  
Urban       -0.79* 0.40 
Lagged ln 
(Per capita SDP)       -8.84** 3.22 
Lagged  
Scheduled Castes       -0.88 0.81 
Constant 1000.89*** 2.40 1000.73*** 2.26 1000.54*** 2.32 1078.12*** 20.65 
N 512  512  512  507  
Within-R-Squared  0.496  0.529  0.531  0.546 
P > | F |    0.000  0.576  0.003 
Rho   0.656  0.636  0.637  0.622 
*p < .05         
**p < .01         
***p < .001         
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Table 7.12 shows results for models with lagged independent variables and state-wise interaction 
terms.  In both Table 7.11 and Table 7.12, time period is negatively and significantly related to a 
decrease in the child sex ratio (p < .001) in all the models.  Although in model 2 of table 7.11 
there is no statistically significant relationship between the interaction effect of women’s rights 
programs*region and variation in the child sex ratio, in model 2 of table 7.12 there is a negative 
and statistically significant relationship between the interaction effect of women’s rights 
programs*Gujarat state and variation in the child sex ratio (p < .01).    
Since the magnitude of this relationship is so high and actually increases in model 4, it is 
worth noting here.  Districts in Gujarat with a women’s rights program present have about 33 
fewer females/1,000 males than districts in Rajasthan with a women’s rights program present.  In 
model 2 of Table 7.11, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the 
interaction effect of region*period and the child sex ratio (p < .05).  Likewise, in model 2 of 
Table 7.12, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the interaction 
effects of Karnataka*period (p < .05), Tamil Nadu*period (p < .01), and change in the child sex 
ratio.  Since both Karnataka and Tamil Nadu are southern states, the positive relationship 
between these two interaction terms and the child sex ratio is consistent with the positive 
relationship between region*period and the child sex ratio in model 2 of table 7.11.  However, 
this does not mean that in Karnataka and Tamil Nadu the passage of time is correlated with an 
increase in the child sex ratio.  Rather, it means that with each passing decade, the female/male 
child sex ratio in Karnataka and Tamil Nadu is higher than it is in Rajasthan, the reference 
category.  In both tables 7.11 and 7.12, model 3 is not statistically significantly different than 
model 2, but model 4 is statistically significantly better than model 3.  In model 4 of table 7.12, 
the negative relationship between lagged women’s rights programs*Gujarat remains statistically 
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significant, and the magnitude of this relationship is even larger than it is in model 2.  In model 4 
of table 7.11, region*period remains statistically significant (p < .05), and in model 4 of table 
7.12, Karnataka*period and Tamil Nadu*period remain positive and statistically significant (p < 
.01).  The relationship between lagged log per capita SDP and child sex ratio is negative and 
statistically significant in model 4 of both tables, and the magnitude of this relationship in model 
4 of table 7.12 is very similar to the magnitude of the relationship in model 4 of table 7.11.  
However, in model 4 of table 7.12, lagged percentage of population in urban areas is statistically 
significantly related to a decrease in the child sex ratio (p < .05), whereas in model 4 of table 
7.11 it is not.  The results of the models with both lagged and unlagged independent variables do 
not lend any support to the GAD hypotheses. 
7.5 NEOLIBERAL  HYPOTHESES AND THE FEMALE/MALE CHILD SEX RATIO 
7.5.1 Models with unlagged independent variables and regional interaction effects 
 
Table 7.13 presents model results that test the neoliberal hypotheses.  Model 1 tests hypothesis 
4a, which states that the presence of women’s microfinance programs will lead to an increase in 
the female/male child sex ratio.  Although there is a statistically significant relationship between 
the presence of microfinance programs and variation in the child sex ratio (p < .05), this 
relationship is in the opposite direction as expected.  Rather than being correlated with higher 
child sex ratios, the presence of microfinance programs is correlated with lower child sex ratios.  
However, the presence of women’s microfinance programs is not statistically significantly 
related to variation in the female/male child sex ratio in any of the subsequent models that 
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control for other factors that might lead to variation in the child sex ratio.  Therefore, there is not 
enough evidence to accept hypothesis 4a. 
Table 7.13 Fixed-Effects Models Testing Neoliberal Hypotheses for Female/Male Child Sex Ratio (Unlagged 
Independent Variables) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Microfinance  -6.293* 2.79 -0.12 12.28 -0.62 12.64 7.97 13.79 
Period -13.33*** 0.67 -13.68*** 1.00 -14.98*** 1.12 -14.14*** 1.42 
ln(Per capita SDP)   0.38 0.96 0.49 0.95 1.09 1.06 
Microfinance* 
ln(Per capita SDP)   -0.61 1.18 -0.79 1.16 -1.38 1.24 
Microfinance*region     1.18 5.24 1.19 5.10 
Region*period     3.75** 1.21 3.37* 1.31 
Women's rights        -3.44 2.85 
Market        -7.58* 3.08 
Urban       -0.10 0.30 
Scheduled Castes       0.82 0.54 
Constant 993.32*** 1.14 990.80*** 6.59 989.84*** 6.49 976.43*** 14.92 
N 640  640  640  636  
Within-R-Squared  0.557  0.557  0.566  0.575 
P > | F |    0.876  0.001  0.008 
Rho   0.661  0.661  0.642  0.657 
* p < .05         
**p < .01         
***p < .001         
 
Model 2 tests the hypothesis that the presence of women’s microfinance programs will 
have a greater impact on increases in the female/male child sex ratio in areas with greater 
economic growth than in areas with less economic growth.  Neither log per capita SDP nor the 
interaction effect of microfinance programs*log per capita SDP are statistically significant, and 
there is no statistically significant difference between this model and the previous model.  The 
third model tests hypothesis 4c, which states that the presence of women’s microfinance 
programs will have a greater positive impact on the female/male child sex ratio in southern 
districts than in northern districts.  The F-statistic indicates that there is a statistically significant 
278 
difference between this model and model 2 (p < .01).  However, this model shows that after 
controlling for the interaction effect of region*period, there is no statistically significant 
relationship between the interaction effect of microfinance programs*region and variation in the 
female/male child sex ratio.  The final model controls for the effects of presence of women’s 
rights programs, presence of women’s market programs, percentage of population living in urban 
areas, and percentage of population comprised of Scheduled Castes.  There is a statistically 
significant difference between this last model and the previous model; thus, this last model is the 
best fit for the data.  As in the previous model, time period and the interaction effect between 
region and time period both have a statistically significant relationship with variation in the child 
sex ratio.  The presence of market programs is significantly related with a child sex ratio that is 
about 8 females per 1,000 males lower than the child sex ratio of districts with no market 
program present (p < .05).  It may appear at first glance that the presence of women’s market 
programs causes a decrease in the female/male child sex ratio.  However, it is important to first 
examine the results of models that include lagged independent variables.  If there is no 
statistically significant relationship between lagged values of women’s market programs and 
variation in the child sex ratio, then one cannot conclude that the presence of women’s market 
programs causes variation in the child sex ratio.   
 
7.5.2 Models with unlagged independent variables and state-wise interaction effects 
 
The results of Table 7.14, which include interaction effects of women’s microfinance 
programs*states and states*period, are very similar to the results of Table 7.13.  There is a 
statistically significant difference between model 3 and model 2 in both table 7.13 and table 7.14.  
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In model 3 of both tables 7.13 and 7.14, the relationship between time period and change in the 
child sex ratio is negative and highly significant (p < .001).  The magnitude of this relationship is 
very similar in both cases (-14.98 in table 7.13 and -12.66 in table 7.14). 
Table 7.14 Fixed-Effects Models Testing Neoliberal Hypotheses for Female/Male Child Sex Ratio (Unlagged 
Independent Variables) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Microfinance -6.293* 2.79 -0.12 12.28 -5.44 12.79 3.32 13.54 
Period -13.33*** 0.67 -13.68*** 1.00 -12.66*** 2.36 -11.40*** 2.58 
ln(Per capita SDP)   0.38 0.96 0.55 0.93 1.15 1.03 
Microfinance* 
ln(Per capita SDP)   -0.61 1.18 -1.08 1.14 -1.73 1.20 
Microfinance* 
A.P.     4.17 7.50 4.47 7.59 
Microfinance* 
Gujarat     5.68 11.37 8.39 11.12 
Microfinance* 
Karnataka     14.17 8.14 13.66 7.54 
Microfinance* 
M.P.     16.48 9.11 16.00 8.95 
Microfinance* 
T.N.     8.01 8.76 9.12 8.15 
AndhraPradesh* 
Period     2.10 2.36 1.79 2.42 
Gujarat* 
Period     -6.66* 2.75 -7.05* 2.77 
Karnataka* 
Period     0.50 2.42 -0.18 2.53 
MadhyaPradesh* 
Period     -1.91 2.33 -1.91 2.38 
TamilNadu* 
Period     2.57 2.99 2.91 3.13 
Women's rights       -2.81 2.82 
Market       -8.24** 2.93 
Urban       -0.25 0.28 
Scheduled Castes       0.68 0.51 
Constant 993.32*** 1.14 990.80*** 6.59 989.33*** 6.31 980.38*** 14.45 
N 640  640  640  636  
Within-R-Squared  0.557  0.557  0.579  0.588 
P > | F |    0.876  0.000  0.003 
Rho  0.661  0.661  0.643  0.653 
*p < .05         
**p < .01         
***p < .001         
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In model 3 of Table 7.13, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between the interaction effect of region*time period and variation in the child sex ratio.  In 
model 3 of Table 7.14, there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between the 
interaction effect of Gujarat*time period and the child sex ratio (p < .05).  This means that at 
every time period, the female/male child sex ratio of Gujarat state is lower than the child sex 
ratio of Rajasthan by about 7 females per 1,000 males.  The child sex ratio of Rajasthan 
decreases by about 11 females per 1,000 males with each passing decade, while the child sex 
ratio of Gujarat decreases by about 18 females per 1,000 males with each passing decade.  Even 
though this relationship is negative, it is still consistent with the results of model 3 in table 7.13, 
which includes the interaction term of region*period.  This is because Gujarat is a northern state.  
If there had been a negative and statistically significant relationship between the interaction 
effect of a southern state (such as Andhra Pradesh) and time period and the child sex ratio, this 
would not be consistent with the results of model 3 in table 7.13.  Model 4 is statistically 
significantly different than model 3 in both table 7.13 and table 7.14.  In both tables, the 
relationship between time period and child sex ratio remains negative and highly significant (p < 
.001), although in both cases the magnitude of this relationship decreases slightly.  In both 
models, districts with a women’s market program present have a child sex ratio that is about 8 
females per 1,000 males fewer than districts without a market program present.  This relationship 
is statistically significant in both models (p < .05).  In model 4 of table 7.13, the relationship 
between the interaction effect of region*period and child sex ratio remains positive and 
statistically significant.  Likewise, in model 4 of table 7.14 the relationship between the 
interaction effect of Gujarat*period and variation in the child sex ratio remains negative and 
statistically significant.  
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7.5.3 Models with lagged independent variables and regional interaction effects 
 
Table 7.15 shows the results of the models with lagged independent variables that test the 
neoliberal hypotheses.  Unlike the first model in Table 7.13, in the first model of table 7.15 the 
presence of microfinance programs is not significantly related to variation in the child sex ratio.   
Table 7.15 Fixed-Effects Models Testing Neoliberal Hypotheses for Female/Male Child Sex Ratio (Lagged 
Independent Variables) 
 
The second model includes logged per capita SDP and the interaction effect of women’s 
microfinance programs*logged per capita SDP.  This model is statistically and significantly 
different than the previous model (p < .01).  Once these two variables are controlled for in the 
model, the presence of microfinance programs is negatively and significantly related to variation 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Coeff. 
Robust 
Std.Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Lagged Microfinance -2.16 2.98 -10.860* 5.28 -7.52 5.32 -5.95 5.32 
Period -16.33*** 1.00 -12.09*** 2.21 -13.07*** 2.35 -11.03*** 2.41 
Lagged ln(Per capita SDP)   -6.62* 2.74 -8.11** 2.76 -8.03** 2.87 
Lagged MFI*ln(Per capita 
SDP)   1.35 0.69 59.74 70.04 86.26 69.64 
Lagged MFI*region     -506.29 593.63 -731.35 590.58 
Region*period     5.63** 1.79 4.96* 2.12 
Lagged Women's rights        -0.96 3.35 
Lagged Market        -8.21** 3.05 
Lagged Urban       -0.36 0.41 
Lagged Scheduled Castes       1.24 0.95 
Constant 1000.41*** 2.40 1041.01*** 16.44 1049.71*** 16.66 1037.91*** 20.00 
N 512  512  512  507  
Within-R-Squared  0.497  0.505  0.516  0.527 
P > | F |    0.009  0.007  0.003 
Rho   0.655  0.652  0.627  0.658 
* p < .05         
**p < .01         
***p < .001         
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in the female/male child sex ratio.  However, the presence of microfinance programs is not 
statistically significant in any of the subsequent models.  Lagged log per capita SDP and time 
period are statistically significantly related to a decrease in the female/male child sex ratio in this 
model and all of the subsequent models.  The third model includes the interaction effects of 
microfinance programs*region and region*period.  Just as in the models with unlagged 
independent variables, in this model the interaction effect of region*period is statistically 
significant but the interaction effect of microfinance programs*region is not.  The fourth model 
controls for the presence of women’s rights programs, the presence of women’s market 
programs, percentage of population comprised of Scheduled Castes, and percentage of 
population living in urban areas.  Even after controlling for these variables, lagged log per capita 
SDP, the passage of time, and the interaction effect of region*time period are statistically 
significantly related with variation in the child sex ratio.  A tenfold increase in the lagged per 
capita SDP leads to a decrease in the child sex ratio of about 8 females per 1,000 males.  
Although the coefficients for lagged microfinance programs*region are unusually large in 
models 3 and 4 (-506.29 and -731.35, respectively), they are not statistically significant.  
Surprisingly, there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between the lagged 
presence of market programs and the child sex ratio. The presence of women’s market programs 
is correlated with a female/male child sex ratio in subsequent decades that is lower than the child 
sex ratio of districts with no market programs by about 8 females per 1,000 males (p < .01).  This 
last model is statistically significantly different than the previous model (p < .01), and is 
therefore the best fit for the data.  Overall, these models lend no support to any of the neoliberal 
hypotheses. 
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7.5.4 Models with lagged independent variables and state-wise interaction effects 
 
Table 7.16 shows the results of lagged models that include the interaction terms of lagged 
microfinance*states and states*period.  Overall, the results of these models are not consistent 
with the results of the lagged models in Table 7.15.  In spite of this, there are some similarities 
between the models of the two tables.  In both tables, there is a statistically significant difference 
between model 3 and model 2.  Also, there is a negative and statistically significant relationship 
between time period and change in the child sex ratio (p < .001) in model 3 of both tables.  In 
both models, there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between lagged log per 
capita SDP and change in the child sex ratio, although this relationship is more highly significant 
and of slightly larger magnitude in model 3 of table 7.15 than in model 3 of table 7.16.  Just as 
there is also a positive and statistically significant relationship between the interaction effect of 
region*period and variation in the child sex ratio in model 3 of table 7.15, there is also a positive 
and statistically significant relationship between the interaction effect of Karnataka*period and 
child sex ratio in model 3 of table 7.16.  With the passing of each decade, the child sex ratio in 
Karnataka is higher than the child sex ratio in Rajasthan by about 5 females per 1,000 males.  
Since Karnataka is a southern state, this is consistent with the positive effect of region*period on 
the female/male child sex ratio in table 7.15.  However, model 4 of table 7.16 is not statistically 
significantly different than model 3, unlike model 4 of table 7.15.  Also, in model 3 of table 7.16, 
the coefficients for the interaction effects of lagged microfinance*Andhra Pradesh, lagged 
microfinance*Karnataka, and lagged microfinance*Tamil Nadu are unusually large, albeit 
statistically insignificant.  For all three of these interaction effects, the coefficients are larger than 
-3,700.  In the fourth model of table 7.16, the coefficients for these interaction variables are even 
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larger (about -8,000) and statistically significant, even though the model is not statistically 
significantly different than model 3.  The results of models 3 and 4 in table 7.16 strongly suggest 
that when interaction effects of lagged microfinance programs*states are introduced into the 
model, the results are unreliable. 
Table 7.16 Fixed-Effects Models Testing Neoliberal Hypotheses for Female/Male Child Sex Ratio (Lagged 
Independent Variables) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Lagged Microfinance -2.16 2.98 -10.860* 5.28 -3.76 6.27 -3.84 6.43 
Period -16.33*** 1.00 -12.09*** 2.21 -12.20*** 2.60 -10.81** 3.03 
Lagged ln 
(Per capita SDP)   -6.62* 2.74 -7.36* 2.89 -6.86* 3.21 
LaggedMicrofinance* 
ln(Per capita SDP)   1.35 0.69 442.63 437.21 946.16** 286.37 
Lagged  
Microfinance*A.P.     -3737.46 3691.24 -7987.48** 2419.21 
Lagged  
Microfinance*Gujarat     -9.62 12.11 -7.51 12.36 
Lagged  
Microfinance*Karnataka     -3755.74 3703.95 -8019.26** 2426.95 
Lagged  
Microfinance*M.P.     -1.07 12.26 1.42 12.45 
Lagged  
Microfinance*T.N.     -3785.43 3737.11 -8091.99** 2445.90 
AndhraPradesh*Period     2.12 2.89 3.29 2.90 
Gujarat*Period     -6.02 3.64 -6.04 3.66 
Karnataka*Period     5.19* 2.43 5.95* 2.66 
MadhyaPradesh*Period     -0.26 2.69 0.74 2.83 
TamilNadu*Period     5.63 3.24 5.28 3.66 
Lagged  
Women's rights       -0.60 3.91 
Lagged Market       1.28 4.06 
Lagged Urban       -0.82 0.43 
Lagged  
Scheduled Castes       -0.87 0.81 
Constant 1000.41*** 2.40 1041.01*** 16.44 1045.27*** 17.74 1066.24*** 20.26 
N 512  512  512  507  
Within-R-Squared  0.497  0.505  0.526  0.532 
P > | F |    0.009  0.034  0.326 
Rho   0.655  0.652  0.634  0.610 
*p < .05         
**p < .01         
***p < .001         
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7.6 DISCUSSION 
In the previous sections, I discussed the results of fixed-effects models that tested the 
modernization, WID, GAD, and neoliberal hypotheses for female/male child sex ratio.  In this 
section, I briefly summarize the results of the best model for each set of hypotheses.  I also 
present graphical displays of the relationships between female/male child sex ratio and the 
variables of interest for each set of hypotheses.  I include graphs that show regional and state-
wise differences in the change trajectories of female/male child sex ratio where the regional and 
state-wise interaction effects are statistically significant.  These graphs depict the predicted rates 
of change in the female/male child sex ratio with one independent variable at a time when all 
other variables are held constant.  I start by discussing the model results for the modernization 
hypotheses first. 
 
7.6.1 Results for Modernization hypotheses 
 
As I discussed earlier in this chapter, in the first set of models that tested the modernization 
hypotheses, the only variables that are significantly related to change in the female/male child 
sex ratio are the presence of women’s microfinance programs, the presence of women’s market 
programs, and the passing of time.  All three of these variables are related to a decrease in the 
child sex ratio.  Figure 7.1 is a graphical display of the relationship between the presence of 
women’s market programs and microfinance programs and the female/male child sex ratio     
over time. 
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Figure 7.1 Women’s microfinance programs, market programs, and predicted female/male child sex ratio 
 
In districts with no women’s programs present, there is an average decadal decline in the 
female/male child sex ratio of about 12 percentage points.  When the passage of time is the only 
predictor, the female/male child sex ratio decreases by about 48 females/1,000 males from 1961 
to 2001.  Districts with a microfinance program experience a child sex ratio that is about 6 
females/1,000 males lower than the child sex ratio of districts with no women’s microfinance 
programs, and districts with a market program present experience a child sex ratio that is about 7 
females/1,000 males lower than districts with no women’s market programs during each decade.  
It is important to remember, however, that this correlation between presence of women’s 
microfinance and market programs and lower child sex ratio does not necessarily mean that 
women’s microfinance and market programs cause the child sex ratio to be lower.  This is 
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because the presence of the women’s programs and the female/male child sex ratio occur at the 
same time. 
Figure 7.2 displays the predicted relationship between change in log per capita SDP and 
change in the female/male child sex ratio by states over time.  In this case, I use the state-wise 
log per capita SDP during each decade and hold all other independent variables constant. It is 
important to note here that for this graph I use the actual log per capita SDP for each state, to 
calculate each state’s predicted child sex ratio trajectory. The log per capita SDP in Rajasthan is 
correlated with an increase in the female/male child sex ratio of about 12 females per 1,000 
males from 1961 to 2001.   
Ln(Per Capita SDP) and Predicted State-wise
Female/Male Child Sex Ratio, 1961-2001
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Figure 7.2 Ln(per capita SDP) and predicted female/male child sex ratio by state 
The greatest increase occurs between 1991 and 2001, during which time the average log 
per capita SDP increases the most sharply.  Although the log per capita SDP in Rajasthan is 
correlated with an increase in the child sex ratio of 3.04 females per 1,000 males each decade, in 
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Karnataka state log per capita SDP is correlated with a decrease in the child sex ratio of only 
0.32 females per 1,000 males each decade.  Although the effect of log per capita SDP on child 
sex ratio is statistically significantly different than the effect of log per capita SDP on child sex 
ratio in Rajasthan, substantively log per capita SDP has almost no effect on change in the child 
sex ratio in Karnataka. This means that in Karnataka, an increase in log per capita SDP is 
correlated with a decrease in the child sex ratio of only about 1 female/1,000 males from 1961 to 
2001.  In Andhra Pradesh, an increase in log per capita SDP from 1961 to 2001 is correlated with 
a decrease in the child sex ratio of a little less than 5 females/1,000 males, which is still very 
little change.  In Gujarat state, however, an increase in log per capita SDP is correlated with a 
much steeper decline in the female/male child sex ratio over time.  In Gujarat state a tenfold 
increase in per capita SDP is correlated with a decrease in the child sex ratio of about 9 females 
per 1,000 males.  One can see from figure 7.2 that in Gujarat, from 1961 to 2001 log per capita 
SDP is correlated with a decrease in the child sex ratio of roughly 55 females per 1,000 males.  
Log per capita SDP in Gujarat state is correlated with a decline of about 35 females per 1,000 
males between 1991 and 2001, which is the steepest decline in child sex ratio across states and 
decades. 
In the modernization models that include state-wise interaction effects, the presence of 
women’s microfinance programs and market programs are also correlated with variation in the 
female/male child sex ratio.  Figure 7.3 is a graphical display of these relationships. 
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Figure 7.3 Women’s microfinance programs, market programs, and predicted female/male child sex ratio 
 
On average, districts experience a decadal decline in the female/male child sex ratio of about 17 
females per 1,000 males, after controlling for all other independent variables.  This is a decline 
of about 68 females per 1,000 males from 1961 to 2001 that occurs only with the passage of 
time.  Districts with a microfinance program experience a female/male child sex ratio that is 
lower than that of districts with no women’s microfinance programs by about 7 females per 
1,000 males during each decade, while districts with a market program have an average 
female/male child sex ratio that is lower than that of districts with no women’s market programs 
by about 8 females per 1,000 males during each decade.   
Once lagged independent variables are included in the models testing the modernization 
hypotheses, the only variable beside the passage of time that has a statistically significant 
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relationship with variation in the female/male child sex ratio is lagged log per capita SDP.  
Figure 7.4 displays this relationship. 
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Figure 7.4 Lagged ln(per capita SDP) and predicted female/male child sex ratio 
 
A tenfold increase in per capita SDP leads to an average decrease of 10 females/1,000 
males ten years later, holding all other independent variables constant.  One can see from figure 
10 that average log per capita SDP in 1961 predicts a child sex ratio in 1971 of about 995 
females per 1,000 males.  An increase in log per capita SDP from 1961 to 1991 leads to a 
decrease in the female/male child sex ratio of roughly 18 females per 1,000 males from 1971 to 
2001.     
Although there is a statistically significant relationship between the main effects of 
lagged log per capita SDP and change in the child sex ratio when regional interaction effects are 
included in the model, there is no statistically significant relationship between the main effects of 
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lagged log per capita and change in the child sex ratio when state-wise interaction effects are 
included in the model.  There is a statistically significant relationship between the interaction 
effects of lagged log per capita SDP*Andhra Pradesh, lagged log per capita SDP*Gujarat, lagged 
log per capita SDP*Madhya Pradesh, lagged log per capita SDP*Tamil Nadu and change in the 
female/male child sex ratio.  Figure 7.5 depicts the relationship between these variables. 
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Figure 7.5 Lagged ln(per capita SDP) and predicted state-wise female/male child sex ratio 
In Andhra Pradesh, a tenfold increase in the per capita SDP leads to a decrease in the child sex 
ratio of about 17 females per 1,000 males ten years later.  In Tamil Nadu, a tenfold increase in 
the per capita SDP leads to a decrease of about 21 females/1,000 males ten years later, while in 
Madhya Pradesh a tenfold increase in per capita SDP leads to a decrease of about 27 females per 
1,000 males ten years later.  Lagged values of log per capita SDP are correlated with an increase 
in the female/male child sex ratio in Gujarat state.  This is surprising given the fact that the 
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contemporaneous association between log per capita SDP and child sex ratio in Gujarat state is 
negative (seeFigure 7.2).  In Gujarat state, an increase in log per capita SDP from 1961 to 1991 
leads to an increase in the child sex ratio of about 33 females per 1,000 males from 1971 to 2001.  
In Andhra Pradesh state, an increase in log per capita SDP from 1961 to 1991 leads to a decrease 
in the child sex ratio of about 25 females per 1,000 males from 1971 to 2001.  In both Madhya 
Pradesh and Tamil Nadu states, an increase in log per capita SDP from 1961 to 1991 leads to a 
decrease in the child sex ratio of roughly 40 females per 1,000 males during the period of 1971 
to 2001. 
 
7.6.2 Results for Women-in-Development hypotheses 
 
In the best-fitting women-in-development model that includes regional interaction effects and 
unlagged independent variables, there is no statistically significant relationship between any of 
the variables of theoretical interest and variation in the female/male child sex ratio.  Therefore, I 
do not present of a graphical display of these results.  In the best-fitting women-in-development 
model that includes state-wise interaction effects, there is a negative, statistically significant 
relationship between the presence of women’s market programs, microfinance programs, and 
variation in the female/male child sex ratio.  Figure 7.6 displays the relationship between the 
presence of women’s market programs, microfinance programs, and the child sex ratio, holding 
all other independent variables constant (beside the passage of time).  These results are similar to 
the results of the modernization models that include state-wise interaction effects (see Figure 
7.3).  Once the interaction effects of market programs*states and microfinance programs*states 
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are controlled for, the passage of time alone accounts for a decrease in the child sex ratio of 
about 37 females per 1,000 males between 1961 and 2001. 
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Figure 7.6 Women’s market programs, microfinance programs, and predicted female/male child sex ratio 
 
In the modernization models with state-wise interaction terms but no market programs*states or 
microfinance programs*states interaction effects, the passage of time alone accounts for a 
decrease of about 30 more females/1,000 males than in the women-in-development model 
depicted in Figure 7.3.  For the WID model depicted above, districts with a women’s market 
program present have 15 fewer females/1,000 males than districts with no women’s market 
program at each time point, and districts with a women’s microfinance program have about 14 
fewer females/1,000 males than districts with no women’s microfinance programs present.   
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Once lagged values of the independent variables are included in the WID models with 
regional interaction effects, there is a statistically significant relationship between lagged log per 
capita SDP and a decrease in the female/male child sex ratio.  Figure 7.7 depicts this relationship 
over time. 
Lagged ln(Per Capita SDP) and Predicted 
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Figure 7.7 Lagged ln(per capita SDP) and predicted female/male child sex ratio 
When all other independent variables are held constant, a tenfold increase in per capita SDP 
leads to a decrease of about 8 females per 1,000 males ten years later.  One can see from Figure 
7.7 above that an increase in log per capita SDP between 1961 and 1991 leads to a decrease of 
about 15 females per 1,000 males between 1971 and 2001.   
The results for the WID models with lagged independent variables and state-wise 
interaction effects are very similar to the results for the WID models with lagged independent 
variables and regional interaction effects.  In the best-fitting model with state-wise interaction 
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effects, there is a statistically significant relationship between lagged log per capita SDP and a 
decrease in the child sex ratio of about 7 females/1,000 males.  There is no significant 
relationship between any of the other theoretically interesting independent variables and 
variation in the child sex ratio. 
 
7.6.3 Results for Gender-and-Development hypotheses 
 
In both the best-fitting Gender-and Development models that include regional interaction effects 
and state-wise interaction effects, there is a statistically significant relationship between the 
presence of women’s market programs and variation in the child sex ratio.  In both models, the 
presence of women’s market programs is the only independent variable of theoretical interest 
that is correlated with the female/male child sex ratio.  Because the results for the best model 
with regional interaction effects are so similar to the results for the best model with state-wise 
interaction effects, I only display the results for the model with regional interaction effects.  
Figure 7.8 graphs these results.  The passage of time alone accounts for an average decrease in 
the child sex ratio of about 13 females per 1,000 males with each passing decade.  As one can 
see from figure 7.8 below, on average districts experience a decrease in the child sex ratio of 
about 51 females per 1,000 males between 1961 and 2001.  Districts with a women’s market 
program present experience a child sex ratio that is about 12 fewer females per 1,000 males than 
districts with no women’s market programs present at every time point. 
The best-fitting GAD model with lagged independent variables and regional interaction 
effects is very similar to the best-fitting WID model with lagged independent variables and 
regional interaction effects, so I do not graphically display the results of this GAD model.  In 
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both the WID model and the GAD model, lagged log per capita SDP is the only independent 
variable of interest that has a statistically significant relationship with the female/male child sex 
ratio.  In both models, a tenfold increase in the per capita SDP leads to a decrease in the child sex 
ratio of about 8 females/1,000 males ten years later. 
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Figure 7.8 Women’s market programs and predicted female/male child sex ratio 
 
7.6.4 Results for Neoliberal hypotheses 
 
The results for most of the neoliberal models are very similar to the results of the models 
discussed earlier.  For the best-fitting neoliberal model that includes regional interaction effects 
and the best-fitting neoliberal model that includes state-wise interaction effects, women’s market 
programs is the only variable of interest that has a statistically significant relationship with 
297 
variation in the female/male child sex ratio.  Figure 7.9 displays the results of the model with 
regional interaction effects.   
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Figure 7.9 Women’s market programs and predicted female/male child sex ratio 
 
In the best neoliberal model with regional interaction effects, the passage of time alone accounts 
for a decrease in the child sex ratio of about 14 females per 1,000 males per decade.  In districts 
with no women’s programs, the female/male child sex ratio decreases by about 57 females/1,000 
males between 1961 and 2001.  In districts with women’s market programs, the child sex ratio is 
lower by about 8 females/1,000 males compared to districts with no women’s market programs 
present.  In the neoliberal model with state-wise interaction effects, districts with a women’s 
market program also experience a child sex ratio that is lower than the child sex ratio of districts 
with no women’s market programs by about 8 females/1,000 males. 
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7.7 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have discussed at length the results of the models that estimate the impact of log 
per capita SDP, the percentage of population living in urban areas, and the presence of women’s 
market programs, women’s microfinance programs, and women’s rights programs on variation 
in the female/male child sex ratio.  I have also accounted for regional as well as state-wise 
interaction effects, as well as the lagged effect of these variables on the child sex ratio.  Although 
the results of some models show that there is a statistically significant relationship between the 
presence of women’s market programs and the presence of women’s microfinance programs and 
variation in the female/male child sex ratio, this relationship is the opposite of what is expected.  
In most cases, once lagged values of the independent variables are included in the models, the 
relationship between the presence of women’s programs and variation in the child sex ratio 
disappears. This means that although there is a statistically significant correlation between the 
contemporaneous presence of women’s market programs and microfinance programs and a 
decrease in the female/male child sex ratio, there is not a causal relationship between the 
presence of these women’s programs and child sex ratio.  It is possible that development 
organizations start women’s programs in the districts that have very unequal gender relations and 
especially high poverty rates. The evidence across the models with lagged independent variables 
shows that an increase in log per capita SDP does lead to a decrease in the female/male child sex 
ratio in subsequent decades.  This finding supports the first WID hypothesis, which is that an 
increase in economic growth leads to a decrease in the female/male child sex ratio.  This also 
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means that we must reject the modernization hypothesis that predicts that an increase in per 
capita SDP will lead to an increase in the female/male child sex ratio.  However, this is the only 
hypothesis that is supported by the results of these models.    Since there is no relationship 
between the lagged presence of women’s rights programs, market programs, and microfinance 
programs and variation in the child sex ratio, there is no support for the WID, GAD, or neoliberal 
hypotheses that predict that women’s market programs, women’s rights programs, or women’s 
microfinance programs will lead to an increase in the child sex ratio. 
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8.0 CHAPTER EIGHT: VARIATION IN THE FEMALE/MALE LITERACY RATIO 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I discuss the results of the fixed-effects models for female/male literacy ratio.  I 
first present and discuss the results of models that test the modernization hypotheses, followed 
by results of models that test the WID hypotheses.  Next, I discuss the results of models testing 
the GAD hypotheses and the models testing the neoliberal hypotheses.  For each set of 
hypotheses, I present models with both lagged and unlagged independent variables, as well as 
models with regional interaction effects and state-wide interaction effects.  I report robust 
standard errors for each model, as well as the within-district R-squared and the significance level 
of the F-statistic below each model.  The “P > | F |” tests whether a more complete model is 
significantly different than the previous model.  I test the hypotheses in such a way such that 
previous models are nested within subsequent models.  This allows me to use the F-statistic to 
determine whether a subsequent model is statistically significantly different (and therefore 
better) than the previous model. 
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8.2 MODERNIZATION HYPOTHESES AND VARIATION IN THE FEMALE/MALE 
LITERACY RATIO 
8.2.1 Models with unlagged independent variables and regional interaction effects 
 
I begin by discussing the models testing the modernization hypotheses.  Table 8.1 shows results 
for the models testing the modernization hypotheses. 
Table 8.1 Fixed-Effects Models Testing Modernization Hypotheses for Female/Male Literacy Ratio (Unlagged 
Independent Variables) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Urban 0.11 0.10 0.16 0.12 0.37* 0.15 
ln(Per capita SDP) 2.22*** 0.21 2.44*** 0.25 3.10*** 0.30 
Period 5.67*** 0.38 5.56*** 0.38 4.02*** 0.55 
Urban*region   -0.025 0.16 -0.37* 0.18 
ln(Per capita SDP)* 
region   -0.52 0.30 -2.27*** 0.34 
Women's rights      -0.49 0.81 
Microfinance      -0.24 0.81 
Market      0.76 0.84 
Scheduled Castes     0.10 0.16 
Region*period     3.54*** 0.67 
Constant 14.2*** 2.41 13.38*** 2.40 11.64*** 3.17 
N 685  685  640  
Within-R-Squared  0.892  0.894  0.897 
P > | F |    0.053  0.000 
Rho   0.862  0.883  0.943 
*p < .05       
**p < .01       
***p < .001       
 
Model 1 tests hypothesis 1a, which states that economic growth and increased 
urbanization lead to an increase in the female/male child sex ratios.  As one can see from model 
1 of table 8.1, there is a statistically significant relationship between log per capita SDP and an 
increase in the female/male literacy ratio (p < .001), but there is not a significant relationship 
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between percentage of population in urban areas and the female/male literacy ratio.  A tenfold 
increase in the per capita SDP is related to an increase in the literacy ratio of about 2 percentage 
points.  Model two tests the hypothesis that urbanization and increased per capita SDP will have 
a greater effect on increases in the child sex ratio in southern districts than in northern districts.  
However, there is no statistically significant difference between this model and the first model.  
The third model controls for the effects of women’s rights programs, market programs, 
microfinance programs, the percentage of population comprised of Scheduled Castes, and the 
interaction effect of region*period.  Once these five variables are controlled for, percent of 
population living in urban areas is statistically significantly related to an increase in the 
female/male literacy ratio (p < .05), although substantively it is a very small change. Log per 
capita SDP continues to statistically significantly related to an increase in the literacy ratio (p < 
.001).   The interaction effects of percentage of population in urban areas* region and the 
interaction effect of log per capita SDP*region also are significantly related with the female/male 
literacy ratio once these five variables are controlled for (p < .05 and p < .001, respectively).  
With every one percentage point increase in urbanization, the female/male literacy ratio in 
northern regions increases by 0.37 percentage points. Since the coefficient for the urban*region 
interaction term is -0.37, this means that in southern districts an increase in urbanization is 
associated with no change in the female/male literacy ratio. While in northern districts a tenfold 
increase in per capita SDP is associated with an increase of about 3 percentage points in the 
female/male literacy ratio, in southern districts a tenfold increase in per capita SDP is associated 
with an increase of a little less than 1 percentage point in the literacy ratio. While the 
relationships between both urbanization and per capita SDP and the female/male literacy ratio  
are statistically significant, neither urbanization nor per capita SDP seem to have much of a 
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substantive effect on the female/male literacy ratio.  There is a positive, statistically significant 
relationship between the interaction effect of region*period and the female/male literacy ratio (p 
< .001).  In southern districts, the literacy ratio is higher than in northern districts by about 4 
percentage points at every time period.  From the results of these models, there is evidence of the 
modernization hypothesis that posits a positive correlation between log per capita SDP, 
percentage of population living in urban areas, and the female/male literacy ratio. 
 
8.2.2 Models with unlagged independent variables and state-wise interaction effects 
 
Table 8.2 shows results for models that include state dichotomous variables rather than the 
region dichotomous variable.  The first model of table 8.2 is the same as the first model of Table 
8.1.  Model two of table 8.2 tests the hypothesis that urbanization and increased per capita SDP 
will have a greater effect on increases in the child sex ratio in southern states than in northern 
states.  Unlike model 2 of table 8.1, model 2 of table 8.2 is statistically significantly different 
than the previous model.  There is a positive and statistically significant relationship between all 
of the urbanization*state interaction effects (except for urban*Tamil Nadu) and the female/male 
literacy ratio.  (The main effect of urbanization is actually the effect of urbanization in since 
Rajasthan is the reference category,)  However, each of these urbanization*state interactions are 
related to an increase in the female/male literacy ratio of less than one percentage point.  There is 
also a negative and statistically significant relationship between the interaction effect of log per 
capita SDP*Gujarat (p < .001).  While a tenfold increase in the per capita SDP is statistically 
significantly related to an increase in the female/male literacy ratio of about 3 percentage points 
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in Rajasthan (p < .001), in Gujarat state a tenfold increase in the per capita SDP is correlated 
with an decrease in the literacy ratio of less than 1 percentage point.   
Table 8.2 Fixed-Effects Models Testing Modernization Hypotheses for Female/Male Literacy Ratio (Unlagged 
Independent Variables) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Urban 0.11 0.10 -0.51* 0.25 -0.53* 0.26 0.23 0.15 
ln(Per capita SDP) 2.22*** 0.21 2.55*** 0.46 2.42*** 0.48 5.56*** 0.46 
Period 5.67*** 0.38 5.68*** 0.41 5.62*** 0.49 -0.04 0.47 
Urban* 
AndhraPradesh   0.63* 0.24 0.65* 0.25 -0.10 0.19 
Urban* 
Gujarat   0.61* 0.25 0.62* 0.26 -0.28 0.19 
Urban* 
Karnataka   0.90** 0.30 0.91** 0.30 -0.24 0.32 
Urban* 
MadhyaPradesh   0.83** 0.26 0.88** 0.27 0.02 0.27 
Urban* 
TamilNadu   0.56 0.35 0.56 0.35 -0.19 0.22 
ln(Per capita SDP)* 
AP   -0.61 0.47 -0.57 0.49 -3.68*** 0.51 
ln(Per capita SDP)* 
Gujarat   -1.82*** 0.51 -1.75** 0.53 -5.76*** 0.5 
ln(Per capita SDP)* 
Karnat   -1.07 0.55 -.97 0.56 -5.39*** 0.53 
ln(Per capita SDP)* 
MP   0.48 0.50 0.49 0.52 -2.87*** 0.53 
ln(Per capita SDP)* 
TN   -0.59 0.78 -0.51 0.78 -6.11*** 0.67 
Women's rights      0.26 0.75 0.01 0.68 
Microfinance      0.16 0.75 0.44 0.75 
Market      0.52 0.70 0.19 0.64 
Scheduled Castes     -0.03 0.13 -0.11 0.12 
AndhraPradesh* 
period       5.71*** 0.65 
Gujarat* 
period       7.25*** 0.86 
Karnataka* 
period       8.59*** 0.99 
MadhyaPradesh* 
period       6.33*** 0.92 
TamilNadu* 
period       9.68*** 0.60 
Constant 14.20*** 2.41 14.78*** 2.23 16.52*** 3.07 17.06*** 2.42 
N 685  685  640  640  
Within-R-Squared  0.892  0.911 0.909 0.909  0.925 
P > | F |    0.000  0.897  0.000 
Rho   0.862  0.933 0.931 0.931  0.974 
*p < .05         
**p < .01         
***p < .001         
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The third model is not statistically significantly different than the previous model.  The 
fourth model of table 8.2 controls for the presence of women’s rights programs, women’s 
microfinance programs, and women’s market programs, as well as the interaction effects of  each 
state*time period.  In the fourth model of Table 8.2, there is no longer a statistically significant 
relationship between the percentage of population in urban areas and the female/male literacy 
ratio.  This is in contrast to the third model of Table 8.1.  Also, there is no statistically significant 
relationship between the interaction effects of urbanization*states and the literacy ratio, in 
contrast to model 3 of Table 8.1 in which there is a significant relationship between 
urbanization*region.  In model 4 of Table 8.2 and model 3 of Table 8.1, there is a statistically 
significant relationship between log per capita SDP and an increase in the female/male literacy 
ratio, although in model 4 of Table 8.2 the magnitude of this relationship is almost twice as great.  
In model 4 of Table 8.2, there is a statistically significant difference in the effect of log per capita 
SDP in Rajasthan and the effect of log per capita SDP in all of the other states (p < .001).  This is 
similar to model 3 of Table 8.1, in which there is a negative and statistically significant 
relationship between the interaction effect of log per capita SDP*region and the literacy ratio.  In 
model 4 of Table 8.2, in Rajasthan a tenfold increase in per capita SDP is correlated with a 
increase in the female/male literacy ratio of about 6 percentage points.   A tenfold increase in per 
capita SDP is correlated with an increase in the female/male literacy ratio of about 2 percentage 
points in Andhra Pradesh, only 0.17 percentage points in Karnataka, and about 3 percentage 
points in Madhya Pradesh.  A tenfold increase in per capita SDP is correlated with a decrease in 
the female/male literacy ratio of only 0.20 percentage points in Gujarat and 0.55 percentage 
points in Tamil Nadu. The greatest increase in female/male literacy ratio correlated with log per 
capita SDP is in Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, which are both northern states.  This is the 
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opposite of what is expected, since the second modernization hypothesis predicts that per capita 
SDP will have a greater positive effect in southern states than in northern states. There is no 
statistically significant relationship between the passage of time and the female/male literacy 
ratio in Rajasthan. However, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between 
the interaction effects of states*time period and female/male literacy ratio (p < .001), which is 
similar to the fact that in model 3 of table 8.1 there is a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between the interaction effect of region*period.  The magnitude of the relationship 
between each of the state*time period interaction effects and literacy ratio is greater than the 
magnitude of the relationship between the region*period interaction effect and female/male 
literacy ratio.  With the passing of each decade, the female/male literacy ratio increases by about 
6 percentage points in Andhra Pradesh, 7 percentage points in Gujarat, 8 percentage points in 
Karnataka, 6 percentage points in Madhya Pradesh, and 10 percentage points in Tamil Nadu.  
Thus, from the models that include regional interaction terms and state interaction terms, there is 
support for the modernization hypothesis that an increase in per capita SDP leads to an increase 
in the female/male literacy ratio.  It is important to consider the temporal order of the 
independent and dependent variables, however.  Therefore, I also estimate fixed-effects models 
with ten-year lagged values of the independent variables before reaching a final conclusion. 
 
8.2.3 Models with lagged independent variables and regional interaction effects  
 
Table 8.3 shows the results for the fixed-effects models with lagged independent variables that 
test the modernization hypotheses.  The first model tests the hypothesis that increased 
urbanization and economic growth will lead to an increase in the female/male literacy ratio.  One 
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can see that an increase in the percentage of population living in urban areas is statistically 
significantly related to an increase in the female/male literacy ratio ten years later (p < .01).  
However, substantively this increase in literacy ratio is rather small.  An increase of one 
percentage point in the percentage of population living in urban areas leads to an increase in the 
female/male literacy ratio of less than half a percentage point.  There is a statistically significant 
relationship between lagged log per capita SDP and a decrease in the literacy ratio (p < .001).   
Table 8.3 Fixed-Effects Models Testing Modernization Hypotheses for Female/Male Literacy Ratio (Lagged 
Independent Variables) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Lag Urban 0.37** 0.11 0.54** 0.17 0.39* 0.19 
Lag ln(Per capita SDP) -4.50*** 0.52 -4.73*** 0.58 -5.78*** 0.75 
Period 11.09*** 0.48 10.94*** 0.51 11.60*** 0.72 
Lag Urban*region   -0.43* 0.20 -0.14 0.21 
Lag ln(Per capita SDP)* region   1.10 0.73 4.85*** 1.03 
Lag Women's rights      -0.35 0.92 
Lag Microfinance      1.40 1.42 
Lag Market      0.61 1.16 
Lag Scheduled Castes     0.48** 0.15 
Region*period     -3.66*** 1.00 
Constant 50.05*** 3.59 49.21*** 3.82 41.88 4.10 
N 547  547  511  
Within-R-Squared  0.85  0.852  0.856 
P > | F |    0.097  0.001 
Rho   0.835  0.845  0.878 
*p < .05       
**p < .01       
***p < .001       
 
For every tenfold increase in per capita SDP, the female/male literacy ratio decreases by about 5 
percentage points ten years later, after controlling for the passage of time.  Time period is 
statistically significantly related to an increase in the female/male literacy ratio (p < .001).  With 
every passing decade, the female/male literacy ratio increases by about 11 percentage points.  
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Therefore, there is partial support for the first modernization hypothesis.  The second model tests 
the hypothesis that urbanization and economic growth will have a greater positive impact on the 
female/male literacy ratio in southern regions than in northern regions.  However, this model is 
not statistically significantly different than the first model.  The third model controls for the 
lagged effects of percentage of population comprised of Scheduled Castes, the presence of 
women’s rights programs, women’s market programs, and women’s microfinance programs, as 
well as the interaction effect of region*period.  Once these variables are controlled for, there is a 
statistically significant relationship between lagged log per capita SDP and female/male literacy 
ratio (p < .001), as well as a statistically significant relationship between the interaction effect of 
lagged log per capita SDP*region and an increase in the female/male literacy ratio (p < .001).  
With every tenfold increase in per capita SDP, ten years later the female/male literacy ratio in 
northern districts decreases by about 6 percentage points. higher than the female/male literacy 
ratio in northern districts.  In southern districts, every tenfold increase in per capita SDP leads to 
a decrease of about 1 percentage point ten years later.  In this third model, lagged urbanization is 
still statistically significantly related to an increase in the female/male literacy ratio (p < .05), and 
the magnitude of this relationship is very close to the magnitude of this relationship in model 1.  
There is a negative, statistically significant relationship between the interaction effect of 
region*period and the literacy ratio (p < .001).  With the passing of each decade, the female/male 
literacy ratio in southern districts is about 4 percentage points lower than it is in northern 
districts.  The passage of time is significantly related to an increase of almost 12 percentage 
points in the female/male literacy ratio in northern districts each decade, whereas in southern 
districts the passage of time is significantly related to an increase in the literacy ratio of about 7 
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percentage points each decade (p < .001).  Overall, there is partial support for the modernization 
hypotheses.   
 
8.2.4 Models with lagged independent variables and state-wise interaction effects  
 
Table 8.4 shows the results for the lagged models testing the modernization hypotheses that 
include the state-wise interaction terms.  The first model in Table 8.4 is the same as the first 
model in Table 8.3.  The second model of Table 8.4 includes the interaction effects of lagged 
urbanization*states and lagged log per capita SDP*states.  This model, unlike model 2 of Table 
8.3, is statistically significantly different than the first model.  There continues to be a positive, 
statistically significant relationship between percentage of population living in urban areas and 
the female/male literacy ratio (p < .001), and there still is a negative, statistically significant 
relationship between lagged log per capita SDP and the literacy ratio (p < .001).  There is a 
negative, statistically significant relationship between all but one of the urbanization*state 
interaction effects and the female/male literacy ratio.  As the percentage of population living in 
urban areas increases each percentage point, there is an increase in the literacy ratio of about 1 
percentage point in Rajasthan.  As the percentage of population living in urban areas increases 
each percentage point, there is a decrease in the female/male literacy ratio ten years later of about 
only 0.03 percentage points in Andhra Pradesh (p < .01) and only 0.39 percentage points in 
Gujarat (p < .001), Karnataka (p < .01), and Tamil Nadu (p < .05).   There is an increase in the 
literacy ratio ten years later of 0.10 percentage points in Karnataka and 0.28 percentage points in 
Tamil Nadu.  Even though there is a statistically significant difference in the effect of 
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urbanization on literacy ratio in these states compared to in Rajasthan, substantively urbanization 
has almost no effect on the literacy ratio in any of these other states.   
Table 8.4 Fixed-Effects Models Testing Modernization Hypotheses for Female/Male Literacy Ratio (Lagged 
Independent Variables) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Lagged Urban 0.37** 0.11 0.86*** 0.19 0.82*** 0.20 0.12 0.23 
Lagged ln 
(Per capita SDP) -4.50*** 0.52 -7.07*** 0.80 -6.64*** 0.86 -19.24*** 1.88 
Period 11.09*** 0.48 10.93*** 0.55 10.37*** 0.62 20.60*** 1.91 
Lagged Urban* 
A.P.   -0.83** 0.25 -0.82** 0.25 0.11 0.30 
Lagged Urban* 
Gujarat   -1.25*** 0.22 -1.20*** 0.24 -0.13 0.28 
Lagged Urban* 
Karnataka   -0.76** 0.30 -0.84** 0.30 -0.01 0.32 
Lagged Urban* 
M. P.   -0.26 0.29 -0.25 0.33 0.51 0.42 
Lagged Urban* 
T.N.   -0.58* 0.26 -0.55* 0.25 0.21 0.27 
Lagged ln 
(Per capita SDP)*AP   3.51*** 0.93 3.18** 1.01 17.50*** 1.88 
Lagged ln 
(Per capita SDP)*Gujarat   2.76** 0.89 2.69** 0.93 20.70*** 2.34 
Lagged ln 
(Per capita SDP)*Karnat   3.48** 1.12 3.55** 1.13 18.03*** 2.18 
Lagged ln 
(Per capita SDP)*MP   4.56*** 1.11 4.63*** 1.28 17.41*** 1.96 
Lagged ln 
(Per capita SDP)*TN   3.57** 1.14 3.26** 1.13 20.00*** 2.03 
Lagged  
Women's rights      0.16 0.88 0.99 0.80 
Lagged  
Microfinance      1.62 1.37 0.82 1.17 
Lagged  
Market      0.23 1.17 -0.30 0.98 
Lagged  
Scheduled Castes     0.21 0.14 0.24 0.14 
AndhraPradesh* 
period       -12.00*** 1.99 
Gujarat* 
period       -15.28*** 2.39 
Karnataka* 
period       -12.08*** 2.13 
MadhyaPradesh* 
period       -10.53*** 2.09 
TamilNadu* 
period       -13.53*** 2.15 
Constant 50.05*** 3.59 48.20*** 3.39 45.00*** 3.97 49.01*** 3.44 
N 547  547  511  511  
Within-R-Squared 0.850   0.870  0.869  0.893 
P > | F |    0.000  0.203  0.000 
Rho  0.835   0.941  0.943  0.988 
*p < .05         
**p < .01         
***p < .001         
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There is a negative, statistically significant relationship between lagged per capita SDP and the 
literacy ratio in Rajasthan state (p < .001). There is a statistically significant difference in the 
effect of lagged per capita SDP in all of the other states compared to the effect of lagged per 
capita SDP in Rajasthan.  With each tenfold increase in per capita SDP, there is a decrease in the 
female/male literacy ratio of about 4 percentage points in Andhra Pradesh (p < .001), Gujarat (p 
< .01), Karnataka (p < .01), and Tamil Nadu (p < .01), and a decrease of about 3 percentage 
points in Madhya Pradesh (p < .001). 
Model 3 controls for the lagged effects of women’s rights programs, market programs, 
microfinance programs, and the percentage of population comprised of Scheduled Castes.  
However, this model is not statistically significantly different than model 2.  Model 4 of Table 
8.4 controls for the interaction effects of states*time period, and is statistically significantly 
different than model 3 (p < .001).  This model explains about 89% of the variance in female/male 
literacy ratio (R-squared = 0.893).  In contrast to model 3 of Table 8.3, in model 4 of Table 8.4, 
there is no statistically significant relationship between percentage of population in urban areas 
and the female/male literacy ratio once the states*period interaction effects are controlled for.  
There is no statistically significant relationship between the interaction effects of 
urbanization*states and the female/male literacy ratio, just as there is no statistically significant 
relationship between the interaction effect of urbanization*region and literacy ratio in model 3 of 
Table 8.3.  There is a negative, statistically significant relationship between lagged per capita 
SDP and literacy ratio in Rajasthan (p < .001).  A tenfold increase in per capita SDP leads to a 
decrease in the female/male literacy ratio of about 19 percentage points ten years later in 
Rajasthan, which is about three times the magnitude of lagged per capita SDP’s effect on literacy 
ratio in the north in model 3 of Table 8.3.   There is a statistically significant difference between 
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the effect of lagged log per capita SDP on the literacy ratio in Rajasthan compared to the effect 
of lagged per capita SDP on the literacy ratio in each of the other states (p < .001).  A tenfold 
increase in the per capita SDP leads to a decrease in the literacy ratio ten years later of about 2 
percentage points in Andhra Pradesh, 1 percentage point in Karnataka, and 2 percentage points in 
Madhya Pradesh.  In both Gujarat and Tamil Nadu, a tenfold increase in the per capita SDP leads 
to an increase in the literacy ratio of about 1 percentage point.  Therefore, it appears that lagged 
per capita SDP has a very large, negative effect on a decrease in the female/male literacy ratio in 
Rajasthan, but substantively only a very small effect on the literacy ratio in the other five states.  
There is a statistically significant difference between the effect of time on the literacy ratio in 
Rajasthan compared to the effect of time on the literacy ratio in all of the other states (p < .001).  
The female/male literacy ratio in Rajasthan increases by about 21 percentage points with the 
passing of each decade.  This is about twice the magnitude of the effect of time on the literacy 
ratio in model 3 of Table 8.3. With the passing of each decade, the female/male literacy ratio 
increases by about 9 percentage points in Andhra Pradesh, 5 percentage points in Gujarat, 9 
percentage points in Karnataka, 10 percentage points in Madhya Pradesh, and 7 percentage 
points in Tamil Nadu.  The relationships between the lagged interaction effects of per capita 
SDP*states and states*time period and the literacy ratio are in the opposite direction as the 
relationships between the lagged interaction effects of per capita SDP*region and the interaction 
effects of region*time period in model 3 of Table 8.3.  Therefore, there is no support for the 
modernization hypothesis with the literacy ratio in Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and 
Madhya Pradesh, and only weak support for the modernization hypothesis in Gujarat and Tamil 
Nadu. 
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8.3 WOMEN-IN-DEVELOPMENT HYPOTHESES AND THE FEMALE/MALE 
LITERACY RATIO  
 
8.3.1 Models with unlagged independent variables and regional interaction effects  
 
Table 8.5 and Table 8.6 show results for models that test the WID hypotheses (hypotheses 2b 
through 2d).  Table 8.5 shows results for models with region-wise interaction effects, while table 
8.6 shows results for models with state-wise interaction terms.   
Table 8.5 Fixed-Effects Models Testing WID Hypotheses for Female/Male Literacy Ratio (Unlagged 
Independent Variables) 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Variables Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Market  1.60 0.90 3.22** 1.06 3.76** 1.33 3.13** 1.17 
Period 8.28*** 0.22 7.99*** 0.25 7.98 0.25 5.40*** 0.46 
Microfinance    3.68** 1.33 3.35 1.82 2.28 1.51 
Market*Microfinance    -5.17** 1.65 -4.94** 1.68 -4.59** 1.43 
Microfinance*region     0.74 1.55 -0.06 1.51 
Market*region     -1.69 1.57 -0.64 1.55 
Urban       0.14 0.10 
ln(Per capita SDP)       2.10*** 0.22 
Women's rights        -0.57 0.82 
Scheduled Castes       0.09 0.15 
Region*period       0.08 0.44 
Constant 30.51*** 0.36 30.63 0.37 30.65 0.36 13.80*** 3.40 
N  644  644  644  640 
Within-R-Squared  0.869  0.873  0.873  0.893 
P > | F |    0.007  0.559  0.000 
Rho   0.862  0.866  0.867  0.865 
*p < .05         
**p < .01         
***p < .001         
 
Hypothesis 2b states that women’s market programs will lead to an increase in the 
female/male literacy ratio. In table 8.5, model 1 tests this hypothesis, while model 2 tests the 
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hypothesis that the joint effect of women’s market programs and women’s microfinance 
programs will have a greater impact on raising the literacy ratio ratio than the presence of 
women’s market programs alone will have in raising the female/male literacy ratio.  In model 1, 
there is no statistically significant relationship between the presence of women’s market 
programs and variation in the female/male literacy ratio.  There is a statistically significant 
difference between model 2 and model 1.  However, in model 2, there is a statistically significant 
relationship between the presence of market programs (p < .01), the presence of microfinance 
programs (p < .010), the joint effect of market and microfinance programs (p < .01), and the 
female/male literacy ratio.  Districts with a market program present have a female/male literacy 
ratio that is about 3 percentage points higher than districts without a market program, and 
districts with a women’s microfinance program have a literacy ratio that is about 4 percentage 
points higher than districts without a microfinance program present.  However, the coefficient 
for the joint effect of market and microfinance programs on the literacy ratio is negative and 
statistically significant (p < .01).  Districts that have both a market program and microfinance 
program have a female/male literacy ratio that is about 2 percentage points higher than districts 
with neither market programs nor microfinance programs present. Therefore, while the joint 
effect of women’s market and microfinance programs does seem to have a positive effect on the 
female/male literacy ratio, the magnitude of this effect is smaller than the effect that either 
market programs alone or microfinance programs alone have on the literacy ratio. Model 3 tests 
the hypothesis that the presence of women’s market programs and microfinance programs will 
have a greater positive effect on the female/male literacy ratio in southern districts than in 
northern districts.  However, there is no statistically significant difference between model 3 and 
the previous model.   
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Model 4 controls for the effects of women’s rights programs, the percentage of 
population comprised of Scheduled Castes, and the interaction effect of region*period.  Once 
these variables are controlled for, there is still a statistically significant relationship between the 
presence of women’s market programs and variation in the female/male literacy ratio (p < .01).  
In districts with a women’s market program present, the female/male literacy ratio is 3 
percentage points greater than in districts without a women’s market program.  However, there is 
no statistically significant relationship between the presence of women’s microfinance programs 
and the female/male literacy ratio.  There is a statistically significant difference between the joint 
effect of women’s market programs and microfinance programs on the female/male literacy ratio 
and the effect of women’s market programs alone on the literacy ratio (p < .01).  In districts 
where there are both market programs and microfinance programs present, the female/male 
literacy ratio is about 1 percentage point lower than in districts where there is only a market 
program present. There is a statistically significant, though substantively small relationship 
between log per capita SDP and an increase in the female/male literacy ratio (p < .001).  With 
every tenfold increase in per capita SDP, there is an increase in the literacy ratio of about 2 
percentage points.  The passage of time has the strongest statistically significant relationship with 
an increase in the female/male literacy ratio (p < .001).  With the passing of each decade, there is 
an increase of about 5 percentage points in the literacy ratio.  This final model is the best fit for 
the data, and suggests that there is support for the second WID hypothesis that the presence of 
women’s market programs leads to an increase in the female/male literacy ratio.  However, it is 
necessary to first examine these same models with state-wise interaction terms, as well as models 
with lagged independent variables in order to establish a (possible) causal relationship between 
the presence of women’s market programs and variation in the female/male literacy ratio. 
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8.3.2 Models with unlagged independent variables and state-wise interaction effects  
 
Table 8.6 shows results for the models testing the WID hypotheses that include the state-wise 
interaction effects.  The first and second models are the same as the first two models of Table 
8.5.  Model 3 tests the hypothesis that the presence of women’s market programs and 
microfinance programs will have a greater positive effect on the female/male literacy ratio in 
southern districts than in northern districts.  Unlike model 3 of table 8.5, model 3 of table 8.6 is 
statistically significantly different than model 2 (p < .001).  However, once the joint effects of 
market programs*states and of microfinance programs*states are included in the model, there is 
no longer a statistically significant relationship between the presence of women’s market 
programs and the female/male literacy ratio.  There is a statistically significant difference 
between the effect of women’s market programs on the literacy ratio in Gujarat (p < .05) 
compared to the effect of market programs on the literacy ratio Rajasthan.  There is also a 
statistically significant difference between the effect of women’s market programs on the literacy 
ratio in Tamil Nadu (p < .01) compared to the effect of market programs on the literacy ratio 
Rajasthan.  The final model controls for the effects of percentage of population in urban areas, 
log per capita SDP, the presence of women’s rights programs, percentage of population 
comprised by Scheduled Castes, and the interaction effects of states*time period.  Once these 
variables are controlled for, there is once again a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between the presence of women’s market programs and the female/male literacy ratio (p < .01).  
In Rajasthan, the female/male literacy ratio is about 7 percentage points higher in districts with a 
women’s market program than in districts without a market program.  This is consistent with 
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model 4 of Table 8.5, in which there is also a positive and significant relationship between the 
presence of women’s market programs and the female/male literacy ratio. 
Table 8.6 Fixed-Effects Models Testing WID Hypotheses for Female/Male Literacy Ratio (Unlagged 
Independent Variables) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Market  1.60 0.90 3.22** 1.06 3.47 2.56 6.64** 1.99 
Period 8.28*** 0.22 7.99*** 0.25 7.95*** 0.25 3.11*** 0.43 
Microfinance   3.68** 1.33 0.82 1.98 4.01* 1.78 
Market* 
microfinance   -5.17** 1.65 -3.35* 1.61 -3.16* 1.23 
Market*A.P.     -3.44 2.83 -6.76** 2.34 
Market*Gujarat     -6.09* 2.91 -9.61*** 2.41 
Market* 
Karnataka     -1.61 2.62 -4.49 2.44 
Market*M.P.     2.30 2.79 -4.54* 2.28 
Market*T.N.     0.08 3.18 -3.11 2.77 
Microfinance* 
A.P.     1.96 2.09 -2.51 2.03 
Microfinance* 
Gujarat     -2.53 3.31 -6.16 3.51 
Microfinance* 
Karnataka     3.71 2.39 -0.68 2.57 
Microfinance* 
M.P.     7.11** 2.29 -0.30 2.19 
Microfinance* 
T.N.     2.38 2.50 -4.15 2.62 
Urban       0.002 0.08 
ln(per capita SDP)       2.03*** 0.23 
Women's rights       0.23 0.70 
Scheduled Castes       -0.07 0.11 
AndhraPradesh* 
period       2.85*** 0.43 
Gujarat* 
period       2.39** 0.76 
Karnataka* 
period       2.57*** 0.66 
MadhyaPradesh* 
period       4.06*** 0.53 
TamilNadu*period       3.38*** 0.71 
Constant 30.51*** 0.36 30.63*** 0.37 30.72*** 0.34 18.95*** 2.83 
N 644  644  644  640  
Within-R-Squared  0.869  0.873  0.888  0.916 
P > | F |    0.007  0.000  0.000 
Rho   0.862  0.866  0.884  0.900 
*p < .05         
**p < .01         
***p < .001         
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In the fourth model of table 8.6, there is a positive, statistically significant relationship 
between the presence of women’s microfinance programs and the female/male literacy ratio (p < 
.05).  This is in contrast to model 4 of Table 8.5, in which there is no statistically significant 
relationship between the presence of women’s microfinance programs and the literacy ratio.  In 
model 4 of both Table 8.5 and Table 8.6, there is a statistically significant difference between the 
joint effect of women’s market*women’s microfinance programs and the female/male literacy 
ratio and the effect of just one of these women’s programs on the literacy ratio (p < .01).  In 
districts that have both a market program and microfinance program present, the female/male 
literacy ratio is about 7.5 percentage points higher than in districts with no market or 
microfinance programs present.  The joint effect of women’s market programs and microfinance 
programs has a greater positive effect on the literacy ratio than the effect of microfinance 
programs alone.  The joint effect of market and microfinance programs also has a slightly greater 
positive effect on the literacy ratio than the effect that market programs alone have on the 
literacy ratio.  Just as there is no statistically significant relationship between the joint effect of 
women’s microfinance programs*region in model 4 of Table 8.5, so there is no statistically 
significant relationship between any of the interaction effects of microfinance programs*states 
and the female/male literacy ratio in model 4 of Table 8.6.  Although in model 4 of Table 8.5 the 
joint effect of market programs*region is not statistically significant, in model 4 of Table 8.6 
some of the joint effects of market*states are statistically significant.  In Andhra Pradesh, the 
female/male literacy ratio is only 0.12 percentage points lower in districts with a women’s 
market program than in districts without a market program; and in Gujarat, the female/male 
literacy ratio is about 3 percentage points lower in districts with a women’s market program than 
in districts without a market program (p < .001).  In Madhya Pradesh, the literacy ratio is about 2 
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percentage points higher in districts with a market program than in districts without a market 
program (p < .05).  Log per capita SDP has a statistically significant relationship with an increase 
in the female/male literacy ratio in model 4 of both Tables 8.5 and 8.6 (p < .001).  While there is 
no statistically significant relationship between the interaction effect of region*period and the 
literacy ratio in model 4 of Table 8.5, there is a statistically significant relationship between all of 
the state*period interaction effects and an increase in the female/male literacy ratio (p < .001).  
One reason for this apparent discrepancy between these two models may be the fact that the 
magnitudes of the joint effects of states*period are all so close, regardless of whether the state in 
question is a northern state or a southern state. There is a statistically significant difference 
between the effect of time on the literacy ratio in Rajasthan and the effect of time on the literacy 
ratio in all of the other states, is statistically significantly different.  For instance, in the states of 
Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, the female/male literacy ratio increases by 
about 6 percentage points with each passing decade.  In Madhya Pradesh, the literacy ratio 
increases about 7 percentage points with each passing decade, which is not much higher than in 
the other four states.  On average, with the passing of each decade there is an increase in the 
female/male literacy ratio of 5.26 percentage points in the north and an increase in the literacy 
ratio of 6.04 percentage points in the south.  Therefore, even in model 4 of Table 8.6 there is not 
much substantive difference in the effect of time on the literacy ratio in the north compared to 
the south.  
 The most important finding of these models is that the joint effect of women’s market 
programs and microfinance programs has a greater positive impact on the female/male literacy 
ratio than the impact of either market programs alone or microfinance programs alone on the 
female/male literacy ratio.  However, this is only true in the state of Rajasthan.  Moreover, it is 
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important to remember that while there is a positive correlation between the joint effect of 
market and microfinance programs and the literacy ratio, this does not mean that the presence of 
both market and microfinance programs causes an increase in the literacy ratio.  It is important to 
examine the models with lagged independent variables before making this determination. 
 
8.3.3 Models with lagged independent variables and regional interaction effects  
 
Table 8.7 shows the results of the WID models that include lagged independent variables.  The 
first model tests the hypothesis that the presence of women’s market programs will lead to an 
increase in the female/male literacy ratio.  However, there is no statistically significant 
relationship between the presence of women’s market programs and the literacy ratio.  Model 2, 
which tests the hypothesis that the joint effect of women’s market programs and women’s 
microfinance programs will have a greater impact on raising the female/male literacy ratio than 
either women’s market programs or microfinance programs alone, is not statistically 
significantly different than model 1.  Model 3 is also not statistically significantly different than 
the previous model.  Model 4 controls for the effects of percentage of population in urban areas, 
log per capita SDP, the presence of women’s rights programs, the percentage of population 
comprised of Scheduled Castes, and the interaction effect of region*period.  Although there is a 
statistically significant relationship between the contemporaneous presence of market programs 
and the female/male literacy ratio (see Table 8.5), the results of the models in Table 8.7 show 
that there is no statistically significant relationship between the presence of women’s market 
programs and the female/male literacy ratio ten years later.   
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Table 8.7 Fixed-Effects Models Testing WID Hypotheses for Female/Male Literacy Ratio (Lagged 
Independent Variables) 
 
There is a positive, statistically significant relationship between the percentage of population 
living in urban areas and the female/male literacy ratio ten years later (p < .01).  There is a 
negative, statistically significant relationship between log per capita SDP and the literacy ratio 
ten years later (p < .001).  Therefore, there is some support for the WID hypothesis that 
economic growth will lead to a decrease in the female/male literacy ratio.  However, this is the 
only WID hypothesis that is supported by the results of these models. 
 
 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Lagged Market  1.84 1.05 2.32 1.39 3.41 2.03 1.89 1.87 
Period 8.88*** 0.27 8.68*** 0.28 8.67*** 0.28 10.63*** 0.51 
Lagged Microfinance    4.32 2.33 5.06 3.73 3.17 3.69 
Lagged Market*Microfinance    -4.40 2.70 -4.31 2.83 -3.40 2.82 
Lagged Microfinance*region     -1.06 2.97 -0.453 2.85 
Lagged Market*region     -2.43 2.27 -0.811 2.36 
Lagged Urban       0.36** 0.12 
Lagged ln(Per capita SDP)       -4.11*** 0.56 
Lagged Women's rights        -0.420 0.96 
Lagged Scheduled Castes       0.49** 0.15 
Region*period       -0.83 0.46 
Constant 28.97*** 0.60 29.25*** 0.60 29.25*** 0.60 42.53*** 3.91 
N 516  516  516  511  
Within-R-Squared  0.831  0.834  0.836  0.853 
P > | F |    0.181  0.198  0.000 
Rho   0.862  0.863  0.866  0.873 
*p < .05         
**p < .01         
***p < .001         
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8.3.4 Models with lagged independent variables and state-wise interaction effects 
 
Table 8.8 shows the results for the WID models with lagged independent variables and state-
wise interaction terms.  Models 1 and 2 are exactly the same as models 1 and 2 in Table 8.6.   
Table 8.8 Fixed-Effects Models Testing WID Theory for Female/Male Literacy Ratio (Lagged Independent 
Variables) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Lagged Market  1.84 1.05 2.32 1.39 3.44 5.38 5.08 5.38 
Period 8.88*** 0.27 8.68*** 0.28 8.71*** 0.28 8.45*** 0.97 
Lagged Microfinance   4.32 2.33 8.93 4.73 9.16 4.94 
Lagged Market*microfinance   -4.40 2.70 -3.43 2.50 -3.51 2.48 
Lagged Market*A.P.     -2.61 5.29 -3.94 5.43 
Lagged Market*Gujarat     -5.34 5.77 -5.59 5.90 
Lagged Market*Karnataka     -3.03 5.26 -4.35 5.69 
Lagged Market*M.P.     0.68 5.62 -5.95 5.74 
Lagged Market*T.N.     -2.80 5.89 -5.64 5.75 
Lagged Microfinance*A.P.     -5.07 4.87 -5.22 5.00 
Lagged Microfinance*Gujarat     -12.43 6.29 -11.66 6.28 
Lagged Microfinance*Karnataka     -6.20 5.30 -7.99 5.2 
Lagged Microfinance*M.P.     -2.98 5.22 -7.62 5.3 
Lagged Microfinance*T.N.     -5.44 5.59 -4.98 5.31 
Lagged Urban       0.33** 0.10 
Lagged ln(per capita SDP)       -2.92*** 0.61 
Lagged Women's rights       0.72 0.95 
Lagged Scheduled Castes       0.31* 0.15 
AndhraPradesh*period       0.02 0.85 
Gujarat*period       -0.17 0.76 
Karnataka*period       0.78 0.89 
MadhyaPradesh*period       3.10*** 0.84 
TamilNadu*period       1.14 0.81 
Constant 28.97*** 0.60 29.25*** 0.60 29.28*** 0.61 38.15*** 3.79 
N 516  516  516  511  
Within-R-Squared  0.831  0.834  0.847  0.874 
P > | F |    0.181  0.002  0.000 
Rho   0.862  0.863  0.877  0.888 
*p < .05         
**p < .01         
***p < .001         
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Unlike model 3 of Table 8.7, model 3 of Table 8.8 is significantly different than model 2  
(p < .01).  Model 3 of table 8.8 includes the interaction effects between lagged market*states, 
lagged microfinance*states, and variation in the female/male literacy ratio.  There is almost a 
statistically significant difference between the lagged effect of microfinance programs on the 
literacy ratio in Gujarat and the lagged effect of microfinance programs on the  literacy ratio in 
Rajasthan (p = .050).  There is no statistically significant difference between the lagged effect of 
microfinance programs on the literacy ratio in any of the other states compared to the lagged 
effect of microfinance programs on the literacy ratio in Rajasthan.  Moreover, the main effect of 
microfinance programs is not statistically significant.  None of the other interaction effects are 
statistically significantly related to variation in the female/male literacy ratio.  Model 4 controls 
for lagged percentage of population living in urban areas, lagged log per capita SDP, lagged 
percentage of population comprised of Scheduled Castes, the lagged presence of women’s rights 
programs, and the interaction effects of states*time period.  Once these variables are controlled 
for, there is no statistically significant difference between the lagged effect of microfinance on 
the literacy ratio in Gujarat and the lagged effect of microfinance on the literacy ratio in 
Rajasthan.  Just as in model 4 of Table 8.7, the only variables of interest that have a statistically 
significant relationship with variation in the female/male literacy ratio are lagged percent of 
population living in urban areas (p < .01) and lagged log per capita SDP (p < .001).  There is a 
small yet statistically significant difference between the effect of the passing of time on the 
female/male literacy ratio in Madhya Pradesh and the effect of time on the literacy ratio in 
Rajasthan (p < .001).   As each decade passes, the female/male literacy ratio increases by about 8 
percentage points in Rajasthan and by about 12 percentage points in Madhya Pradesh.  These 
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models with the state-wise interaction terms confirm the findings of the models with lagged 
independent variables and regional interaction terms.  Since there is a positive, significant 
relationship between percentage of population in urban areas and the female/male literacy ratio, 
there is some support for the modernization hypothesis that increased urbanization will lead to an 
increase in the female/male literacy ratio.  However, there is also support for the first WID 
hypothesis since an increase in log per capita SDP leads to a decrease in the female/male literacy 
ratio ten years later.  
8.4 GENDER-AND-DEVELOPMENT HYPOTHESES AND THE FEMALE/MALE 
LITERACY RATIO 
 
8.4.1 Models with unlagged independent variables and regional interaction effects 
 
Table 8.9 presents the results of models that test the GAD hypotheses regarding change in the 
female/male literacy ratio.  Model 1 tests the hypothesis that the presence of women’s rights 
programs will have a positive effect on the female/male literacy ratio.  However, the presence of 
women’s rights programs is not statistically significantly related to variation in the literacy ratio.  
Model 2, which tests the hypothesis that the presence of women’s rights programs will have a 
greater positive effect in southern districts than in northern districts, is not statistically 
significantly different than the previous model.  Model 3 tests the hypothesis that the joint effect 
of women’s rights programs, market programs, and microfinance programs will have a greater 
positive impact on the female/male literacy ratio than the presence of women’s rights programs 
alone have on the literacy ratio.  There is a statistically significant relationship between this 
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model and model 2 (p < .001).  However, there is no statistically significant relationship between 
the joint effect of women’s rights programs, market programs, and microfinance programs and 
variation in the female/male literacy ratio.  There is therefore no evidence that supports this 
hypothesis.  There is a positive, statistically significant relationship between the presence of 
women’s microfinance programs and the female/male literacy ratio (p < .001).  In districts with a 
microfinance program, the female/male literacy ratio is about 5 percentage points higher than in 
districts without a microfinance program.   
Table 8.9 Fixed-Effects Models Testing GAD Hypotheses for Female/Male Literacy Ratio (Unlagged 
Independent Variables) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Women's rights  0.04 0.86 -0.72 1.35 -1.88 1.39 -1.67 1.25 
Period 8.53*** 0.23 8.61*** 0.31 8.22*** 0.36 5.61*** 0.49 
Women's rights* 
Region   1.82 1.58 1.86 1.55 1.89 1.42 
Region*Period   -0.23 0.43 -0.30 0.41 -0.47 0.41 
Microfinance      4.85*** 1.12 3.29** 1.10 
Market      2.09 1.47 1.96 1.19 
Women's rights* 
Microfinance     -1.61 2.02 -1.46 1.69 
Women's rights* 
Market     2.36 1.79 1.68 1.48 
Market* 
Microfinance     -6.60* 2.72 -5.88* 2.24 
WRP*Market* 
MFI     1.36 3.40 1.28 2.80 
Urban       0.13 0.10 
ln(Per capita SDP)       2.10*** 0.22 
Scheduled Castes       0.12 0.14 
Constant 30.43*** 0.35 30.46*** 0.35 30.67*** 0.37 13.41*** 3.36 
N 645  645  644  640  
Within-R-Squared  0.868  0.869  0.874  0.894 
P > | F |    0.504  0.000  0.000 
Rho   0.862  0.862  0.866  0.868 
*p < .05         
**p < .01         
***p < .001         
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There is also a statistically significant difference between the joint effect of women’s market and 
microfinance programs on the literacy ratio and the effect of market or microfinance programs 
alone on the literacy ratio (p < .05).  Districts with both a women’s market program and 
microfinance program present have a literacy ratio that is only 0.34 percentage points higher than 
the literacy ratio of districts with neither of these types of programs present.   
The fourth model controls for percentage of population in urban areas, log per capita 
SDP, and percentage of population comprised of Scheduled Castes.  This model is statistically 
significantly different than the previous model, and is therefore the best fit for the data (p < 
.001).  After controlling for these other variables, there is still a positive, statistically significant 
relationship between the presence of microfinance programs and the female/male literacy ratio (p 
< .01).  There is also still a statistically significant difference between the joint effect of market 
and microfinance programs on the literacy ratio and the effect of these two types of programs 
alone on the literacy ratio (p < .05).  However, the results of this last model show that districts 
with both a market and microfinance program present have a female/male literacy ratio that is 
lower by 0.63 percentage points than the literacy ratio of districts with only one of these two 
types of women’s programs.  Overall, there is no evidence from these models that support the 
GAD hypotheses. 
 
8.4.2 Models with unlagged independent variables and state-wise interaction effects 
 
Table 8.10 provides the results for models testing the GAD hypotheses that include the state-
wise interaction terms.  The first model is the same as the first model in Table 8.9.  Model 2 of 
Table 8.10 includes the women’s rights programs*states and the states*time period interaction 
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effects, and tests the hypothesis that women’s rights programs will have a greater positive effect 
on the female/male literacy ratio in southern districts than in northern districts.  This model is 
statistically significantly different than model 1, unlike model 2 of Table 8.9.   
 
Table 8.10 Fixed-Effects Models Testing GAD Hypotheses for Female/Male Literacy Ratio (Unlagged 
Independent Variables) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err. 
Women's rights 0.04 0.86 0.83 2.26 0.02 2.01 0.39 1.66 
Period 8.53*** 0.23 7.03*** 0.46 6.38*** 0.46 4.12*** 0.48 
Women's rights*A.P.   0.04 2.60 -0.20 2.34 -0.63 1.87 
Women's rights*Gujarat   -5.49 3.85 -6.57 3.89 -6.19 3.59 
Women's 
rights*Karnataka   -0.15 2.53 -0.80 2.45 -0.79 2.20 
Women's rights*M.P.   1.51 2.67 0.91 2.52 0.25 2.05 
Women's rights*T.N.   0.57 3.04 0.00 2.54 0.56 1.98 
AndhraPradesh*Period   1.04 0.63 1.02 0.54 1.31* 0.50 
Gujarat*Period   0.96 1.04 1.63 1.03 1.46 0.99 
Karnataka*Period   1.53* 0.58 1.83** 0.65 1.75* 0.67 
MadhyaPradesh*Period   2.66*** 0.55 2.87*** 0.53 3.09*** 0.50 
TamilNadu*Period   1.69 0.98 1.85* 0.82 1.76* 0.69 
Microfinance     5.00*** 1.31 3.07* 1.20 
Market     2.09 1.31 1.75 0.99 
WRP*MFI     -1.44 1.87 -0.74 1.58 
WRP*Market     2.07 1.67 1.36 1.38 
Market*MFI     -6.27** 2.30 -4.90** 1.80 
WRP*Market*MFI     1.66 2.91 1.09 2.32 
Urban       -0.02 0.08 
ln(Per capita SDP)       2.07*** 0.21 
Scheduled Castes       -0.06 0.12 
Constant 30.43*** 0.35 30.48*** 0.29 30.74*** 0.31 18.97*** 2.79 
N 645  645  644  640  
Within-R-Squared  0.868  0.886  0.892  0.911 
P > | F |    0.000  0.001  0.000 
Rho   0.862  0.880  0.883  0.901 
*p < .05         
**p < .01         
***p < .001         
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However, there is no statistically significant relationship between any of the women’s 
rights programs*states variables and variation in the female/male literacy ratio.  Therefore, I 
confidently reject the hypothesis that model 2 tests.  There is a statistically significant difference 
between the effect of the passing of time on the literacy ratios in Karnataka (0.05) and Madhya 
Pradesh (0.001) compared to the effect of the passing of time on the literacy ratio in Rajasthan. 
Model 3 tests the hypothesis that the joint effect of women’s rights programs, women’s market 
programs, and women’s microfinance programs will have a greater positive effect on the 
female/male literacy ratio than the presence of women’s rights programs alone will have on the 
literacy ratio.  The results of this model show that there is no statistically significant relationship 
between any of the interaction effects that include women’s rights programs, which is similar to 
model 3 of table 8.9.  Also similar to model 3 of Table 8.9, in model 3 of Table 8.10 there is a 
statistically significant relationship between the presence of women’s microfinance programs 
and an increase in the female/male literacy ratio (p < .001).  Likewise, there is a statistically 
significant difference between the joint effect of women’s market programs and microfinance 
programs on the literacy ratio (p < .01) and the effect of market programs or microfinance 
programs alone on the literacy ratio.  Model 4 controls for the effects of percentage of population 
in urban areas, log per capita SDP, and percentage of population comprised of Scheduled Castes, 
and is statistically significantly different than model 3.  After controlling for these variables, 
there is still a positive, statistically significant relationship between the presence of women’s 
microfinance programs and the female/male literacy ratio (p < .05).  There is also a statistically 
significant difference between the joint effect of women’s market programs and microfinance 
programs on the literacy ratio (p < .01) and the effect of market programs or microfinance 
programs alone on the literacy ratio.  However, districts with both a market and microfinance 
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program have a female/male literacy ratio that is lower by only 0.08 percentage points than the 
literacy ratio of districts with neither of these two types of programs.  There is also a statistically 
significant relationship between log per capita SDP and an increase in the literacy ratio (p < 
.001).  All of these statistically significant relationships are very similar to the statistically 
significant relationships of model 4 of Table 8.9.  Moreover, the magnitude of these variables’ 
relationships with the female/male literacy ratio are very close to the magnitude of these 
variables’ relationships with the literacy ratio in model 4 of Table 8.9.  However, whereas in 
model 4 of table 8.9 there is no statistically significant difference between the effect of the 
passage of time on the literacy ratio in northern districts versus southern districts, in model 4 of 
table 8.10 there is a statistically significant difference between the effect of time on the literacy 
ratio in Rajasthan and the effect of time on the literacy ratio in four other states.  In Karnataka 
and Tamil Nadu, the female/male literacy ratio increases by about 6 percentage points with each 
passing decade (p < .05), and in Andhra Pradesh the literacy ratio increases by about 5 
percentage points with each passing decade (p < .05).  In Rajasthan, the literacy ratio increases 
about 4 percentage points with each passing decade (p < .001). In Madhya Pradesh, the 
female/male literacy ratio increases by about 7 percentage points with each passing decade (p < 
.001).  The passage of time leads to an average increase in the literacy ratio of 5.7 percentage 
points each decade in both northern states and southern states. The results of the models in both 
tables 8.9 and 8.10 indicate that there is no support for any of the GAD hypotheses. 
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8.4.3 Models with lagged independent variables and regional interaction effects 
 
Table 8.11 shows the results for the models testing the GAD hypotheses that include lagged 
independent variables and regional interaction effects.  Just as in model 1 in Table 8.9 and Table 
8.10, in model 1 of table 8.11 there is no statistically significant relationship between the 
presence of women’s rights programs and variation in the female/male literacy ratio.  This is the 
case in all of the subsequent models as well.   
Table 8.11 Fixed-Effects Models Testing GAD Hypotheses (Lagged Independent Variables) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Lagged Women's rights  1.07 0.91 0.12 1.51 -1.03 1.66 -1.68 1.44 
Period 8.94*** 0.27 9.45*** 0.36 9.25*** 0.37 10.84*** 0.52 
Lagged Women's 
rights*Region   2.75 1.69 2.19 1.84 1.74 1.83 
Region*Period   -1.45** 0.49 -1.65** 0.49 -1.37** 0.47 
Lagged Microfinance     5.53** 2.00 3.39 1.96 
Lagged Market      1.26 1.44 0.64 1.25 
Lagged WRP*MFI     -0.72 4.37 -0.46 4.25 
Lagged WRP*Market     2.07 2.26 1.86 2.13 
Lagged Market*MFI     -3.98 2.90 -4.11 3.34 
Lagged 
WRP*Market*MFI     -1.30 5.19 0.19 5.48 
Lagged Urban       0.36** 0.11 
Lagged ln(Per capita 
SDP)       -4.08*** 0.55 
Lagged Scheduled Castes       0.50** 0.15 
Constant 28.90*** 0.59 29.02*** 0.56 29.43*** 0.57 42.27*** 3.93 
N 516  516  516  511  
Within-R-Squared  0.830  0.833  0.838  0.854 
P > | F |    0.015  0.097  0.000 
Rho   0.863  0.878  0.88  0.876 
*p < .05         
**p < .01         
***p < .001         
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Model 2 tests the hypothesis that women’s rights programs will have a greater positive impact on 
female/male literacy ratio in southern districts than in northern districts.  Although this model is 
statistically significantly different than model 1 (p < .05), there is no statistically significant 
relationship between the interaction effect of women’s rights programs*region and variation in 
the literacy ratio.  However, the interaction effect of region*period has a small negative, yet 
statistically significant relationship with the female/male literacy ratio.  In southern districts, the 
literacy ratio is about 1 percentage point lower during each decade than in northern districts.  
Model 3 tests the hypothesis that the joint effect of women’s rights programs, women’s market 
programs, and women’s microfinance programs will have a greater positive effect on the literacy 
ratio than the effect of women’s rights programs alone will have on the literacy ratio.  However, 
there is no statistically significant difference between model 3 and the previous model.  Model 4 
controls for the lagged effects of log per capita SDP, percentage of population in urban areas, 
and percentage of population comprised of Scheduled Castes.  This model is statistically 
significantly different than the previous model, and thus is the best-fitting model for the data.  In 
this final model, there is still no statistically significant relationship between the lagged presence 
of women’s rights programs and variation in the female/male literacy ratio, nor between the 
lagged joint effect of women’s rights programs, market programs, and microfinance programs 
and the literacy ratio.  There is still a small yet statistically significant relationship between the 
interaction effect of region*period and the female/male literacy ratio.  There is also a small yet 
statistically significant relationship between lagged percentage of population in urban areas and 
an increase in the literacy ratio (p < .01), as well as a small yet statistically significant 
relationship between lagged percentage of population comprised of Scheduled Castes and an 
increase in the female/male literacy ratio (p < .01).  There is a negative, statistically significant 
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relationship between lagged log per capita SDP and the female/male literacy ratio (p < .001).  
With every tenfold increase in the per capita SDP, there is a decrease in the female/male literacy 
ratio of about 4 percentage points ten years later.  The passage of time has the strongest positive, 
statistically significant impact on the female/male literacy ratio (p < .001).  With each passing 
decade, the female/male literacy ratio increases by about 11 percentage points in northern 
regions and by about 9 percentage points in southern regions.  Overall, these models indicate that 
there is no evidence supporting the GAD hypotheses. 
 
8.4.4 Models with lagged independent variables and state-wise interaction effects 
 
Table 8.12 gives the results for the models testing the GAD hypotheses that include lagged 
independent variables and state-wise interaction effects.  Model 1 is the same as model 1 in table 
Table 8.11.  Model 2 includes the lagged interaction effects of women’s rights programs*states, 
as well as the interaction effects of states*region.  Just as in model 2 of table 8.11 there is no 
statistically significant relationship between the lagged interaction effect of women’s rights 
programs*region and the female/male literacy ratio, in model 2 of table 8.12 there is no 
statistically significant relationship between the interaction effects of lagged women’s rights 
programs*states and variation in the literacy ratio.  There is a statistically significant difference 
in the effect of the passing of time on the literacy ratio in Madhya Pradesh and the effect of the 
passing of time on the literacy ratio in Rajasthan (p < .01).  While in Rajasthan the passage of 
time leads to an increase in the literacy ratio of about 8 percentage points with each passing 
decade, in Madhya Pradesh the passage of time leads to an increase in the literacy ratio of about 
11 percentage points with each passing decade.   
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Model 3 of table 8.12 is not statistically significantly different than model 2, just as model 3 of 
table Table 8.11 is not statistically significantly different than the previous model.   
Table 8.12 Fixed-Effects Models Testing GAD Hypotheses for Female/Male Literacy Ratio (Lagged 
Independent Variables) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Lagged  
Women's rights 1.07 0.91 2.08 2.78 1.03 2.56 0.67 2.27 
Period 8.94*** 0.27 8.47*** 0.75 8.05*** 0.73 9.87*** 0.89 
Lagged  
Women's rights*A.P.   1.68 3.01 0.42 3.01 0.95 2.85 
Lagged  
Women's rights*Gujarat   -3.77 3.36 -4.56 3.62 -5.97 3.49 
Lagged Women's 
rights*Karnataka   -0.05 3.01 -1.78 3.13 -2.61 2.96 
Lagged  
Women's rights*M.P.   0.29 3.88 -0.21 3.51 -0.50 3.27 
Lagged  
Women's rights*T.N.   0.92 3.29 0.31 3.31 -1.39 3.14 
AndhraPradesh*Period   -0.42 0.91 -0.56 0.86 -1.26 0.90 
Gujarat*Period   -1.56 0.89 -1.22 0.88 -0.90 0.82 
Karnataka*Period   -0.46 0.90 -0.19 0.91 -0.16 0.89 
MadhyaPradesh*Period   2.38** 0.83 2.72** 0.80 1.78* 0.79 
TamilNadu*Period   -0.61 1.13 -0.61 1.05 -0.01 0.98 
Lagged Microfinance     4.73* 2.16 3.17 2.28 
Lagged Market     0.39 1.25 0.22 1.17 
Lagged WRP*MFI     1.61 4.14 1.31 4.13 
Lagged WRP*Market     2.99 2.16 2.56 2.10 
Lagged Market*MFI     -1.56 3.17 -1.83 3.48 
Lagged WRP*Market*MFI     -4.60 5.12 -3.20 5.28 
Lagged Urban       0.28** 0.10 
Lagged ln(Per capita SDP)       -3.39*** 0.61 
Lagged Scheduled Castes       0.35* 0.14 
Constant 28.90*** 0.59 29.14*** 0.49 29.58*** 0.49 41.23*** 3.96 
N 516  516  516  511  
Within-R-Squared  0.830  0.854  0.860  0.867 
P > | F |    0.000  0.105  0.000 
Rho   0.863  0.901  0.903  0.893 
*p < .05         
**p < .01         
***p < .001         
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Model 4 of table 8.12 controls for the lagged effects of percent of population in urban 
areas, log per capita SDP, and percent of population comprised of Scheduled Castes, and is 
statistically significantly different than the previous model (p < .001).  There continues to be a 
statistically significant difference between the effect of time on the literacy in Rajasthan and the 
effect of time on the literacy ratio in Madhya Pradesh (p < .05).  Just as in model 4 of Table 8.11, 
in model 4 of Table 8.12 all of the variables introduced in this model as control variables are 
statistically significantly related to variation in the female/male literacy ratio.  Also, the passage 
of time has the strongest positive, statistically significant impact on change in the female/male 
literacy ratio (p < .001), just as it does in model 4 of Table 8.11.  The results of the models with 
lagged effects of independent variables and state-wise interaction effects indicate that there is no 
evidence in support of any of the GAD hypotheses, which is consistent with the models in Table 
8.11. 
8.5 NEOLIBERAL HYPOTHESES AND FEMALE/MALE LITERACY RATIO 
8.5.1 Models with unlagged independent variables and regional interaction effects 
 
Table 8.13 shows results for the models testing the neoliberal hypotheses that include regional 
interaction effects.  The first model tests the hypothesis that the presence of women’s 
microfinance programs will have a positive effect on the female/male literacy ratio.  However, in 
this model there is no statistically significant relationship between the presence of microfinance 
programs and variation in the literacy ratio.  Moreover, there is no significant relationship 
between the presence of microfinance programs and variation in the female/male literacy ratio in 
335 
any of the subsequent models.  Therefore, these models provide no support for this hypothesis.  
Model 2 tests the hypothesis that the joint effect of log per capita SDP and women’s 
microfinance programs will have a greater positive effect on the female/male literacy ratio than 
the impact of women’s microfinance programs alone will have on the literacy ratio.  Although 
there is a statistically significant difference between this model and model 1 (p < .001), there is 
no statistically significant relationship between the joint effect of log per capita SDP and 
microfinance programs and variation in the female/male literacy ratio.   
Table 8.13 Fixed-Effects Models Testing Neoliberal Hypotheses for Female/Male Literacy Ratio (Unlagged 
Independent Variables) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Microfinance  1.16 0.88 3.91 3.30 3.76 3.26 3.66 3.33 
Period 8.36*** 0.23 5.77*** 0.33 5.77*** 0.38 5.42*** 0.46 
ln(Per capita SDP)   2.35*** 0.31 2.35*** 0.31 2.37*** 0.31 
Microfinance*ln(Per capita 
SDP)   -0.38 0.35 -0.38 0.35 -0.38 0.35 
Microfinance*region     0.26 1.53 -0.13 1.50 
Region*period     0.02 0.40 0.02 0.39 
Women's rights        -0.66 0.83 
Market        1.15 0.89 
Urban       0.12 0.10 
Scheduled Castes       0.08 0.16 
Constant 30.55*** 0.37 15.75*** 2.13 15.74*** 2.13 12.33** 3.61 
N 644  644  644  640  
Within-R-Squared  0.869  0.890  0.890  0.890 
P > | F |    0.000  0.974  0.532 
Rho   0.862  0.879  0.878  0.863 
*p < .05         
**p < .01         
***p < .001         
 
There is, however, a statistically significant relationship between log per capita SDP and an 
increase in the literacy ratio (p < .001).  With every tenfold increase in per capita SDP, there is 
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an increase in the female/male literacy ratio of about 2 percentage points.  Although this is 
statistically significant, substantively this is very small. 
Model 3 includes the interaction effects of microfinance*region and region*period, but is 
not statistically significantly different than the previous model.  Model 4, which controls for the 
effects of the presence of women’s rights programs, percent of population in urban areas, and 
percentage of population comprised of Scheduled Castes, is also not statistically significantly 
different than the previous model.  Therefore, the results of these models provide no support for 
the neoliberal hypotheses. 
 
8.5.2 Models with unlagged independent variables and state-wise interaction effects 
 
Table 8.14 shows results for the models testing the neoliberal hypotheses that include state-wise 
interaction effects.  Models 1 and 2 are the same as models 1 and 2 in Table 8.13.  Model 3 of 
Table 8.14 includes the interaction effects of women’s microfinance programs*states and 
states*period, and is statistically significantly different than model 2.  This is in contrast to 
model 3 of Table 8.13, which is not significantly different than the previous model.  Once these 
interaction effects are included in the model, there is a statistically significant relationship 
between the presence of women’s microfinance programs and variation in female/male literacy 
ratio (p < .05).  In Rajasthan, districts with a microfinance program present have a female/male 
literacy ratio that is about 9 percentage points higher than districts with no microfinance program 
present.  There is a statistically significant difference between the effect of microfinance 
programs on the literacy ratio in Andhra Pradesh (p < .05) and the effect of microfinance 
programs on the literacy ratio in Rajasthan. 
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Table 8.14 Fixed-Effects Models Testing Neoliberal Hypotheses for Female/Male Literacy Ratio (Unlagged 
Independent Variables) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Microfinance 1.16 0.88 3.91 3.30 8.52* 3.38 7.65* 3.51 
Period 8.36*** 0.23 5.77*** 0.33 3.66*** 0.46 3.65*** 0.49 
ln(Per capita SDP)   2.35*** 0.31 2.41*** 0.31 2.32*** 0.30 
Microfinance* 
ln(Per capita SDP)   -0.38 0.35 -0.46 0.35 -0.40 0.35 
Microfinance*A.P.     -4.42* 1.79 -4.50* 1.86 
Microfinance*Gujarat     -10.13** 3.27 -10.41** 3.25 
Microfinance*Karnataka     -1.64 2.47 -1.38 2.50 
Microfinance*M.P.     -1.77 2.07 -1.56 2.10 
Microfinance*T.N.     -5.91** 2.09 -5.58* 2.13 
AndhraPradesh*Period     1.96*** 0.52 2.07*** 0.52 
Gujarat*Period     1.24 0.79 1.32 0.78 
Karnataka*Period     1.80** 0.67 1.95** 0.68 
MadhyaPradesh*Period     3.45*** 0.59 3.47*** 0.60 
TamilNadu*Period     3.03*** 0.68 3.08*** 0.71 
Women's rights       -0.07 0.69 
Market       1.18 0.72 
Urban       -0.02 0.08 
Scheduled Castes       -0.12 0.12 
Constant 30.55*** 0.37 15.75*** 2.13 15.49*** 2.11 17.91*** 3.00 
N 644  644  644  640  
Within-R-Squared  0.869  0.890  0.911  0.912 
P > | F |    0.000  0.000  0.323 
Rho   0.862  0.879  0.900  0.899 
*p < .05         
**p < .01         
***p < .001         
 
There is also a statistically significant difference between the effect of microfinance 
programs on the literacy ratio in both Gujarat (p < .01) and Tamil Nadu (p < .01) compared to 
the effect of microfinance programs on the literacy ratio in Rajasthan. In Andhra Pradesh (a 
southern state), districts with a microfinance program have a female/male literacy ratio that is 
about 4 percentage points higher than districts with no women’s microfinance program.  In 
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Gujarat (a northern state), districts with a microfinance program present have a female/male 
literacy ratio that is about 2 percentage points lower than in districts with no microfinance 
program.  In Tamil Nadu (another southern state), districts with a women’s microfinance 
program have a literacy ratio that is about 3 percentage points higher than districts without a 
microfinance program.   
The fact that there is a statistically significant relationship between some of the 
microfinance*state variables and the female/male literacy ratio may seem inconsistent with the 
fact that there is no statistically significant relationship between the interaction effect of 
microfinance programs*region and the literacy ratio (compare to Table 8.13).   However, if one 
averages the coefficients for microfinance programs in the northern states and then does the same 
with the coefficients for microfinance programs in southern states, one finds that the average 
effect of microfinance programs on the literacy ratio in northern states and southern states is 
almost identical. On average, districts in northern states with a microfinance program present 
have a female/male literacy ratio that is 2.3 percentage points higher than in districts with no 
microfinance programs. On average, districts in southern states with a microfinance program 
present have a female/male literacy ratio that is 2.2 percentage points higher than districts with 
no microfinance program. Therefore, even though there is support for the hypothesis that 
women’s microfinance programs have a positive impact on the female/male literacy ratio, there 
is no evidence supporting the hypothesis that women’s microfinance programs will have a 
greater positive impact on the literacy ratio in southern districts than in northern districts.  It 
appears that the presence of microfinance programs on the female/male literacy ratio has the 
strongest positive effect in Rajasthan.  There is a statistically significant difference between the 
effect of the passage of time on the literacy ratio in the state of Rajasthan compared to the effect 
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of the passage of time on the literacy ratio in Andhra Pradesh (p < .001), Karnataka (p < .01), 
Madhya Pradesh (p < .001), and Tamil Nadu (p < .001).  At first this seems rather surprising 
since there is no statistically significant relationship between the interaction effect of 
region*period and the literacy ratio in the models from Table 8.13.  If one averages the 
coefficients for time period in the northern states, one finds that with each passing decade the 
female/male literacy ratio increases by an average of about 4 percentage points in the northern 
region.  Likewise, in the southern region, with each passing decade the female/male literacy ratio 
increases by about 6 percentage points.  This is a difference of only 2 percentage points between 
the two regions. There is no statistically significant difference between model 4 and the previous 
model, which is consistent with model 4 of Table 8.13.  Therefore, model 3 is the best-fitting 
model for the data.  Overall, these models support the hypothesis that the presence of women’s 
microfinance programs will have a positive effect on the female/male literacy ratio.  However, 
they do not provide support for any of the other neoliberal models. 
 
8.5.3 Models with lagged independent variables and regional interaction effects 
 
Table 8.15 provides results for the models testing the neoliberal hypotheses that included lagged 
independent variables and regional interaction effects.  The results of the first model indicate that 
there is no statistically significant relationship between the presence of women’s microfinance 
programs and variation in the female/male literacy ratio, which is similar to the results of the 
previous models testing the neoliberal hypotheses.  The second model, which includes lagged log 
per capita SDP and the lagged interaction effect of women’s microfinance programs*log per 
capita SDP, is statistically significantly different than the previous model.   
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Table 8.15 Fixed-Effects Models Testing Neoliberal Hypotheses for Female/Male Literacy Ratio (Lagged 
Independent Variables) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Lagged Microfinance 2.23 1.16 2.14 2.09 1.75 2.14 1.21 2.37 
Period 8.87*** 0.26 11.63*** 0.45 11.74*** 0.47 10.78*** 0.51 
Lagged ln(Per capita SDP)   -4.30*** 0.53 -4.13*** 0.54 -4.25*** 0.55 
Lagged MFI* 
ln(Per capita SDP)   -0.24 0.26 -4.56 15.73 6.74 15.09 
Lagged MFI*region     37.87 133.57 -57.80 128.33 
Region*period     -0.65 0.44 -0.85 0.43 
Lagged Women's rights        -0.38 0.96 
Lagged Market        0.59 1.21 
Lagged Urban       0.36** 0.12 
Lagged Scheduled Castes       0.49** 0.16 
Constant 29.06*** 0.59 55.42*** 3.20 54.44*** 3.33 43.24*** 4.07 
N 516  516  516  511  
Within-R-Squared  0.832  0.846  0.846  0.852 
P > | F |    0.000  0.323  0.003 
Rho   0.863  0.879  0.885  0.872 
*p < .05         
**p < .01         
***p < .001         
 
Just as in the models with unlagged independent variables, there is no statistically significant 
relationship between the lagged interaction effect of microfinance programs*log per capita SDP 
and variation in the female/male literacy ratio.  There is a negative, statistically significant 
relationship between lagged log per capita SDP and change in the female/male literacy ratio (p < 
.001).  With every tenfold increase in the per capita SDP, there is a decrease in the female/male 
literacy ratio of about 4 percentage points ten years later.  Model 3 tests the hypothesis that the 
presence of women’s microfinance programs will have a greater positive effect on the literacy 
ratio in southern districts than in northern districts.  However, there is no statistically significant 
difference between model 3 and the previous model.  Therefore, there is not enough evidence to 
conclude that this hypothesis is true.   
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Model 4, which controls for the lagged effects of women’s rights programs, women’s 
market programs, percentage of population in urban areas, and percentage of population 
comprised of Scheduled Castes, is statistically significantly different than model 3. Therefore, 
this final model is the best fit for the data.  Even after controlling for these other variables, there 
is still a negative, statistically significant relationship between lagged log per capita SDP and 
change in the female/male literacy ratio.  There is still no statistically significant relationship 
between the presence of women’s microfinance programs and the literacy ratio, nor between the 
lagged interaction effect of microfinance programs*region and the literacy ratio.  There is a 
small, positive, and statistically significant relationship between lagged percentage of population 
in urban areas and the literacy ratio (p < .01), and between the lagged percentage of population 
comprised of Scheduled Castes and the female/male literacy ratio (p < .01).  The passing of time 
has the strongest positive, statistically significant effect on the female/male literacy ratio (p < 
.001).  With the passing of each decade, the female/male literacy ratio increases by about 11 
percentage points.  The results of these models with lagged independent variables and regional 
interaction terms do not support any of the neoliberal hypotheses. 
 
8.5.4 Models with lagged independent variables and state-wise interaction effects 
 
Table 8.16 shows the results for the models testing the neoliberal hypotheses that include lagged 
independent variables and state-wise interaction effects.  The first two models are the same as the 
first two models in Table 8.15 with the regional interaction effects.  Model 3 of table 8.16 
includes lagged interaction effects of microfinance programs*states and states*period, and is 
statistically significantly different than model 2.  There is a statistically significant difference 
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between the effect of microfinance programs on the female/male literacy ratio in Rajathan 
compared to the effect of microfinance programs on the literacy ratio in Gujarat (p < .01) and in 
Madhya Pradesh (p < .01).  In Rajasthan, districts with a women’s microfinance program at one 
time period have a female/male literacy ratio that is 10 percentage points higher a decade later.   
Table 8.16 Fixed-Effects Models Testing Neoliberal Hypotheses for Female/Male Literacy Ratio (Lagged 
Independent Variables) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err. 
Lagged Microfinance 2.23 1.16 2.14 2.09 10.00** 2.80 9.79** 3.07 
Period 8.87*** 0.26 11.63*** 0.45 9.49*** 0.86 8.83*** 0.92 
Lagged ln(Per capita SDP)   -4.30*** 0.53 -2.88*** 0.58 -3.04*** 0.61 
LaggedMicrofinance* 
ln(Per capita SDP)   -0.24 0.26 -3.74 68.55 -86.34 90.44 
Lagged Microfinance*A.P.     24.42 579.48 721.35 764.33 
Lagged 
Microfinance*Gujarat     -14.10** 4.12 -14.92*** 4.14 
Lagged 
Microfinance*Karnataka     22.28 580.75 721.20 766.5 
Lagged Microfinance*M.P.     -10.11** 3.24 -11.25** 3.49 
Lagged Microfinance*T.N.     22.40 585.33 729.05 772.57 
AndhraPradesh*Period     0.24 0.77 -0.14 0.83 
Gujarat*Period     -0.52 0.73 -0.52 0.75 
Karnataka*Period     0.92 0.75 0.62 0.80 
MadhyaPradesh*Period     3.09*** 0.75 2.74** 0.80 
TamilNadu*Period     1.07 0.89 0.85 0.84 
Lagged Women's rights       0.66 0.89 
Lagged Market       -0.19 1.11 
Lagged Urban       0.32** 0.10 
Lagged Scheduled Castes       0.31* 0.15 
Constant 29.06*** 0.59 55.42*** 3.20 46.99** 0.00 38.92*** 3.82 
N 516  516  516  511  
Within-R-Squared  0.832  0.846  0.869  0.872 
P > | F |    0.000  0.000  0.007 
Rho   0.863  0.879  0.906  0.890 
*p < .05         
**p < .01         
***p < .001         
 
343 
In Gujarat, districts with a women’s microfinance program during one time period have a 
literacy ratio that is about 4 percentage points lower than districts without a microfinance 
program ten years later.  In Madhya Pradesh, districts with a women’s microfinance program 
during one time period have a literacy ratio that is 0.11 percentage points lower than districts 
without a microfinance program ten years later, which substantively is very small.  This finding 
appears to be inconsistent with the fact that there is no statistically significant relationship 
between the lagged interaction effect of microfinance programs*region.  However, if one 
averages the coefficients for microfinance programs in the northern states, one finds that districts 
with a microfinance program present have a literacy ratio that is, on average, only about 2 
percentage points higher than districts with no microfinance programs ten years later.  
Substantively this is not much different than in southern states where the lagged presence of 
microfinance programs has no statistically significant impact on the literacy ratio ten years later.   
Model 4 of table 8.16 controls for the lagged effects of women’s rights programs, women’s 
market programs, percentage of population in urban areas, and percentage of population 
comprised of Scheduled Castes.  There is a statistically significant difference between this model 
and model 3 (p < .01); thus, model 4 is the best fit for the data.  There is a small, statistically 
significant relationship between the percentage of population in urban areas and the female/male 
literacy ratio ten years later (p < .01), and between the percentage of population comprised of 
Scheduled Castes and the literacy ratio ten years later (p < .05).  This is similar to the results of 
model 4 of table 8.15.  There continues to be a positive, statistically significant relationship 
between the presence of women’s microfinance programs and variation in the female/male 
literacy ratio in Rajasthan (p < .01).  In Rajasthan, districts with a microfinance program present 
during one decade have a female/male literacy ratio that is about 10 percentage points higher in 
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the following decade than districts with no microfinance program present.  The magnitude of this 
relationship is even greater than the magnitude of the relationship between the passage of time 
and change in the literacy ratio.  There is still a statistically significant difference between the 
lagged effect of microfinance programs on the literacy ratio in Rajasthan compared to the lagged 
effect of microfinance programs on the literacy ratio in Gujarat (p < .001) and in Madhya 
Pradesh (p < .01). The results of this model suggest that while in Rajasthan the presence of a 
women’s microfinance program during one decade has a positive impact on the literacy ratio in 
the following decade, in the states of Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh the presence of a 
microfinance program in one decade has a negative effect on the literacy ratio in the following 
decade.  Moreover, there is no statistically significant relationship between the lagged effect of 
microfinance programs and the literacy ratio in any of the southern states.  Therefore, this model 
provides qualified support for the neoliberal hypothesis that women’s microfinance programs 
have a positive impact on the female/male literacy ratio.  It is important to examine the 
coefficients and standard errors of the other variables in the model, though.  For instance, the 
coefficients for the lagged interaction effects of microfinance*Andhra Pradesh, 
microfinance*Karnataka, and microfinance*Tamil Nadu are all greater than 720, which is 
unusually high.  The standard errors for these coefficients are even higher.  These unusually high 
coefficients and standard errors for these variables may be due to the fact that by including 
lagged independent variables there is a loss of one wave of data.  Thus, this loss of information 
and degrees of freedom may lead to larger standard errors and less precise estimators (Allison 
2009).  
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8.6 DISCUSSION 
In the previous sections, I discussed the results of fixed-effects models that tested the 
modernization, WID, GAD, and neoliberal hypotheses for female/male literacy ratio.  In this 
section, I briefly summarize the results of the best model for each set of hypotheses.  I also 
present graphical displays of the relationships between female/male literacy ratio and the 
variables of interest for each set of hypotheses.  I include graphs that show regional and state-
wise differences in the change trajectories of female/male child sex ratio where the regional and 
state-wise interaction effects are statistically significant.  These graphs depict the predicted rates 
of change in the female/male literacy ratio with one independent variable at a time when all other 
variables are held constant.  I start by discussing the model results for the modernization 
hypotheses first. 
 
8.6.1 Results for Modernization hypotheses 
 
In the first set of models testing the modernization hypotheses, both log per capita SDP and 
percentage of population in urban areas are significantly related to an increase in the female/male 
literacy ratio.  Figure 8.1 Ln(per capita SDP) and predicted female/male literacy ratiois a 
graphical display of the relationship between log per capita SDP and the literacy ratio when all 
other independent variables are held constant. 
Even though there is a positive relationship between log per capita SDP and the 
female/male literacy ratio in both northern and southern districts, the magnitude of this 
relationship is larger in the north than in the south.  The contemporaneous effect of log per capita 
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SDP predicts that the female/male literacy ratio will be higher in northern districts than in 
southern districts by roughly 15 percentage points starting in 1961.   
ln(Per Capita SDP) and Predicted Female/Male Literacy 
Ratio by Region, 1961-2001
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Figure 8.1 Ln(per capita SDP) and predicted female/male literacy ratio 
 
By 2001, the female/male literacy ratio is predicted to be about 29 percentage points higher in 
northern districts than in southern districts, controlling for all other independent variables.  In 
fact, in southern districts there appears to be only a slight increase in the female/male literacy 
ratio as log per capita SDP increases. 
Figure 8.2 Urbanization and predicted female/male literacy ratiodepicts the change 
trajectory of female/male literacy ratio as percentage of population living in urban areas 
increases when all other variables are held constant.  There is a statistically significant difference 
between the effect of urbanization on the literacy ratio in northern difference than in southern 
districts.  However, while in northern districts a one percentage increase in the percentage of 
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population in urban areas is correlated with a 0.37 percentage point increase in the literacy ratio, 
in southern districts urbanization has no impact on the female/male literacy ratio. 
 
Urbanization and Predicted Female/Male Literacy Ratio, 
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Figure 8.2 Urbanization and predicted female/male literacy ratio 
 
Therefore, Figure 8.2 shows only the predicted change trajectory for the literacy ratio in the 
northern region.  An increase in urbanization from 1961 to 2001 is correlated with an increase in 
the female/male literacy ratio of about 9 percentage points in northern districts. 
Figure 8.3 Ln(per capita SDP) and state-wise predicted female/male literacy ratioshows 
the state-wise change in female/male literacy ratio over time with only log per capita SDP as the 
predictor and all other predictors held constant.  Although there are also interaction effects of 
each state and the passage of time, I do not include these in this graph so that I can more clearly 
highlight the relationship between log per capita SDP and female/male literacy ratio in each 
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state.  I use the actual value of log per capita SDP for each state to predict each state’s literacy 
ratio change trajectory.   
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Figure 8.3 Ln(per capita SDP) and state-wise predicted female/male literacy ratio 
 
Even though there is a positive relationship between the effect of log per capita SDP and 
female/male literacy ratio in Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh, in Gujarat and 
Tamil Nadu there is a  negative relationship between log per capita SDP and the literacy ratio.  
Rajasthan experiences the greatest increase in the female/male literacy ratio as log per capita 
SDP increases.  In Rajasthan, an increase in log per capita SDP from 1961 to 2001 is correlated 
with an increase in the literacy ratio of about 32 percentage points.  In Madhya Pradesh, an 
increase in log per capita SDP from 1961 to 2001 is correlated with an increase in the literacy 
ratio of about 14 percentage points, and in Andhra Pradesh it is correlated with an increase in the 
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literacy ratio of about 10 percentage points.  In both Gujarat and Tamil Nadu, an increase in log 
per capita SDP is correlated with a decrease in the female/male literacy ratio, although the rate of 
change is very small.  An increase in per capita SDP from 1961-2001 is correlated with a 
decrease in the female/male literacy ratio of about 3 percentage points in Tamil Nadu.  The 
decrease in female/male literacy ratio correlated to per capita SDP in Gujarat was even less.  In 
Karnataka an increase in per capita SDP from 1961-2001 is correlated with an increase in the 
literacy ratio of only about 1 percentage point. Therefore there is a statistically significant 
difference between the effect of log per capita SDP on the literacy ratio in Rajasthan and the 
effect of log per capita SDP on the literacy ratio in all five other states.  However, in Karnataka, 
Gujarat, and Tamil Nadu there is almost no predicted change at all in the female/male literacy 
ratio that is correlated with log per capita SDP.  
Figure 8.4 depicts the relationship between lagged log per capita SDP and regional 
variation in female/male literacy ratio, controlling for all other independent variables.  That is, 
values of log per capita SDP in 1961 predict values of female/male literacy ratio in 1971.  While 
log per capita SDP is correlated with an increase in female/male literacy ratio that occurs 
contemporaneously, lagged values of per capita SDP are correlated with a decrease in the 
female/male literacy ratio.  This is true in both northern and southern districts, although the 
magnitude of this change is steeper in northern districts.  Log per capita SDP in 1961 leads to a 
gap in the female/male literacy ratio between northern and southern districts in 1971 of roughly 
30 percentage points.  Whereas a tenfold increase in per capita SDP leads to a decrease in the 
female/male literacy ratio of about 6 percentage points ten years later in northern districts, a 
tenfold increase in per capita SDP leads to a decrease in the literacy ratio of about 1 percentage 
point in southern districts.   
350 
 
Lagged ln(Per Capita SDP) and Predicted Female/Male Literacy Ratio 
by Region, 1971-2001
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Figure 8.4 Lagged ln(per capita SDP) and predicted female/male literacy ratio by region 
In the north, an increase in the log per capita SDP from 1961 to 1991 predicts a net decrease in 
the female/male literacy ratio from 1971 to 2001 of about 10 percentage points, while in the 
south, an increase in the log per capita SDP from 1961 to 1991 predicts a net decrease in the 
female/male literacy ratio from 1971 to 2001 of about 2 percentage points.  
While lagged percentage of population in urban areas does not have a statistically 
significant relationship with female/male literacy ratio when state-wise interaction effects are 
controlled for, lagged percentage of population in urban areas does have a statistically significant 
relationship when regional interaction effects are controlled for.  Figure 8.5 depicts this 
relationship, controlling for all other independent variables.  Since there is no statistically 
significant difference in the lagged effects of urbanization on the female/male literacy ratio in the 
northern versus the southern region, Figure 8.5 depicts the average change in literacy ratio 
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caused by percentage of population in urban areas in earlier decades.  One can see that even 
though there is a statistically significant relationship between percentage of population in urban 
areas and an increase in the female/male literacy ratio ten years later, substantively this change is 
very small.   
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Figure 8.5 Lagged urbanization and predicted female/male literacy ratio 
 
An increase in percentage of population in urban areas from 1961-1991 leads to a net increase in 
the female/male literacy ratio from 1971-2001 of less than 5 percentage points.  This is partly 
due to the small magnitude of change in female/male literacy ratio that is explained by percent of 
population in urban areas during previous decades.  For every one percentage point increase in 
the percentage of population in urban areas, there is an increase in the literacy ratio of only 0.39 
percentage points ten years later.  However, this miniscule amount of change in the literacy ratio 
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predicted by percentage of population in urban areas is also due to the low rate of change in 
urbanization itself over time.  On average, the percentage of population living in urban areas 
increases by only 2 percentage points each decade (see Table 6.71 in chapter 6.)   
 
8.6.2 Results for Women-in-Development hypotheses 
 
Figure 8.6 depicts change in the female/male literacy ratio correlated with change in log per 
capita SDP, controlling all other variables in the WID models constant.  With every ten-fold 
increase in per capita SDP, there is an increase in the female/male literacy ratio of about 2 
percentage points.  Although this relationship is statistically significant, one can see from the 
graph that there is very little change in the female/male literacy ratio as log per capita SDP 
increases from 1961 to 1991.  During this period, log per capita SDP is correlated with an 
increase in the literacy ratio of less than 5 percentage points.  However, between 1991 and 2001 
the average per capita SDP increased almost forty-fold, with an increase in the literacy ratio of 
about 8 percentage points. 
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Figure 8.6 Ln(per capita SDP) and predicted female/male literacy ratio 
 
Figure 8.7 shows the correlation between the presence of women’s market programs and 
the joint effect of women’s market*microfinance programs on variation in the female/male 
literacy ratio over time.  The blue line depicts change in female/male literacy ratio with only time 
as a predictor, while the other lines depict change in female/male literacy ratio with time and 
either market programs or market*microfinance programs as predictors.  One can see that the 
passage of time accounts for an increase in the literacy ratio of about 22 percentage points from 
1961 to 2001.  Districts with a women’s market program present experience a female/male 
literacy ratio that is about 3 percentage points higher than districts without a market program at 
each time point.  What is interesting is that districts with both a women’s market program and a 
women’s microfinance program experience a female/male literacy ratio that is about 0.5 
percentage points higher than districts with neither type of program at each time point. 
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Figure 8.7 Women’s market programs, microfinance programs, and predicted female/male literacy ratio 
 
There are two possible explanations for this.  One is that development organizations target 
districts with very unequal gender relations or with especially high poverty levels, and thus have 
both women’s market and microfinance programs present.  Thus, it is possible that very unequal 
gender relations and/or high poverty levels leads to an increased presence of women’s programs, 
rather than the presence of both types of women’s programs causing a decline in the literacy 
ratio.  Another possibility is that in districts with women’s market and microfinance programs 
present, there are a greater number of women who keep their daughters at home to take care of 
domestic chores so that the women/mothers can devote more time to their income-generating 
activities. This last possibility is especially troubling given the fact that the goal of women’s 
development programs is to raise the quality of life of women and girls.  
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Figure 8.8 shows the correlation between the presence of women’s market programs, 
microfinance programs, and the joint effect of women’s market*microfinance programs on 
variation in the female/male literacy ratio over time, controlling for all other variables in the 
WID models including the state-wise interaction effects.   
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Figure 8.8 Women’s market programs, microfinance programs, and state-wise predicted                   
female/male literacy ratio 
 
When the state-wise interaction effects are controlled for, the passage of time explains an 
increase in the female/male literacy ratio of about 33 percentage points from 1961 to 2001.  
Districts with microfinance programs experience a female/male literacy ratio that is 4 percentage 
points higher than districts with no women’s programs, while districts with a women’s market 
program experience a literacy ratio that is about 7 percentage points higher than districts with no 
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women’s program.  Districts with both a market program and a microfinance program also have 
a literacy ratio that is about 7 percentage points higher than districts with no women’s program.   
Figure 8.9 depicts state-wise change in the female/male literacy ratio that is correlated 
with the presence of women’s market programs when all other independent variables in the WID 
models beside the passage of time are held constant.   
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Figure 8.9 Women’s market programs and state-wise predicted female/male literacy ratio 
 
The passage of time alone accounts for an increase in the female/male literacy ratio of a little 
over 30 percentage points from 1961 to 2001. Even though there is a statistically significant 
difference between the effect of market programs on the literacy ratio in Andhra Pradesh and the 
effect of market programs on the literacy ratio in Rajasthan, substantively there is almost no 
difference between the female/male literacy ratio in districts of Andhra Pradesh that have a 
market program and the average change in female/male literacy ratio for all districts with no 
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women’s program present.  In Rajasthan, districts with a women’s market program have a 
literacy ratio that is 6.64 percentage points higher than districts with no women’s program at 
each time point.  In Andhra Pradesh, districts with a women’s market program have a literacy 
ratio that is 6.76 percentage points lower than the literacy ratio for districts in Rajasthan with a 
women’s market program.  This means that in Andhra Pradesh, districts with a women’s market 
program experience a female/male literacy ratio that is 0.12 percentage points lower than the 
average literacy ratio for all districts with no women’s program.  Districts in Gujarat state that 
have a market program have a literacy ratio that is about 3 percentage points lower than districts 
with no women’s programs at each time point, while districts in Madhya Pradesh that have a 
market program have a literacy ratio that is about 2 percentage points higher than districts with 
no women’s programs present. 
Figure 8.10 depicts the predicted change trajectory of female/male literacy ratio that is 
predicted by lagged log per capita SDP when all other independent variables in the WID models 
are held constant.  While log per capita SDP is correlated with an increase in the 
contemporaneously-occurring female/male literacy ratio, an increase in log per capita SDP is 
correlated with a decrease in the female/male literacy ratio ten years later.  As can be seen from 
figure 8.10, change in lagged log per capita SDP from 1961 to 2001 leads to a net decrease in the 
female/male literacy ratio of about 7 or 8 percentage points from 1971 to 2001.  A tenfold 
increase in per capita SDP leads to a decrease in the literacy ratio of about 4 percentage points 
ten years later.  Moreover, in the WID models with lagged values of independent variables, there 
is no statistically significant relationship between the presence of women’s market or 
microfinance programs and the literacy ratio, nor is there a significant relationship between the 
regional interaction effects and the female/male literacy ratio. 
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Figure 8.10 Lagged ln(per capita SDP) and predicted female/male literacy ratio 
 
In the WID models with lagged independent variables and the regional interaction terms, 
the magnitude of change in the female/male literacy ratio that is predicted by lagged percentage 
of population in urban areas is almost identical to the magnitude of change in the literacy ratio 
that is predicted by lagged percentage of population in urban areas in the modernization models.  
Therefore, I do not present a graph of change in the female/male literacy ratio predicted by 
lagged percentage of population in urban areas for the WID models with the regional interaction 
terms.  Moreover, in the WID models with lagged independent variables that include the state-
wise interaction terms, there are no statistically significant relationships between the lagged 
market*microfinance interaction effects, the lagged market*states interaction effects, or the 
lagged microfinance*states interaction effects and variation in the female/male literacy ratio.  An 
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increase in lagged percentage of population living in urban areas still predicts a slight increase in 
the female/male literacy ratio, although the magnitude of this relationship is almost identical to 
the magnitude of this relationship in the modernization models with lagged percentage of 
population in urban areas, as well as the WID models with lagged percentage of population in 
urban areas and the regional interaction effects.   
Figure 8.11 shows the relationship between a lagged increase in log per capita SDP and a 
decrease in the female/male literacy ratio when all of the WID variables are controlled for, 
including the state-wise interaction terms. 
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Figure 8.11 Lagged ln(per capita SDP) and predicted female/male literacy ratio 
 
The change trajectory of female/male literacy ratio that lagged log per capita SDP predicts in this 
model is very similar to the change trajectory of female/male literacy ratio predicted by lagged 
log per capita SDP in figure 8.10.  The rate of decline in the literacy ratio is only slightly less in 
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the lagged model that controls for state-wise interaction terms than it is in the lagged model that 
controls for regional interaction terms.  In the former model (depicted in Figure 8.10), a tenfold 
increase in the per capita SDP leads to a decrease in the literacy ratio of about 3 percentage 
points ten years later, whereas in the latter model a tenfold increase in the per capita SDP leads 
to a decrease in the literacy ratio of about 4 percentage points ten years later. 
 
8.6.3 Results for Gender-and-Development hypotheses 
 
Figure 8.12 shows the relationship between the presence of women’s microfinance programs, the 
joint effect of market and microfinance programs, and change in the female/male literacy ratio 
for the GAD models with unlagged independent variables and regional interaction terms. 
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Figure 8.12 Women’s microfinance programs, market programs, and predicted female/male literacy ratio 
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The passage of time leads to an increase in the female/male literacy ratio of a little over 20 
percentage points from 1961 to 2001.  Districts with a microfinance program experience a 
literacy ratio that is about 3 percentage points higher at every time point than the literacy ratio of 
districts with no women’s programs.  Similar to the results shown in Figure 8.7, Figure 8.12 
shows that districts with both a women’s market program and microfinance program present 
experience a female/male literacy ratio that is almost the same as the literacy ratio of districts 
with no women’s programs present.  The GAD models that control for state-wise interaction 
effects yield similar results for the effects of women’s microfinance programs and the joint effect 
of women’s microfinance and market programs on variation in the female/male literacy ratio.   
 
8.6.4 Results for Neoliberal hypotheses 
 
The change trajectory of female/male literacy ratio that log per capita SDP predicts for the 
neoliberal models with regional interaction effects is almost identical to the trajectory of 
female/male literacy ratio depicted in figure 8.6 for the WID models with regional interaction 
effects.  In both the neoliberal models and the WID model of figure 8.6, every tenfold increase in 
per capita SDP is correlated with an increase in the female/male literacy ratio of about 2 
percentage points. 
Figure 8.13 shows the change trajectory of the female/male literacy ratio for districts in 
four states that have microfinance programs present, controlling for all other variables beside 
time that are in the neoliberal models.  On average, districts with no women’s programs present 
experience an increase in the female/male literacy ratio of about 4 percentage points each 
decade.  From 1961 to 2001, the passage of time alone accounts for an increase in the 
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female/male literacy ratio of about 15 percentage points.  In Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, 
districts with microfinance programs experienced almost the same increase in female/male 
literacy ratio, holding all other variables beside time constant.   
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Figure 8.13 Women’s microfinance programs and state-wise predicted female/male literacy ratio 
 
At each time point, districts in Rajasthan with microfinance programs had a literacy ratio 
that was about 9 percentage points higher than districts in Rajasthan with no microfinance 
programs. At each time point, districts in Andhra Pradesh with microfinance programs had a 
female/male literacy ratio that was about 4 percentage points higher than the female/male 
literacy ratio of districts with no women’s programs, while in Tamil Nadu districts with a 
microfinance program present had a female/male literacy ratio that was about 3 percentage 
points higher than the literacy ratio of districts with no women’s program present.  Districts in 
Gujarat state that have a microfinance program fare the worst in terms of the female/male 
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literacy ratio.  In Gujarat, districts with a microfinance program have a female/male literacy ratio 
that is about 2 percentage points lower than the literacy ratio for districts with no women’s 
program present.  The slopes of the change trajectories for districts in Andhra Pradesh, Tamil 
Nadu, and Gujarat states with women’s microfinance programs are the same as the slope of the 
change trajectory for all districts in Rajasthan with microfinance programs present. 
While there is a statistically significant relationship between the contemporaneous 
presence of women’s microfinance programs and the female/male literacy ratio in Rajasthan, 
Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Gujarat states, there is not a statistically significant 
relationship between the lagged presence of women’s microfinance programs and the literacy 
ratio in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu states.  There is, however, a statistically significant 
relationship between the lagged presence of women’s microfinance programs and the literacy 
ratio in Madhya Pradesh.  Figure 8.14 displays the lagged effects of women’s microfinance 
programs on change in the female/male literacy ratio for Rajasthan, Gujarat, and Madhya 
Pradesh states.  The passage of time alone accounts for an increase in the female/male literacy 
ratio of about 27 percentage points from 1971 to 2001, controlling for the lagged effects of all 
other independent variables.  Districts with microfinance programs in Gujarat in previous 
decades have a female/male literacy ratio that is about 15 percentage points lower than the 
female/male literacy ratio of districts in Rajasthan with microfinance programs.  Districts with 
microfinance programs in Madhya Pradesh in previous decades have a female/male literacy ratio 
that is about 12 percentage points lower than the female/male literacy ratio of districts in 
Rajasthan with women’s microfinance programs.   
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Figure 8.14 Lagged effect of women’s microfinance programs and state-wise predicted                    
female/male literacy ratio 
8.7 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have discussed at length the results of the models that estimate the impact of log 
per capita SDP, the percentage of population living in urban areas, and the presence of women’s 
market programs, women’s microfinance programs, and women’s rights programs on variation 
in the female/male literacy ratio.  I have also accounted for regional as well as state-wise 
interaction effects, as well as the lagged effect of these variables on the literacy ratio.  While 
there is a positive, statistically significant relationship between log per capita SDP and 
contemporaneous female/male literacy ratio in seven of the eight models that include unlagged 
independent variables, there is a negative, statistically significant relationship between lagged 
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log per capita SDP and the female/male literacy ratio in all but one of the models that include 
lagged independent variables.  In one model that includes both lagged independent variables and 
state-wise interaction terms, there is a small, statistically significant relationship between an 
increase in log per capita SDP and an increase in the literacy ratio in Gujarat and Tamil Nadu 
states.  Even in this model, however, there is a negative relationship between lagged log per 
capita SDP and the literacy ratio in all other states.  This implies that while log per capita SDP 
and female/male literacy ratio increase simultaneously, an increase in the log per capita SDP 
actually leads to a decrease in the female/male literacy ratio ten years later.  There is a positive, 
statistically significant relationship between percentage of population living in urban areas and 
the female/male literacy ratio in only one of the models that include unlagged independent 
variables.  However, in seven out of eight models with lagged independent variables, there is a 
positive, statistically significant (though substantively very small) relationship between the 
percentage of population living in urban areas and the female/male literacy ratio.  Therefore, 
there is evidence that supports the modernization hypothesis that an increase in percentage of 
population in urban areas will lead to an increase in the female/male literacy ratio.  However, the 
increase in literacy ratio caused by an increase in percentage of population in urban areas is very 
small—usually an increase of about 1 female/1,000 males for every 3 percentage-point increase 
in urbanization.  Substantively, there is stronger evidence for the WID hypothesis that an 
increase in log per capita SDP will lead to a decrease in the female/male literacy ratio.  There is a 
positive, statistically significant relationship between the presence of market programs and 
literacy ratio and/or between the presence of microfinance programs and literacy ratio in five of 
the eight models with unlagged independent variables.  However, there is a positive, statistically 
significant relationship between the lagged effect of the presence of women’s microfinance 
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programs and the literacy ratio in only one of the eight models with lagged independent 
variables.  Moreover, in this model the negative interaction effects of microfinance 
programs*states outweigh the positive main effect of microfinance programs in Gujarat and 
Madhya Pradesh states.  There is no statistically significant correlation between the presence of 
women’s market programs and variation in the female/male literacy ratio in any of the models 
that included lagged independent variables.   Therefore, while there may be a number of districts 
with women’s market programs or women’s microfinance programs and the female/male literacy 
ratio may increase simultaneously, one cannot conclude that the presence of women’s market or 
microfinance programs causes this increase in female/male literacy ratio.  There is therefore little 
to no evidence in support of the WID, GAD, or neoliberal hypotheses that relate to the presence 
of women’s market, microfinance, or women’s rights programs. 
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9.0 CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION 
Do development programs and organizations designed for women really help raise women’s 
status and promote gender equality in India?  Which programs and organizations benefit women 
the most?  Since India won independence in 1947, economists, scholars, and practitioners have 
developed and implemented numerous programs to mitigate female poverty, low women’s 
status, and gender inequality.  However, gender disparities in education, health care, political 
representation, and the overall female/male sex ratio persist (Bhan 2001).   
According to early modernization scholars, as traditional societies adopt “modern,” 
Western expectations and values, they become more urbanized and economically developed 
(Webster 1990), less authoritarian and male-dominated, and more egalitarian and democratic 
(Jacquette 1982).  Development practitioners who designed programs for Indian women 
grounded in the modernization paradigm focused on teaching rural women about nutrition, 
childcare, and home decorating.  They also tried to instill new, Western values and ideas in these 
Indian women (Berry 2007). 
Development agencies with a neoliberal ideology view the integration of women into the 
global market as the most efficient way of boosting a developing nation’s economy (Sharma 
2008), while also lifting families out of poverty, raising women’s status, and reducing gender 
inequality (Mayoux 1995, Cheston and Kuhn 2002, Ahmed et. al. 2001).  Nicholas Kristof and 
Sheryll WuDunn, winners of the 2009 Pulitzer Prize, argue that microcredit empowers women to 
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start successful businesses, provide for the needs of their families, and counteract domestic 
violence (Kristof and WuDunn 2009).   
Other researchers do not see neoliberal development projects such as microcredit 
schemes in such a rosy light.  Feiner and Barker (2006) criticize neoliberal policymakers’ 
emphasis on microcredit programs, arguing that microcredit programs reproduce rather than 
eradicate female poverty in poor nations.  Also, Rankin (2002) argues that the social networks 
women build through microlending groups may actually reinforce gender and caste hierarchies 
rather than help overcome them.   
Women-in-development (WID) theorists, like modernization theorists, assume that 
industrialization and the rise of capitalism are beneficial for all societies (Tinker 1997).  
However, they argue that women will benefit only if they are fully integrated into the economic 
and political spheres (Tinker 1997).   
Gender-and-Development (GAD) researchers have a very different vision of 
development than those coming from a neoliberal paradigm.  GAD theorists argue that it is 
necessary to analyze the power relations between women and men in the domestic and public 
spheres, and how these spheres overlap in women’s lives, in order to raise gender equality 
(Young 1997).  Whereas neoliberal researchers emphasize women’s need for greater access to 
credit, GAD theorists and practitioners argue that women need to organize to gain political 
power in the economic system.   
The objective of this study has been to examine whether material development 
(associated with modernization theory), women’s market-based development programs (based on 
WID theory), women’s empowerment programs (rooted in GAD theory), or women’s 
microfinance programs (based on neoliberal theory) best promote gender equality in India.  I 
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have analyzed the effects that the passage of time, urbanization, state-level economic growth, 
and the presence, absence, and combination of various types of women’s development programs 
have on district-level variation in gender inequality in India from 1961-2001.   
In the following section, I present two tables that summarize the results of the models 
testing the modernization and WID hypotheses.  I do not include tables summarizing the results 
of the GAD models or the neoliberal models because none of the results were statistically 
significant for these models.  I also discuss possible reasons for why there are no statistically 
significant relationships between the different types of women’s programs and the female/male 
child sex ratio and literacy ratio.  Finally, I discuss the policy implications of my dissertation 
findings, as well as avenues for exploration in future research.  
Table 9.1 below provides a summary of the results for the models testing the 
modernization hypotheses about the effects of economic growth and urbanization on the 
female/male child sex ratio and the female/male literacy ratio.  
The results of the unlagged models for female/male child sex ratio that test the 
modernization hypotheses show that there is no relationship between economic growth nor 
between urbanization and the child sex ratio.  However, the lagged models that test the 
modernization hypotheses indicate that there is a negative correlation between per capita SDP 
and the female/male child sex ratio.  This is the opposite of what modernization theory predicts 
in Hypothesis 1a:  “An increase in urbanization and per capita SDP will lead to an increase in the 
female/male child sex ratios and female/male literacy ratios.” 
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Therefore, there is no support for the modernization hypotheses regarding the female/male child 
sex ratio.  However, this also means that these results are consistent with the first WID 
hypothesis, which predicts that an increase in economic growth will lead to a decrease in the 
female/male child sex ratio.   
Table 9.1 Outcomes of Modernization Hypotheses 
Hypotheses Female/Male Child Sex Ratio Female/Male Literacy Ratio 
H1a: An increase in urbanization  Unlagged: No relationship  Unlagged: Positive relationship 
and per capita SDP will lead to  between SDP and child sex ratio.  between SDP and literacy ratio. 
an increase female/male child  No relationship between urbanization Positive relationship between  
sex ratios and female/male and child sex ratio. urbanization and literacy ratio. 
literacy ratios. Lagged: Negative relationship  Lagged: Negative relationship 
 between SDP and child sex ratio. between SDP and literacy ratio. 
 No relationship between urbanization Positive relationship between  
  and child sex ratio. urbanization and literacy ratio. 
H1b: An increase in urbanization  Unlagged: No relationship between Unlagged: Negative relationship 
and per capita SDP will have a  SDP*region and child sex ratio. between SDP*region and literacy ratio. 
greater impact on increases in  No relationship between urban*region Negative relationship between 
female/male child sex ratios  and child sex ratio. urban*region and literacy ratio. 
and literacy ratios in southern  Lagged: No relationship between Lagged: Positive relationship between 
states than in northern states. SDP*region and child sex ratio. 
SDP*region and literacy ratio. 
However, this is because the negative 
 No relationship between  
relationship between lagged SDP and 
literacy ratio is less steep in southern  
districts than in northern districts. 
 urban*region and child sex ratio. No relationship between  
    urban*region and literacy ratio. 
 
The results of the unlagged models for female/male literacy ratio indicate that there is a 
positive relationship between both per capita SDP and urbanization and the female/male literacy 
ratio.  Therefore these results do support the first modernization hypothesis: economic growth 
and increased urbanization lead to increased female/male literacy ratio.  This increase in the 
female/male literacy ratio is due to the fact that literacy rates for both males and females has 
increased throughout the period of 1961-2001, but on average the literacy rate for women and 
girls has increased more rapidly than the literacy rate for men and boys.  Once lagged 
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independent variables are included in the models, there is still a small yet positive relationship 
between urbanization and the literacy ratio.   However, there is a negative relationship between 
lagged log per capita SDP and the female/male literacy ratio, indicating that we should reject the 
first modernization hypothesis and accept the first WID hypothesis.  This finding is consistent 
with the results of the lagged models testing the first modernization hypothesis. 
The finding that increased urbanization leads to an increase in the female/male literacy 
ratio confirms the findings of other researchers who have found that in some states, female 
literacy rates and school enrollment rates tend to be much greater in urban areas than rural areas.  
For instance, one study found that in Madhya Pradesh about 59% of urban women were literate 
in 1991, but only about 20% of rural women were literate that same year (Panchamukhi 2006).  
In urban areas, the net enrollment rate (NER) for girls was 87%, but girls’ NER in rural areas 
was only 67%.  Girls’ enrollment rates and female/male enrollment ratios in Rajasthan follow a 
similar pattern.   In urban areas, the female/male enrollment ratio for children aged 6-10 years 
was 97%, whereas in rural areas the enrollment ratio was about 76% (Ray 2006). 
The second modernization hypothesis states that economic growth and urbanization will 
have a greater positive effect on female/male child sex ratios and literacy ratios in southern 
regions than in northern regions.  However, the models that include unlagged independent 
variables and lagged independent variables that test the second modernization hypothesis for the 
female/male child sex ratio reveal that there is no relationship between the regional interaction 
effect of per capita SDP and the child sex ratio, nor between the regional interaction effect of 
urbanization and the child sex ratio.   
The unlagged models that tested this hypothesis for the female/male literacy ratio show 
that while per capita SDP has a positive relationship with the literacy ratio, the magnitude of this 
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relationship is slightly smaller in the south than in the north. While urbanization is correlated 
with an increase in literacy ratios in the north, it has no impact on literacy ratios in the south.  
Both findings are the opposite of what is expected from hypothesis 1b.   The results for the 
models with lagged independent variables reveal that there is a negative relationship between 
lagged log per capita SDP and the female/male literacy ratio in northern regions.  Every tenfold 
increase in per capita SDP is correlated with a decrease in the female/male literacy ratio of about 
6 percentage points ten years later. In southern regions, every tenfold increase in the per capita 
SDP is correlated with a decrease in the literacy ratio of about 1 percentage point ten years later. 
There is no relationship between lagged urbanization and the female/male literacy ratio.  
Therefore, the models for female/male literacy ratio do not support the second modernization 
hypothesis that states that economic growth and urbanization will have a greater positive impact 
in southern regions than in northern regions.  
The descriptive analyses in chapter six indicate that the female/male literacy ratio has 
increased in most districts from 1961-2001.  However, the model results for the modernization 
hypotheses show that neither economic growth nor urbanization are causing this increase in the 
female/male literacy ratio.  This increase in female/male literacy rates may be due to the 
educational policies that Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan states have implemented.  Madhya 
Pradesh and Rajasthan historically have had literacy rates that were below the national average 
(Mehotra 2006), but both states have implemented some innovative educational programs in the 
late 1980s through the 1990s.  The overall literacy rate in Madhya Pradesh increased 20 
percentage points between 1991-2001, and the female literacy rate increased by 22 percentage 
points during the same period (Panchamukhi 2006).  In Rajasthan the female literacy rate 
increased 24 percentage points in between 1991-2001 (Ray 2006).   
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Table 9.2 Outcomes of Women-in-Development Hypotheses 
Hypotheses Female/Male Child Sex Ratio Female/Male Literacy Ratio 
H2a: An increase in urbanization and Unlagged: No relationship between Unlagged: Positive relationship between 
economic growth alone will lead to a SDP and child sex ratio.  SDP and literacy ratio. 
decrease in female/male child sex ratios No relationship between urbanization No relationship between  
and female/male literacy ratios. and child sex ratio. urbanization and literacy ratio. 
 Lagged: Negative relationship  Lagged: Negative relationship between 
 between SDP and child sex ratio. SDP and literacy ratio. 
 No relationship between urbanization Positive relationship between 
  and child sex ratio. urbanization and literacy ratio. 
H2b: The presence of women's Unlagged: No relationship between Unlagged: Positive relationship between 
market programs will lead to  women's market programs and  women's market programs and  
increases in female/male child sex ratios child sex ratio. literacy ratio. 
and female/male literacy ratios. Lagged: No relationship between  Lagged: No relationship between  
 women's market programs and  women's market programs and  
  child sex ratio. literacy ratio. 
H2c: The presence of women's  Unlagged: No relationship between Unlagged: Negative relationship between 
market programs and women's market*microcredit and child sex ratio 
women's market*microcredit and literacy 
ratio. 
microfinance programs jointly will have Lagged: No relationship between  Lagged: No relationship between  
a greater impact than women's market market*microcredit and child sex ratio 
women's market*microcredit and literacy 
ratio. 
programs alone in raising female/male   
child sex ratios and female/male    
literacy ratios.     
H2d: The presence of women's market Unlagged: No relationship between Unlagged: No relationship between  
programs and women's microfinance market*region and child sex ratio. market*region and literacy ratio. 
programs will have a greater impact on No relationship between  No relationship between  
increases in female/male child sex ratios microcredit*region and child sex ratio. microcredit*region and literacy ratio. 
and female/male literacy ratios in  Lagged:  No relationship between Lagged: No relationship between  
southern states than in northern states. market*region and child sex ratio. market*region and literacy ratio. 
 No relationship between  No relationship between  
  microcredit*region and child sex ratio. microcredit*region and literacy ratio. 
 
Table 9.2 provides a summary of the results for the models testing the women-in-
development hypotheses.  In the models with unlagged independent variables that test the WID 
hypotheses, there is no relationship between economic growth and the female/male child sex 
ratio, nor between urbanization and the child sex ratio. There is no relationship between 
urbanization and the child sex ratio even after lagged independent variables are included in the 
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models.  Once lagged independent variables are included in the models, there is a negative 
relationship between per capita SDP and the child sex ratio.  These results confirm the findings 
of the modernization models.  Just as with the modernization models, I can accept the first WID 
hypothesis, which states that economic growth and urbanization will lead to a decrease in the 
child sex ratio.  
The findings of the modernization and WID models that test the relationship between 
economic growth and the female/male child sex ratio replicate the findings of some cross-
national studies about economic growth and gender inequality.  For example, Young et al. (1994) 
analyzed quantitative data from 70 countries on a range of gender inequality indicators related to 
physical well-being, political representation, family formation, education, and economic activity. 
Young et al. (1994) found that the number of females per 100 males was lower in higher-income 
nations than in lower-income nations.  Young et al.’s finding is similar to the finding of this 
dissertation that lagged economic growth is correlated with a decrease in the female/male child 
sex ratio. 
In the models with unlagged independent variables that test the WID hypotheses for the 
literacy ratio, there is a positive relationship between log per capita SDP and variation in the 
female/male literacy ratio, which is the opposite of what hypothesis 2a predicts.  However, there 
is no relationship between urbanization and the literacy ratio.  Once lagged independent variables 
are included in the models testing the WID hypotheses, there is a negative relationship between 
lagged log per capita SDP and the female/male literacy ratio. There is a positive relationship 
between lagged urbanization and the literacy ratio, however. While there is a positive, 
statistically significant relationship between log per capita SDP and contemporaneous 
female/male literacy ratio  in seven of the eight models that include unlagged independent 
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variables, there is a negative, statistically significant relationship between lagged log per capita 
SDP and the female/male literacy ratio in all of the models that include lagged independent 
variables.  This implies that while log per capita SDP and female/male literacy ratio increase 
simultaneously, an increase in the log per capita SDP actually leads to a decrease in the 
female/male literacy ratio ten years later. In seven out of eight models with lagged independent 
variables, there is a positive, statistically significant (though substantively very small) 
relationship between the percentage of population living in urban areas and the female/male 
literacy ratio.  Therefore, there is evidence that supports the modernization hypothesis that an 
increase in percentage of population in urban areas will lead to an increase in the female/male 
literacy ratio.  However, the increase in literacy ratio caused by an increase in percentage of 
population in urban areas is very small—usually an increase of about 1 female/1,000 males for 
every 3 percentage-point increase in urbanization.  Substantively, there is stronger evidence for 
the WID hypothesis that an increase in lagged log per capita SDP will lead to a decrease in the 
female/male literacy ratio. 
In the unlagged models testing the WID hypotheses, there is a positive relationship 
between the presence of women’s market programs and the female/male literacy ratio. However, 
once lagged independent variables are included in the models, there is no longer a relationship 
between the presence of women’s market programs and the female/male literacy ratio. While in 
models with unlagged independent variables there is a negative relationship between the joint 
effect of women’s market programs*microfinance programs and the female/male literacy ratio, 
in models with lagged independent variables there is no relationship between the interaction 
effects of women’s market programs*microfinance programs and literacy ratio. However, there 
is no correlation between the interaction effect of market programs*region and the literacy ratio, 
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nor between the interaction effect of microfinance programs*region and the literacy ratio in any 
of the models testing the WID hypotheses. Moreover, there is no relationship between the 
presence of market programs and the female/male child sex ratio, nor between the joint effect of 
market*microfinance programs and the child sex ratio.  This is the case for both models with 
lagged and unlagged independent variables.  There is also no difference in the impact that 
women’s market programs have on the child sex ratio in northern versus southern regions.  There 
is therefore no evidence for hypothesis 2c or 2d. 
While the results for the lagged models for change in female/male child sex ratios and 
female/male literacy ratios seem to indicate that economic growth leads to a decrease in both 
gender inequality measures, it is important to consider that there may be other factors that are 
actually causing the changes in female/male child sex ratios and female/male literacy ratios.  
Lagged per capita SDP is correlated with a decrease in female/male literacy ratios despite the 
fact that female/male literacy ratios have actually increased over time. Moreover, the passage of 
time seems to explain most of the variance in child sex ratios and literacy ratios, even after 
including all other variables in the models.  The passage of time is correlated with a decrease of 
about 10 to 13 females/1,000 males per decade in 11 out of 16 models regarding change in the 
female/male child sex ratio.  In all but one of the unlagged models regarding change in the 
female/male literacy ratio, time is correlated with an increase in the literacy ratio of between 3 
and 6 percentage points per decade.  In 7 out of 8 of the lagged models, time is correlated with an 
increase in the female/male literacy ratio of between 8 and 12 percentage points per decade.  
However, it is highly unlikely that the mere passing of time is what is causing the female/male 
child sex ratio to decrease and the female/male literacy ratio to increase.  Therefore, there must 
be other factors that are driving the changes in female/male child sex ratios and female/male 
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literacy ratios.  In the next few paragraphs I discuss some of these possible causes of the decline 
in the female/male child sex ratio.  I discuss the negative correlation between SDP and the 
female/male literacy ratio later on in this chapter. 
India has experienced rapid economic growth from the 1950s to the present.  Beginning 
in the 1980s, India’s economic growth began to soar.  The per capita SDP increased from about 
Rs. 9,400 per capita in 1980-81 to about Rs. 18,100 per capita in 2000-2001 (Chandramouli 
2011).  From 2000-01 to 2009-2010, the SDP per capita had more than doubled, reaching as high 
as Rs. 37,000 per capita.  However, there are great disparities in the distribution of this wealth.  
In 2005, the poorest decile of the population controlled only 3.6% of household income, while 
the richest decile of the population controlled 31.1% of India’s income (CIA World Factbook 
2005).  During 1994-2000, consumption expenditure per capita increased an average of 16.6% a 
year in urban areas, but only increased an average of 8.7% a year in rural areas (Guha 2007).  
This disparity between urban and rural areas in terms of economic growth is also reflected in the 
percentages of GDP that are comprised by the (rural) agricultural sector and the mostly urban 
service sector. At Independence, almost 75% of India’s employed population worked in the 
agricultural sector, and the agricultural sector accounted for almost 60% of India’s GDP (Guha 
2007).    In 2009, the agricultural sector comprised only 17% of India’s GDP, even though over 
half of the labor force worked in the agricultural sector (CIA World Factbook 2009).  Moreover, 
the service sector accounted for almost 55% of India’s GDP even though only about one-third of 
the labor force worked in this sector.  Therefore, although economic growth may not cause a 
decrease in the female/male child sex ratios and female/male literacy ratios, it has not benefitted 
all segments of the population equally. 
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If economic growth itself does not cause a decrease in the female/male child sex ratio, 
what else may cause this decline?  An examination of trends in child mortality can provide us 
with some clues.  The infant and child mortality rates have drastically declined over the past 
several decades.  Around the time of India’s independence in 1947, the infant mortality rate was 
180 deaths per 1,000 live births (Dreze and Sen 2002). By 2009 the infant mortality rate had 
dropped to 50 deaths per 1,000 live births (UNICEF 2011).  The child mortality rate (0-4 years 
old) dropped from 186 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1970 to 66 deaths per 1,000 live births in 
2009 (Dreze and Sen 2002, UNICEF 2011).   However, the female/male child mortality ratio 
increased from the early 1970s to the late 1990s. During the period of 1970-72, the female/male 
child mortality ratio (0-4 years) was 1.1 (Dreze and Sen 2002).  This means that for every 100 
boys under five years who died, there were 110 girls in the same age range who died.  By the 
period of 1996-98, the female/male child mortality ratio (0-4 years) had increased to 1.14, or 114 
girls per 100 boys who died.  The female/male child mortality ratio increased even more among 
children 5-9 years of age.  The female/male child mortality ratio increased from 110 girls per 100 
boys in 1971 to 135 girls per 100 boys in 1996 (Dreze and Sen 2002).  This shows that while 
overall child mortality rates have decreased, female child mortality rates have decreased less for 
girls than they have for boys. 
The Indian government initiated the Universal Immunisation Programme in 1985, which 
resulted in a dramatic increase in child immunization rates (Dreze and Sen 2002).  However, 
even by 1998-99, less than 50% of children aged 12-23 months were fully immunized 
(International Institute of Population Sciences 2000, cited in Dreze and Sen 2002).  Moreover, 
even though India’s GDP increased an average of 7% per year from 1990-91 to 2000-2001, the 
government spent only 0.8% of GDP on health care from 1990-1998 (Chandramouli 2011, Dreze 
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and Sen 2002).  It is possible that parents who cannot afford to immunize all of their children 
may give preference to their sons over their daughters in this matter. 
One of the main focuses of this study has been to test the relative merits of women’s 
rights programs, women’s market programs, and women’s microfinance programs in raising the 
female/male child sex ratio and female/male literacy ratio.  However, the results of this study 
show that there is no relationship between any of these types of women’s programs and district-
level variation in the child sex ratio or literacy ratio.  This is most likely because the scope and 
reach of these programs is too small to impact change in the child sex ratios and literacy ratios at 
the district level.  Some women’s development organizations, such as the Self-Employed 
Women’s Association (SEWA), have a relatively large number of members, while others operate 
in only a few blocks of one or two districts.  SEWA had about 500,000 members in Gujarat state 
in 2005 across all of its programs, including the cooperatives (market programs), microcredit 
programs, and its labor union wing (Panda 2007).   The total population of Gujarat state in 2001 
was over 50 million people, and over 24 million women (Census of India 2001).  This means that 
even if SEWA’s membership in Gujarat was as high as 500,000 members in 2001, its 
membership still would have included only around 2% of Gujarat state’s women. Other 
development organizations with women’s programs operate on a much smaller scale than 
SEWA.  For example, India Development Services operates in only one census block of 
Dharwad district, Karnataka (Viswanath 1991).  One limitation of my study is that it does not 
take into account the overall effectiveness of the women’s programs.  India Development 
Services started a dairy project for women through which they gave women loans to buy cattle, 
properly care for their cattle, and market their milk more effectively (Viswanath 1991).  
However, many of the women used the loans they received for purposes other than purchasing 
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livestock.  Moreover, the amount of milk that women brought to the dairy to be sold dropped 
from 105 liters a day in 1985 to only 30 liters a day just two years later.  It is unknown how 
many of the women’s development programs included in this study have been successful, and 
how many have faced the same kind of failure as IDS’s women’s dairy project.  
Many feminist researchers in the field of development engage in heated debates over 
which types of development programs are most effective in raising women’s status.  Some GAD 
feminists critique WID policy-makers for not challenging patriarchal cultural norms in their 
development projects (Jaquette and Staudt 2006).  Other feminist scholars and policy-makers 
argue that GAD development strategies are difficult to implement, and that it is difficult to 
translate theories of GAD approach into actual development programs.  However, the findings of 
this dissertation reveal that neither women’s rights programs coming from a GAD perspective 
nor women’s market programs coming from a WID perspective have an impact on bringing 
about large-scale changes in increasing the female/male child sex ratio and the female/male 
literacy ratio.  These findings also show that the main issue seems to be about whether or not 
large-scale economic growth leads to an increase in women’s status (as proposed by 
modernization scholars) or a decline in women’s status (as proposed by WID scholars).  It is 
important to stress that these findings do not suggest that women’s development programs have 
little or no positive effect on the women at the village level or individual level, however.  
The findings of this dissertation have important policy implications.  The results of this 
dissertation show that economic growth, which is the goal of both modernization and neoliberal 
policy-makers, does not directly lead to an increase in female/male literacy ratios or girls’ 
survival rates vis-à-vis boys’ survival rates.  Also, while neoliberal policy makers and 
practitioners argue that nations should decrease the role of the state, especially in state 
381 
expenditures in areas such as health care and education, the Indian government may actually 
need to increase its role in ensuring that girls’ survival rates increase and do not decline even 
further. The Indian government started to follow neoliberal economic policies in the early 1990s, 
and began to assign more and more development programs over to the care of development 
NGOs (Marius-Gnanou 2003, Katar and Singh 2005).   However, the evidence from this 
dissertation shows that the programs of development NGOs do not bring about wide-scale 
change in girls’ survival rates or women’s literacy rates vis-à-vis boys and men, regardless of 
which development paradigm these development NGOs operate under. 
While this study sheds light on which types of development programs and policies do not 
help raise the status of women and girls in the areas of literacy and survival rates, it does not 
answer the question of what policies actually do raise the status of women and girls in these 
areas.  More research needs to be done, therefore, into the factors that lead to the continual 
decline of female/male child sex ratios so that Indian policy makers know how to begin to 
address this problem and so that donor agencies know what types of programs they should fund.  
It is encouraging to note that female/male literacy ratios have been improving from 1961-2001, 
despite the negative impact that economic growth may have on female/male literacy ratios.  It 
may be beneficial, therefore, to carry out further research on the factors that have caused this 
increase in female/male literacy ratios in order to shed light on whether certain policies that the 
Indian government has implemented have led to increases in literacy ratios. 
One area of research for further investigation regarding women and girls’ unequal access 
to education is the relationship between economic growth and state government educational 
policies to female/male literacy ratios and female/male educational completion ratios. This 
dissertation shows that an increase in economic growth is correlated with an increase in the 
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female/male literacy ratio in the same decade, but is correlated with a decrease in the 
female/male literacy ratio in later decades.  This is despite the fact that the average female/male 
literacy ratio across the states in this study increased about 13 percentage points between 1991 
and 2001.  The state of Madhya Pradesh experienced an average increase in the female/male 
literacy ratio of about 21 percentage points between 1991 and 2001, and Rajasthan experienced 
an average increase in the literacy ratio of about 18 percentage points during this period.  
Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh both implemented new educational programs in the late 1980s-
late 1990s, which could very well be the reason why the female/male literacy ratios have 
increased so much in these two states.  It is also possible that economic growth as measured by 
per capita SDP may lead to more immediate changes in the female/male literacy ratio rather than 
after a lag of ten years.  For instance, as states experience economic growth, they may increase 
their spending on education.  This, in turn, could lead to an increase in the female/male literacy 
ratio as the number of schools in villages that previously had no schools increases and girls are 
easily able to walk to school.  One possible strategy to disentangle the relationship between 
economic growth, government policies, and female/male literacy ratios (and female/male 
educational attainment levels) is to carry out a longitudinal study that includes district-level 
variables for percentage of villages in districts with primary schoolsxi, female/male literacy 
ratios, female/male elementary education completion ratios; and state-level variables for per 
capita SDP, educational expenditures, and the presence/absence of educational policies related to 
elementary education.  Such a study should include a random sample of districts across all states 
to ensure that districts in Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh that implemented these educational 
policies are not over-represented.  It is possible that once educational policies and percentage of 
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villages with primary schools are included, per capita SDP may no longer be correlated with 
female/male literacy ratios.   
Another beneficial and particularly interesting avenue for further research is to 
investigate the relationship between economic growth, variation in cultural norms, and the 
female/male child sex ratio.  The results of the current dissertation study show that an increase in 
per capita SDP leads to a decline in the overall female/male child sex ratio ten years later.  With 
every tenfold increase in per capita SDP, the child sex ratio decreases by about 8 females per 
1,000 males ten years later. The models for female/male child sex ratio also reveal that in 
general, there were about 5 more females per 1,000 males in southern regions compared to 
northern regions at each time period.  This seems to indicate that regional variation in cultural 
practices impact change in the child sex ratio. However, this does not tell us the mechanisms 
through which economic growth leads to a decrease in the female/male child sex ratio, or 
whether there may be some other factors that more directly impact the child sex ratio.   
As I have discussed in previous chapters, Indian parents often view sons as an economic 
asset and daughters as a liability.  This is because typically daughters move to their husband’s 
household when they are married and parents of daughters must pay a large dowry.  Unlike 
daughters, sons bring resources into their parents’ households when they marry, and traditionally 
they continue to care for their parents in their old age (Dyson and Moore 1983).   Therefore, 
parents place more importance in investing in the well-being of sons than of daughters.  Some 
researchers have argued that the increased availability of mass media, increased upward 
mobility, and an increased emphasis in Indian culture on consumerism have all led to changes in 
Indians’ aspirations (Basu 1999).  It is possible that the overall increase in economic growth has 
led to an increase in consumerism and the desire for material goods such as television sets, 
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refrigerators, motorcycles, etc. Starting as early as the 1950s, grooms’ families had begun to 
demand larger and larger dowries from brides’ families, so much so that it is often very difficult 
for brides’ families to afford the dowries demanded of them (Subramaniam 2006) .  It may be 
possible that this increased “dowry-burden” has led to a greater number of Indian parents to 
neglect or kill their daughters.   
Another possibility is that it is not per capita SDP per se that causes a decline in the 
female/male child sex ratio, but some other unmeasured variable such as increased access to 
medical facilities.  It is possible that an increase in number of medical facilities has led to an 
increase in parents’ opportunity to determine the sex of a fetus through ultrasound and then abort 
it if it is a female.  As discussed in chapter 4, by the 1980s ultrasound had become a widely-used 
and relatively inexpensive technique to determine the sex of a fetus by the mid-1980s (Claycraft 
1989, cited in Shepherd 2008).  Moreover, portable ultrasound equipment has made it possible 
for women in rural areas to undergo this test (Shepherd 2008).   
One study that I can draw upon that addresses many of these issues is the India Human 
Development Survey, 2004-2005 (Desai and Andrist 2010).  This nationally representative study 
includes surveys related to households, villages, medical facilities, and individual men and 
women.  There are questions related to the number of primary health centers and maternity 
centers at the village level.  One segment of the study consists of a representative sample of over 
27,000 women aged 25-49 across the country.  While the original unit of analysis is the 
individual woman, it is possible to aggregate the data at the district level as Desai and Andrist 
(2010) have already done.  This survey includes questions related to the types of gifts that are 
typically given as part of a dowry in respondents’ communities, the prevalence of village 
endogamy in their villages, as well as the prevalence of cousin-marriage in their villages.   This 
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first question relates to the economic burden that parents face in order to marry their daughters.  
These last two questions relate to kinship patterns that are more typical in the south than in the 
north.  The survey also asks questions about respondents’ practice of purdah, gender segregation 
within their households, and the respondents’ ability to go to various places alone.  The data 
from this study is free and can be downloaded from ICPSR.  Although this study does not 
include data on the female/male child sex ratio, the 2011 data on the sex-ratio, female/male 
literacy ratio, and other district-level variables should be available on the Census of India 
website soon.  The disadvantage of using the data from the India Human Development Survey is 
that it is the first wave of data, so it would be only possible to carry out a cross-sectional study.   
 
                                                 
NOTES TO CHAPTER NINE 
 
xi I had originally planned to include the variable for percentage of villages in a district with 
primary schools, but the Census of India did not measure the number of primary schools in 
districts in a consistent way until the 1981 census.  Since the period of my study begins in 1961, 
I needed to omit this variable from this study. 
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Appendix A 
CHANGES IN NAMES AND ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARIES                                     
OF STATES AND DISTRICTS 
States 1971 1981 1991 2001
Andhra Pradesh
Ongole district Guntur renamed No change No change
created from parts Prakasam
of Nellore, Guntur,
and Kurnool districts Srikakulam divided
into Srikakulam &
Vizianagaram
Hyderabad divided
into Hyderabad &
Rangareddi 
Rajasthan
Chitorgarh renamed No change Bharatpur divided Kota divided into
Chittaurgarh into Bharatpur & Kota & Baran
Dhaulpur
Jaipur divided into
Jaipur & Dausa
Sawai Madhopur
divided into  Karauli,
Sawai Madhopur, &
a lit t le bit  of Dausa
Udaipur divided into
Udaipur & Rajsamand
Ganganagar divided
into Ganganagar &
Hanumangarh  
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
States 1971 1981 1991 2001
Gujarat
Kaira renamed No change No change Kheda divided
Kheda into Kheda &
Anand
Broach renamed
Baruch Panch Mahals
divided into 
Surat divided Dohad &
into Surat and Panch Mahals
Valsad districts
Bharuch divided
Ahmedabad into Bharuch &
divided into Narmada
Ahmadabad &
Gandhinagar Surat & Valsad
divided into 
Baroda renamed Surat, Valsad, 
Vadodara & Navsari
Mahesana 
divided into 
Mahesana &
Patan
Junagadh divided
into Porbander
& Junagadh
Karnataka
No change Dharwar renamed Bangalore divided Bijapur divided 
Dharwad into Bangalore & into Bijapur &
Bangalore Rural Bagalkot
North Kanara 
renamed Coorg renamed Dharwad divided
Uttar Kannad Kodagu into Dharwad, 
Gadag, & Haveri
South Kanara Uttar Kannad
renamed renamed Raichur divided
Dakshin Kannad Uttara Kannada into Raichur &
Koppal
Dakshin Kannad
renamed Mysore divided
Dakshina Kannada into Mysore &
Chamarajanagar
Dakshina Kannada
divided into Udupi
& Dakshina Kannada
Chitradurga 
divided into 
Chitradurga &
Davanagere  
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
States 1971 1981 1991 2001
Madhya Pradesh
No change Sehore divided into No change Mandsaur divided into
Sehore & Bhopal Mandsaur & Neemuch
Durg divided into Morena divided into
Durg & Rajnandgaon Morena & Sheopur
Shahdol divided into
Shahdol & Umaria
Mandla divided into
Mandla & Dindori
West Nimar divided
into West Nimar &
Barwani
Jabalpur divided into
Jabalpur & Katmi
Hoshangabad divided
into Hoshangabad &
Harda
Chhattisgarh State  
formed from these 
districts: Surguja,
Raipur, Raigarh,
Bastar, Rajnandgaon,
Durg, & Bilaspur
Surguja divided into
Surguja & Koriya
Raipur divided into
Raipur, Dhamtari, &
Mahasamund
Raigarh divided into
Raigarh & Jashpur
Bastar divided into
Bastar, Kanker, &
Dantewada
Durg & Rajnandgaon
divided into Durg,
Rajnandgaon, &
Kawardha
Bilaspur divided into
Bilaspur, Korba, &
Janjgir-Champa  
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
States 1971 1981 1991 2001
Tamil Nadu
Chingleput renamed Coimbatore divided Madurai divided into Periyar renamed Erode
Chengalpattu into Coimbatore & Madurai &
Periyar Dindigul-Anna South Arcot renamed 
Salem district Cuddalore; 
divided into Salem Tiruchirappalli North Arcot divided Cuddalore divided into
and Dharmapuri divided into into N. Arcot/Ambedkar Cuddalore & Viluppuram
Tiruchirappalli & and T iruvannamalai-
Pudukkottai Sambuvarayar Tiruchirappalli &
Pudukkottai divided into
Tirunelveli divided into Tiruchirappalli, Karur,
T irunelveli Kattabomman Perambalur, Ariyalur, 
& Chidambaranar & Pudukkottai
Ramanathapuram divided Chengalpattu renamed
into Ramanathapuram, Kancheepuram;
Kamarajar, and Kancheepuram divided
Pasumpon into Kancheepuram &
Muthuramalinga Thevar Thiruvallur
Thanjavur divided into
Thanjavur, Thiruvarur,
& Nagapattinam
Madurai & Dindigul-Anna
divided into Madurai, 
Dindigul, & Theni
Salem & Dharmapuri 
divided into Salem,
Dharmapuri, & 
Namakkal
N. Arcot/Ambedkar
renamed Vellore
Tiruvannamalai-Sambuvarayar
renamed Tiruvannamalai
T irunelveli Kattabomman
renamed Tirunelveli
Chidambaranar renamed
Thoothukkudi
Madras renamed Chennai
Kamarajar renamed
Virudhunagar
Pasumpon Muthuramalinga 
Thevar renamed Sivaganga  
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